{"id":168178,"date":"2016-09-27T00:19:04","date_gmt":"2016-09-26T18:49:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/?p=168178"},"modified":"2016-10-02T11:40:53","modified_gmt":"2016-10-02T06:10:53","slug":"from-hesitant-compromise-to-resolve-mahinda-rajapaksa-in-2006","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/from-hesitant-compromise-to-resolve-mahinda-rajapaksa-in-2006\/","title":{"rendered":"From Hesitant Compromise To Resolve: Mahinda Rajapaksa In 2006"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Michael Roberts<\/span><\/a> \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Dr.<\/a>

Dr. Michael Roberts<\/p><\/div>\n

Delineating the fault lines and events that generated the ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese Sri Lanka since 1948 will demand careful historical work that builds upon the many studies by a battery of scholars thus far — referring here to a whole line of intellectual work extending from Howard Wriggins through Robert Kearney, KM de Silva, SJ Tambiah and AJ Wilson to Nira Wickremasinghe. Historical causation is usually multi-factorial not singular. It is also marked by critical episodes and temporal moments. Each episode and\/or phase is likely as not to be generated by several causes involving a multiplicity of factors.<\/p>\n

Whenever I have chanced upon tales that enabled a dissection of significant episodes in the history of the ethnic conflict, I have seized the moment. Clarifying the key events and personalities that figured in the process by which the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) overcame the disastrous loss of their military complex at Elephant Pass in early 2000 has been one recent study (Roberts 2016c). Losing control of Jaffna Peninsula at that point would have been disastrous for GSL and arguably for Sri Lankan society writ large. Thamil\u012blam <\/em>would have been consolidated and the course of subsequent events altered. The chief hero then was Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte<\/a> and the ordinary soldiers in the peninsula war theatre with President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the Pakistani government in supporting roles (Roberts, \u201cRatwatte,\u201d 2016 c).<\/p>\n

\"mahinda-kebatigollewa\"<\/a>Here, I dissect[1]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> another turning point involving the events leading to the onset of Eelam War IV. I emphasize the series of events in mid-2006 which led President Rajapaksa to shelve his earnest, albeit tentative, efforts to work out a compromise with the LTTE and to come to the determination that defeating the Tiger was the only path forward. That is, I indicate that Mahinda Rajapaksa was faced with a Hobson\u2019s Choice then in July-August 2006. He pursued the only course left.[2]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Parenthetically, let me observe that my pursuit of this study will only damn me further in the eyes of those who have concluded that I am partial to Rajapaksa. These voices are not confined to internet assassins such as \u201cFitzpatrick\u201d and the feature writer Emil Vanderpoorten.[3]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Even the moderate Tamil scholar Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, who is no lover of the Tigers, has accused me directly: \u201cI could understand why people like Emil Vanderpoorten tend to agree with Dr. Gnana blindly. This is unfortunately because of your\u00a0non-criticism of the Rajapaksas at any time (in the aftermath of the civil war),\u00a0which gives the impression that you are a champion (or blind follower)\u00a0of the Rajapaksas\u201d\u00a0(email note: 9th<\/sup> April 2016). Whether Sarvananthan and other critics are aware of my several criticisms of the Rajapaksa government,[4]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> I cannot say. However, as an analyst devoted to historical and political dissection, I must seize any \u2018moment\u2019 that throws up pertinent data on significant episodes in the tale of political crises in our island.<\/p>\n

The events leading to the outbreak of Eelam War IV, clearly, are significant. The reasons why I abandoned my earlier position of the 1990s-2003, namely, a na\u00efve faith in the desirability of compromise and the choice of \u201cpragmatic Eelam\u201d by the Sri Lankan Tamils,[5]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> demands a separate essay.[6]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Both these ventures demand a clarification of the political context prevailing then in the first six years of the twenty-first century
\n
\n<\/strong>The Setting: 2002-06<\/strong><\/p>\n

