{"id":160243,"date":"2016-04-05T09:39:55","date_gmt":"2016-04-05T04:09:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/?p=160243"},"modified":"2016-04-11T00:41:21","modified_gmt":"2016-04-10T19:11:21","slug":"attempts-to-rescue-pirapaharan-et-al-in-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/attempts-to-rescue-pirapaharan-et-al-in-2009\/","title":{"rendered":"Attempts To Rescue Pirap\u0101haran Et Al In 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"

By\u00a0Michael Roberts<\/span><\/a> –<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Dr.<\/a>

Dr. Michael Roberts<\/p><\/div>\n

ONE: Saving Private Ryan<\/strong>[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

Stephen Spielberg\u2019s blockbuster film<\/a><\/span> \u201cSaving Private Ryan\u201d was a fictional war film that was as dramatic as effective because of its realistic portrayal of the horrors of war<\/a><\/span>, notably the D-Day landings. The realism was rendered feasible by the availability of solid accounts of the D-Day invasion that included film footage. In contrast any review of the efforts made to save the LTTE leader, or talaivar<\/em>, Velupillai Pirap\u0101haran (also presented as Prabh\u0101karan) has to negotiate the murky world of international politics and its whispers.<\/p>\n

TWO: Declining LTTE Fortunes, 2008<\/strong><\/p>\n

Let me set up the context leading to these efforts in point form.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

(A) Having set a course towards securing Eelam through war by initiating the \u2018final struggle\u2019 in July 2006 at M\u0101vil Aru, the LTTE\u2019s first major setback was the loss of their guerilla bases and political power in the Eastern Province by July-August 2007.<\/p>\n

(B) This situation was aggravated by the SL Navy\u2019s success in destroying its seven rogue[3]<\/a> warehouse ships on the high seas in the course of 2006\/07.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

(C) Nevertheless, the state of Thamil\u012blam<\/em> remained a viable entity<\/a><\/span> in late 2007\/08 (Roberts, \u201cCitizens,\u201d 2013). It was only when the SL Army broke through on the western section of the southern front circa March 2008 and advanced northwards along the coast from Wilpattu to take control of the western coast by November 2008 that Thamil\u012blam<\/em> was imperiled. The supply route from Tamilnadu in India was the LTTE\u2019s chief military lifeline. This path of advance also enabled the SL Army to press eastwards from the Mannar-Madhu area from about April 2008. So, by mid-2008 the LTTE would have realized that they were in dire straits.<\/p>\n

Way back, Sivaram alias Taraki taught us that one dimension of talaivar<\/em> Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s military genius[5]<\/a> was his \u201cscenario planning\u201d (2004a and Roberts 2006: 83). It is this vision and his uncompromising fascist inclinations[6]<\/a> that guided him towards fashioning a diabolical international act of blackmail in 2008\/09. The plan was summed up neatly by the Tiger political chief Pulid\u0113van speaking on the phone to a friend in Europe in early 2009: \u201cJust as in Kosovo if enough civilians died in Sri Lanka the world would be forced to step in\u201d <\/strong><\/strong>(quoted in Harrison 2012: 63).\"MAP<\/a><\/p>\n

(D) Any review must attend to the fact that the majority of the Tamil civilians were pro-Tiger and closely linked to their order via kinship, ideological faith, jobs and dependency. A significant number had also been trained in basic military action in the makkal padai<\/em> (civilian auxiliary force) in the years 2005-08.[7]<\/a> It was not till the LTTE regime became draconian from early 2009 that segments of this population turned against their supremo,[8]<\/a> the talaivar<\/em> as he was called. But even in late April 2009, as TamilNet <\/em>pictures show,[9]<\/a> a significant number moved south to the Tiger command area rather than joining others who seized the opportunity to escape<\/span>.<\/a><\/p>\n

(E) As a first step, in early 2008 the LTTE responded to the situation they faced by persuading and pressing their civilian populace to retreat well ahead of the SLA advance[10]<\/a> \u2013 in effect enforcing multiple displacements<\/a><\/span> and considerable privation on their people. This was a central element in a grand strategy involving the creation of a spectre, namely that of \u201can impending humanitarian crisis.\u201d[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

(F) This dire picture was perpetuated by the Tiger\u2019s many propaganda arms abroad and quickly recruited support in the West<\/a><\/span> from gullible radicals and humanists as well as those already pro-Tamil; while many channels within the Western media readily fell in with this line of thinking<\/a><\/span> (aggravated as they were in the course of 2008\/09 by the intimidation and killing of local journalists<\/a><\/span> in Sri Lanka[12]<\/a>).<\/p>\n

(G) The LTTE succeeded in slowing down the SL Army advance eastwards from Mannar and northwards from Omanthai by deploying a berm defense system (impregnated with mines and booby traps: Fig. 04) and the considerable skills and bravery of its fighters.[13]<\/a> The \u201cberm\u201d is an age-old tactic, a method which the Indian military refer to as the \u201cditch cum bund\u201d and a defence system which is said to stretch for miles in the North-West Frontier with Pakistan. Thus, by way of illustration, a 25 kilometre berm-and-ditch line snaked from north to south several miles to the west of the arterial A9 road and the administrative capital of Kilinochchi (see in de Silva Ranasinghe 2009a: 7). It held the SLA back for some time in October-November 2008.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n

(H) However, the LTTE were outgunned and outnumbered and this resistance eventually came to no avail so that Kilinochchi fell at the end of the year. The process, as witnessed dimly from the rear of the SL Army\u2019s advance, can be gleaned from a review of the Al-Jazeera videos on the war in October 2008<\/a><\/span>, January 2009<\/a><\/span> and February 2009<\/a><\/span> and also from Bryson Hull\u2019s report<\/a><\/span> on behalf of Reuters of 23rd<\/sup> February 2009.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

THREE: A Grand Strategy to meet the Crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n

It was at this point, around December 2008 and the months which followed, that two dimensions of the talaivar<\/em> Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s grand strategy came into sharper focus. The mass of (mostly) Tamil civilians were not only conceived as hostages servicing the spectre of an impending catastrophe<\/a><\/span>. Rather they were to be (i) part of the defensive structures of the LTTE as the terrain that they held declined into a cage-like pocket; and (ii) to be strategically located on the coastal shores between Nandhikadal Lagoon and the sea so as to foil a potential operation mounted by the Sri Lankan security forces in combination that would have caged them from all sides.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

The LTTE regiments may have been increasingly caged in, but the pressure in early-mid 2008 was from three sides (Map 1). Any military operation mounted by GSL forces that secured the north-eastern coastal area would square the cage. It would, worse still, prevent escape via the sea with the help of American forces marshaled by the Norwegians, the UN bureaucracy and other sympathizers egged on by KP in Malaysia (see below).<\/p>\n

Two critical pieces of evidence support this thesis. First: in December 2008 the Tigers induced about 20,000 people from their HQ locality of Mullaitivu to move to the Nandhikadal coastal strip between Vellamullivaikkal and Puttumattalan (Jeyaraj, \u201cFraudulent,\u201d 2009). Second: on the 31st December \u2013 at a point where the LTTE had decided to abandon the capital of Kilinochchi \u2013 Pirap\u0101haran phoned the former head of the LTTE\u2019s International operations, Selvar\u0101sa Pathman\u0101than, alias \u201cKP,\u201d and asked him to \u201cre-join the movement\u201d[17]<\/a> and start purchasing and transporting supplies again (Jeyaraj 2011: 23-24). It was during this conversation that Pirap\u0101haran was persuaded by KP to allow him (KP) to focus on securing a ceasefire and helping the Tiger command to escape if the situation deteriorated severely. That objective became KP\u2019s principal role.[18]<\/a> It was to be the critical \u201cfirst step for a negotiated peace\u201d (KP\u2019s words in Jeyaraj 2011: 29).<\/p>\n

FOUR: Issues and Tracks<\/strong><\/p>\n

There are, now, two tracks in the historical unravelling of this tale: one being KP\u2019s subsequent account via DBS Jeyaraj and the other being the details revealed by Mark Salter in his book on the Norwegian diplomatic endeavour vis a vis Sri Lanka, details that bear a heavy imprint from Eric Solheim. The latter track has to be complemented by the information on international interventions spearheaded by the US Embassy in Colombo that one can glean from media reports and the corpus of despatches disclosed by Wikileaks.<\/p>\n

Unravelling the events and processes is a mean task. We enter the shady world of international diplomacy where governments pursue different paths with left hand and right hand<\/span>;<\/a> and gloss their activity in subsequent reportage. Transcending these problems is rendered doubly difficult because key temporal moments are not always specified with clarity. One has to navigate a field of smoke and mirrors.<\/p>\n

FIVE: KP, Norway and USA to the Rescue<\/strong><\/p>\n

KP\u2019s account via David Jeyaraj (with my emphasis inserted) provides the central details about his efforts to rescue the LTTE leadership with international help<\/p>\n

Q: Did you not try to save the civilians by getting the LTTE to release them?<\/strong><\/p>\n

A:<\/strong> I did try at the start. There was even an offer by the Americans to transport them by sea to Trincomalee.<\/strong> But the LTTE hierarchy was not agreeable. This attitude was most unfortunate and may appear as inhuman. I am not trying to condone or justify this action but when I reflect upon the past I think the LTTE leadership also had no choice. If they released the people first, then only the tigers would be left there. Thereafter all of them could have been wiped out.<\/p>\n

\u2026. In March 2009 I thought I had made a breakthrough but sadly Prabhakaran rejected the proposal.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Q: Was this the \u201clock-off\u201d plan that was rejected by Prabhakaran in just three words? Could you elaborate please?<\/strong><\/p>\n

A: <\/strong>Well Yes. I had<\/strong> a tentative plan<\/strong> with international endorsement.<\/strong> The LTTE was to lay down arms by hoarding them in specific locations. The words used were \u201clock \u2013off\u201d. That is arms particularly heavy weapons were to be locked off in specific places. They were to be handed over to representatives of the UN. Afterwards there was to be a cessation of hostilities in which the people were to be kept in specific \u201cno firing zones\u201d. Negotiations were to be conducted between the Govt and LTTE with Norwegian facilitation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tentatively about 25 to 50 top leaders with their families were to be transported to a foreign country if necessary. The middle level leaders and cadres were to be detained, charged in courts and given relatively minor sentences. The low level junior cadres were to be given a general amnesty. The scheme was to [be] endorsed by the west including Norway, EU and the USA. The Americans were ready to send their naval fleet in to do evacuation if necessary.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The countries that KP had in mind and was negotiating with for one can identify as \u2018safe recuperation rights\u2019 were Eritrea, South Africa and East Timor.[19]<\/a> But, as it happened, the plans did not progress that far because the talaivar <\/em>Pirap\u0101haran would not have a bar of it. A lock-out of their guns was not negotiable: ithai etrukkola mudiyathu<\/em> \u2026 \u201cthis is unacceptable\u201d \u2026 he said on reading KP\u2019s sixteen-page memorandum on the subject (Jeyaraj 2011: 31-32). KP\u2019s memo had been faxed and the talaivar<\/em>\u2019s rejection in three words was also by fax (email from Jeyaraj).<\/p>\n

