By Asoka S. Seneviratne –

“It is not the critic who counts” ~ Winston Churchill

Was the 2025 Ditwa disaster preventable? The Unfinished World Bank Flood-Resilience Program 2016, No One Wants to Talk About.  When Cyclone Ditwah hit Sri Lanka in late November 2025, the Opposition’s immediate reaction was to blame the AKD government. “Failure of preparedness,” they shouted in Parliament. “Lack of mitigation,” they proclaimed on television. Social media echoed the same chorus — as if eight months of governance could undo or rebuild decades of structural vulnerability.

Yet behind the political noise lies a truth far more uncomfortable, and far more important for the public to understand.

Sri Lanka did, in fact, have a multi-hundred-million-dollar, internationally funded programme designed specifically to prevent the scale of devastation we saw during Cyclone Ditwa. It was launched following the major floods of 2016, financed by the World Bank, and structured to protect the Kelani, Mahaweli, Attanagalu Oya, and other critical river basins that repeatedly threaten our people.

This was the Climate Resilience Multi-Phase Programmatic Approach (CRes-MPA) — a bold, long-term national protection programme. But what happened to it? Why did the full benefits never reach the ground? And most crucially: Would Ditwa’s destruction have been significantly reduced if the 2016 programme had achieved full implementation?

The answer is yes — and that is exactly why the criticism directed at the AKD government is intellectually dishonest and politically manipulative. This article explains why.

A Hard Truth: The World Bank Saw This Coming In 2016

In May 2016, Sri Lanka experienced one of the worst combined flood-landslide disasters in recent memory. The World Bank’s assessment was blunt:

“Sri Lanka’s flood risk is systemic, recurring, and growing — requiring structured investment in river-basin management, forecasting, and protection infrastructure.”

As a response, the Bank proposed and designed a comprehensive, multi-billion-rupee programme: The Climate Resilience Improvement Project (CRIP) and the broader Climate Resilience Multi-Phase Programmatic Approach (CRes-MPA). Its core objectives were clear:

* Modernise forecasting and early warning

* Protect high-risk river basins (Kelani, Mahaweli, Attanagalu, Kalu)

* Build new embankments, diversion channels, reservoirs and river-training works

* Strengthen government disaster-response capacity

* Reduce flood exposure for Colombo and the Western Province

* Support nature-based solutions and watershed conservation

In 2019, the Bank approved USD 310 million for the first major phase of these works. This was not merely a study. Not merely a pilot. It was intended to physically upgrade Sri Lanka’s flood-resilience systems across multiple basins.

If it had continued at full pace from 2016 to 2025, the Kelani basin — the centre of Ditwa’s devastation — would have been significantly better protected. But it didn’t.

What Went Wrong? The Program Was Delayed, Restructured, and Partially Stalled

The Bank’s audits, restructuring papers, and implementation status reports reveal the reality:

Land acquisition delays

The river-protection embankments and diversion channels required extensive land acquisition. This stalled repeatedly.

Institutional and administrative weaknesses

Required project teams were not fully staffed. Oversight committees were delayed. Procurement processes dragged on for years.

Safeguard compliance issues

Environmental and social safeguards — essential in any World Bank project — were not met on schedule.

Restructuring of components

One of the most critical components — Resettlement & Safeguards Implementation — was removed in a major restructuring, meaning large-scale infrastructure lost momentum.

Political transitions wiped out continuity

From 2016 to 2025, Sri Lanka cycled through five governments.
Each transition slowed or reshaped the program.

Financial disbursement was extremely low

World Bank audits show that actual expenditure remained minimal for years, despite large sums allocated. In short, by 2025, only a fraction of the original physical flood-protection works had been completed. The devastating question writes itself:

How much of Ditwa’s flood impact could have been avoided if the 2016–2024 governments had ensured the World Bank programme progressed on schedule?

Most experts agree — the answer is: a significant portion.

So Why Is the AKD Government Being Blamed?

The AKD administration assumed office in 2024, inheriting:

* a stalled, partially implemented flood-protection programme

* incomplete forecasting upgrades

* unbuilt river embankments

* pending land acquisition

* outdated drainage infrastructure

* long-standing political neglect

To blame the AKD government for a cyclone whose risk foundations were laid a decade earlier is politically convenient, but factually absurd. Sri Lanka’s disaster-risk problem is not one of eight months. It is one of eight years of under-implementation.

