By Jayampathy Wickramaratne –

Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne PC

In a country where the Constitution is supreme, all conduct that is inconsistent with it is invalid. This includes parliamentary legislation, which may be reviewed by the judiciary, potentially resulting in inconsistent provisions being declared invalid. Ideally, other actions of Parliament, such as the conduct of its proceedings and the adoption of resolutions, should also be subject to constitutionality review. Conversely, in countries where parliamentary sovereignty prevails, legislation or processes of Parliament are not open to review.

This article emphasises the importance of permitting judicial review of actions by Parliament and its officials, thereby ensuring the Constitution’s supremacy in practice. It must be emphasised that this also applies to the executive, judiciary, independent institutions, and the citizenry.

Sri Lankan Constitutions

In the Independence (Soulbury) Constitution of Ceylon, although there was no explicit provision conferring upon courts the power to declare legislation invalid, such power was implicitly acknowledged and exercised, as demonstrated in Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe and Liyanage v. The Queen.

Under the Republican Constitution of 1972, the National State Assembly (NSA) was the supreme instrument of state power and possessed unlimited legislative authority, including the power to amend and to replace the Constitution with a two-thirds majority. A Bill inconsistent with a constitutional provision can be passed with a two-thirds majority without amending that provision. All laws that existed when the Constitution came into effect remained valid, notwithstanding any inconsistency with fundamental rights. The Public Security Ordinance, a pre-independence law, was deemed to have been enacted under the Constitution, thereby validating its provisions in relation to the entire Constitution. Legislation can be challenged only at the Bill stage. Section 39 stipulated that the proceedings of the NSA, or anything done, purported to be done, or omitted to be done by the NSA, were immune from judicial review.

The 1978 Constitution declares in the Preamble that it is the Supreme Law of the country. However, several provisions of the Constitution undermine the very concept of its supremacy. Provisions from the 1972 Constitution relating to judicial review, existing laws, passing Bills inconsistent with the Constitution and the Public Security Ordinance remain in effect. The President’s unconstitutional acts could not have been challenged until the Nineteenth Amendment allowed fundamental rights applications to be filed.

The prohibition on post-enactment review means that if citizens have not been vigilant in challenging a Bill containing an unconstitutional provision, such a provision cannot be contested once the Bill becomes law. In a developing country like ours, it is irrational to expect citizens to be watchful and scrutinise all Bills published in the Gazette for potential unconstitutional provisions. Many unconstitutional provisions have escaped the attention of even the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the effects of a law are best observed once it is in operation; not all possible effects can be anticipated at the Bill stage. Additionally, citizens would benefit from the evolution of the law if post-enactment review is permitted.

Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act

The 1978 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to section 39 of the 1972 Constitution, stipulating that proceedings of Parliament are immune from judicial review. However, like the 1972 Constitution, Article 67 provides that until Parliament determines its privileges, immunities, and powers by law, the Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act, 1953, shall apply. Section 3 of the Act states: “There shall be freedom of speech, debate and proceeding in Parliament and such freedom of speech, debate or proceedings shall not be liable to be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament.” Several Speakers of Parliament have interpreted Section 3 to assert complete autonomy for parliamentary decisions and unfettered control over proceedings.

For example, Speakers Anura Bandaranaike and Chamal Rajapaksa took up the position that the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into allegations against a judge of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal was immune from judicial review. Speaker Bandaranaike quoted Erskine May, an acknowledged authority on parliamentary procedure in the United Kingdom: The whole of the law and custom of Parliament has its origin from one maxim, ‘that whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament ought to be examined, discussed and adjudged in that House to which it relates and not elsewhere.’

However, in Chandraguptha Thenuwara v. Chamal Rajapaksa, a five-member Bench of the Supreme Court held that such an appointment did not fall within the legislative powers of Parliament. Instead, it amounted to executive or administrative action, challengeable under the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Yet, the issue of the justiciability of other actions of the Speaker and Parliament remains. One must remember that Erskine May was discussing practices in Britain, where the concept of parliamentary sovereignty reigns. Additionally, in the absence of a specific constitutional provision permitting the judiciary to review the constitutionality of actions by the Speaker and Parliament, judicial decisions would be disregarded, as Speakers Bandaranaike and Rajapakse did.

Globally, there have been instances where Members of Parliament have infringed upon the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens under the pretence of exercising their freedom of speech and debate. Citizens have no recourse against such actions. Such instances are significantly fewer in countries with strong political traditions. While effective internal procedures are the best means to ensure that the rights of others are not violated, it is timely to consider alternative procedures and remedies in countries like ours where such violations continue unabated.      