The Norwegian version of this plan relayed in Mark Salter\u2019s To End the War<\/em> (2015) is different in some details. Solheim has told Salter that<\/p>\n

The primary focus was on rescuing the civilians trapped in the war zone and facilitating the surrender of LTTE cadres who wished to do so. This would be achieved by sending a large ship under international supervision to the Vanni coast<\/strong>. Civilians would be taken to Colombo and set free. LTTE cadres would hand in their weapons, be registered and have their photos taken to ensure that their identities were known in order to protect them from government harm. A general amnesty would apply for everyone other than Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman<\/strong> (2015: 365, emphasis added).<\/p>\n

While the differences between KP\u2019s package and Solheim\u2019s deal are not inconsequential, there is one point of agreement in both stories: the rejection of the scheme by the LTTE arose from the fantasy world in which Pirap\u0101haran and his key advisors dwelt. As KP told the Norwegians, \u201cthe LTTE leadership was living in a surreal world, believing in miracles\u201d (Solheim\u2019s words in Salter 2015: 361). The impracticality at this point arose from Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s inflexibility about his final goal: a separate state. He \u201cwanted all or nothing\u201d \u2026. so that [for him] the masses were mere clockwork toys, cannon fodder\u201d (Jayatilleka 2014: 55, 54).<\/p>\n

To End the War<\/em> provides crucial details of the evolving process that are missing in KP\u2019s account. A team of Norwegians and SL Tamils met with KP secretly in Kuala Lumpur at some point in late February.[20]<\/a> Jon Westborg and Tomas Stangeland (two senior Norwegian functionaries) and Tore Hattrem, the Norwegian Ambassador in Colombo, represented Norway; while KP, V. Rudrakum\u0101ran (from USA) and Jay Maheswaran (from Australia) represented the LTTE (Salter 2015: 348-49). We can regard them as the initial planning team.<\/p>\n

No rescue mission could be mounted without US naval support and it seems that Ambassador Hattrem brought the US embassy in Colombo into the tentative plans that were being hatched. If Salter\u2019s account can be relied upon, Norway and USA were seeking \u201ca negotiated end to the hostilities\u201d through this intervention (Salter 2015: 364ff). Thus, in late February the Co-Chairs in Colombo mulled over the possibility of mounting \u201ca sea-directed rescue mission\u201d and \u201ca high-level team from the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters in Hawaii\u201d visited [Sri Lanka] to evaluate the logistics of such an exercise.\u201d[21]<\/a> This was because such an operation demanded long-term planning: US naval forces in the Philippines, the Gulf States and\/or Diego Garcia needed at least five days to reach the eastern reaches of Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n

In American minds the scheme was tentative at best. As a well-informed American media man who became privy to the tentative scheme later in the day told me, the US officials believed that they faced \u201ca non-permissive environment\u201d[22]<\/a> \u2013 a form of American-speak which is as precise as pin-point accurate. USA had learnt a lesson from the disastrous international consequences and humiliations arising from its military sortie in Somalia in October 1993<\/a><\/span> \u2013 since immortalized in the film Black Hawk Down<\/em>.[23]<\/a> Given the fierceness of the ongoing military battle and given the obduracy of both the LTTE and GSL commands even the almighty USA would have had its work cut out in mounting such an exercise.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n

Nor could USA just march in. Such a massive operation was not feasible without the consent of the government of Sri Lanka (GSL).[25]<\/a> From Salter\u2019s account it seems that Basil Rajapaksa was the conduit through whom this international cabal explored such options.[26]<\/a> But Solheim and Salter \u2013 perhaps deliberately \u2013 do not tell us WHEN Rajapaksa or some other Sri Lankan dignitary was approached. This is a critical gap in my present stock of information. It is my surmise that Sri Lanka was only approached with this scheme late in the day, say mid-April or late April.<\/p>\n

We confront yet another uncertainty in our information. There is a stark discrepancy as to when precisely the deal was placed before Pirap\u0101haran by fax and subject to his decisive rejection. KP\u2019s account indicates that this rejection took place in early March (confirmed by Jeyaraj\u2019s recent indication that this exchange occurred in late February or early March[27]<\/a>). However, late April is the date which the Norwegian account in Salter\u2019s book points to (see pp. 364-65 in particular).<\/p>\n

We must allow for the possibility that Pirap\u0101haran was presented with rescue\/surrender\/amnesty plans on two occasions, first in early March and then again in late April. This set of question-marks is of consequence. The battlefield situation was different on the dates in question, while the cadences of international pressure on GSL were sharper by April than those earlier in the year 2009 or early March. It is to the clarification of these background conditions that we must now proceed.<\/p>\n

SIX: Pressures from the West, January-March 2009<\/strong><\/p>\n

As the account above indicates, KP\u2019s diplomatic engagements did not reach fruition and take shape as a concrete plan till early March (and maybe till late April). However, the Western international consortium led by USA was a powerful element in island politics throughout the war and especially from late 2008. The \u201cWest\u201d was embodied in a coterie of ambassadors known as the \u201cCo-Chairs\u201d who met regularly and were engaged in the ongoing events in the political arena in Sri Lanka. One of their principal imperatives from 2008 was humanitarian concern for the fate of the numerous Tamil civilians trapped in the declining space of war because of the LTTE\u2019s grand strategy of blackmail.<\/p>\n

This humanitarian activity was not a new area of action. Here one needs to emphasise a remarkable aspect of the war between GSL and Thamil\u012blam <\/em>over the extended period 1990-2009 \u2013 an aspect that the general Western readership probably has no inkling of. With substantial material aid from the West, GSL continued to supply the Sri Lankan people living under LTTE rule with essential supplies. The flow of material via land convoys or ships had been maintained both in peacetime and war time. In other words, GSL was feeding the enemy (while also sending salary payments and pensions to officials in that insurgent state).[28]<\/a><\/p>\n

The flow of supplies (especially essential foods, medical supplies and kerosene) to the Tiger-ruled areas of the Vanni had been sustained throughout Eelam War IV from mid-2006. A logistics hub at Vavuniya and a fleet of lorries were central to this task as also the services of GSL personnel and staff from specific INGOs and NGOs.[29]<\/a> The Co-Chairs were a key force in this endeavour because they generated the monies and goods required for this monumental set of tasks, with the World Food Programme (an INGO) at the centre of such operations. Thus, from 2006 through to the end of January 2009 supplies of food, medicine and other necessities were sent to the beleaguered people of Thamil\u012blam <\/em>by land convoys. Thereafter ships chartered by the ICRC (supported and supervised by the SL Navy) took up this task and made at least 31 voyages from Trincomalee to the war zone \u2013 returning with at least\u00a013,794 injured and sick people and their \u201ccarers\u201d.[30]<\/a><\/p>\n

This massive task was feasible because of the monetary aid from USA and other governments. The Co-Chairs also supported the GSL\u2019s efforts to house and sustain the Tamil peoples who escaped from their trapped \u201chell hole\u201d (Reddy\u2019s words) in the detention centres that were being set up on the run from late 2008 \u2013 indeed, the international consortium harangued GSL persistently on this front in a manner that deserves praise.[31]<\/a><\/p>\n

On the political front, however, the tale is different: the interventions sometimes amounted to brow-beating and breached the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. In January 2009 one sees several international initiatives that seem to predate the intervention sponsored by KP with the Norwegians as go-betweens. Ambassador Blake\u2019s secret despatch No. 33 of 9th<\/sup> January not only reiterated the fixed US policy of fashioning \u201ca political solution\u201d to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (see below for more evidence), but even noted: \u201cwe should also be prepared to help locate, detain and hand over to Sri Lanka or India Prabhakaran and other senior LTTE leaders should they leave the country.\u201d[32]<\/a> Parenthetically, one should note that at this stage in January 2009 the US Ambassador Blake\u2019s reading of the battle situation was as flawed as asinine: on several occasions he intimated to Washington that the LTTE could return to its old programme of insurgency.[33]<\/a><\/p>\n

India was also a player in the firmament. On the 25th January 2009 India made a symbolic move which gathered US support. Mukherjee, the Minister of External Affairs, flew to Colombo, where he \u201cregistered deep concern over the current humanitarian crisis in the Vanni, where Tamil civilians are caught in the crossfire between military forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) [and] insisted that the military ensure that medical supplies reach the safe zone, that exit routes for civilians be clearly marked and communicated, and that every effort be taken to avoid civilian casualties.\u201d[34]<\/a> This was a line of demand that Blake endorsed wholeheartedly.<\/p>\n

We do not know if Blake and USA were alive to grandstanding bluff guiding the Indian hand in Delhi. PK Balachandran (2015)<\/strong> tells us that a troika in Delhi was in regular touch with a troika<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (<\/strong>Gotabaya & Basil Rajapaksa and Lalith Weeratunga)<\/strong> within the heart of Colombo\u2019s regime; and that at no stage did Delhi wish the LTTE leadership to be let off the hook. Likewise, GSL sometimes had Basil Rajapaksa and the Foreign Minister Bogollagama presenting an amenable listening face to the imperial pressures of the international consortium, while Gotabaya Rajapaksa played hard ball.<\/p>\n

We must be attentive to the possibility that USA too adhered to a dual track policy, but I leave consideration of this possibility for the final summing up. What needs emphasis at this temporal point in our review, in late January\/early February 2009, is that USA does not seem to have been cognizant of KP\u2019s rescue plan as yet \u2013 in part because the scheme was still being moulded.<\/p>\n

