![\"Ashley](\"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/E.-Ashley-Wills.jpg\")
<\/a>Ashley Wills<\/p><\/div>\n
The Colombo Telegraph<\/span><\/a> found the related leaked cable from the WikiLeaks<\/span><\/a> database. The cable discusses Sri Lankan Navy’s strengths and weaknesses. The \u201cConfidential\u201d cable written on February 05, 2003 and signed by the US Ambassador to Colombo E. Ashley Wills.<\/p>\n The ambassador wrote; As our reporting also has stressed, however, the GLS wants to enter this delicate period with ‘a warm heart, but a cool head.’ the GSL’s foe is one of the world’s most ruthless and sophisticated terrorist organizations. As our public statements and other information have made clear, we continue to see ltte efforts at resupply and other activities that seem to indicate, at a minimum, a lack of total reliance on peace talks as a means to resolve the dispute that has torn apart Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n Under the sub heading “The Sri Lankan Navy Needs Help” the ambassador wrote; “It has repeatedly shown a willingness to close with the ltte’s ocean-going force, the sea tigers. The navy’s will to fight, however, has exceeded their ability to fight effectively. The sea tigers have inflicted serious casualties on the navy, including through the use of devastating suicide craft. Open press in Sri Lanka points to past attacks by LTTE suicide boats as the inspriration for the attack on the uss cole. Tiger maritime supply arguably remains one of, if not the most, serious challenges faced by the gsl in brining to a successful conclusion the recently launched peace process. An assessment by a team form the us pacific command headquarters in september and october of 2002 indicated that maritime interdiction of the ltte’s resupply capability was one of the most important factors needing to be addressed by the governemtn of Sri Lanka. The navy simply cannot do the job with its current fleet — and the tigers know it and simply do not take the navy very seriously. Beefing up the ability to interdict and deter tiger supplies would make a major contribution to the peace talks, showing the LTTE that talking is better than fighting, and, if the talks break down and conflict resumes, the navy could put a serious dent in terrorist supply efforts. To those ends, the country team strongly supports the provision of a 210′ eda cutter to the sl navy.”<\/p>\n “Providing the Sri Lanka navy with vessels of the medium endurance cutter class size supports embassy Colombo’s MPP. Regional security and counter-terrorism are two fundamental areas of the mission’s plan for Sri Lanka. By improving the navy’s ability to interdict LTTE supplies, the USG will help to bring this terrorist organization to heel.” the ambassador said.<\/p>\n Under the subheading “Human Rights” ambassador Wills wrote; “The Sri Lanka military has had an improving Human Rights record while the LTTE has a consistently poor record. Assisting the GSL to bring and keep the LTTE at the negotiation table and in the political process can only help improve the human rights record of both sides. The Sri Lanka navy’s sea-going units have a solid HR record with few verifiable incidents in the last three years.”<\/p>\n Placing a comments he said; “Provision of the cutter fully supports our 2003 MPP and the overall US objectives of combatting terrorism and illict traffic in drugs and humans. It further increases US influence with the SL military and rewards a frankly pro-US government that seeks increasingly close US-SL mil-to-mil relations.”<\/p>\n Read the cable below for further details;<\/p>\n C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000198<\/p>\n SIPDIS<\/p>\n STATE FOR SA AND PM; SECDEF FOR DSCA AND ISA; CINCPAC FOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 02\/05\/13 \u00b61. (U) Classified by DCM W. Lewis Amselem, Reasons 1.5 (b, \u00b62. (SBU) THE COUNTRY TEAM STRONGLY SUPPORTS PROVISION OF \u00b63. (SBU) AS EXTENSIVE EMBASSY REPORTING HAS DISCUSSED, \u00b64. (SBU) AS OUR REPORTING ALSO HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, \u00b65. (C) THE SRI LANKAN NAVY NEEDS HELP. IT HAS \u00b66. (U) BELOW, WE SEEK TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS THAT NEED \u00b6A. (C) COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS. THE SRI LANKA NAVY IS \u00b6B. (C) ABILITY TO USE EFFECTIVELY. THE COUNTRY TEAM \u00b6C. (C) ITEM LOCATION AND TRANSPORTATION. THE SRI LANKA \u00b6D. (C) ABILITY TO PAY. IN THE PAST WE HAVE \u00b6E. (C) ABILITY TO ABSORB INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE. THE \u00b6F. (C) MPP SUPPORT. PROVIDING THE SRI LANKA NAVY WITH \u00b6G. (SBU) HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SRI LANKA MILITARY HAS HAD \u00b68. (U) POINT OF CONTACT IS LT COL RICH GIRVEN, DEFENSE WILLS<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":22,"featured_media":81627,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,1,6969,2375,27],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-140241","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-colombotelegraph","category-news","category-popular-stories","category-stories","category-wikileaks"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nJ454 AND POLAD<\/p>\n
\nTAGS: PREL PARM MASS PGOV PTER PINS CE
\nSUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NEED FOR EDA CUTTER<\/p>\n
\nd)<\/p>\n
\nA 210′ EDA CUTTER TO THE SL NAVY.<\/p>\n
\nTHE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND SECURITY
\nENVIRONMENT IN SRI LANKA HAS UNDERGONE DRAMATIC CHANGES
\nSINCE THE 5 DECEMBER 2001 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WHICH
\nBROUGHT A NEW GOVERNMENT TO POWER. THE GSL AND TAMIL
\nTIGERS (LTTE) HAVE SIGNED A CEASEFIRE MEMORANDUM OF
\nUNDERSTANDING AS A PRELUDE TO TALKS (O\/A MAY 27) AIMED
\nAT ENDING NEARLY TWO DECADES OF BRUTAL CIVIL WAR.
