By Rifaq Azhar –

Recent developments in West Asia, following the outbreak of the Israel-US war on Iran, have created divergent views among political and strategic analysts. Unlike previous American-led wars, this conflict is markedly different and has unfolded amid strained relations between Trump administration and several long-standing Westerns allies, particularly over issues such as Greenland and broader transatlantic disagreements. Against this backdrop of geopolitical and trade complexities, West Asia has entered a period of heightened instability. 

Many analysts view the escalation as a pivotal moment reshaping the regional balance of power and strategic alliances, certainly conferring significant advantages on China and Russia. Meanwhile, the conflict has generated unprecedented sympathy for Iran among segments of the Muslim world, while exposing the persistence of deeply rooted strategic distrust among Arab states. This article examines shifting public perception, evolving diplomatic engagement and more importantly the entrenched historical suspicions that continue to shape Arab – Iranian relations. It argues that although tactical cooperation between Iran and Arab states has emerged in response to shared interests and immediate threats, fundamental structural tensions remain unresolved. It further contends that sustainable stability will require a comprehensive and just resolution of the Palestinian question.  

It is widely observed that not only the Muslim community but the entire international community holds deeply critical views of Israel’s genocidal war against Palestinians that undermines international laws and fundamental human rights. Meanwhile, a wave of pro-Iran sentiment among Muslims, irrespective of traditional sectarian divisions, has emerged at an unprecedented level since the US’s “Epic Fury” and Israel’s “Roar of the Lion”. In fact, the direct escalation between Israel and Iran has been perceived by segments of the Muslim world as a response to humanitarian catastrophe carried out by Israel in Palestine and elsewhere in the region in pursuit of its Great Israel Project, an expansionist biblical vision for territory spanning from the Euphrates River in Iraq to the Nile River in Egypt. It is true that since the 1979 revolution in Iran, Arab states, including the Gulf countries, had viewed US-led regime change in Iran as the need of the hour. However, the outbreak of Tufan Al Aqsa fundamentally altered this strategic calculation, prompting restraint in traditional Arab – Iranian rivalries as Israeli expansionism has become the region’s most imminent threat.  Experts argue that this represents a structural shift at the heart of Arab politics. 

Arab States’ Diplomatic Responses

In this context, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) demonstrated its solidarity with the Iranian people and strived to prevent escalation in the region through diplomatic efforts. Similarly, this escalation shifted the mutual focus of Iran and Saudi Arabia from developing bilateral relations following diplomatic restoration to coordinating efforts to contain the repercussions. From the very beginning, the KSA has engaged in multilateral diplomatic initiatives, urging several actors, including the US, to refrain from escalation in the region. As a silent actor, Oman has played a significant role in building bridges and fostering trust between rival states. In a joint statement by GCC-European Union ministers, Oman was praised for its “constructive role” and commitment to resolving the conflict. In fact, Oman has designed the blueprint for navigating the conflict and high-stakes tensions in the region. Moreover, Qatar leverages its unique position as a vital diplomatic bridge and neutral mediator to resist US pressure to pursue military action against Iran. Further, it plays a significant role in de-escalation through negotiation, hosting talks, and coordinating with US officials while navigating complex, behind-the-scenes communications with all stakeholders. 

These efforts indicate how neighbouring countries strive to advance viable institutional frameworks for both the Palestinian and Iranian causes. In addition to these developments, public opinion across many Muslim societies has reflected increasing solidarity with Iran following the outbreak of direct hostilities with Israel. The majority of Muslims who live as minority communities like in Sri Lanka hold similar sentiments influenced by humanitarian concerns regarding the conflict in Gaza.   

However, a rift has begun to unfold as a result of Iran’s retaliatory attacks on the Gulf countries, reviving the longstanding strategic mistrust that remain deeply entrenched. Closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting enemy assets and military bases inside the other sovereign states based on ‘tit for tat’ approach, even before those countries allowed the US to use those bases against Iran, have been viewed by some experts as rational and perhaps strategic move largely due to defensive purpose. Yet, devastating civilian infra-structures and livelihood such as water desalination plants, airports, oil refineries, ports, bridges and residential areas in neighbouring country has created widespread discontent and heated debate among many analysts. Many describe such attacks as offensive. For instance, Oman doesn’t have any US military bases and has never attempted any attacks on Iran, yet Oman has been attacked by Iran without justification. Furthermore, the IRGC’s hawkish behaviour toward neighbouring countries has added fuel to the prevailing suspicion among Gulf Countries. For instance, Iran’s recent mixed messages regarding the attacks have triggered further suspicion. These developments have reignited longstanding concerns and disappointment among regional actors regarding Iran’s strategic intentions and regional aspirations. 