SEVEN: The LTTE Strategy comprehended \u2026 and yet supported<\/strong><\/p>\n

During the months of February and March the Western international consortium at the centre of diplomatic politics in Sri Lanka — with several UN agencies as their handmaidens — were quite exasperated by the LTTE\u2019s refusal to countenance their appeals to release the civilians held in the war theatre. When Tamarat Samuel, an UN special envoy, visited Colombo in February he was \u201cstruck by two things: a general feeling of helplessness among the ambassadors he talked to and the government\u2019s confidence that the end was near\u201d <\/strong>(quoted in Salter 2015: 345). The hopelessness derived in large part from the fact that Pirap\u0101haran and his commanders rejected their advice and refused to consider a ceasefire or a release of the civilians.<\/p>\n

The civilians were not \u201ctrapped\u201d by accident. They were a \u201ccentral element in a grand LTTE strategy.\u201d[35]<\/a> Ambassador Robert Blake had comprehended this clearly. In early February 2009 he presented this cogent reading to his superiors in Washington: \u201cthe LTTE had refused to allow civilians to leave because the LTTE needs the civilians as human shields, as a pool for forced conscription, and as a means to try to persuade the international community to force a cease-fire upon the government, since that is the LTTE’s only hope<\/strong>\u201d (Secret Despatch 133 of 5 Feb. 2009).<\/p>\n

Having comprehended the situation in insightful fashion but getting no cooperation from the LTTE, Blake then proceeded to meet the LTTE\u2019s expectations.[36]<\/a> With the Co-Chair ambassadors and various UN bureaucrats as his cohorts at different moments, he exerted heavy pressure on the GSL authorities in March and April to institute ceasefires and even to halt their military operations.<\/p>\n

EIGHT: The Battle Situation in March \u2026 and Thereafter<\/strong><\/p>\n

One must now attend to the context by addressing the progress of the unfolding military struggle in summary fashion. If talaivar <\/em>Pirap\u0101haran rejected KP\u2019s carefully formulated proposal in early March rather than in late April,[37]<\/a> he did so in military circumstances that were dire but not desperate (as they were in late April). By early March, indeed by late February, the vast majority of the civilian population, perhaps numbering anything from 260-270,000,[38]<\/a> had been deployed by the LTTE on the Nandhikadal coastal strip as a defensive formation of so many sandbags and the main plank in their appeal for international intervention (Roberts, \u201cRealities,\u201d 2015). The LTTE, moreover, still retained the little town and stronghold of PTK in early-mid March; and had considerable fighting and assault capacity. Indeed, they even launched a counter attack on the 7\/8th<\/sup> March (Salter 2015: 351).<\/p>\n

However, PTK town was lost in mid\/late-March<\/a><\/span> after the only vestige of urban fighting seen in the last phase of the war.[39]<\/a> The Tiger military responded in the manner typical: they assembled their best fighters in order to counter-attack. But their assembly point in the locality Aanandapuram was rumbled by the GSL forces on the 31st<\/sup> April and in the next 4-6 days was subject to withering shellfire and infantry assault from all sides. Jeyaraj was way ahead of the international media in his monitoring of events and told the world<\/a><\/span> that the LTTE lost 623 fighters, including several outstanding male and female commanders, in this battle.[40]<\/a><\/p>\n

After this debacle the circumstance of the LTTE and the civilian mass (now reduced to about 220,000 people because of escapes and death) serving as hostages\/supporters\/labour-force\/defensive-barrier was desperate. From mid-April they were restrained to a coastal strip abutting the elongated Nandhikadal Lagoon running north-south (see Map 2) beside the coast. This arena was roughly 24 square kilometres and had been delimited as a \u201cNo Fire Zone\u201d (also called \u201cSafe Zone\u201d) by GSL in mid-February.<\/p>\n

This terminology, a diplomatic sop, was, in fact, legally invalid because (1) there was no agreement with the LTTE on this score and (2) because the LTTE and its Sea Tigers retained their military emplacements in the area and eventually assembled its HQ therein; while using the hulk of the \u201cSS Farrah\u201d as observation post and RPG emplacement. It is a measure of bureaucratic inertia \u2013 and its relentless power \u2013 that international agencies as well as GSL and journalists have deployed this designation in mechanical fashion\u2026. And that they continue to do so. I have consistently avoided this misleading phrase. In my conceptualization this arena is described as the \u201cLast Redoubt\u201d — with the understanding that GSL had every right to direct its fire within\/into this space because the mass of hostage-people was an integral pillar in the Tiger defense mechanisms and thus their responsibility.<\/p>\n

NINE: The American Sword of Damocles<\/strong><\/p>\n

Before these battlefield misfortunes weakened the LTTE still further, the US Ambassador proceeded to ratchet up his pressure on GSL in ways that would have shored up the LTTE military dispensation. At a meeting on the 18th<\/sup> March 2009 he threatened the Foreign Minister Bogollagama. His report to Washington runs thus: \u201cthe Ambassador noted that he was hearing credible reports that many in the military and elsewhere favor entering the safe zone and finishing off the conflict. The Ambassador warned the Minister that Sri Lanka needed to understand that the deaths of thousands or even tens of thousands of civilians from such an action would cause an international outcry, likely subject the GSL to war crime charges<\/strong>, and almost certainly undermine public support in the U.S. and other donor countries for future reconstruction efforts in the north.\u201d[41]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cWar Crimes.\u201d This heavy human rights weapon had been explicitly deployed by Navy Pillai (the UN Human Rights Commissioner) in a widely-publicized statement five days earlier \u2013 one that levelled accusations and threats at both the LTTE and GSL (Salter 2015: 352-53). Blake was now wielding the sword over the Sri Lankan government in circumstances where the international consortium was reconciled to the fact that they their appeals would receive no mileage from the LTTE.<\/p>\n

In other words, the international cabal was working within the framework of LTTE strategy<\/strong>.<\/strong> They were in effect encouraging the Tigers to sustain their use of the civilians as a defensive formation and a raison d\u2019etre<\/em> for international intervention. The Sword of Damocles in the form of \u201cwar crimes,\u201d therefore, was held over the head of one party to the conflict in a manner that slotted in neatly with the grand strategy of the other party, the LTTE. In other words, in blithely positioning itself as international arbiter, and wrapping itself with a \u201chumanitarian cloak,\u201d USA, the UN bureaucrats working as American agents and its other international allies (embracing AI, HRW and ICG) were aiding and abetting the LTTE.<\/p>\n

The Western international cabal, therefore, seems to have been deliberately blind to the structured circumstances that I have outlined. It follows that their earnest exploration of KP\u2019s valiant (and understandable) efforts to save the Tiger leadership was a path that would also have materially helped the LTTE.<\/p>\n

TEN: Approaching Climax, mid-late April 2009<\/strong><\/p>\n

Our tale is now placed in mid-April with the LTTE in dire straits and its territory confined to the Last Redoubt. As an observer from outside who happened to fly in to Colombo in mid-April just when a \u201chumanitarian pause\u201d declared unilaterally by GSL on the 13\/14th<\/sup> April had brought no beneficial results, I anticipated a blood-bath.[42]<\/a> I also felt that the sacrificial devotion to their cause displayed over the years by the Tigers could translate into a mass act of civilian\/Tiger suicide in the manner seen among the Japanese people in 1944 at Saipan.[43]<\/a><\/p>\n

As an ordinary citizen of course, I was unaware of the flurry of political activity taking place at this moment \u2013 with USA and the UN, India, the TNA leaders and various representatives of GSL pressing their views and seeking to gain advantage in every which way. Blake had met the Foreign Minister (Bogollagama) once again on the 11th<\/sup> April and expressed concerns about GSL \u201cshelling of the civilian safe zone.\u201d He had broached the idea of an UN envoy being inserted into the LTTE terrain to talk directly to Pirap\u0101haran so as to negotiate a surrender. Quite ominously, he observed that \u201cthe alternative of sending the army into the safe zone would be disastrous for Sri Lanka.\u201d[44]<\/a> This was nothing less than a polite threat, yet another one.<\/p>\n

The threat was underlined a few days later when Blake met the Secretary of Defense, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and \u201cpressed\u201d him \u201cto exercise restraint [so as] to ensure civilian casualties are minimized in the safe zone.\u201d[45]<\/a> This was a critical political push-and-deflect encounter. Its implications can only be grasped in the light of (a) the US government\u2019s earlier indication that they could institute war crimes charges against Sri Lanka and (b) a previous meeting with Rajapaksa on the 12th<\/sup> March where Blake had insisted that (once the SL Army captured PTK) the GSL forces should not enter the \u201csafe zone.\u201d On that occasion in March Gotabhaya Rajapaksa blandly played poker: he \u201crepeated his pledge to not enter the safe zone and stated that the Army would take a passive stance on its boundary once the other areas were secured.\u201d[46]<\/a><\/p>\n

With retrospective advantage we know, now, that neither Rajapaksa nor the military forces had any intention of stopping their advance. In this intent they were secure in their awareness that India supported this goal in clandestine voice (Balachandran 2015). With the Indian General Elections looming in late April and early May, with a final date on the 13th<\/sup> May, their goal was to gain control of rump-Thamil\u012blam<\/em> before then.[47]<\/a> After the triumph at Aanandapuram the SL Army\u2019s special forces spent time practicing methods of breaching the berm defences. Suitable circumstances for attack were also prepared by aerial drops of leaflets in Tamil among the corralled civilian people augmented by loudspeaker announcements across the waters of Nandhikadal Lagoon.[48]<\/a><\/p>\n

On the night of 19th<\/sup> April commando forces \u201cblasted through a massive earthen wall built by the LTTE\u201d at a point near Pokkanai (Map 2) and secured a beachhead within the Last Redoubt that soon expanded and enabled them to split the LTTE domain — so that the Tigers and remaining populace were confined to about 5 square kilometres in the southern segment of the Last Redoubt (Hull & Sirilal 2009a).<\/p>\n

The SL Army exercise over 19-22 April was a remarkable military operation \u2013 assisted by the extent to which some Tiger fighters discarded their weapons and joined the refugee streams that marched and\/or waded westwards to safety along the \u201csafe corridors\u201d developed by the infantry. Some 39,845 people reached safety on the 20th<\/sup> April; and by the 22nd<\/sup> a total of about 103,000 Tamil civilians and (deserting) troops had exited the battle theatre on foot. Others got away in fishing boats heading north or south along the coast guided by marker buoys set up by the SL Navy. The mixture of photographs provided by Reuters are essential viewing<\/a><\/span> for all students of this event.[49]<\/a><\/p>\n

