{"id":149164,"date":"2015-08-16T20:08:27","date_gmt":"2015-08-16T14:38:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/?p=149164"},"modified":"2015-08-22T16:30:36","modified_gmt":"2015-08-22T11:00:36","slug":"sri-lankas-ethnic-question-the-jvp-a-pre-election-clarification","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/sri-lankas-ethnic-question-the-jvp-a-pre-election-clarification\/","title":{"rendered":"Sri Lanka\u2019s Ethnic Question & The JVP: A Pre-Election Clarification"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Chaminda Weerawardhana<\/span><\/a> –<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Dr.<\/a>

Dr. Chaminda Weerawardhana<\/p><\/div>\n

As the Sri Lankan general election approaches, there is an effort among pro-UNP media<\/span><\/a> to raise an intriguing argument. This argument goes as follows: Voting the JVP is thoroughly unadvisable, because JVP MPs will side with Mahinda Rajapaksa<\/span><\/a>, when the UNP-led government moves towards \u2018reforms\u2019, especially with regards to the ethnic question. Articles of this nature<\/span><\/a>, published in outlets such as Lanka E News, first appear in Sinhala, and then in English. In the Sinhala articles, the term \u2018balaya bedeema<\/em>\u2019 is used, when referring to the steps that a UNP-led government will supposedly take, in addressing Sri Lanka\u2019s ethnic question. Civil society activists in Colombo\u2019s English-speaking, West-oriented non-governmental lobby, who rely on funding from Western sources for their projects, have long advocated the term \u2018balaya bedeema<\/em>\u2019 in their Sinhala language documents, media engagements and public events. This was also the preferred wording of Chandrika Bandaranaike<\/span><\/a>, who held the executive presidency from 1994 to 2005, and engaged in repeated efforts to bring about political reforms to the ethnic question. Back in 1993-1994 and during her first few years in office, the term \u2018balaya bedeema<\/em>\u2019 was regularly used when referring to a set of political reforms that would help address the political grievances of the Tamil community. When programmes for awareness raising and mass mobilisation, such as sudu nelum<\/em> and thavalama<\/em> were launched, the Sinhala documentation explaining the rationale for such initiatives also included the term \u2018balaya bedeema<\/em>\u2019.<\/p>\n

\"JVP\"<\/a>In what follows, this writer argues that the above-mentioned anti-JVP position of pro-UNP media is all but a hollow and desperate bid to woo swing voters. By castigating the JVP as prone to take the side of Mahinda Rajapaksa and Sinhala nationalists in the face of \u2018progressive\u2019 balaya bedeema<\/em> reforms, the pro-UNP media demonstrates that they either a) have no clue of the political evolution of the JVP and the party\u2019s present-day situation, or b) they are fully aware of the JVP\u2019s rising popularity and present-day position on the ethnic question, and are therefore desperate to engage in last-minute fear-mongering. In order to get to the bottom of this argument, it is necessary to take a minor detour, recapitulating the regional and international implications of the issue of political reform.<\/p>\n

Political Reform: international ramifications?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Six months into the presidential election of January 2015, it is clear that external powers, especially the India-USA-EU consensus, played a role in the political developments that facilitated the political changes of early 2015. Such developments involved Ranil Wickremesinghe<\/span><\/a>, the leader of a political party since 1994, with a strong track record of being \u2018unmarketable\u2019 at elections, taking a back seat. Through the mediation of Chandrika Bandaranaike \u2013 who, just like Wickremesinghe, is a trusted \u2018friend\u2019 of the West \u2013 a much more locally marketable \u2018man of the people\u2019, Maitripala Sirisena<\/span><\/a>, was chosen to contest for presidency on behalf of a common front, headed behind the scenes by the Wickremesinghe-Bandaranaike duo.<\/p>\n

One of the key reasons that led Delhi to endorse a process of regime change in Sri Lanka was the Mahinda Rajapaksa government\u2019s reluctance to fulfil a pre-May 2009 promise to Delhi- that of implementing political reforms that would address the fundamental demands of the Tamil polity (read the Tamil leadership represented by the Tamil National Alliance), which Delhi could eventually market in Tamil Nadu to appease the province\u2019s Tamil nationalist sentiments, and to enhance Delhi\u2019s profile in Tamil Nadu as devoted to the cause of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The failure of this plan was at the heart of strained relations between Delhi and Colombo. Some media reports referred to an angry President Rajapaksa returning from Delhi after attending Narendra Modi\u2019s swearing in ceremony, the reason for presidential anguish being Modi\u2019s reiteration of Delhi\u2019s demand for political reforms in Sri Lanka. Irrespective of the truism of this claim, it is clear that Delhi was, and continues to be, deeply interested in witnessing some form of \u2018political reform\u2019 taking place in Sri Lanka vis-\u00e0-vis the ethnic question. It goes without saying that Delhi\u2019s position influences perspectives on Sri Lanka in Brussels and Washington D.C.<\/p>\n