The opposition’s criticism — loud, forceful, and emotionally crafted — deliberately ignores this reality because acknowledging it means accepting shared responsibility. Yet the truth remains:

Cyclone Ditwa did not expose eight months of AKD mismanagement. It exposed eight years of institutional delay and political indifference to the 2016 World Bank resilience program.

What the 2016 Program Was Supposed to Deliver — And Did Not

To understand how the missed protections worsened Ditwa’s impact, the public deserves to know what the CRes-MPA/CRIP programme was supposed to achieve by 2025.

Kelani River Basin Protection

* Construction of new embankments from Hanwella to Kaduwela

* River widening and deepening

* Flood storage reservoirs in upper catchments

* Early warning upgrades linked to hydrological modelling

Status by 2025: Partially designed; not built.

Mahaweli Basin Integrated Flood-Control Measures

* Watershed management

* Downstream flood-risk mapping

* Diversion engineering plans

Status by 2025: Studies completed; physical interventions delayed.

Attanagalu Oya Basin Protection for Gampaha Region

* Major flood-management infrastructure

* Improved drainage and river-training works

Status by 2025: Delayed due to land issues and political changes.

National Forecasting and Early Warning System Modernisation

* Real-time hydromet network

* Modern forecasting models

* Institutional strengthening of the Department of Meteorology

Status by 2025: Some upgrades done; far from full modernisation.

Urban Flood-Resilience Measures (Colombo Metropolitan Region)

* Integrated drainage reform

* Protection of wetlands

* Retention basins and pumping investments

Status by 2025: Limited progress; wetlands preserved but not expanded; major drainage reform pending.

All these were supposed to shield the public long before 2025. All were delayed across multiple governments.

And now, in 2025, the blame is being placed on the only administration that inherited the mess — not created it.

Could Ditwa’s Damage Have Been Mitigated If the 2016 Program Was Completed?

Let us be transparent and honest with the public: Yes.

A fully implemented 2016–2025 World Bank flood resilience program would have significantly reduced Ditwa’s impact.

* Flood heights in the Kelani basin would have been lower

* Several inundated communities would have been protected

* Thousands of displaced families might have remained safe in their homes

* Drainage failures across Gampaha & Colombo would have been significantly eased

* Early warnings would have been more accurate and timely

* Economic losses would have been far lower

The science is not ambiguous. The engineering is not theoretical. These are not political interpretations. These are the very results the World Bank designed, financed, and intended for Sri Lanka.

The AKD Government: Facing the Consequences, Not Creating Them

The AKD administration, confronted with Ditwa’s devastation, is now working with the World Bank, UN agencies, and technical experts to conduct:

* A Rapid Disaster Needs Assessment

* A recovery and reconstruction financing plan

* A renewed flood-resilience framework for 2026–2030

The fact remains:

AKD is cleaning up the consequences of a programme that should have protected Sri Lanka years ago.

This is not an ideological claim. Official audits support it, World Bank restructuring papers, and documented implementation gaps. Opposition parties want the public to believe Ditwa is AKD’s failure. The facts show otherwise.

Where We Must Go From Here

Sri Lanka cannot afford to repeat the cycle:

Disaster → Blame → Forget → Repeat

The country now needs:

* A revived, accelerated flood-protection master plan

* A non-politicized implementation structure

* Transparent land acquisition and resettlement processes

* Full modernization of forecasting and early warning

* Completion of the shelved components of the 2016 World Bank programme

* Cross-party agreement to ring-fence resilience funds from political interference

The AKD government’s task is not to defend itself against false political attacks.
Its task — and our national task — is to finish the work that should have protected us already.

Conclusion

Stop the Blame. Start the Solution.

Cyclone Ditwa was not the failure of eight months. It was the failure of a decade of delayed flood-resilience implementation. The 2016 World Bank programme was the roadmap that should have saved lives and protected homes long before 2025.It was not completed. And today, the AKD government is facing the consequences of that national failure — a failure shared by administrations across 2016 to 2024. Blaming the only government that inherited this structural weakness is not only unfair — it is dangerous, because it distracts the nation from the real lessons we urgently need.

Sri Lanka must look beyond politics and build resilience, not narratives.

Only then will disasters like Ditwa cease to be national tragedies — and instead become national turning points.

*The writer, among many served as the Special Advisor to the President of Namibia from 2006 to 2012 and was a Senior Consultant with the UNDP for 20 years. He was a Senior Economist with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1972-1993). He can be reached via asoka.seneviratne@gmail.com