In overview, one could say that Eelam War III (1996-2001) was a disaster for GSL[7]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> While the LTTE too had suffered severe casualties during this phase they had gained in confidence and now, by 2002, had the leading Tamil moderates in their pocket in the new-front known as the Tamil National Alliance.[8]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> In signing the \u201cCeasefire Agreement\u2019 with GSL in February 2002 the LTTE also gained a great deal politically (apart from a respite wherein they could build up their military capacity). They had international recognition and became a de facto state \u2013 albeit still tagged as \u201cterrorist\u201d in certain quarters, including GSL voices.[9]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

The media event at Kilinochchi on 11th<\/sup> April 2002 was a world event and paved the way for the LTTE to participate at several peace talks (Sattahip, Nakhon Pathom, Oslo, Berlin, Nakhom Pathom, Hakone) brokered by the Norwegians over the next couple of years.[10]<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>There is room to suggest that several Norwegian envoys and Erik Solheim in particular became \u2018aides\u2019 partial to LTTE interests during the next few years.\u00a0We are in need of a careful study that dissects the Norwegian and Solheim role in Sri Lankan affairs in the 2000s — one that goes beyond the Solheim hagiography presented by Mark Salter (2015)<\/p>\n

\"kebatigollewa-ltte-attack\"<\/a>The ceasefire agreement was an unequal arrangement. Where GSL envoys or personnel had to face rigorous checks and\/or monitoring to enter the territory of Thamililam<\/em>, Tiger personnel had considerable freedom in entering other parts of the island. The LTTE was even able to sponsor \u201cPongu Thamil\u201d pageants in government territory — with that in the Jaffna Peninsula attracting over 200,000 people (Salter 2015: 223). Besides indicating the massive popularity of the Tiger project, these gatherings signaled the degree to which the Tamil politicians residing in GSL space were catspaws of the LTTE period (see Roberts, Tamil Person & State. Pictorial<\/em>, 2014: 100).<\/p>\n

Though the tsunami on 26th December 2004 wrought havoc in the coastal districts held by the LTTE as well as those elsewhere,[11]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> it provided another instrument in the LTTE locker in the form of funds and greater INGO involvement in relief work within Thamil\u012blam<\/em>. The<\/p>\n

Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation was set up by the LTTE to exploit these channels and became a respected civilian agency eligible for funding and international trips.[12]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Throughout, from 1990 to the first decade of the 21st<\/sup> century, Thamil\u012blam<\/em> remained a single-party fascist state under a dictator, its talaivar <\/em>Pirap\u0101haran. The writings of Narayan Swamy as well as those of Rajan Hoole and the UTHR personnel made that quite clear \u2013 then.[13]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> With the advantage of hindsight we also know that the LTTE utilized the period of peace to recuperate and strengthen its military capacities.[14]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> The impact of the tsunami delayed its intentions of resuming war, but \u2013 as we know now \u2013 they moved towards this end confidently in mid-2006 (see note below on Thamil Chelvam re Mavil Aru talks).<\/p>\n

Initially, in 2002-04, the LTTE faced a dual government: with a President from the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (elected in 1999) and a parliamentary majority headed by Ranil Wickremasinghe of the United National Party after the General Election of 5th<\/sup> December 2001. However, the General Elections of 2 April 2004 saw the United Peoples\u2019 Freedom Alliance, with the SLFP as its principal unit, regaining control of the government \u2013 with Mahinda Rajapaksa as its Prime Minister.<\/p>\n

President Chandrika Kumaratunga attempted to delay the scheduled Presidential Election of late 2005 for another year<\/a>, but the Supreme Court determined otherwise.[15]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> This meant that a Presidential Election was on the cards in late 2005. As before, it was known that the SLFP and UNP would provide the main candidates, with Mahinda Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremasinghe as the obvious choices from within their ranks.<\/p>\n

In Lakshman Kadirgamar the SLFP also had a highly-capable statesman who had impressed the international circuit as Foreign Minister and was rumoured to be the likely Prime Minister if Rajapaksa won the Presidential race. As Kadirgamar was a Tamil, this prospect was anathema to Pirap\u0101haran and the LTTE.[16]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> From his early days Pirap\u0101haran had pursued one tactic against those who opposed him from within this coterie or in enemy ranks: eliminate them. Assassination was a key weapon in his political\/military armoury.[17]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Alfred Duraiappah, Michael, Uma Maheswaran, Amirthalingam, Rajiv Gandhi and Mahaththaya had been among the kills he had carried out by his own hand or through Tiger operatives up to 2005.[18]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

