The Colombo Telegraph found the leaked cable from the WikiLeak database. The cable classified as \u201cCONFIDENTIAL\u201d recounts details of a meeting <\/a>Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis has had with General Sarath Fonseka\u2019s chief campaign strategist Mangala Samaraweera on January 6, 2010.<\/p>\n With his intimate knowledge of Mahinda Rajapaksa\u2019s thinking and methods, Samaraweera is as much of a danger to them in the presidential campaign as \u2018traitor\u2019 General Fonseka.<\/p><\/div>\n Ambassador Butenis wrote \u201cMangala Samaraweera\u2019s defection to the opposition is old news, but it is only now that it is probably causing the greatest heartburn for the\u00a0Rajapaksas. With his intimate knowledge of Mahinda Rajapaksa\u2019s thinking and\u00a0methods, Samaraweera is as much of a danger to them in the presidential campaign as \u2018traitor\u2019 General Fonseka. The key to this appears to be Rajapaksa\u2019s rigidly and fear of alienating his base. While known as masterful campaigner and the king of divide and conquer, Rajapaksa has offered no new significant initiatives during the campaign and has done little to reach out to Tamils other than to kiss their babies. Fonseka, on the other hand \u2013 presumably under the guidance of Samaraweera and Ranil Wickramasinghe \u2013 has re-invented himself, dramatically reached out to the minorities, and promised great reforms for Sri Lanka.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cWe assume that at least some of Samaraweera\u2019s claims about Fonseka\u2019s \u2018liberalism\u2019 are exaggerated and meant to impress us. Nevertheless, the general and his agents are making promises that it would be hard for them to walk back. The 10-point program signed with TNA leader Sampanthan would radically alter the government\u2019s relationship with Tamils and would represent a major step toward national reconciliation. Similarly, their telling us about their plans for a truth and reconciliation commission \u2013 though not announced publicly \u2013 puts them on the hook with the international community. The next few weeks will tell whether this strategy is a winner, but in the mean time it has breathed new life into Sri Lankan politics and brought issues to the fore that had been all but buried.\u201d the ambassador further wrote.<\/p>\n Read the\u00a0cable below\u00a0for further details.<\/p>\n Related news to this cable; \u00a0WikiLeaks: Mahinda Rajapaksa is \u201cnot so bad\u201d \u2013 Mangala to\u00a0US<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":2344,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[53,1,26,27],"tags":[1143,1139,1208,1161,1549,1206,1385,1298,1397,1550,1263],"class_list":["post-2330","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-global-politics","category-news","category-war-crimes","category-wikileaks","tag-authoritarianism","tag-democracy","tag-election-monitoring","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-liberalism","tag-presidential-election-2010","tag-sampanthan-fonseka-secret-pact","tag-sri-lankans-in-wikileaks","tag-tamil-politics","tag-truth-and-reconciliation-commission","tag-us-embassy-cables-on-sri-lanka"],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.colombotelegraph.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2011\/12\/mangala-and-mahinda-colombotelegraph.jpg\" "\\"mangala")
<\/a>VZCZCXRO3099\nOO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR\nDE RUEHLM #0008\/01 0061154\nZNY CCCCC ZZH\nO 061154Z JAN 10 ZDK\nFM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO\nTO RUEHC\/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1075\nINFO RUCNMEM\/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\nRUEHKA\/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2233\nRUEHIL\/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9255\nRUEHKT\/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7510\nRUEHLO\/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5350\nRUEHNE\/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3666\nRUEHNY\/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5275\nRUEHOT\/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0136\nRUEHSM\/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0808\nRUEHKO\/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4397\nRUEHCG\/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9817\nRUEHBI\/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 7106\nRUEHON\/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0131\nRHEFDIA\/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY\nRUEHGV\/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3973\nRHHMUNA\/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY\nRUEHBS\/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY\nRHEHAAA\/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY\nRUEKJCS\/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY\nC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000008\n\nSIPDIS\n\nDEPARTMENT