“Mann expressed concern that government forces had given excessive freedom to the LTTE-breakaway “Karuna group,” which was using this freedom destructively. Ambassador noted that reports from NGOs and international organizations in the Batticaloa area indicated that the Karuna cadres were roaming freely and out of control through the cities, intimidating the population and plundering NGO warehouses of whatever they could use for their bases.” the US Embassy Colombo informed Washington.

Gota and Karuna

The US Embassy wrote; “Gothabaya, smiling, said he had recently received a scolding from his brother, the President, on this matter. He told us that once the army gets control of Thoppigala (the area to which the LTTE retreated from Vakarai), it could assure full governmental control in Batticaloa. ‘Why go to the effort to clear an entire area just to hand it over to someone else?’ The plan, he said, was to hand over control of the towns soon to the police, including the Special Task Force, leaving the military to deal with the jungle fighting. In the long run, the GSL would need to recruit Tamil and Muslim policemen who would be subject to local control to improve relations with those communities. Previous attempts to recruit and train Tamil-speaking police had failed because they were premature, he thought.”

The Colombo Telegraph found the related leaked cable from the WikiLeaks database. The cable is classified as “Confidential” and recounts a meeting the US Embassy had with the Secretary to the Ministry of Difence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The cable was written on March 14, 2007 by the US Ambassador to Colombo Robert O. Blake.

The ambassador wrote; “Gothabaya said that he would not have a problem with the Karuna group emerging as a purely political force. In fact, he said ‘Karuna as a military force is a myth. It’s a plus for us that he’s no longer with the LTTE ) but all our operations are carried out by the Sri Lankan military. We do not need or want his help.'”

Placing a comment Blake wrote; “Gothabaya’s comments on the relations between the Karuna group and the government confirmed what the president had told us an hour before ) that the government will seek to draw the Karuna group into the political mainstream as a normal political party. Embassy, however, agrees with most observers that the near-term prospects for a return to normalcy in the East in a political landscape dominated by the Karuna group, with its terrorist origins, are remote. Gothabaya’s explanation of the government’s six-month military strategy pointedly did not include an all-out drive to invade the Tiger-held Vanni and finish off the LTTE once and for all, something that few analysts here feel the government forces could do. On the other hand, there are a number of indications that the Sri Lankan defense leadership is in fact bent on pursuing a decisive military victory.”

Read the cable below for further details;

Related posts to this cable;

WikiLeaks: Gota Agreed To Provide US A Copy Of Prabhakaran And Karuna Tape

WikiLeaks: Mahinda, The Right Leader To Make Progress On A Solution To Ethnic Problem – US

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000416

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND SCA/RA
MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017
TAGS: PTER PGOV MOPS PREL CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY OUTLINES SIX-MONTH
MILITARY STRATEGY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa told
visiting SCA PDAS Steven Mann that the government was certain
that the LTTE was not interested in a political solution to
Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, he said, the
government would try to reach out to the Tamil populations,
bypassing the LTTE leadership. The security forces were
finding it difficult to choke off LTTE resupply of arms and
ammunition, but would redouble its efforts. Security forces
would seek to consolidate their hold on the East by drviing
the LTTE out of its remaining base in Thoppigala, then
replace troops in the cities with police and Special Task
Force units. He said the Karuna group was not a partner of
the government in military operations, but that he saw no
problem with the Karuna faction transforming itself into a
mainstream political party. The government would try to push
the LTTE back in the Vavuniya sector in order to control LTTE
infiltration and secure the overland route to Mannar. Then
it would press the LTTE to retrun to the negotiating table.
End summary.

¶2. (C) PDAS Steven Mann, accompanied by Ambassador and Pol
Chief, met Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on March 8.
Gothabaya, noting that an overwhelming majority of Sinhalese
Buddhists had voted for Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, told us
that his brother’s popularity among the majority community
was still strong. However, Sri Lanka’s system of
proportional representation in Parliament meant that the
President’s party would never secure an absolute majority on
its own. This, he explained, had made it necessary to create
such a big cabinet to satisfy everyone. Mann responded that
the President’s considerable political skills and his strong
support made him the right leader to make progress on a
solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem. The U.S. hoped that
the new power-sharing proposals that emerge form the current
consultation process would be of a quality that hadn’t been
seen before.

¶3. (C) Gothabaya told us that the government was sure the
LTTE did not believe in a political solution. He said the
GSL has recently come into possession of a videotape of a
speech by Prabhakaran apparently recorded about two months
after the signing of the CFA in 2002. In the video, Karuna
was standing next to Prabhakaran and introduced him.
Prabhakaran asserted that the LTTE knew it would never reach
its goal of a Tamil Homeland (“Eelam”) through peaceful
means. He told Karuna’s cadres, who were about to return to
the East, that the CFA only signified a pause for the LTTE,
during which they could regroup, rearm, resupply, recruit and
retrain. Gothabaya agreed to provide the Embassy a copy of
the tape.