The figures of those who survived by reaching GSL hands are not easy to compute with certainty, but an UNHCR report on 25th<\/sup> April indicated that some 120,000 had escaped (Salter 2015, fn. 102 on page 516). Needless to say, the number of Tamils who died from crossfire, shellfire and\/or Tiger killings by gun or suicide bomber are difficult to work out, but one computation places the figure for the period 20-31 April at roughly 2,500 (IDAG 2013: section 4.4.4) — surprisingly low given the circumstances.<\/p>\n

The operational activity and the outcome of streams of escaping people was followed by aerial footage provided by UAVs of the SL Air Force. President Rajapaksa was shown real time footage at the SLAF headquarters in Colombo on Monday morning 20th<\/sup> April. Thereafter a number of ambassadors and foreign dignitaries as well as some journalists were invited to watch this real-life drama<\/a><\/span> unfolding slowly in real-time.[50]<\/a> While Bryson Hull filed a brief account of this momentous real-life show<\/a><\/span>, I have not been able to secure a list of the personnel who were privileged to witness these scenes \u2013 a mark of governmental inefficiency on this front (also see Roberts, \u201cReuters,\u201d 2016).<\/p>\n

Without such vital evidence one cannot plot the identity of reporters who did NOT provide the world with accounts of this remarkable moment in world history. We can be certain, however, that US embassy officials were among those present. In this circumstance the ignorance and arrogance displayed at this moment by their Secretary of State, no less than Hilary Clinton, speaks volumes. On Wednesday the 22nd<\/sup> April she told the world<\/a><\/span> that \u201ca terrible humanitarian tragedy\u201d was taking place in Sri Lanka, referred to \u201cgenocide\u201d and demanded \u2013 yes demanded — a halt to fighting so that \u201cwe could secure a safe passage for so many of the trapped civilians as possible.\u201d Notice the arrogant \u201cwe.\u201d USA was to call the shots. However, such arrogance pales into insignificance when set beside the imperial Cardinal Pell manner in which she ignored the graphic pictures of thousands of Tamil civilians (some 120,000 people no less) fleeing across water and land to safety.<\/p>\n

Clinton\u2019s vitriolic broadside is a platform for reflection. If she had not read her embassy staff\u2019s reports from Sri Lanka, she was not up to her job. However, it is more likely that she swept the events under the carpet in order to publicly birch a little Asian country that refused to abide by American bidding. That country, moreover, had leaned towards China in the recent past. Geo-political issues may have been one of the factors guiding her rhetoric.<\/p>\n

ELEVEN: American Political Dreams <\/strong><\/p>\n

Within this overarching US interest, however, there nestled another American programme. The schemes of international intervention under consideration were not only focused on saving the civilians held as bargaining chips by the LTTE. They were designed to whisk the Tiger leaders to safety in another country where, in effect, they would be without weaponry and be in \u201cinternational\u201d pockets. Here, \u201cinternational\u201d reads as \u201cAmerican\u201d or \u201cEuro-American.\u201d<\/p>\n

This line of wishful thinking on the part of USA came to light (inadvertently perhaps) in May. To understand that moment one must procced step by step to that month and the LTTE\u2019s final denouement in mid-May. Albeit highly successful, the SL army operation launched on 19\/20th<\/sup> April had not overwhelmed the LTTE as yet. The LTTE still held a stub of territory, perhaps five sq. kilometres in extent, in the southern segment of the Last Redoubt where its remnant command and fighters were among the 80,000 or so persons hemmed in all sides by government forces.<\/p>\n

Thus, the humanitarian concerns of liberals in the world order and the humanitarian-cum-strategic concerns of the Western powers remained. Indeed, agitation in the Western countries continued at high-octane levels. Sri Lanka remained the target of adverse media reportage and still very much in the spotlight.<\/p>\n

It was in the midst of continuing Western pressure on the government in early May 2009 that Michael Owen, the Political Attache at the US Embassy (Fig. 00), told the world on the 6th<\/sup> May 2009 that one had \u201cto find a way for the LTTE to surrender arms possibly to a third party in the context of a pause in the fighting, to surrender their arms in exchange for some sort of limited amnesty to at least some members of the LTTE and the beginning of a political process.<\/strong>\u201d[51]<\/a> Admitting that the plans were \u201cvague,\u201d he said \u201cbut that is something that is under way behind the scenes<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n

This piece of information fits neatly with KP\u2019s disclosures earlier. It also lets the American cat out of the bag. What cat? Answer: their political schemes for Sri Lanka, well-intended schemes that had been formulated in the 1980s, but which were quite unsuited to the new circumstances arising from the establishment and consolidation of Thamil\u012blam<\/em> under a fascist ruler.[52]<\/a><\/p>\n

Owen\u2019s presentation included a note to the effect that the \u201cTamils had legitimate grievances.\u201d Thus, it seems that USA was keen on returning to programmes that it had sketched out for Sri Lanka during the 1970s and 1980s<\/span>:<\/a> they wished to negotiate a devolutionary federal solution (Gamage 2014, Roberts 2015). The Tiger leadership parked in some neutral country, one surmises, was to be an instrument of this future settlement. One can surmise that the reshaped LTTE would then have been headed by, say, Rudrakum\u0101ran, Pulid\u0113van, Nad\u0113san, Bishop SJ Emmanuel and Arjuna Sivanandan rather than the military men.<\/p>\n

These are sketchy contentions. Subject to this caveat, it seems that the Tamil National Alliance in Sri Lanka was to remain in the shadow of the LTTE[53]<\/a> in this future dispensation. As critically, and fatally, the fascist character of the LTTE was glossed over<\/a><\/span>\u2026. and remains glossed over today in the agenda of USA and its handmaidens in the UN bureaucracy. How devolution can be rendered feasible within a political arrangement involving a fascist sub-unit does not seem to have entered the minds of the liberal-arts simpletons[54]<\/a> designing American policy.<\/p>\n

TWELVE: The SL Armed Forces\u2019 Achievement<\/strong><\/p>\n

If there were any reservations about the remarkable success of the SL Army and its supporting arms in the Navy and Air Force in overcoming that formidable foe, the LTTE, it should be dispelled by the evaluation provided by the retired SAS officer, Major General JT Holmes:[55]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cthe SLA did not rush in, but instead took its time to plan and adapt its tactics to take account of the civilian presence.\u00a0\u00a0It was, in the view of the author, an entirely unique situation and the fact that 290,000 people escaped alive is in itself remarkable\u2026. In my military opinion, faced with a determined enemy that were deploying the most ruthless of tactics and which involved endangering the Tamil civilian population, SLA had limited options with regard to the battle strategy they could deploy.\u2026The SLA had either to continue taking casualties and allow the LTTE to continue preying upon its own civilians, or take the battle to the LTTE, albeit with an increase in civilian casualties. The tactical options were stark, but in my military opinion, justifiable and proportionate given the unique situation SLA faced in the last phase.\u201d<\/p>\n

This evaluation supports my bold assertion previously from the position of a raw amateur: that the penetration and capture of the Tiger\u2019s Last Redoubt in April-May 2009 must rank as one of the outstanding military operations in recent world history (Roberts, \u201cWinning the War,\u201d 1 Sept. 2014).<\/p>\n

These appraisals can be placed alongside the misleading directions and bombast in the account presented by Gordon Weiss in The Cage<\/em>[56]<\/a> and the comic \u2018interludes\u2019 within the assessments peddled by Solheim through Salter. Take the latter\u2019s illustration of the \u201cbrutality\u201d of the SL Army in mid-May: \u201cfrom 13 May advancing [SLA] soldiers fired or threw grenades into civilian bunkers as a \u2018precaution\u2019 against the possibility of the LTTE using them to launch attacks\u201d (Salter 2015: 371). In circumstances where many Tiger fighters were not wearing uniforms and where some of the fighting occurred at night, the criteria deployed by Solheim and Salter underline their infantile military intelligence. Soldiers can hardly peep into every foxhole\/bunker and inquire in Tamil \u201cwho goes there?\u201d In any event, the standard infantry tactics in the face of numerous foxholes in their path is directed by the importance of speed of advance so as to deny the enemy time for redeployment.<\/p>\n

What should be clear, however, is that considered evaluations do not always carry weight in the world of international politics. Media clout varies and big-powers drown out little minnows<\/strong>. General Holmes\u2019s evaluation lies buried in a document in little Sri Lanka.<\/strong> Western institutions such as the Public Interest Advocacy Centre<\/a><\/span> in Sydney and the Greens Party of Australia<\/a><\/span> chose to be guided by Gordon Weiss and simply ignored documentary data<\/a><\/span> and bodies of reportage that could undermine their goals in surveying the war outcomes in Sri Lanka.[57]<\/a> When one dominates the oceans, those located in little backwaters can be ignored. <\/strong><\/p>\n

THIRTEEN: <\/strong>Quod Erat Demonstrandum<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, Talaivar <\/em>Pirap\u0101haran was not saved.<\/p>\n

BIBLIOGRAPHY<\/strong><\/p>\n

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Coupland, R. M and D. Meddings\u00a0<\/strong>1999 \u201cMortality associated with use of weapons in armed conflicts, wartime atrocities, and civilian mass shootings: literature review,\u201d\u00a0British Medical Journal<\/em>,http:\/\/www.bmj.com\/content\/319\/7207\/407<\/a><\/p>\n

Colman,<\/strong>\u00a0Padraig\u00a0<\/strong>2013 \u201cDeadly Accountancy. Part II,\u201d http:\/\/pcolman.wordpress.com\/2013\/05\/07\/deadly-accountancy-part-2\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cThe Battle for the Vanni Pocket,\u201d\u00a0Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, March 2009, Vol. 35\/2, pp. 17-19,<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong>\u00a02009d \u201cSri Lanka\u2019s Experience in Counter-Insurgency Warfare,\u201d\u00a0Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, Oct. 2009, Vol. 35\/8, pp. 40-46.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong>\u00a02009e \u201cGood Education. Sri Lankan Military learns Counter Insurgency Lessons,\u201d\u00a0Jane\u2019s Intelligence Review<\/em>\u00a0Dec. 2009, pp. 3-7.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei\u00a0<\/strong>2010 \u201cInformation Warfare and the Endgame of the Civil War,\u201d\u00a0Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, May 2010 30\/4: 35-37. http:\/\/www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com\/articles\/40\/Sri-Lanka<\/a>..<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009f \u201cMaritime Counter-Terrorism and the Sri Lanka Navy,\u201d Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, November 2009, 35: 32-33.<\/p>\n