The Ceasefire Agreement(s) did not extend to the dirty underground war pursued by the LTTE in the years 2002-06. Perceptive Tamils forecast that Kadirgamar would also face assassination[19]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> \u2013 not only because he was a prominent Tamil in the ranks of the enemy, but because of his capacities and potentiality. A Tiger sniper killed him outside his home swimming pool<\/a> one dark evening on the 12th<\/sup> August 2005. Again, a year later the former Tamil militant Kethesh Loganathan was murdered on 12th<\/sup> August 2006<\/a> because he was serving the GSL as an official in the Peace Secretariat.<\/p>\n

The killing of Kadirgamar was one step in the Tiger plan to secure a weakened enemy in the war that was planned for the near future. The other step was to ensure that a Sinhala hawk won the Presidential Election. A hawk in the Sinhala pole would assist the LTTE in its international campaign in the Western world. Mahinda Rajapaksa was not only less urbane, but more hawk than Ranil Wickremasinghe.[20]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> So, the LTTE asked Tamil voters throughout the land not to cast their votes, thereby depriving Wickremasinghe and the UNP of potential pro-UNP\/Ranil votes.[21]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

In consequence, Mahinda Rajapaksa won the Presidential race \u2013 sneaking in by 50.3 per cent of the votes. This was what the Tiger doctors had desired. A hawk on the other pole would render their war plans and war games more legitimate. A hawk could be more easily ensnared in battle.<\/p>\n

This was, as we now know, a misjudgment. As Gerald Peiris indicates (2009: 205), Rajapaksa showed \u201cingenuity in maintaining a dove-hawk image\u201d during the years 2005-06. That is the point of this article: to provide information that indicates (A) efforts by Mahinda Rajapaksa to appease the LTTE in 2005\/06 despite many provocations and (B) the deepening of his commitment to war in the circumstances that he faced.<\/p>\n

Critical information emerged in the course of an interview with Lalith Weeratunga on 14th<\/sup> June 2016, information that confirmed one rumour that I had picked up from Harsha Navaratne some years back.[22]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> This interview also revealed that (a) Mahinda Rajapaksa sought a modus vivendi<\/em> and some form of cohabitation in 2006; but that (b) events led him to jettison these explorations and to face the outcome, namely, full-scale war.<\/p>\n

I stress here that my visit to Sri Lanka in June 2016, involving a two-month stay, was directed mainly towards finalizing the publication of two books on history.[23]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> However, I had been chipping away in 2015\/16 at deeper understandings of the circumstances surrounding my analysis of \u201cThe Realties of Eelam War IV\u201d (Roberts, \u201cRealities,\u201d 2015c) as well as incidents beyond that event extending to the international manoeuvres centred on the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva a<\/a>nd New York. In Lanka subsidiary endeavours were feasible at close quarters and some opportunities were seized.<\/p>\n

The unfortunate death of Ananda Chittambalam had removed a friend who had assisted me with contacts and advice on many fronts. But I knew that he had been quite friendly with Lalith Weeratunga, a civil servant who worked as Rajapaksa\u2019s official Private Secretary. I used this link to approach Weeratunga, who readily agreed to meet me. This interview has provided me with vital pieces of information,[24]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> aided by the fact that Weeratunga seems to have been a meticulous public servant (for instance he indicated that his working days with President usually extended from 5.00 am to 11.00 pm virtually non-stop).<\/p>\n

