By Mahil Dole –

The concerns articulated by Dinesh Dodamgoda regarding the proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PTSA) raise important and legitimate questions that cannot be dismissed lightly. Sri Lanka’s painful history with terrorism, emergency laws, and post-conflict governance demands that any new counterterrorism framework be examined with both vigilance and balance.

At the same time, it is equally important to recognise that the complete rejection of a modern anti-terrorism legal framework is neither realistic nor responsible, given contemporary regional and global security dynamics. The debate, therefore, should not be framed as PTA versus human rights or PTSA versus democracy, but rather as how Sri Lanka can design a terrorism law that is effective, restrained, accountable, and future-oriented.

Learning from the PTA: Why Reform Was Necessary

There is broad consensus that the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) had serious structural flaws:

* Prolonged detention without judicial oversight

* Confessions obtained under coercive conditions

* Weak safeguards against abuse

* Disproportionate impact on minority communities

* Erosion of public trust in law enforcement

These shortcomings were not merely technical; they had long-term strategic consequences, including alienation of communities, international isolation, and reputational damage to Sri Lanka’s justice system. In this respect, the call by domestic actors and international partners alike to repeal and replace the PTA was justified.

Where the Critique of the PTSA Is Persuasive

The critique rightly warns that changing the name of the law without changing its philosophy risks repeating past mistakes.

Concerns regarding:

* Over-broad definitions of terrorism

* Vague thresholds for digital and cyber-related offences

* Expansive surveillance powers

* Weak differentiation between violent extremism and political dissent deserve serious reconsideration, especially in light of guidance issued by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism.

History both global and local shows that excessive securitisation of dissent can itself become a driver of radicalisation, a point the article makes convincingly through its reference to “propaganda by deed.”

Where a Counter-Perspective Is Necessary

However, equating the need for legal precision with a rejection of non-violent dimensions of terrorism would be strategically incomplete.

Modern terrorism has evolved:

* Financing, recruitment, indoctrination, logistics, cyber facilitation, and psychological warfare often precede violence.

* Digital ecosystems, encrypted platforms, and transnational funding networks are now central to terrorist operations.

* Lone-actor and hybrid threats blur the line between crime, extremism, and terrorism.

To restrict terrorism definitions only to acts of extreme physical violence would leave the state reactive rather than preventive, repeating failures seen globally from South Asia to Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, a reformed PTSA is necessary, but it must be intelligently calibrated, not bluntly empowered.

The Middle Path: What a Future-Ready PTSA Must Do

A credible anti-terrorism law for Sri Lanka should:

1. Differentiate Clearly

* Violent terrorism

* Non-violent extremist facilitation

* Legitimate dissent, protest, journalism, and professional activity

Clear statutory thresholds and intent requirements are essential.

2. Embed Judicial Oversight by Design

* Surveillance, detention, and data access must require prior or immediate post-facto judicial authorisation.

* Military involvement in evidence handling—especially digital—should be strictly limited or excluded.

3. Respect Proportionality

* Cyber offences should be graded, not automatically escalated to terrorism.

* Life sentences and mandatory minimums must be reserved for gravest offences involving loss of life or mass harm.

4. Protect Professional and Ethical Spaces

* Lawyers, journalists, doctors, and clergy must not be criminalised for ethical silence.

* “Duty to report” clauses must include narrowly defined exceptions.

5. Build Trust as a Counter-Terror Tool

* Community confidence, not fear, is the strongest early-warning system.

* A law seen as unjust will undermine intelligence-led policing and national resilience.

Regional and International Realities Cannot Be Ignored

Sri Lanka operates in a region facing:

* Transnational extremist networks

* Online radicalisation flows

* Illicit financial and cyber ecosystems

* Geopolitical contestation and proxy instability

From South Asia to Southeast Asia, states that abandoned counterterror laws entirely have quietly reintroduced them in revised forms with better safeguards but firm preventive capacity.

The challenge is not whether Sri Lanka needs an anti-terrorism law.

The challenge is whether it can learn from the PTA without reproducing it in spirit.

Preventing Terrorism Without Creating It

The warning that counterterrorism laws can become counterproductive is valid. Yet so is the warning that legal paralysis in the face of evolving threats invites future tragedy.

The PTSA should not be:

* A rebranded PTA

* A surveillance-first statute

* A tool of political convenience

But neither should Sri Lanka return to a vacuum that ignores the realities of modern terrorism.

Security and liberty are not opposites, they are interdependent.

A just, precise, and proportionate PTSA can protect both, if designed with humility, memory, and foresight.That is the real lesson of Sri Lanka’s past and the responsibility of its present.

*Mahil Dole, SSP (Retired), is the former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka, and has served as Head of the Sri Lankan Delegation at three BIMSTEC Security Conferences. With over 40 years of experience in policing and intelligence, he writes on regional security, interfaith relations, and geopolitical strategy and the managing director of Smart Security Solutions Pvt  Ltd.