Fernando, Philip 2009 \u201c<\/strong>Hilary Clinton\u2019s hundred days as Secretary of State off-handish and callous,\u201d 25 April 2009, http:\/\/www.srilankaguardian.org\/2009\/04\/hilary-clintons-hundred-days-as.html<\/p>\n

Fuard, Asif <\/strong>2009 \u201cTigers caught in a Noose,\u201d 5 April 2009, http:\/\/www.sundaytimes.lk\/090405\/News\/sundaytimesnews_19.html<\/strong><\/p>\n

Gamage, Daya <\/strong>2008 \u201cBarack Obama & Civil War in Sri Lanka; Robert Blake\u2019s Mind-Set; Negating R2P Psychology Build-Up,\u201d 2 November 2008, http:\/\/www.asiantribune.com\/?q=node\/14004<\/a>.<\/u><\/p>\n

Gamage, Daya<\/u><\/strong> 2009 \u201cRudrakumaran\u2019s Role to promote LTTE contravenes US material support Laws,\u201d 22 September 2009, <\/u>http:\/\/www.asiantribune.com\/news\/2009\/08\/23\/rudrakumaran%E2%80%99s-role-promote-ltte-contravenes-us-%E2%80%98material-support%E2%80%99-laws<\/a><\/p>\n

Gamage, Daya <\/strong>2011a \u201cTamil Issue in Sri Lanka: US Policy Development 1981-1995,\u201d 5 June 2011, http:\/\/www.asiantribune.com\/news\/2011\/06\/04\/tamil-issue-us-%E2%80%93-sri-lanka-relations-proper-perspective-part-one-policy-development-<\/a><\/p>\n

Gamage, Daya <\/strong>2011b \u201cInternational Humanitarian Law \u2013 at all times \u2013 applicable to LTTE atrocities: Why was the West silent?\u201d 6 July 2011, http:\/\/www.asiantribune.com\/news\/2011\/07\/05\/applicability-ihl-provisions-ltte-violent-acts-why-was-west-silent<\/a><\/p>\n

Gamage, Daya<\/strong> 2014 \u201cThe American Agenda for Sri Lanka\u2019s National Issues,\u00a01970s-2014<\/a>,\u201d <\/u>5 July 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/07\/05\/the-american-agenda-for-sri-lankas-national-issues-1970s-2014\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Govt Film Unit [SL]\u00a0<\/strong>2014 \u201cLast Days at Nandikadal,\u201d https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=5kEzLEafDss<\/a>\u00a0OR<\/em>https:\/\/mail.google.com\/mail\/u\/0\/?shva=1#inbox\/148fce36b9866525?projector=1<\/a><\/p>\n

Gray, David<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cA Day at the Front Line in Sri Lanka (Photographer\u2019s Blog),\u201d 27 April 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/photographers-blog\/2009\/04\/27\/a-day-at-the-front-line-in-sri-lanka\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Harshula\u00a0<\/strong>2011a \u201cWhen allegations becomes evidence,\u201d 6 June 2011,http:\/\/groundviews.org\/<\/a>\u00a02011\/06\/06\/when-allegations-become-evidence\/<\/p>\n

Harshula\u00a0<\/strong>2011b \u201cAustralia\u2019s Tamil Eelam Lobby and CHOGM,\u201d http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2011\/11\/03\/australia%E2%80%99s-tamil-eelam-lobby-and-chogm\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Harrison, Frances\u00a0<\/strong>2012\u00a0Still Counting the Dead<\/em>, London: Portobello.<\/p>\n

Holmes, Maj-Genl John <\/strong>2015 \u201cExpert Military Report,\u201d 28 March 2015, Annex I of Report on the Second Mandate of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Complaints of Abductions and Disappearances<\/em> [i.e. Paranagama Report], August 2015, pp. 243-44<\/p>\n

Hoole, Rajan<\/strong> 2001 Sri Lanka:<\/em> The Arrogance of Power. Myths, Decadence, & Murder<\/em>, Nugegoda Wasala Publications for UTHR (Jaffna).<\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson 2009 <\/strong>\u201cSri Lankan army measures end of 25-year war in days,\u201d 23 February 2009, <\/strong>http:\/\/in.reuters.com\/article\/2009\/02\/23\/idINIndia-38164620090223<\/a><\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson<\/strong> 2009 \u201cSri Lanka opens eye in the sky on war zone,\u201d 20 April 2009, http:\/\/mobile.reuters.com\/article\/idUSCOL450259<\/a><\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson & Ranga Sirilal <\/strong>2009a \u201c<\/strong>Sri Lankan War in Endgame, 100,000 escape rebel zone,\u201d 23 April 2009, http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-srilanka-war-idUSTRE53J0IZ20090422<\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson & Ranga Sirilal<\/strong> 2009b<\/strong> \u201cSri Lanka’s long war in bloody final climax,\u201d 17 May 2009, http:\/\/mg.co.za\/article\/2009-05-17-sri-lankas-long-war-in-bloody-final-climax<\/p>\n

Humanitarian Effort \u2013 see Presidential Task Force<\/strong><\/p>\n

IDAG [i.e. Citizen Silva]\u00a0<\/strong>2013 \u201cThe Numbers Game: Politics of Retributive Justice,\u201d\u00a0http:\/\/www.scribd.com\/doc\/132499266\/The-Numbers-Game-Politics-of-Retributive-Justice<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>OR<\/strong><\/em> http:\/\/<\/a>www.satp.org\/satporgtp\/countries\/shrilanka\/document\/TheNG.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Jane\u2019s Naval Intelligence <\/strong>2009 \u201cSri Lanka learns to counter Sea Tigers\u2019 Swarm Tactics,\u201d March\u00a0\u00a0 2009, pp. 20-26.<\/p>\n

Jayatilleka, Dayan <\/strong>2013 Long War, Cold Peace,<\/em> Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications.<\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2009a \u201cTheepan of the LTTE: Heroic Saga of a Northern Warrior,\u201d 4 April 2009, http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/archives\/5381<\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2009b \u201cAnatomy of the LTTE Military Debacle at Aananthapuram,\u201d Sunday Leader<\/em>, 8 April 2012 \u2014 http:\/\/www.thesundayleader.lk\/2012\/04\/08\/anatomy-of-the-ltte-military-debacle-at-aananthapuram\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2009c \u201cFraudulent concept of a \u201cfire-free, no-fire, safe zone,\u201d 18 April 2009, http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/archives\/343<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2009d \u201cWretched of the Earth break Free of Bondage,\u201d Daily Mirror<\/em>, 25 April 2009, http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/archives\/380<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2011 \u201cKP\u2019 Speaks Out. An Interview with Former Tiger Chief<\/em>, Vavuniya: NERDO.<\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong> 2015 \u201cThe Life and Death of Velupillai Pirap\u0101haran<\/a>,\u201d 9 May 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/05\/09\/the-life-and-death-of-velupillai-pirapaharan\/<\/p>\n

Ladduwahetty, Neville <\/strong>2014 Sri Lanka\u2019s Armed Conflict<\/em>, Colombo.<\/p>\n

LLRC<\/strong> 2011 Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation<\/em>, Colombo. November 2011,<\/p>\n

[LTTE]<\/strong>\u00a02014 \u201cLTTE War Video recovered by the Government\u2013Revealing Episode,\u201d\u00a0https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/02\/13\/ltte-war-video-recovered-by-the-government-revealing-episodes\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Mango\u00a0<\/strong>2014 \u201cSri Lanka\u2019s War In Its Last Phase: Where WIA Figures Defeat The Gross KIA Estimates,\u201d 14 February 2014, https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/sri-lankas-war-in-its-last-phase-where-wia-figures-defeat-the-gross-kia-estimates\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Marga\u00a0<\/strong>2011\u00a0An Analysis and Evaluation of The Report of the Advisory Panel to the UNSG nn the Final Stages of the War in Sri Lanka, <\/em>https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/s\/0eybj1ynej6spaa\/The%20Darusman%20Report-%20Final%20doc-2.doc<\/a><\/p>\n

Marga\u00a0<\/strong>2014\u00a0Issues of Truth and Accountability. The Last Stages of the War in Sri Lanka<\/em>, https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/s\/tdxwntf7wu5andq\/The%20Last%20Stages%20of%20the%20war%20in%20Sri%20Lanka.pdf?n=66191473<\/a><\/p>\n

Mohan, Rohini <\/strong>2014 The Seasons of Trouble. Life amid the Ruins of Sri Lanka\u2019s Civil War<\/em>, Noida, India, Harper Collins. <\/strong><\/p>\n

Narendran, Rajasingham\u00a0<\/strong>2014\u00a0\u201c<\/strong>Harsh Ground Realities in War: Decomposing Bodies and Missing Persons and Soldiers,\u201d 28 January 2014,https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/01\/28\/11702\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[Nessman] <\/strong>http:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/01\/31\/the-war-in-sri-lanka-ravi-nessmans-slanted-story-for-usa-on-the-tavis-smiley-show-18-february-200\/<\/p>\n

Noble, Kath\u00a0<\/strong>2013b \u201cNumbers Game reviewed by Kath Noble: The Full Monty,\u201d 14 July 2013,\u00a0https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2013\/07\/14\/numbers-game-reviewed-by-kath-noble-the-full-monty\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Paranagama <\/strong>2015 Report on the Second Mandate of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Complaints of Abductions and Disappearances<\/em>, August 2015<\/p>\n

Prasad, Kanchan<\/strong>\u00a0[2009] \u201cMullivaikkal Hospital in NFZ Last Redoubt,\u201d http:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/thuppahi\/sets\/72157626797848747\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Presidential Task Force <\/strong>2011 Sri Lanka\u2019s Humanitarian Effort<\/em>, http:\/\/www.defence.lk\/news\/pdf\/20110829_SRILANKAS_HE.pdf<\/strong>Reddy, B. Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009a \u201cCornered Tigers.<\/a>\u00a0The Sri Lanka Army takes control of the administrative and political capital of the LTTE,<\/a>\u201d\u00a0Frontline,<\/em>\u00a026\/2, 17-30 Jan 2009.Reddy, B. Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009b \u201cFinal Act<\/a>,\u201d\u00a0Frontline<\/em>, 26\/4, 14-27 February 2009<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Reddy, B. Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009c \u201cEnd Game<\/a>,\u201d\u00a0Frontline<\/em>\u00a026\/10, 9-22May 2009<\/p>\n