\nFEELINGS OF OPTIMISM AND HOPE HAVE SWEPT OVER THIS
\nTROUBLED ISLAND. THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED, AND THE MANY
\nAND ONEROUS SECURITY PROCEDURES THAT AFFECTED EVERY DAY
\nLIFE HAVE DISSIPATED: LONG CLOSED ROADS HAVE REOPENED;
\nPOLICE AND MILITARY CHECKPOINTS HAVE SHUT DOWN; AND
\nDRACONIAN RESTRICTIONS ON FISHING AND OTHER MARITIME
\nACTIVITIES HAVE BEGUN TO DISAPPEAR.<\/p>\n
\nTHE GSL WANTS TO ENTER THIS DELICATE PERIOD WITH ‘A WARM
\nHEART, BUT A COOL HEAD.’ THE GSL’S FOE IS ONE OF THE
\nWORLD’S MOST RUTHLESS AND SOPHISTICATED TERRORIST
\nORGANIZATIONS. AS OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND OTHER
\nINFORMATION HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE CONTINUE TO SEE LTTE
\nEFFORTS AT RESUPPLY AND OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT SEEM TO
\nINDICATE, AT A MINIMUM, A LACK OF TOTAL RELIANCE ON
\nPEACE TALKS AS A MEANS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE THAT HAS
\nTORN APART SRI LANKA.<\/p>\n
\nREPEATEDLY SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO CLOSE WITH THE LTTE’S
\nOCEAN-GOING FORCE, THE SEA TIGERS. THE NAVY’S WILL TO
\nFIGHT, HOWEVER, HAS EXCEEDED THEIR ABILITY TO FIGHT
\nEFFECTIVELY. THE SEA TIGERS HAVE INFLICTED SERIOUS
\nCASUALTIES ON THE NAVY, INCLUDING THROUGH THE USE OF
\nDEVASTATING SUICIDE CRAFT. OPEN PRESS IN SRI
\nLANKA POINTS TO PAST ATTACKS BY LTTE SUICIDE
\nBOATS AS THE INSPRIRATION FOR THE ATTACK ON THE
\nUSS COLE. TIGER MARITIME SUPPLY ARGUABLY
\nREMAINS ONE OF, IF NOT THE MOST, SERIOUS
\nCHALLENGES FACED BY THE GSL IN BRINING TO A
\nSUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THE RECENTLY LAUNCHED
\nPEACE PROCESS. AN ASSESSMENT BY A TEAM FORM
\nTHE US PACIFIC COMMAND HEADQUARTERS IN
\nSEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER OF 2002 INDICATED THAT
\nMARITIME INTERDICTION OF THE LTTE’S RESUPPLY
\nCAPABILITY WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
\nFACTORS NEEDING TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE
\nGOVERNEMTN OF SRI LANKA. THE
\nNAVY SIMPLY CANNOT DO THE JOB WITH ITS CURRENT FLEET —
\nAND THE TIGERS KNOW IT AND SIMPLY DO NOT TAKE THE NAVY
\nVERY SERIOUSLY. BEEFING UP THE ABILITY TO INTERDICT AND
\nDETER TIGER SUPPLIES WOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO
\nTHE PEACE TALKS, SHOWING THE LTTE THAT TALKING IS BETTER
\nTHAN FIGHTING, AND, IF THE TALKS BREAK DOWN AND CONFLICT
\nRESUMES, THE NAVY COULD PUT A SERIOUS DENT IN TERRORIST
\nSUPPLY EFFORTS. TO THOSE ENDS, THE COUNTRY TEAM
\nSTRONGLY SUPPORTS THE PROVISION OF A 210′ EDA CUTTER TO
\nTHE SL NAVY.<\/p>\n
\nANSWERING PRIOR TO THE PROCESSING OF A LETTER OF OFFER
\nAND ACCEPTANCE (LOA).<\/p>\n
\nSHIFTING FROM A STRATEGY OF CLOSE-IN (4 TO 12 NAUTICAL
\nMILES) TO LITTORAL WATERS (25 – 27NM) DEFENSE AGAINST
\nLTTE SMUGGLING EFFORTS BECAUSE OF THE RELAXATION OF
\nMARITIME RESTRICTIONS MENTIONED ABOVE. THIS CHANGE IN
\nNATIONAL STRATEGY AND NAVAL DOCTRINE IS NOT WELL
\nSUPPORTED BY THE CURRENT FLEET. THE ADDITION OF SEVERAL
\nVESSELS OF MEDIUM ENDURANCE FOR LONGER AND DEEPER
\nPATROLLING, SUCH AS THE 210′ FORMER-USCG CUTTERS, WOULD
\nCONTRIBUTE IMMENSELY TO THE SRI LANKA NAVY’S ABILITY TO