Comparative provisions and judgments

It would be useful to examine constitutional provisions and landmark judgments of developing countries where the supremacy of the Constitution is recognised. I chose India, South Africa, Papua New Guinea and Malawi, all members of the Commonwealth.

Although the Indian Constitution does not explicitly declare so, its supremacy is evident throughout. Numerous decisions of the Indian Supreme Court support this position. Legislation is subject to post-enactment judicial review, and acts of the Executive can also be reviewed. Articles 122 and 212 provide that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament and a State legislature, respectively, shall not be called in question “on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.” In Raja Ram Pal v. Lok Sabha and Rojer Mathew vs South Indian Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that the immunity granted is limited to ‘irregularity of procedure’ and does not extend to substantive illegality or unconstitutionality.

The Forty-second Amendment, passed during Indira Gandhi’s notorious emergency rule, stipulated that no amendment to the Constitution could be challenged in any court on any grounds. This provision was struck down by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills v. Union of India, stating that “Parliament cannot, under Article 368, expand its amending power so as to acquire for itself the right to repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and essential features.”

Section 2 of the South African Constitution reads: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”

Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker of the National Assembly concerned a report by the Public Protector regarding allegations of improper conduct or irregular expenditure related to security upgrades at the private residence of President Jacob Zuma. She concluded that the President derived undue benefits and directed him to pay a portion that was reasonably proportionate to the undue benefit. However, based on a report by the Minister of Police, the National Assembly passed a resolution absolving the President of liability. An eleven-member Bench of the Constitutional Court unanimously held that the National Assembly resolution was inconsistent with the Constitution.

In Papua New Guinea, section 11 of the Constitution declares that the Constitution and the Organic Laws are the Supreme Law of Papua New Guinea, and all acts (whether legislative, executive, or judicial) that are inconsistent with them are, to the extent of the inconsistency, invalid and ineffective. Under section 18, the Supreme Court has an original and exclusive jurisdiction as to any question relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of the Constitution or an Organic Law.

Application by the Honourable James Nomane MP related to a decision made by the Private Business Committee of Parliament to disallow a motion of no confidence in the Prime Minister on the ground that it was brought within twelve months after a similar motion was defeated. Standing Order 165 permitted the Speaker to disallow any motion that is the same in substance as one brought within the previous twelve months. The constitutionality of the decision, as well as of Standing Order 165, was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court was satisfied that Standing Order 165, which constrains the exercise of the right of a member of Parliament to bring a motion of no confidence, was not reasonably justifiable and therefore unconstitutional. The decision of the Private Business Committee was consequently unconstitutional. The Speaker was directed to recall Parliament on a date appointed by the Court.

In Reference by Morobe Provincial Executive re Re-election of the Governor-General, the Supreme Court declared that the re-election of a Governor-General by Parliament was unconstitutional and ordered that Parliament be recalled as soon as practicable to remedy deficiencies in the nomination and election of the Governor-General.

Thus, acting under section 18 of the Constitution, the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court has declared a Standing Order unconstitutional, reviewed and struck down decisions of parliamentary committees, declared decisions of Parliament unconstitutional and directed the Speaker to convene Parliament. Parliament obeyed the rulings without demur.

Section 5 (Supremacy of this Constitution) of the Constitution of Malawi states: Any act of Government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be invalid. Section 108(2) states: “The High Court shall have original jurisdiction to review any law, and any action or decision of the Government, for conformity with this Constitution, save as otherwise provided by this Constitution and shall have such other jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this Constitution or any other law”.

In Tembo v. Attorney-General, the Malawi High Court held that it had no difficulty in concluding that ‘government’ as used in section 108 includes the three organs of government. When the Speaker or the National Assembly makes a decision within the House that involves interpreting the Constitution or a law, such a decision is subject to review by the judiciary to ensure it complies with the law and the Constitution. Both the Supreme Court and the High Court held similarly in Nseula v. Attorney-General, where a decision of the Speaker that the petitioner’s seat in Parliament had fallen vacant as he had allegedly crossed the floor was challenged.

Establishing constitutional supremacy

Sri Lankans are weary of both persons in authority and institutions running roughshod over the law. The Aragalaya’s demand for “system change” exemplified the popular sentiment, which was followed by an electoral mandate for a radical transformation. The promised Constitution must therefore be a transformative constitution that reflects the people’s wishes. Regarding actions of the legislature, this would mean a constitution under which all actions of Parliament, whether legislative or otherwise, are subject to review by the judiciary for constitutionality.