The report on Norwegian engagement in the Vth Peace Process, produced by the Christian Michelsen Institute in Norway, reveals, Ranil Wickremesinghe\u2019s zest to implement market reforms raised concern even among Western diplomats. Under a Ranil Wickremesinghe-led government after #gesl2015, there is a likelihood that Colombo would be receptive to the Delhi-led call for political reform, and get itself involved with a balaya bedeema discourse with the TNA.<\/p>\n

A convoluted topic: parameters and public perceptions of political reform in Sri Lanka<\/strong><\/p>\n

In implementing political reforms with regards to the ethnic question, one can notice similitudes in the challenges that successive governments have faced. During the heyday of the LTTE, attempts at negotiation, mediation, external facilitation, confidence-building measures, and discussions on extensive devolution and quasi-federal reform were all perceived with scepticism in the Sinhala nationalist lobbies. The reason for that scepticism, from the Chandrika Bandaranaike proposals for a draft constitution to the Wickremesinghe-led, Oslo-facilitated Vth peace process and the aborted P-TOMs initiative, were the same; they were all deemed as measures that would \u2018divide\u2019 the \u2018country\u2019. The Sinhalese appellation \u2018rata bedana salasum<\/em>\u2019 was tagged onto all the aforementioned reform initiatives. Political opportunism put aside, a substantial segment of the polity and Sinhalese society perceive extensive devolution and quasi-federal reforms as inimical to the interests of the Sri Lankan state. If a government, on the basis of a parliamentary majority, international support or the strength of an influential leader, seeks to \u2018force in\u2019 such reforms in the absence of public support, that government and its leader are prone to face a political crisis and a challenge to its power base, paving the path for wider protest and unrest.<\/p>\n

Managing the Reform Challenge?<\/strong><\/p>\n

When considering political reforms, any future government needs to take past precedents strongly into account. Secondly, and most importantly perhaps, it is essential to take stock of public attitudes to political reform. A crucial question pertains to the domestic and international actors who are demanding political reforms. At home, the TNA is very keen to obtain a set of reforms from Colombo, which it can then market to its northern electorate, and reinforce its power base for posterity. Delhi\u2019s keenness on political reforms was evoked earlier in this article.<\/p>\n

At this point, it is of importance to highlight a crucial factor. It is not this writer\u2019s objective to adopt a Sinhala nationalist stance and maintain that political reforms are unwarranted. This has been, for instance the position of the Jathika Hela Urumaya<\/a><\/em><\/span>. This writer strongly believes that political reform, inspired by a context-specific amalgamation of elements from consociational power-sharing models and integrationist perspectives of political reform, would be extremely suitable and useful in enhancing the existing structures of governance (i.e. the Northern Provincial Council, municipalities and pradeshiya sabas<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Yet, this understanding of the suitability and worth of political reform does not blind this writer to a vital reality \u2013 that of the practical feasibility of implementing political reform in a context of asymmetric power, between an ethno-national majority and numerical minorities. On top of that, the Sri Lankan polity is marked by repetitive instances when political reform projects failed due to varying forms of majoritarian opposition, from the BC Pact of 1957 to the P-TOMS proposals of 2005.<\/p>\n

Given this reality, if a programme of political reform is to be successfully negotiated, agreed upon, ratified in parliament and implemented in full, there is an earlier preliminary step to be dealt with \u2013 that of developing broad-ranging consensus on the necessity and usefulness of such reforms in managing minority rights and ethnic relations. The collective failure of all past leaders who attempted political reform lay in an inadequate appraisal of this preliminary necessity. Taking past precedents and the present-day political configuration into account, it can be noted with certitude that Sri Lanka has not yet entered the phase of implementing devolution or federalism-based political reform. If this reality is ignored and reforms are to be introduced directly, it amounts to putting the cart before the horse and abject pointlessness.<\/p>\n

The real<\/em> issues at hand?<\/strong><\/p>\n

How, then can a future government seek to reconcile this situation, and adopt a workable approach?<\/p>\n

As a first step, a future government should imperatively recognise the fact that the Tamil people of northern Sri Lanka are concerned with priorities that go beyond political reforms, which neither the TNA nor any other Tamil political parties are keen to prioritise. An incomplete list of issues, which the next government imperatively ought to consider as absolute priorities, include the following:<\/p>\n