¶4. (C) Gothabaya thought the government could reach out to
the Tamil people, particularly their educated technocrats.
“People need to know that there is a normal life waiting for
them after the conflict,” he said. It was therefore
important for the government to intervene immediately and do
development work in the areas in the East that had recently
come under its control. The Tamils also needed genuine
representation, Gothabaya said. The people had no confidence
in the Tamil National Alliance, which was simply a
placeholder for the LTTE. On the other hand, Gothabaya
asserted that previous attempts by Sri Lankan government to
“introduce” alternative Tamil representatives in the North
and East had failed, and would not work in the future, either.

COLOMBO 00000416 002 OF 003

¶5. (C) Gothabaya said that over the next six months, the
military planned to consolidate its control over the East,
then stabilize the border region adjacent to the LTTE-held
Vanni. Vavuniya remained a problem, with much LTTE
infiltration, which was also causing problems in an
east-to-west arc toward Mannar. In order to secure
unfettered access to the population in government-held
Mannar, the army would seek to push the Tigers back a bit
more. The government would try to deny the LTTE resupply of
arms and ammunition, then put pressure on them to return to
the negotiating table.

¶6. (C) Gothabaya noted that cutting off arms LTTE shipments
to Sri Lanka might be easier than stemming financial flows.
The Tigers didn’t need t bring the money they raised abroad
to Sri Lanka he said, but used it abroad to purchase arms.
Wile the Navy and other security forces had found i
difficult enough to choke off LTTE resupply of mmunition, it
was worth the effort to try to do s. While Prabhakaran,
with his terrorist mentaliy, would likely never give in, his
younger cadre might eventually grasp that there is no
militar solution to the conflict, he thought.

¶7. (C) rime Minister Wickremenayake had visited a number of
Southeast Asian countries and concluded MoUs oncooperation
against LTTE arms smuggling with sevral governments,
including Indonesia and Thailan, Gothabaya noted. He added
that the LTTE arms hip sunk on February 28 had refitted and
replenished in an Indonesian harbor. However, Gothabaya
thought that the LTTE smuggling operations were not occurring
with the approval of those governments, but that certain
corrupt officials were abetting them.

¶8. (C) Mann expressed concern that government forces had
given excessive freedom to the LTTE-breakaway “Karuna group,”
which was using this freedom destructively. Ambassador noted
that reports from NGOs and international organizations in the
Batticaloa area indicated that the Karuna cadres were roaming
freely and out of control through the cities, intimidating
the population and plundering NGO warehouses of whatever they
could use for their bases.

¶9. (C) Gothabaya, smiling, said he had recently received a
scolding from his brother, the President, on this matter. He
told us that once the army gets control of Thoppigala (the
area to which the LTTE retreated from Vakarai), it could
assure full governmental control in Batticaloa. “Why go to
the effort to clear an entire area just to hand it over to
someone else?” The plan, he said, was to hand over control
of the towns soon to the police, including the Special Task
Force, leaving the military to deal with the jungle fighting.
In the long run, the GSL would need to recruit Tamil and
Muslim policemen who would be subject to local control to
improve relations with those communities. Previous attempts
to recruit and train Tamil-speaking police had failed because
they were premature, he thought.

¶10. (C) Gothabaya said that he would not have a problem with
the Karuna group emerging as a purely political force. In
fact, he said “Karuna as a military force is a myth. It’s a
plus for us that he’s no longer with the LTTE ) but all our
operations are carried out by the Sri Lankan military. We do
not need or want his help.”

¶11. (C) COMMENT: Gothabaya’s comments on the relations
between the Karuna group and the government confirmed what
the president had told us an hour before ) that the

COLOMBO 00000416 003 OF 003

government will seek to draw the Karuna group into the
political mainstream as a normal political party. Embassy,
however, agrees with most observers that the near-term
prospects for a return to normalcy in the East in a political
landscape dominated by the Karuna group, with its terrorist
origins, are remote. Gothabaya’s explanation of the
government’s six-month military strategy pointedly did not
include an all-out drive to invade the Tiger-held Vanni and
finish off the LTTE once and for all, something that few
analysts here feel the government forces could do. On the
other hand, there are a number of indications that the Sri
Lankan defense leadership is in fact bent on pursuing a
decisive military victory.

¶12. (U) PDAS Mann cleared this message.
BLAKE