Rajapkasa: Tentative Moves towards a Modus Vivendi in 2006<\/strong><\/p>\n

Though the ceasefire held in formal terms from 2002-06, there were ceasefire violations from both sides, with the vast majority initiated by the LTTE \u2013 as many as 5700 in Palitha Kohona\u2019s recollections.[25]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> These included a few naval attacks by the Sea Tigers and the killing of about 150 armed services personnel at various points of time.[26]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Despite such ominous signs, Mahinda Rajapaksa held out an olive branch by sending Weeratunga to the small village of Arippu on the north-west coast[27]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> in early March 2006 to meet one Pooivannan(?), a senior LTTE official, in order to sort out issues pertaining to the supplies for the Tamil peoples in LTTE territory that were being sent on a regular basis.[28]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

This visit was without fanfare and incognito. Weeratunga was smuggled into Thamililam <\/em>in a Sewalanka vehicle bearing its head Harsha Navaratne. Sewalanka was a local NGO that was heavily involved in welfare and relief work in the north and east. Parenthetically, let me note that the Sewalanka office in Vavuniya, headed invariably by Tamils,[29]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> was at the centre of its efforts in both Vavuniya District and the lands commanded by the LTTE.<\/p>\n

Weeratunga informed me that these discussions at Arippu were amicable. It seems, then, that Rajapaksa\u2019s government was still disposed towards maintaining the status quo. However, incidents of violence and tension from both sides were mounting. In a major move the LTTE attempted to kill Lieut-General Sarath Fonseka<\/a> at the SLA headquarters in Colombo on 25th<\/sup> April 2006, but only succeeded in wounding him<\/a>.[30]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Weeratunga\u2019s inside information indicates that, more than this incident, it was the LTTE attack on a bus bearing Sinhalese people at Kebithigollewa in Anuradhapura District on 15th<\/sup> June 2006 that consolidated Rajapaksa\u2019s resolve. Two claymore mines devastated that bus — with 66 persons being torn apart by that explosion<\/a>, while others were injured.[31]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Mahinda Rajapaksa took Weeratunga with him when he flew by helicopter to the site where he attended the harrowing scenes of burial.[32]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> On the return flight to Colombo Rajapaksa was \u201cvery silent for quite a while.\u201d Suddenly, speaking in Sinhala, he told Weeratunga: \u201cWe must finish these people off. There is no point in dealing with them.\u201d<\/p>\n

So, his pre-existing inclinations and resolve on these lines had now solidified.[33]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> One can assume that he discussed matters with Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (his brother and Defence Minister) and the military chiefs and that they continued to pursue the programme of military transformation already in place \u2013 not least (1) the increase in manpower and (2) the revolutionary re-skilling of the SL Army into a force capable of night operations as well as deep penetration via SIOT teams.[34]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

A month later the LTTE took its first step towards the renewal of war. Circa 20th<\/sup> July 2006 they closed the sluice gates at Mavil Aru in the Eastern Province south of Trincomalee. This irrigation system sustained the Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil villages to the north and east of the sluice gates.[35]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> As Gerald Peiris has concluded, this was \u201ca classic riparian gambit\u2014a challenge for a showdown for control of the entire Mahaveli delta, based on the [Tiger leadership\u2019s] belief that the recovery from the Karuna and tsunami setbacks was adequate \u2026 for its fighting cadres to achieve the twin objectives of evicting not only the security forces, but also the Muslim inhabitants from this area\u201d (Peiris 2009: 217).<\/p>\n

Even at this point Rajapaksa attempted to save the peace. There are slivers of evidence that he sent a senior minister, Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, a person of Colombo Chetty lineage with proficiency in Tamil, to meet Thamil Chelvam.[36]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> Details of this meeting are sketchy but significant. It is said that Thamil Chelvam was belligerent: \u2018we will teach you all a lesson\u201d sums up the message conveyed to Colombo via Fernandopulle if rumours can be relied upon.[37]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Another rumour caps this tale. Fernandopulle is said to have indicated to Thamil Chelvam: \u201cPirap\u0101haran may be from the jungles in the north, but the Rajapaksas are from the jungles down south. They do not back down easily.\u201d That rumour is misplaced[38]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> \u2013 one purveyed in Rajapaksa circles and attached to several incidents. It is nevertheless based on an actual exchange that occurred earlier with Lalith Weeratunga as witness. This exchange was between the President and the Norwegian envoy, Erik Solheim, and occurred early in April 2006.[39]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Weeratunga had conducted some business with his boss one day when President Rajapaksa indicated that Solheim was about to meet him. Weeratunga rose to leave because foreign affairs were not part of his brief, but Rajapaksa insisted that he wait. The one-on-one discussion focused on the ceasefire agreement with which Mahinda Rajapaksa was extremely unhappy because of its inequities and imbalances. Solheim\u2019s arguments in favour of the existing situation were on hard-nosed pragmatic grounds: Pirap\u0101haran, he stressed, was \u201ca military genius\u201d and the Tigers could not be defeated. He was immediately challenged by President Rajapaksa, a man who was not trained in diplomatic suaveness: \u201cto you he may be a military genius. But I am going to finish him militarily. That man may think he is king of the jungles, but I am from the jungles in the south \u2026.\u201d[40]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