FOR SCA\/INSB\n\nE.O. 12958: DECL: 01\/06\/2020\nTAGS: PGOV<\/a> PREL<\/a> PREF<\/a> PHUM<\/a> PTER<\/a> EAID<\/a> MOPS<\/a> CE<\/a>\nSUBJECT: CAMPAIGN STRATEGIST SAYS FONSEKA WANTS TRUTH AND\nRECONCILIATION COMMISSION\n\nCOLOMBO 00000008 001.8 OF 003\n\nClassified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)\n\n\u00b6<\/a>1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Ambassador, chief\nopposition campaign strategist and one-time Rajapaksa\nconfidante Mangala Samaraweera said he was \"pleasantly\nsurprised\" that General Fonseka believed accountability was\nimportant for Sri Lanka, that he agreed with Samaraweera that\nthe country needed a truth and reconciliation process, and\nthat he had ordered the campaign to start working out the\nlogistics of a truth and reconciliation commission.\nSamaraweera was \"increasingly optimistic\" about the Fonseka\ncampaign, noting opposition polls showing the general's\nnumbers increasing from 43 percent just after nomination in\nmid-December to 52 percent now. But Samaraweera was worried\nabout rising violence of pro-government thugs and suggested\nthe president was not above ordering Fonseka's assassination\nor even wounding himself to gain public sympathy. If Fonseka\nwon, the general had made clear he wanted to remain chairman\nof the security council and wanted to oversee the\nre-organization of the armed forces. Samaraweera was not\nconcerned about the general reneging on his promises about\nabolition of the executive presidency and establishing a\nmilitary dictatorship. Indeed, Samaraweera argued it was the\nFonseka campaign that had brought questions of democracy and\nminority rights to the center of the presidential race,\nsupplanting the war triumphalism and budding \"national\nsocialism\" of the Rajapaksas. END SUMMARY.\n\nRAJAPAKSA'S BRAIN ABANDONS HIM\n------------------------------\n\n\u00b6<\/a>2. (C) If General Fonseka was the heart of the Sri Lankan war\neffort that \"betrayed\" the president, Mangala Samaraweera was\nthe Rajapaksa campaign brain that also deserted him. Having\na long history with the president's SLFP, Samaraweera was a\nclose confidante of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, the\narchitect of Rajapaksa's successful 2005 presidential\ncampaign, and the GSL foreign minister during the first year\nand a half of the Rajapaksa government. He lost his position\nas FM to Bogollagama when the latter crossed over from the\nUNP, and Samaraweera soon broke with the Rajapaksas to form\nhis own party, the SLFP (Mahajana Wing). Samaraweera is now\nthe strategic architect of the campaign of joint opposition\ncandidate Fonseka.\n\nCAMPAIGN VIOLENCE, FONSEKA SECURITY BIGGEST WORRIES\n--------------------------------------------- ------\n\n\u00b6<\/a>3. (C) Samaraweera said he was \"increasingly optimistic\"\nabout the Fonseka campaign, noting opposition polls showing\nthe general's numbers increasing from 43 percent just after\nnomination in mid-December to 52 percent now. He claimed\nthat polls by GSL domestic intelligence were similarly\nshowing a 51-Fonseka\/49 Rajapaksa breakdown. This was most\nsurprising in the north and east, where the opposition had\nnot expected to do so well. At the same time, however,\nSamaraweera said he was worried about campaign violence and\nintimidation -- that is, attacks by pro-government thugs on\nopposition rallies and offices -- which were quickly\nescalating, including in his home district of Mahara in the\nsouth. He expected the situation to get worse as election\nday approached, though he thought the violence was\nback-firing on the Rajapaksas by turning people against them.\n\n\u00b6<\/a>4. (C) He also expressed concern about Fonseka's personal\nsafety, noting that he knew Mahinda Rajapaksa intimately and\nwould not put it past him to facilitate an assassination\nattempt on Fonseka if the campaign increasingly went in the\ngeneral's favor. Given Rajapaksa's penchant for high drama\n\nCOLOMBO 00000008 002.4 OF 003\n\nand theatrics, he also thought the president was not above\nshooting himself then publishing photos of his wounds and\nblood to gain sympathy as a victim of alleged opposition\nviolence. If these or other such scenarios led the\nopposition to believe the election was stolen, Samaraweera\nsaid they would object strongly and the JVP would likely take\nto the streets. But he did not believe this reaction would\npush Sri Lanka to its own Orange Revolution, as in Ukraine.\nSri Lankans were \"too laid-back,\" and the Buddhist belief in\nkarma would make them accept even a stolen election as what\nwas \"meant to be.