\nPERFORM THIS VITAL NATIONAL FUNCTION. THIS NATION’S
\nNAVY ONLY HAS FOUR, OLDER VESSELS OF MIXED NATIONAL
\nORIGIN TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION. FAILURE TO ASSIST
\nSRI LANKA’S NAVY IN THE PROCUREMENT OF SUITABLE VESSELS
\nIN SUFFICIENT QUALITIES COULD RESULT IN THE LTTE’S SEA
\nTIGER WING GAINING THE UPPER HAND IN THE ‘LOGISTICS
\nWAR.’ CONTINUED SUCCESS BY THE LTTE AT SEA
\nWOULD ALSO SET AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER GROUPS TO
\nCOPY-CAT IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE US.
\nAFTER AN END TO LOCAL HOSTILITIES, THE SRI
\nLANKA NAVY COULD USE THE VESSEL FOR MARITIME
\nPATROLLING IN THE COUNTER-DRUGS ROLE, COMBAT
\nHUMAN TRAFFICKING, COUNTER PIRACY AND CONDUCT
\nSEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE NOW
\nLARGELY
\nUNPATROLLED SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN.<\/p>\n
\nBELIEVES THE SRI LANKA NAVY HAS THE ABILITY TO USE A
\nMEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTER IN THE WAR AGAINST THE LTTE, A
\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE-DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST
\nORGANIZATION, AND THAT THIS IS IN THE USG INTEREST. THE
\nNATION’S MARITIME SERVICE HAS OVER 50 YEARS EXPERIENCE
\nIN LITTORAL OPERATIONS COUNTERING SMUGGLERS AND
\nTERRORISTS. THE NAVY ALREADY OPERATES A SIMILARLY
\nSIZED, OFFSHORE PATROL VESSEL (OPV) OF INDIAN-ORIGIN.
\nSRI LANKAN NAVAL OFFICERS ATTEND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
\nEDUCATION COURSES IN THE UNITED STATES RANGING FROM THE
\nVERY PRACTICAL CIC OFFICERS COURSE TO THE MORE
\nTHEORETICAL SENIOR COMMAND COURSE. FINALLY, THE
\nGOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA PLANS TO BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN
\nGLOBAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WHERE MARITIME RESOURCES,
\nSUCH AS US-PROVIDED MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS, COULD
\nPROVIDE VALUABLE SYNERGIES WITH THE UNITED STATES NAVY
\nAND COAST GUARD AS WELL AS OTHER ALLIED FLEETS.<\/p>\n
\nNAVY INITIALLY PLANS TO BASE ANY MAJOR US ACQUISITION AT
\nTHE PORT OF COLOMBO WITH DUTY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN
\nAND THE PALK STRAITS. THIS IS FOR TWO MAJOR REASONS.
\nFIRST, THE PORT OF COLOMBO HAS THE NATION’S MAJOR HARBOR
\nWITH ASSOCIATED SUPPORT FACILITIES, SECOND, TO
\nPROTECT THE VESSEL FROM POSSIBLE SEA TIGER
\nATTACK. THE VESSEL WOULD THEN PATROL THE
\nWATERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN BASIN FROM AMBANTOTA
\nIN THE SOUTH TO THE JAFFNA PENINSULA IN THE
\nNORTH. A VESSEL AS LARGE AS A 210′ MEDIUM
\nENDURANCE CUTTER COULD BE SAILED FROM ITS
\nREFURBISHMENT SITE IN THE US TO SRI LANKA AFTER
\nA PERIOD OF CREW TRAINING. THE SRI LANKA NAVY
\nHAS EXPERIENCE IN MOVING SHIPS FROM THE UNITED
\nKINGDOM TO THE ISLAND NATION.<\/p>\n
\nREPORTED THAT SRI LANKA, AND ITS NAVY, HAS
\nBEEN CASH STRAPPED BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY
\nCONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE GSL AS IT STRUGGLES
\nTO MEET INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND TARGETS.