It is this encounter that has since been attached to different exchanges at different spots, but with Mahinda Rajapaksa as original spokesman or centre-piece. Gossip sometimes purveys nuggets of truth amidst its embellishments and distortions.<\/p>\n

And so it transpired. The resolve and leadership of the Rajapaksas, assisted by the people in government-territory and the rejuvenated fighting capacities of all the security services (army, navy, air force, police and home guards) — in circumstances where the GSL had more human resources than the leaders of Thamil\u012blam <\/em>and where India lent covert support and China & Pakistan provided substantial aid — saw GSL defeat the LTTE by 19th<\/sup> May 2009.[41]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a> The path to the \u2018end-game\u2019 on the banks of Nandikadal, however, was long, bloody and complicated.<\/p>\n

Deciphering this path calls for research on many threads and episodes. It therefore demands many hands and many voices. This essay is another voice on a lesser-known preliminary episode, complimenting dissections of the battle scenarios that are already in the public realm, notably those by Citizen Silva, Sergei de Silva-Ranasinghe, Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda, Al-Jazeera, the Reuters team headed by Bryson Hull, Muralidhar Reddy, Wasantha Karannagoda, Retd Colonel Hariharan and VK Shashikumar.[42]<\/strong><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Many episodes. Many paths. A giant pyramid has to be carefully built up over the years to comprehend the shaping of Eelam War IV.<\/p>\n

BIBLIOGRAPHY<\/strong><\/p>\n

Al-Jazeera\u00a0<\/strong>2008 SL Army closes in on Tamil Tigers,\u201d 7 October 2008 ,https:\/\/thuppahi<\/a>. wordpress.com\/wp-admin\/post.php?post=14022&action=edit&message=6&postpost=v2<\/p>\n

Al-Jazeera\u00a0<\/strong>2009a \u201cSL army claims control of rebel territory, 26 Jan 2009,\u201d https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=brMeGyyt8ow<\/a><\/p>\n

Al-Jazeera\u00a0<\/strong>2009b \u201cSL army closes in on Tamil Tigers,\u201d 1 February 2009. https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=CZc_Am5HUSs<\/a><\/p>\n

[Balachandran-Roberts]<\/strong> 2015 \u201cPK Balachandran on Overt and Covert Paths in Indian and American Policies towards the Sri Lankan War,\u00a02008-09<\/a>,\u201d 15 September 2015, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/09\/16\/pk-balachandran-on-overt-and-covert-faces-in-indian-and-american-policies-towards-the-sri-lankan-war-2008-09\/#more-17752<\/a><\/p>\n