Reddy, B. Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009d \u201cAn Escape from Hellhole,\u201dhttp:\/\/www.hindu.com\/ 2009\/04\/25\/<\/a>stories\/2009042558390100.html.<\/p>\n

Reddy, Muralidhar\u00a0<\/strong>2009g \u201cMultiple Displacements, Total Loss of Identity,\u201d The Hindu<\/em>, 27 May 2009,http:\/\/www.hindu.com\/2009\/05\/27\/stories\/2009052755811500.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

Reddy, Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009e \u201cFinal Assault. A first-hand account of the war and the civilians\u2019 plight as Eelam War almost comes to a close,\u201d\u00a0Frontline<\/em>, 26\/11, May 23-June 5, 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/www.frontline.in\/navigation\/?type=static&page=archive<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Reddy, Muralidhar<\/strong>\u00a02009f \u201cFinal Hours. An eye-witness account of the last 70 hours of Eelam War IV,\u201d\u00a0Frontline<\/em>, 26\/12, 6-19 June 2009, http:\/\/www.frontline.in\/static\/html\/fl2612\/stories\/20090619261200900.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael <\/strong><\/p>\n

—–2009a \u201cDilemmas at War\u2019s End: Thoughts on Hard Realities,\u201d<\/strong> 10 Feb. 2009, http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2009\/02\/10\/dilemmas-at-wars-end-thoughts-on-hard-realities\/<\/a>, rep. in Roberts, Fire and Storm, <\/em>Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 267-74.<\/p>\n

—-2009b \u201cDilemma\u2019s at War\u2019s End: Clarifications and Counter-offensive,\u201d<\/strong> www. groundviews.org<\/a>, rep. in Roberts, Fire and Storm, <\/em>Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 275-87.<\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong> 2009 \u201cThe Rajapaksa Regime and the Fourth Estate,\u201d 9 December 2009, http:\/\/www.groundviews.org\/2009\/12\/08\/the-rajapakse-regime-and-the-fourth-estate\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—- 2010 \u201cLTTE and Tamil People,\u201d in Roberts, Fire and Storm<\/em>, Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 239-62.<\/p>\n

—- 2010 \u201cKilling Rajiv Gandhi: Dhanu\u2019s Metamorphosis in Death?\u201d<\/strong> South Asian History and Culture, <\/em>2010 1: 25-41.<\/p>\n

—- 2011 \u201cPeople of Righteousness march on Sri Lanka,\u201d<\/strong> The Island<\/em>, 22 June 2011 and https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/06\/27\/people-of-righteousness-target-sri-lanka\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2011b \u201cDeath and Eternal Life: Contrasting Sensibilities in the Face of\u00a0Corpses,\u201d<\/strong> 29 June 2011, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/06\/29\/death-and-eternal-life-contrasting-sensibilities-in-the-face-of-corpses\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—- 2011c \u201cA Think-Piece drafted in May\u00a02011,\u201d<\/strong> http:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress<\/a>. com \/2011\/07\/23\/a-think-piece-drafted-in-may\/#more-2998, 23 July 2011<\/p>\n

—-2011d<\/strong> \u201cReading \u201cdevastation\u201d: Botham, CMJ, Ban\u00a0Ki-Moon,\u201d<\/strong> 10 June 2011 https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/06\/10\/reading-%E2%80%9Cdevastation%E2%80%9D-botham-cmj-ban-ki-moon\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2011e<\/strong> \u201cAmnesty International reveals its Flawed Tunnel-Vision in Sri Lanka in\u00a02009,\u201d<\/strong> 10 Aug. 2011, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/08\/10\/amnesty-international-reveals-its-flawed-tunnel-vision-on-sri-lanka-in-2009\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2011f<\/strong> \u201cThe Tamil Death Toll in Early 2009: A Misleading Count by Rohan Gunaratna,\u201d<\/strong> 23 November 2011, http:\/\/transcurrents.com\/news-views\/archives\/6285<\/a>.<\/p>\n

—-2011g<\/strong> \u201cIDP-Camps-2009-Humanitarian-Work-in-Midst-of-Propaganda-War,\u201d [late 2011] being power-point slides for seminar at ICES, http:\/\/www.scribd.com\/doc\/202053396\/IDP-Camps-2009-Humanitarian-Work-in-Midst-of-Propaganda-War-by-Dr-Michael-Roberts<\/p>\n

—-2012a \u201cThe Torture Scene in \u201cKilling Fields\u201d and Gordon Weiss,\u201d <\/strong>9 January 2012, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2012\/01\/09\/the-torture-scene-in-killing-fields-and-gordon-weiss\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2012b \u201cInspirations: Hero Figures and Hitler in Young Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s\u00a0Thinking,\u201d<\/strong> Colombo Telegraph<\/em>, 12 February 2012, http:\/\/thuppahi<\/a>. wordpress.com\/2012\/11\/26\/velupillai-pirapaharan-veera-maranam\/\u2026 rep. in TPS: Essays<\/em>, 2014: 69-89.<\/p>\n

—- 2012c \u201c<\/strong>Blackmail during the Endgame in Eelam War\u00a0IV<\/a>,\u201d 12 April 2012, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2012\/04\/12\/blackmail-during-the-endgame-in-eelam-war-iv\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2012d \u201cVelupillai Pirapaharan: <\/strong>Veera Maranam<\/em>,\u201d <\/strong>26 November 2012, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2012\/11\/26\/velupillai-pirapaharan-veera-maranam\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2013a \u201cBBC-Blind: Misreading the Tamil Tiger Strategy of International Blackmail, 2008-13,\u201d<\/strong> 8 December 2013, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2013\/12\/08\/bbc-blind-misreading-the-tamil-tiger-strategy-of-international-blackmail-2008-13\/#more-11221<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2013b \u201cCongestion in the \u201cVanni Pocket\u201d<\/strong> January-May 2009: Appendix IV for \u201cBBC Blind,\u201d 8 December 2013, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2013\/12\/09\/congestion-in-the-vanni-pocket-january-may-2009- appendix-iv-for-bbc-blind\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—–2013c \u201cIDP Camps, 2009-Humanitarian Efforts in the Midst of Propaganda War, Power=Point Presentation at ICES, late 2011<\/p>\n

—-2013d \u201cTowards Citizenship in Thamil\u012blam<\/em> Sri Lanka\u2019s Tamil People of the North, 1983-2010,\u201d South Asia Research<\/em>, 2013, 33: 57-75.<\/p>\n

—-2014a \u201cGenerating Calamity, 2008-2014: An Overview of Tamil Nationalist Operations and Their Marvels,\u201d<\/strong> 10 April 2014, http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2014\/04\/10\/generating-calamity-2008-2014-an-overview-of-tamil-nationalist-operations-and-their-marvels\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2014b- \u201cThe War in Sri Lanka: Ravi Nessman\u2019s Slanted Story for USA on the Tavis Smiley Show, 18 February\u00a02009,\u201d 31 January 2014, http:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/01\/31\/the-war-in-sri-lanka-ravi-nessmans-slanted-story-for-usa-on-the-tavis-smiley-show-18-february-200\/<\/p>\n

—-2014e \u201c<\/strong>Dedicated Medical Work Amidst the Heat of War, Death and Propaganda: In the Vanni Pocket,\u00a02009<\/a>,\u201d https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/ 2012\/04\/12\/blackmail-during-the-endgame-in-eelam-war-iv\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2014f \u201cEncompassing Empowerment in Ritual, War & Assassination: Tantric Principles in Tamil Tiger Instrumentalities,\u201d<\/strong> in Social Analysis<\/em>,<\/strong> sp. issue on War Magic ed. by D. S. Farrer, —- Spring 2014, vol. 58, pp. 88-106.<\/p>\n

—-2014g \u201c<\/strong>Winning the War: Evaluating the Impact of API WENUWEN\u00a0API<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong> 1 Sept. 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/09\/01\/winning-the-war-evaluating-the-impact-of-api-wenuwen-ap\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2014h \u201c<\/strong>Truth Journalism? Marie Colvin hoist on her own\u00a0Petard<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong> 5 November 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/11\/05\/triuth-journalism-marie-colvin-hoist-on-her-own-petard\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2014i \u201cThe War in Sri Lanka and Post-War Propaganda,\u201d 18 November 2014, http:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/11\/18\/the-war-in-sri-lanka-and-propaganda-debates\/<\/a> \u2026being Memo sent to OISL with Hyperlinks and Images added<\/p>\n

—-2014j \u201cCartographic & Photographic Illustrations in support of the Memorandum Analysing the War in Sri Lanka and Its Propaganda\u00a0Debates<\/a>,\u201d 18 November 2014, http:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/11\/18\/cartographic-photographic-illustrations-in-support-of-the-memorandum-analysing-the-war-in-sri-lanka-and-propaganda-debates\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2014k Tamil Person and State. Essays<\/em>,<\/strong> Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2014<\/p>\n

—-2014l Tamil Person and State. Pictorial<\/em><\/strong>, Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2014<\/p>\n

—-2015a \u201cTargeting Sri Lanka by playing ball with Tamil Extremism,\u201d<\/strong> 24 July 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/wpadmin\/post.php?post=17127&action=edit&postpost=v2<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2015b \u201cAmbassador Blake in Never-Never-Land: Misreading LTTE Capacity in Early 2009,\u201d<\/strong> 26 August 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/08\/26\/ambassador-blake-in-never-never-land-misreading-ltte-capacity-in-early-2009\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2015c \u201cThe Realities of Eelam War IV,\u201d 27 October 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/10\/27\/the-realities-of-eelam-war-iv\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—-2016a \u201cSpeaking to Gotabaya-I: Plans Afoot in 2009 to Rescue the Tiger\u00a0Leadership<\/a>,\u201d 8 March 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/03\/08\/speaking-to-gotabaya-i-plans-afoot-in-2009-to-rescue-the-tiger-leadership\/#more-20092<\/a><\/p>\n

—–<\/strong>2016b \u201c<\/strong>Speaking to Gotabaya-II: Listening in on KP\u2019s Chats with Prabhakaran\u2019s \u2018Man\u00a0Friday\u2019,\u201d\u00a08 March 2016,\u00a0\u00a0 https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/03\/08\/speaking-to-gotabaya-ii-listening-in-on-kps-chats-with-prabhakarans-man-friday\/#more-20103<\/a><\/p>\n

