{"id":158847,"date":"2016-03-08T13:02:49","date_gmt":"2016-03-08T07:32:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/?p=158847"},"modified":"2016-03-12T07:54:09","modified_gmt":"2016-03-12T02:24:09","slug":"gotabaya-rajapaksa-clarifies-the-international-efforts-to-rescue-the-tiger-leaders-in-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/gotabaya-rajapaksa-clarifies-the-international-efforts-to-rescue-the-tiger-leaders-in-2009\/","title":{"rendered":"Gotabaya Rajapaksa Clarifies; The International Efforts To Rescue The Tiger Leaders In 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"

By\u00a0Michael Roberts<\/span><\/a> –<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Dr.<\/a>

Dr. Michael Roberts<\/p><\/div>\n

I am deeply entangled in drafting an article entitled Saving Talaivar Prabhakaran<\/em>, an effort that has involved several revisions and is now subject to further embellishments in the light of Mark Salter<\/span><\/a>\u2019s presentation of the Norwegian spin on events in the last stages of Eelam War IV.[1]<\/a> A chance inquiry from a friend put me in touch with the former Defence Minister, Gotabaya Rajapaksa<\/span><\/a> on Skype telephone on Monday 7th<\/sup> March (yesterday).<\/p>\n

I was in pursuit of a specific piece of information relating to the Norwegian-cum-American exploration of pathways that could extricate the Tiger leaders from Sri Lanka,[2]<\/a> while saving the Tamil civilians in danger. Salter tells us that in late February the Co-Chairs in Colombo mulled over the possibility of mounting \u201ca sea-directed rescue mission\u201d and \u201ca high-level team from the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters in Hawaii\u201d visited [Sri Lanka] to evaluate the logistics of such an exercise\u201d (Salter 2015: 354). I wanted the date of this visit and other relevant details.\"Gota\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Gotabaya Rajapaksa was not aware of such an enterprise and responded to me by indicating that these military men could have been inserted into the island through Sri Lankan embassy channels.[3]<\/a> However, he went on to highlight a key moment in the American efforts to extricate the LTTE command and halt the ongoing conflict. This was when Ambassador Robert Blake<\/span><\/a> with whom he was on friendly first name terms as \u201cBob\u201d called at his office [presumably in the Defence Ministry] one evening at 5.00 pm.<\/p>\n

Blake had indicated that there were plans afoot to rescue the Tamil civilians trapped in the coastal NFZ by sending a ship. The conversation had then taken the following trajectory.<\/p>\n

GR had been highly sceptical about the Tiger leaders agreeing to this idea and asked: how can one prevent Tiger personnel mingling with the civilians and escaping?<\/p>\n

RB: Your people can be on the ship to monitor the process.<\/p>\n

GR: What about India? Will the Indians agree?<\/p>\n

RB: We will speak to the Indians.<\/p>\n

GR had then alluded to Rajiv Gandhi\u2019s attempt to force the LTTE hand and the outcome that emanated from this process as a foundation for an assertion to Blake that \u201cthe LTTE would never agree to such a proposal.\u201d<\/p>\n

RB: \u201cWe are Americans. We will teach them a lesson and even bomb them if need be.\u201d<\/p>\n

Gotabaya Rajapaksa, alas, could not recall on what day this exchange occurred, though he could remember the time and place. This is not surprising \u2013 for I find this specific form of memory lapse to be of increasing frequency as I age. In any event, we should be able to work out the date \u2013 in April 2009 I believe \u2013 when this important exchange occurred.\"22=WAR<\/a><\/p>\n

Rajapaksa indicated that he discovered that Blake had immediately proceeded to meet the Indian ambassador in Sri Lanka, Alok Prasad<\/span><\/a>, that very evening. While he did not know what transpired there, it so happened that Prasad had a breakfast meeting with President Mahinda Rajapaksa<\/span><\/a> the next morning. President Rajapaksa, taken by surprise by the tale of international plans of intervention, had phoned his Foreign Minister Bogollagama<\/span><\/a> who had then phoned Blake.<\/p>\n

When precisely did this conversation take place? Guided by the US embassy despatches released by Wikileaks, there are two possibilities in my mind: 10th<\/sup> April or 15th<\/sup> April.<\/p>\n

One despatch[4]<\/a> indicates that Blake met Bogollagama on the morning of 11th<\/sup> April to \u201cdiscuss U.S. concerns about shelling of the civilian safe zone, and the ideas of a humanitarian pause and of a UN Special Envoy.\u201d Blake had \u201cpointed out that it was common knowledge the Tamil Tigers won’t let the civilians go. A better alternative, he said, would be for the GSL to allow a UN envoy to go in to the safe zone during the pause to talk directly to LTTE supremo Prabhakaran<\/span><\/a> about terms for letting the civilians go and surrender of those LTTE cadres still in the safe zone\u201d (Blake\u2019s report to Washington).<\/p>\n

After continuing to detail the further cajole and pressure that seems to be integral to big-power diplomacy, the dispatch notes that Blake told the Foreign Minister that \u201clarge civilian casualties would also have serious longer-term consequences for the GSL [so he had] sought Bogollagama’s personal intervention in raising these issues in the National Security Council meeting [scheduled for that evening].\u201d The National Security Council announced a unilateral two-day ceasefire on the 12th<\/sup>\/13th<\/sup> April to honour the local New Year ritual period, but did not abide by the US demand for a longer term.<\/p>\n

It is therefore possible that Robert Blake\u2019s meeting with Gotabaya Rajapaksa occurred on the 10th<\/sup> April<\/strong>. But Blake also reported on a meeting with Gotabaya Rajapaksa himself on the 15th<\/sup> April<\/strong> where<\/p>\n