Bavinck, Benjamin 2014 <\/strong>Of Tamils and Tigers. A Journey through Sri Lanka\u2019s War Years, Part II. 1994-2004. Jaffna Man, II<\/em><\/strong>. Colombo Vijitha Yapa Publications. <\/strong><\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009a \u201cPolitical and Security Implications of Sri Lanka\u2019s Conflict,\u201d Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, Feb. 2009, Vol. 35\/1, pp. 20-24.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009b \u201cThe Battle for the Vanni Pocket,\u201d Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, March 2009, Vol. 35\/2, pp. 17-19. http:\/\/www.dtic.mil\/dtic\/aulimp\/citations\/gsa\/2009_157395\/156554.html<\/a><\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009c \u201cTiger Trail. Strategic Defeat of the LTTE and Its Implications,\u201d Force<\/em>, April 2009, pp. 52-54.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009d \u201cSri Lanka\u2019s Experience in Counter-Insurgency Warfare,\u201d Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, Oct. 2009, Vol. 35\/8, pp. 40-46.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei<\/strong> 2009e \u201cGood Education. Sri Lankan Military learns Counter Insurgency Lessons,\u201d Jane\u2019s Intelligence Review<\/em> Dec. 2009, pp. 3-7.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei <\/strong>2010b \u201cInformation Warfare and the Endgame of the Civil War,\u201d Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter<\/em>, May 2010 30\/4: 35-37. http:\/\/www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com\/articles\/40\/Sri-Lanka<\/a>.<\/p>\n

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2016<\/strong> \u201cHow Sri Lanka defeated the \u2018Invincible\u2019 LTTE\\: A Concise Summary from 2009,\u201d 14 September 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/09\/14\/how-sri-lanka-defeated-the-invincible-ltte-a-concise-summary-from-2009\/<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dias, Wije 2005 \u201c<\/strong>Sri Lankan Supreme Court orders new presidential elections,\u201d 30 September 2005, http:\/\/www.wsws.org\/en\/articles\/2005\/08\/sril-a30.html<\/p>\n

Ferdinando, Shamindra 2016 <\/strong>\u201cMine action: Overseas funds for LTTE front org., EU won\u2019t help unless…,\u201d 7 April 2006, http:\/\/www.island.lk\/2006\/04\/07\/news2.html<\/p>\n

Ferdinando, Shamindra 2016 <\/strong>\u201cShocking police nexus in Jeyaraj’s assassination. On the trail of LTTE terror mastermind Morris,\u201d 26 April 2016, http:\/\/www.island.lk\/ index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=144202<\/a><\/p>\n

Ganapathy, Nirmala 2009 <\/strong>\u201cSri Lanka defeats LTTE, time to win over Tamils,\u201d 19 May 2009, http:\/\/articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com\/2009-05-19\/news\/28440377_1_ltte-cadres-tamil-diaspora-prabhakaran<\/p>\n

Gnainandran, Roger 2006 \u201c<\/strong>Kebithigollewa Massacre,\u201d June 2006, http:\/\/sangam.org\/taraki\/articles\/2006\/09-19_Kebithigollewa_Massacre.php?uid=1955<\/strong><\/p>\n

Gray, David<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cA Day at the Front Line in Sri Lanka (Photographer\u2019s Blog),\u201d 27 April 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/photographers-blog\/2009\/04\/27\/a-day-at-the-front-line-in-sri-lanka\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Guardian<\/strong>\u00a02010\u201cMiliband in row with Sri Lankan defence minister,\u201d 30 April 2009,<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2009\/apr\/30\/sri-lanka-tamil-tigers<\/a><\/p>\n

Guardian<\/strong>\u00a02010\u201cWikileaks cables: David Miliband focused on Sri Lankan war \u2018to win votes\u2019,\u201d\u00a0https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2010\/dec\/01\/wikileaks-david-miliband-sri-lanka<\/a><\/p>\n

Hariharan, Colonel 2009 \u201cSome Insights on Sri Lanka\u2019s Success in the Eelam War IV,\u201d Agni- Studies in International Strategic Issues<\/em>, Jan-March 2009, Vol 1.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Holmes, Maj-Genl John <\/strong>2015 \u201cExpert Military Report,\u201d 28 March 2015, Annex I of Report on the Second Mandate of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Complaints of Abductions and Disappearances<\/em> [i.e. Paranagama Report], August 2015, pp. 243-44<\/p>\n

Hoole, Rajan<\/strong> 2001 Sri Lanka:<\/em> The Arrogance of Power. Myths, Decadence, & Murder<\/em>, Nugegoda Wasala Publications for UTHR (Jaffna).<\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson<\/strong> 2009 \u201cSri Lanka opens eye in the sky on war zone,\u201d 20 April 2009, http:\/\/mobile.reuters.com\/article\/idUSCOL450259<\/a><\/p>\n