—–<\/strong>2016c \u201c<\/strong>Gotabaya Rajapaksa Clarifies, III: American Volte Face in\u00a02008<\/a>,\u201d 10 March 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/03\/10\/gotabaya-rajapaksa-clarifies-iii-american-volte-face-in-2008\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—–<\/strong>2016d \u201cCrunched In-Between the Sinha-Le Activists and the Self-Righteous International\u00a0Cabal<\/a>,\u201d 9 February 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/02\/09\/crunched-in-between-the-sinha-le-activists-and-the-self-righteous-international-cabal\/<\/a><\/p>\n

—–<\/strong>2016e \u201cReuters in Word and Image: Depicting the Penetration of the LTTE\u2019s Last Redoubt, 19-22 April\u00a02009<\/a>,\u201d 19 March 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/03\/19\/reuters-in-word-and-image-depicting-the-penetration-of-the-lttes-last-redoubt-19-22-april-2009\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Salter, Mark <\/strong>2015 To End a Civil War. Norway\u2019s Peace Engagement in Sri Lanka, <\/em><\/strong>London: Hurst & Company.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Saravanamuttu, P. <\/strong>2009 \u201cUnending End Game,\u201d 9 March 2009,<\/strong> http:\/\/www.thesundayleader.lk\/archive\/20090308\/issues.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

Shanmugarajah, V.\u00a0<\/strong>2014\u00a0\u201c<\/strong>Dr. Veerakanthipillai Shanmugarajah\u2019s Affidavit Description of Conditions in the Vanni Pocket in Refutation of Channel Four,\u201d 5 January 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/01\/05\/drveerakanthipillai-shanmugarajahs-affidavit-description-of-conditionsin-the-vanni-pocket-in-refutation-of-channel-four\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Sundarji, Padma Rao <\/strong>2015 Sri Lanka. The New Country<\/em>, Harper Collins India.<\/p>\n

Tammita-Delgoda, S.\u00a0<\/strong>2009 \u201cSri Lanka: The Last Phase in Eelam War IV. From Chundikulam to Pudukulam,\u201d New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare, Manekshaw Paper No. 13,http:\/\/www.claws.in\/administrator\/uploaded_files\/1274263403MP%2022.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n

Tammita-Delgoda, S.<\/strong>\u00a02014a \u201cCrossing the Lines: Tamils Escapees from the Last Redoubt meet the\u00a0Army<\/a>,\u201d 21 September 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/wpadmin\/post. php?post=13751&action\u00a0 =edit&message=6&postpost=v2<\/a><\/p>\n

Tammita-Delgoda, S.\u00a0<\/strong>2014b \u201cReading Between the Lines in April 2009: Tammita-Delgoda takes apart Marie Colvin\u2019s jaundiced propaganda article in British\u00a0newspaper<\/a>,\u201d 26 September 2014,https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/09\/26\/rading-between-the-lines-in-april-2009-tammita-delgoda-takes-apart-marie-colvins-jaundiced-propanda-article-in-british-newspaper\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Times\u00a0<\/strong>2011 \u201cTIMES Aerial Images, NFZ Last Redoubt, 23 May 2009,\u201d http:\/\/www.flickr.com\/ photos\/thuppahi\/sets\/72157626922360092\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Taraki [D. P. Sivaram]<\/strong> 2004a \u201cLTTE Develops Asymmetric Deterrence to Stall Foreign Intervention,\u201d Daily Mirror, <\/em>22 May 2004.<\/p>\n

Taraki [D. P. Sivaram]<\/strong> 2004b \u201cStrategic Positioning Vital for Military Advantage,\u201d Daily Mirror, <\/em>21 July 2004.<\/p>\n

UNPoE\u00a0<\/strong>2011\u00a0Report of the Secretary General\u2019s Panel of Experts report on Accountability in Sri Lanka,\u00a0<\/em>March 2011\u2026.http:\/\/www.un.org\/News\/dh\/infocus\/Sri_Lanka\/ POE_Report_Full.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

UTHR<\/strong>\u00a02009\u00a0A Marred Victory and a Defeat Pregnant with Meaning,\u00a0<\/em>Special Report No. 32.\u00a0http:\/\/www.uthr.org\/SpecialReports\/spreport32.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

UTHR<\/strong>\u00a02009\u00a0Let Them Speak: Truth about Sri Lanka\u2019s Victims of War<\/em>. Special Report No. 34,\u00a0http:\/\/www.uthr.org\/SpecialReports\/Special%20rep34\/Uthr-sp.rp34.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Video Image [GSL]<\/strong>\u00a02014 \u201cA balanced insight into the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict \u2013 \u201cCommon Differences\u201d (HD),\u201d\u00a0https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=_L8QfZw0XUo<\/a><\/p>\n

Washington Post<\/strong> 2009 \u201cClinton & self-styled peacemakers obstructing Tiger defeat,\u201d 27 April 2009,http:\/\/www.priu.gov.lk\/news_update\/Current_Affairs\/ca200904\/20090427clinton_self_styled_peacemakers_obstructing_tiger_defeat.htm<\/a><\/p>\n

Wax, Emily 2009 \u201cWithout Me, They Couldn’t Win the War’ — Former Tamil Tiger Commander Says He Helped Weaken Rebellion\u201d, 11 February 2009, http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2009\/02\/10\/AR2009021003343.html<\/p>\n

Weiss, Gordon\u00a0<\/strong>2011a\u00a0The Cage<\/em>, Sydney: Picador..<\/p>\n

Weiss, Gordon\u00a0<\/strong>2012\u00a0\u201c<\/strong>New Evidence \u2014 The Death of Colonel Ramesh,\u201d 21 March 2012,\u00a0https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/newevidencethe-death-of-colonel-ramesh-warning-disturbing-images\/<\/a><\/p>\n

You Tube Video [GSL]<\/strong> 2013 \u201cThe Last Phase,\u201d http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/RQmn4ubPy5A<\/a>.<\/p>\n