\"\n\nIF FONSEKA WON\n--------------\n\n\u00b6<\/a>5. (C) Samaraweera said that in the event of a Fonseka\nvictory, the general would not be content to assume a\nfigure-head role after the abolition of the executive\npresidency in line with opposition campaign promises. He had\nmade clear that he wanted to remain chairman of the security\ncouncil and wanted to oversee the re-organization of the\narmed forces. Samaraweera said he was not concerned,\nhowever, about the general reneging on his promises about\nabolition of the executive presidency and establishing a\nmilitary dictatorship once in office. The UNP and JVP\nalready had been working hard against the Rajapaksa\ndictatorship, and the whole thrust of the Fonseka campaign\nwas against the \"national socialism\" that raised its ugly\nhead at the end of the war. Samaraweera claimed that Fonseka\nwas chosen by the opposition as one of the original war icons\npurposefully to arrest this development and, indeed, the\ncampaign had brought questions of democracy and minority\nrights to the center of the presidential race, supplanting\nthe war triumphalism the Rajapaksas preferred.\n\nRECONCILIATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY\n---------------------------------\n\n\u00b6<\/a>6. (C) Samaraweera had no faith in the Rajapaksas to address\nmeaningfully the questions of national reconciliation and\naccountability, despite their great importance for the health\nand future of Sri Lanka. Mahinda Rajapaksa was \"not so bad,\"\nbut his family (that is, brothers Gotabhaya and Basil) had\nmade him a prisoner of the worst racist and chauvinist\nelements in society. Mahinda himself also was firmly opposed\nto any devolution of power and had argued in closed\ngovernment meetings that he wanted Sri Lanka to be a\n\"unitary\" not just a \"united\" country.\n\n\u00b6<\/a>7. (C) Fonseka, on the other hand, had made reconciliation\nand accountability centerpieces of his campaign. Samaraweera\nnoted the 10-point plan the general had just signed with the\nTNA leader Sampanthan on political rights and economic\nre-development of the war-affected areas. He also said\nFonseka had been \"surprising me with his liberalism\" and\nnoted that the general himself had come up with the idea of\nensuring freedom of religious belief under a new regime. On\nthe very sensitive issue of accountability, Samaraweera again\nsaid he was \"pleasantly surprised\" that Fonseka believed\naccountability was important for Sri Lanka, agreed with\nSamaraweera that the country needed a truth and\nreconciliation process, like the South Africans, and had\nordered the campaign to start working out the logistics of a\ntruth and reconciliation commission. Samaraweera thought\nthat if Fonseka won, the Rajapaksas would be marginalized in\nthe SLFP and the SLFP mainstream would want to work with the\nnew government on reconciliation and accountability.\n\nCOMMENT\n-------\n\nCOLOMBO 00000008 003.4 OF 003\n\n\u00b6<\/a>8. (C) Mangala Samaraweera's defection to the opposition is\nold news, but it is only now that it is probably causing the\ngreatest heartburn for the Rajapaksas. With his intimate\nknowledge of Mahinda Rajapaksa's thinking and methods,\nSamaraweera is as much of a danger to them in the\npresidential campaign as \"traitor\" General Fonseka. The key\nto this appears to be Rajapaksa's rigidity and fear of\nalienating his base. While known as a masterful campaigner\nand the king of divide and conquer, Rajapaksa has offered no\nnew significant initiatives during the campaign and has done\nlittle to reach out to Tamils other than to kiss their\nbabies. Fonseka, on the other hand -- presumably under the\nguidance of Samaraweera and Ranil Wickramasinghe -- has\nre-invented himself, dramatically reached out to the\nminorities, and promised great reforms for Sri Lanka.\n\n\u00b6<\/a>9. (C) We assume that at least some of Samaraweera's claims\nabout Fonseka's \"liberalism\" are exaggerated and meant to\nimpress us. Nevertheless, the general and his agents are\nmaking promises that it would be hard for them to walk back.\nThe 10-point program signed with TNA leader Sampanthan would\nradically alter the government's relationship with Tamils and\nwould represent a major step toward national reconciliation.\nSimilarly, their telling us about their plans for a truth and\nreconciliation commission -- though not announced publicly --\nputs them on the hook with the international community. The\nnext few weeks will tell whether this strategy is a winner,\nbut in the meantime it has breathed new life into Sri Lankan\npolitics and brought issues to the fore that had been all but\nburied.\nBUTENIS<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"