Hull, C. Bryson & Ranga<\/strong> Sirilal 2009 \u201c<\/strong>Sri Lankan War in Endgame, 100,000 escape rebel zone,\u201d 23 April 2009, http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-srilanka-war-idUSTRE53J0IZ20090422<\/a><\/p>\n

IDAG [i.e. Citizen Silva]\u00a0<\/strong>2013 \u201cThe Numbers Game: Politics of Retributive Justice,\u201d\u00a0http:\/\/www.scribd.com\/doc\/132499266\/The-Numbers-Game-Politics-of-Retributive-Justice<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong>OR<\/em> http:\/\/<\/a>www.satp.org\/satporgtp\/countries\/shrilanka\/document\/TheNG.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Iyer, Ganeshan<\/strong> 2012 \u201cMilitary Training in the German Nazi Mould amidst Internal Dissension in the Early LTTE, late 1970s,\u201d trans by Parames Blacker, in http:\/\/thuppahi<\/a>.wordpress.com\/2012\/01\/30\/ military-training-in-the-german-nazi-mould-amidst-internal-dissension-in-the-early-ltte-late-1970s\/.<\/p>\n

Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cFraudulent concept of a \u201cfire-free, no-fire, safe zone,\u201d 18 April 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/dbsjeyaraj.com\/dbsj\/archives\/343<\/a>.<\/u><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong>\u00a02011\u00a0\u201cKP\u2019 Speaks Out. An Interview with Former Tiger Chief<\/em>, Vavuniya: NERDO.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Jeyaraj, D. B. S.<\/strong>\u00a02015 \u201cThe Life and Death of Velupillai\u00a0Pirap\u0101haran<\/a>,\u201d 9 May 2015,\u00a0https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2015\/05\/09\/the-life-and-death-of-velupillai-pirapaharan\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Karannagoda, Admiral Wasantha 2014 Adhist\u0101naya,<\/em> [Determination], Rajagiriya, Harshana Printers.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Layton, Peter 2015 \u201c<\/strong>How Sri Lanka Won the War. Lessons in strategy from an overlooked Victory,\u201d http:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2015\/04\/how-sri-lanka-won-the-war\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Mahindapala, H. L. D<\/strong>. 2006 \u201cIs blood a substitute for water in Mavil Aru?\u201d 7 August 2006, http:\/\/www.asiantribune.com\/?q=node\/1433<\/a><\/p>\n

Mango 2011<\/strong>\u00a0\u201cAmnesty International reveals its Flawed Tunnel-Vision in Sri Lanka in\u00a02009,\u201d 10 Aug. 2011,\u00a0https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/08\/10\/amnesty-international-reveals-its-flawed-tunnel-vision-on-sri-lanka-in-2009\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Mango <\/strong>2014 \u201cSri Lanka\u2019s War in its Last Phase: Where WIA Figures Defeat The Gross KIA Estimates,\u201d 14 February 2014, https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/sri-lankas-war-in-its-last-phase-where-wia-figures-defeat-the-gross-kia-estimates\/<\/p>\n

Narayan Swamy, M. R.<\/strong> 2003 Inside an Elusive Mind.<\/em> Prabhakaran<\/em>, Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications.<\/p>\n

Narayan Swamy<\/strong>, M. R.<\/strong> 2009 \u201cPrabhakaran: from Catapult Killer to Ruthless Insurgent,\u201d IANS, 18 May 2009 \u2013 see http:\/\/twocircles.net\/node\/148596<\/a> [reprinted in The Tiger<\/em> Vanquished<\/em>, pp. 165-67].<\/p>\n

NAT [Norwegians against Terrorism] 2007 \u201cInternational fight against the LTTE,\u201d http\/\/www.evik.org\/nat.1<\/strong><\/p>\n