FOOTNOTES<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> This long essay was sent to The editor of Groundviews in late March. After a reminder I was told on 4th<\/sup> April that GV had decided not to present it.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> It has taken me years to develop the capacity to present the distillation that follows (as any study of my writings would reveal). Perhaps the best support for the summary that follows will be found in Roberts, Tamil Person and State<\/em>, 2 vols. (2014) and in \u201cThe Realities of Eelam War IV,\u201d 27 October 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/10\/27\/the-realities-of-eelam-war-iv\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> The LTTE commercial transport ships did not carry internationally recognized insignia when carrying arms illegally, though they may have had some Panama registration.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> See Roberts, Tamil Person and State. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014, pp. 112-14; Jane\u2019s Naval Intelligence 2009; De Silva-Ranasinghe, \u201cMaritime Counter-Terrorism,\u201d 2009; and Chandradasa n. d. Note: Pirap\u0101haran \u201ctold me in 2000 that in the coming years the outcome of the war would be decided at sea\u201d (KP speaking – in Jeyaraj, KP speaks out,<\/em> 2011: 20).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s biographers have indicated that in his youthful days. he carefully digested the works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu in translation or through interpreters. Dayan Jayatilleka has rightly noted that Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s programme was guided by \u201cthe twinning of tactical flexibility with strategic implacability\u201d ((2013: 49). The latter principle eventually led to his demise.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> See the characterization from within SL Tamil society in Bavinck, 2014 and Hoole 2001. Supplement this reading with the insightful analysis in Jayatilleka 2013: 38-59.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> See Figs. 62-64 in Roberts, Tamil Person and State. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014, pp. 106-08.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> A point dinned into me in 2009 by Muralidhar Reddy on the basis of his interviews with Tamils who managed to escape. Note that he conducted interviews with about 80-90 of those who slipped out of the LTTE corral in the last eight months of the war in the course of his frequent visits to the rear battle front. A careful reading of the detailed recounting of the tales retailed by the Tigress identified by the pseudonym Mugil in Rohini Mohan\u2019s The Seasons of Trouble<\/em> (2014) will indicate both facets of this story of continued loyalty to the Tigers and growing disenchantment.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> See especially the two images numbered 104a and 104b \u2013 taken from TamilNet, 1 May 2009 \u2013 in Roberts, Tamil Person and State. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014 which show people moving southwards along the ocean waterline on foot and with tractor and bicycle<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> As Murali Reddy indicated to me in several conversations over the years, at this stage the Tamil people had little reason to trust the Sinhala dominated Rajapaksa government and their exodus eastwards and northwards was mostly willing. It was not till early 2009 and the implementation of draconian demands by the LTTE that considerable segments of the populace jettisoned their loyalty to the Tiger cause (see Roberts, \u201cTowards Citizenship in Thamil\u012blam<\/em>,\u201d 2013).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> See Roberts, \u201c<\/strong>Blackmail<\/strong>,\u201d <\/strong>2012\u00a0<\/strong>and \u201c<\/strong>Generating Calamity<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong> 2014.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Roberts, \u201cFourth Estate,\u201d 2009, http:\/\/www.groundviews.org\/2009\/12\/08\/the-rajapakse-regime-and-the-fourth-estate\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> See Figs.73-75 in Roberts, Tamil Person and State, Pictorial<\/em>, 2014: 117-19.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Note video report of Al-Jazeera 2008 and de Silva-Ranasinghe, \u201cVictory, 2009a.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> In typical military bluster Brigadier Shavendra Silva responded to Bryson Hull\u2019s query about a final victory thus: “How long it will take is not in weeks. I am talking in days” (Hull, 23 Feb. 2009). One has to consider why his assessment was wrong in its detail amidst the validity of his general thrust.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> The likelihood was that the 55th<\/sup> Division would advance down the coastal line from the Jaffna Peninsula, while the 59th<\/sup> would head for Mullaitivu and then push up the coast. Indeed, Jeyaraj indicates that the SL Army had such a plan (\u201cFraudulent Concept,\u201d 2009). There was the additional option of an amphibious landing with naval vessels in support. Bryson Hull\u2019s news report of 23rd<\/sup> February notes that most of the people were now located in the second NFZ on the coast. (Hull 2009).<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> The displacing of KP and the appointment of Castro in his place in 2001\/02, arguably, was one of the cardinal errors in Pirap\u0101haran\u2019s life story.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Even at this stage, a dire situation, KP\u2019s tasks in 2009 seem to have been restrained and even thwarted by jealousies in the LTTE\u2019s international circuits. As some observers would say, in these internal back-stabbings the Tamil Tigers were not different from the majority of Sri Lankans.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Email note from David Jeyaraj to Roberts, 24 November 2015. Also see Jeyaraj 2011: 34.<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> An infuriating shortcoming in the Norwegian account ghosted via Mark Salter is the failure, whether by design or carelessness, to specify dates in several critical instances. This is compounded by an absence of documentation on occasions.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> Salter 2015: 354. Remarkably, the Minister of Defence (Gotabaya Rajapaksa) was not aware of this visit and suggested that the American officials could have slipped in through other diplomatic channels (Roberts, \u201cSpeaking to Gotabaya,I,\u201d 2016). While it is conceivable that he was playing poker with me, we must mull over the implications of this statement.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> I am not free to divulge this source.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> See BBC 2013; Pflanz 2011 and Bowden 1999.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> My informant (fn. 13) tells me that \u201cthe [US] diplomats had few illusions that the conditions to create a permissive environment would be met.\u201d S\/he also indicated that David Miliband (British Foreign Minister) was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of a rescue intervention \u2013 an indication of the impractical doctrinaire cocoon in which Miliband was residing and further proof that rescue plan was placed before Pirap\u0101haran in late April and not in early March \u2013 for the reason that the Miliband-Kouchner visit to Sri Lanka was in late April.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> The assault assassination of Osama bin Laden may well have been with the assent of the Pakistan military; but in any event it was a less complicated job than any evacuation plan for the LTTE and civilians in north east Sri Lanka.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> At some point the Sri Lankan military leaked information about the plans afoot to the media \u2013 a deliberate act that agitated the US embassy officials and a step that must surely have been approved by both Gotabhaya and Mahinda Rajapaksa. PK Balachandran tells me that this was in late April \u2013 in which case we are considering a second international effort to devise a workable rescue plan.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> Email note from David Jeyaraj to Roberts, 24 November 2015.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> The British scholar Rajesh Venugopal spent some time in Thamiilam<\/em> in the 200s in the course of his researches and he told me that one pillar of the insurgent state\u2019s economy was the pool of monies sent as salary or pension.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> See Presidential Task Force 2011, chap. 2, especially the images of the logistics hub and fleets of lorries on pp. 11 & 15.<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> See Roberts, \u201cUS Action,\u201d 2015 and Tamil Person and State<\/em>. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014, p. 140 where Fig. 95 shows one of the medivac operations. The number of ICRC convoys is an underestimate and is derived from Citizen Silva\u2019s (aka IDAG) remarkable cataloguing (the ICRC stonewalled when I called).<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> See Roberts, \u201cIDP Camps,\u201d 2011 and TPS. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014: Figs. 140-159.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a> This important reservation was not referred to again in subsequent despatches, but Salter\u2019s book indicates that Pirapaharan and Pottu Amman would not have been granted any amnesty (2015: 365).<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> See Blake Des. No. 33 of 9 January and Secret Despatch No. 133 of 5th<\/sup> February 209. The latter observed \u201cWithout a credible political settlement, the LTTE might be able to carry on a guerilla insurgency with the support of the Diaspora\u2026\u201d. An insurgency depends on a supporting population. There were no people in the portions of the northern Vanni to the west of the A9 road; while the Eastern Province had been pacified. The thinking of the American liberal arts personnel in Colombo on this issue seems quite stupid and one wonders if they had any conversations with their very own Military Attache.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> [Blake] Despatch No. 106 0f 29 Jan 2009. The next sentence says: \u201cPresident Rajapaksa was receptive to these concerns.\u201d Blake did not refer to Mukherjee\u2019s crystal clear denunciation of the LTTE as \u201cterrorists.\u201d See You-Tube presentation of Pranab Mukherjee\u2019s rushed visit to Sri Lanka circa 25 January 2009 — https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=_4zJKIWGT2Q<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>[35]<\/a> See Roberts, \u201cGenerating Calamity\u201d 2014 and \u201cThe Realities of Eelam War IV,\u201d 2015.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Note that at one point in early 2009 a leading LTTE official, Pulidevan, told a friend in Europe that \u201cJust as in Kosovo if enough civilians died in Sri Lanka the world would be forced to step in\u201d<\/strong> (quoted in Harrison 2012: 63).<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a>Such a refusal must surely have been conveyed immediately to the Norwegians and USA.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> This guestimate is worked out thus: GSL figures indicate that 3,484, 31,694 and 24,619 persons fled the rump Thamil\u012blam <\/em>terrain in January, February and March respectively. So I have subtracted this total of 59,791 from the rough estimate (mine) of 320,000-330,000 in the Last Redoubt in early January.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> See De Silva-Ranasinghe 2009 and Tammita-Delgoda 2014.<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> See Jeyaraj 2009a \u201cTheepan,\u201d and 2009b \u201cAnatomy.\u201d Theepan, Vidusha, Kamalini, Mohanna, Durga, Keerthi, Nagesh were among the commanders who died. There is an account of this incident in the Sunday Times<\/em> by Fuard (2009) which also embraces the land and sea battles around Chalai on the northern boundary of Tiger territory. USA too was aware of this unfolding event \u2013 see Blake\u2019s despatch BBB of 2nd<\/sup> April. Also note Salter 2015: 000.<\/strong><\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> Blake to Washington, Despatch No. 308 of 19th<\/sup> March 2009 (also see despatch No. 307 of same date).<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a> I expressed this fear on the phone to Kumari Jayawardena in mid-April when I reached Wellawatte from Adelaide. On 21 April 2019 DBS Jeyaraj also spoke of a \u201cmassive bloodbath\u201d as likely (quoted in Salter 2915: 363).<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> I stepped out on a limb and wrote four essays on this line of possibility for the web site transcurrents<\/em> beginning with one on2 April 2009. The articles have since been amalgamated into one essay, entitled \u201cLTTE and Tamil People,\u201d in Roberts, Fire and Storm<\/em>, 2010: 239-62. That\u2019 this idea was\/is not fanciful is seen in the weight given to this possibility by General Holmes (Military Expert Opinion by Major General (Retd) John Holmes, in Paranagama Commission Report, 2015. pp. 243-44).<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> See Despatch No 413 of 13 April \u2013 \u201cAmbassador pointed out that it was common knowledge the Tamil Tigers won’t let the civilians go. A better alternative, he said, would be for the GSL to allow a UN envoy to go into the safe zone during the pause to talk directly to LTTE supremo Prabhakaran about terms for letting the civilians go and surrender of those LTTE cadres still in the safe zone. 9. (SBU) Bogollagama countered that the GSL was worried that the LTTE would seek to generate public relations capital from a visit, or try to string out the discussions. Ambassador explained that the UN and others could make clear publicly what the parameters of the visit were. Ambassador said the UN would have to be clear that the urgency of getting civilians out of harm’s way would not permit lengthy negotiations. He observed the alternative of sending th army into the safe zone would be disastrous for Sri Lanka. The GSL’s own Unmanned Aerial Vehicle footage confirmed the LTTE is building a berm, bunkers and trenches in anticipation of an attack. The bunkers will shelter cadres so it is the civilians who will be killed, Ambassador noted. The LTTE would like nothing more than to see 10,000 or more civilians killed which would give them a new 1983-style massacre around which they could rejuvenate the LTTE after its military defeat. Large civilian casualties would also have serious longer-term consequences for the GSL. Ambassador sought Bogollagama’s personal intervention in raising these issues in the National Security Council meeting.\u201d<\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> Blake Despatch 418 of 15th<\/sup> April. Rajapaksa met this demand by reiterating the \u201cGSL offer of amnesty to all LTTE fighters, except LTTE leader Prabakharan and Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman.\u201d<\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Blake Despatch No. 283 of 12 March 2009.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/a> The LTTE leadership saw the Indian elections as a potential lifeline because they hoped that a hung Parliament would enable the Tamilnadu political parties to enter a coalition government and sway policy towards Sri Lanka. This was widely known. The Tiger deadline therefore became a mark for the SL armed forces.<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> A translation of a leaflet was placed on web by DBS Jeyaraj and is now reproduced in Salter (2015: 364); while reference to the loudspeaker usage occur in accounts from Tamils who escaped (for e.g. in \u201cThe Last Phase,\u201d (You Tube Video<\/a>).<\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> See bottom of Hull & Sirilal 2009a and follow http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/news\/picture\/sri-lankan-war-in-endgame-100000-escape?articleId=USTRE53J0IZ20090422&slideId=9807410. The pictures are now reproduced in Roberts, \u201cReuters,\u201d 2016. Also see Roberts, Tamil Person and State, Pictorial<\/em>, 2014: Figs. 102-03.<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a> The general public in Lanka saw snatches on some local television networks, or shellfire or but these presentations were clearly edited, itsy-bitsy and not in real time.<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> See Gamage 2014 and Roberts, \u201cAmerican Action,\u201d 2015.<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> Those who have doubts on this point should digest the judgements as well as details in (a) Bavinck 2011 (b) Ben Bavinck\u2019s diaries (Of Tamils and Tigers<\/em>, 2014) and (b) Rajan Hoole, The Arrogance of Power<\/em>, 2001.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> The TNA had consciously and willingly fallen at the feet of the LTTE from the late 1990s and displayed its total compliance during the Pongu Thamil pageants of the 2002-05 period. On this aspect, see especially Dayan Jayatilleka 2013: \u2026. and Roberts, Tamil Person and State, Pictorial<\/em>, 2014, Figs. 55 & 56. So there was historical logic in this arrangement.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> This is my charge in Roberts, \u201cAmerican Action,\u201d 2015.<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> Annex I \u2013 Military Expert Opinion by Major General (Retd) John Holmes, in Paranagama Commission Report, 2015. pp. 243-44.<\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> See The Cage <\/em>2011: 171-226, espec. 180, 183, 189, 192-93,212-13, 218-19. Weiss also berates the LTTE and does refer to humane acts by the SL Army with approval on occasions. It is the one-sided excess, misguided evaluation of possibilities in the circumstances prevailing, bloated estimates of the death toll that brings his presentations into question. In asserting that \u201cthe Sri Lankan government deliberately denied the besieged population food, medicine, shelter and medical aid\u201d (p. 196), he also lied.<\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> What sees in these two instances is blatant dishonesty and chicanery in the public assessments of moral crusaders clothed in ethical garments. See Roberts, \u201cCrunched In-between,\u201d 2016d<\/strong>..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026 <\/strong>https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/02\/09\/crunched-in-between-the-sinha-le-activists-and-the-self-righteous-international-cabal\/<\/a> for the documentation of these charges.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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