\nTHE SRI LANKA DEFENSE BUDGET, NEVERTHELESS, IS
\nOVER UNITED STATES DOLLARS (USD) 500 MILLION
\nWITH ALMOST USD 100 MILLION OF THAT FOR
\nDEFENSE PROCUREMENT, AND THE PRIME MINISTER
\nHAS RECENTLY DIRECTED THE SERVICE CHIEFS TO
\nLOOK SPECIFICALLY AT US EQUIPMENT. WHILE THE
\nSRI LANKA NAVY’S INITIAL PROCUREMENT BUDGET
\nFOR FY2002 WAS APPROXIMATELY USD 30 MILLION, A
\nSUPPLEMENTAL COULD BE GIVEN AT THE DIRECTION
\nOF THE GOVERNMENT. THE PURCHASE OF A MEDIUM
\nENDURANCE CUTTER COULD BE SPREAD OVER TWO
\nFISCAL YEARS.<\/p>\n
\nSRI LANKA NAVY IS PLANNING TO CHANGE ITS FORCE STRUCTURE
\nOVER THE NEXT DECADE FROM A PURELY CLOSE-IN FORCE
\nRELIANT UPON FAST ATTACK CRAFT AND PATROL CRAFT TO A
\nLITTORAL FORCE BASED ON OPVS AND POSSIBLY CORVETTES\/CUTTERS.
\nTHE FLEET’S FOCUS WILL SHIFT AS WELL FROM CONCENTRATING
\nEXCLUSIVELY ON SMALLER SMUGGLERS’ CRAFT TO ‘MOTHER SHIPS.’
\nWHILE THERE WILL CERTAINLY BE SOME ‘TEETHING PAINS’ WITH THE
\nACQUISITION OF MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS BY THE SRI LANKA
\nNAVY, THE SYSTEM(S) SHOULD EVENTUALLY ENTER SERVICE. THE
\nPURCHASE OF AN INDIAN OPV WENT EXTREMELY SMOOTHLY FROM AN
\nOPERATIONAL POINT OF VIEW. FINALLY, THE MAINTENANCE COST
\nESTIMATES PROVIDED BY THE USCG ARE BASED MAINLY ON THREE
\nITEMS, LABOR (MUCH CHEAPER IS SRI LANKA THAN IN THE US),
\nFUEL (CURRENTLY AT A SIMILAR PRICE AS PAID BY THE USCG) AND
\nSPARES (THE ONLY FIXED PRICE THAT CANNOT BE ADJUSTED BY THE
\nGSL). WITH THESE COSTS IN MIND, COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES THAT
\nSRI LANKA CAN AFFORD TO MAINTAIN THE VESSEL.<\/p>\n
\nVESSELS OF THE MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTER CLASS SIZE
\nSUPPORTS AMEMBASSY COLOMBO’S MPP. REGIONAL SECURITY AND
\nCOUNTER-TERRORISM ARE TWO FUNDAMENTAL AREAS OF THE
\nMISSION’S PLAN FOR SRI LANKA. BY IMPROVING THE NAVY’S
\nABILITY TO INTERDICT LTTE SUPPLIES, THE USG WILL HELP TO
\nBRING THIS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION TO HEEL.<\/p>\n
\nAN IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WHILE THE LTTE HAS A
\nCONSISTENTLY POOR RECORD. ASSISTING THE GSL TO BRING
\nAND KEEP THE LTTE AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE AND IN THE
\nPOLITICAL PROCESS CAN ONLY HELP IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS
\nRECORD OF BOTH SIDES. THE SRI LANKA NAVY’S SEA-GOING
\nUNITS HAVE A SOLID HR RECORD WITH FEW VERIFIABLE
\nINCIDENTS IN THE LAST THREE YEARS.
\n\u00b67. (C) FINAL COMMENTS: PROVISION OF THE CUTTER FULLY
\nSUPPORTS OUR 2003 MPP AND THE OVERALL US OBJECTIVES OF
\nCOMBATTING TERRORISM AND ILLICT TRAFFIC IN DRUGS AND
\nHUMANS. IT FURTHER INCREASES US INFLUENCE WITH THE SL
\nMILITARY AND REWARDS A FRANKLY PRO-US GOVERNMENT THAT
\nSEEKS INCREASINGLY CLOSE US-SL MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONS.<\/p>\n
\nAND ARMY ATTACHE, CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE
\nCOOPERATION. TELEPHONE AT: 94 (COUNTRY CODE) – 1 (CITY
\nCODE) – 448007, EXT.: 2442\/2; OR, EMAIL AT:
\nDIGIRRS@NOTES.DAWN.DIA.SMIL.MIL (CLASSIFIED) OR
\nDATT@ITMIN.COM (UNCLASSIFIED).<\/p>\n