Norway [see SLMM]<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nugera, [Nugara] Ralph<\/strong> 2016 \u201cCombat Training in the Sri Lanka\u00a0Army<\/a>.\u201d 26 February 2016, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2016\/02\/26\/combat-training-in-the-sri-lanka-army\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Peiris, Gerald H. <\/strong>2009 Twilight of the Tigers. Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka<\/em>, Colombo, Vijitha Yapa Publications.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Roberts, Michael <\/strong>2002 \u201cLTTE\u2019s Ideological Retreat: ‘Eelavar’ as internal self-determination,\u201d Sunday Observer<\/em>, 13 October 2002, http:\/\/www.sundayobserver.lk\/2002\/10\/13\/fea01.html<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael <\/strong>2002 \u201cThe Meaning of Eelam,\u201d Island<\/em>, 8 October 2002, http:\/\/www.island.lk\/2002\/08\/09\/featur01.html<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cDilemmas at War\u2019s End: Thoughts on Hard Realities,\u201d\u00a010 Feb. 2009,\u00a0http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2009\/02\/10\/dilemmas-at-wars-end-thoughts-on-hard-realities\/<\/a>, rep. in Roberts,\u00a0Fire and Storm,\u00a0<\/em>Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 267-74.<\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong> 2009 \u201cThe Rajapaksa Regime; Brickbats, Plaudits,\u201d 17 December 2009, http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2009\/12\/17\/the-rajapakse-regime-brickbats-plaudits\/<\/a> \u2026<\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02009 \u201cThe Rajapaksa Regime and the Fourth Estate,\u201d 9 December 2009, http:\/\/www.groundviews.org\/2009\/12\/08\/the-rajapakse-regime-and-the-fourth-estate\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02010\u00a0\u201cSimpletons at the World\u2019s Peak: Sri Lankan Situation Stumps the World,\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0i<\/strong>n Roberts,\u00a0Fire and Storm,<\/em>\u00a0Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, pp. 289-302.\u2026 originally in\u00a0Frontline\u00a0<\/em>under a different title in May 2009<\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02011a \u201cPeople of Righteousness target Sri Lanka,\u201d 27 June 2011,\u00a0https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2011\/06\/27\/people-of-righteousness-target-sri-lanka\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong> 2012 \u201cPopulism and Sinhala-Kingship in the Rajapaksa Regime\u2019s Political Pitch,\u201d 29 January 2012, https:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/index.php\/populism-and-sinhala-kingship-in-the-rajapaksa-regimes-political-pitch\/<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong>Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02013 \u201cBBC-Blind: Misreading the Tamil Tiger Strategy of International Blackmail, 2008-13,\u201d\u00a08 December 2013, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2013\/12\/08\/bbc-blind-misreading-the-tamil-tiger-strategy-of-international-blackmail-2008-13\/#more-11221<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02013 \u201cCongestion in the \u201cVanni Pocket\u201d<\/strong> January-May 2009: Appendix IV for \u201cBBC Blind,\u201d 8 December 2013<\/strong>, <\/strong>https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2013\/12\/09\/congestion-in-the-vanni-pocket-january-may-2009- appendix-iv-for-bbc-blind\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02014a\u00a0\u201cGenerating Calamity, 2008-2014: An Overview of Tamil Nationalist Operations and Their Marvels,\u201d<\/strong>\u00a010 April 2014,\u00a0http:\/\/groundviews.org\/2014\/04\/10\/generating-calamity-2008-2014-an-overview-of-tamil-nationalist-operations-and-their-marvels\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong>\u00a02014b\u00a0\u201c<\/strong>Winning the War: Evaluating the Impact of API WENUWEN\u00a0API<\/a>,\u201d<\/strong> 1 Sept. 2014, https:\/\/thuppahi.wordpress.com\/2014\/09\/01\/winning-the-war-evaluating-the-impact-of-api-wenuwen-ap\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Roberts, Michael<\/strong> 2014c \u201cIdeological Cancers within the Sinhala Universe: Roadblocks in the Path of Reconciliation<\/a>,\u201d 10 May 2014,<\/p>\n

Ideological Cancers within the Sinhala Universe: Roadblocks in the Path of Reconciliation<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n