Arab perspective on Iran 

To understand the volatile nature of the relationship between Iran and neighbouring countries, we must retrospectively examine the root causes of the mistrust entrenched in the minds of Arabs. In the wake of the Iranian revolution in 1979, many Muslims viewed Iran as a utopian Islamic state resisting external domination. Perhaps this view persists among a few due to surface level attractions, but, over time, it has become increasingly polarized due to two ideological tendencies that emerged in the Muslim world as a response to the trajectories and policies the IRGC adopted. The first was a pro-Iranian group aligned with the Iranian cause due to its opposition to Israel and Western intervention, whereas the second is a sceptical or even hostile group that emerged because of Arab nationalism, sectarian politics, Iran’s growing influence, and the alleged hegemonic ambition of the IRGC in West Asia. 

In this broader context, we must have a clear understanding of the depth and root causes of this hostility before taking sides. Although Arab nationalism is obsolete, the deep distrust among Arab states towards Iran remains in effect and continues to shape the foreign policies of those Arab states. In fact, this distrust is rooted in several intervening factors, including perceptions of Iran’s ideological influence through religious and cultural networks, growing influence of its proxies, concerns over Iran’s oil supremacy and hegemonic ambition in the region, and Iran’s ambiguity regarding the Palestinian cause. Understanding these historical and strategic dynamics is essential for explaining the complex nature of the mistrust and the often contradictory responses of Arab states towards Iran.  

1. Ideological Expansion and Interventionism 

In modern history, Shiism was neither problematic nor considered a threat to the national security of the neighbouring countries until the late 1970s. Arabs had witnessed the harmonious coexistence of both sects in the region, where both Shia and Sunni followers lived side by side in their respective countries. Major sectarian wars were largely absent until the late 1990s. Soon after the revolution, the regional dynamics evolved dramatically, particularly in political, economic, and sociocultural domains of Iran. In Particular, a new dimension of Shiism was conceptualized by late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The remarkable elements of this transformation were the invention of the concept of ‘Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist’, ideological Indoctrination, and the establishment of the IRGC. 

These foundational pillars, to a large extent, shaped Iran’s foreign policy, which aims at ideological expansion and intervention. The concept of ‘Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist’ is perceived as a strategic move in Iran’s political sphere, granting an exclusive supreme power to its religious leader in all matters related to religious, political, and social affairs of Shia followers. It is a form of authority with divine sanction. This innovative concept, which was entirely strange to the Sunni world, even to traditional Shiism, transformed Iran’s political worldview. To put into perspective, it reinvigorated Shiism among its followers and became a catalyst for ideological cohesion encouraging followers to stand unanimously behind their supreme leader. Meanwhile, in 1979, Late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), a unique military branch, to preserve the ideological legacy of the Iranian revolution, ensure the integrity of the Islamic Republic, and prevent foreign interference on Iranian soil. The IRGC enjoys extensive institutional autonomy and powers beyond those of conventional state institutions reporting exclusively to the Supreme Leader and functioning largely outside the authority of Iran’s elected political system.  

Among many systemic changes, these two significant dimensions were instrumental in creating advocacy, establishing perceived ideological influence, and subsequently forming a buffer around the head of state. During the first decade, Iran encountered tremendous problems internally and externally due to various reasons, notably the Iran- Iraq War (1980 – 1988).  Upon Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accession to the leadership in 1989, Iran witnessed a slow and gradual growth and stability within the country. By that time, it had also adopted a policy of expansion and intervention in neighbouring states. The doctrine of “Maqar Ramadan” designed by Bakir Zul Qadr in 1984 was a vivid testament to this strategy. It underscored the concept of ‘creating enemies inside the enemy’s land’. In fact, this doctrine was designed to counter Iraq’s invasion of Iran and later evolved to address perceived threats as well as accelerate its intervention and expansion in the region. This policy of intervention and expansion aims to incite public anger against the ruler of the enemy state, thereby destabilizing the country and instigating sectarian violence with the support of its proxies. This approach escalated to an extreme level over the following two decades. It is strongly believed that IRGC utilizes Shiism outside Iran for regional power projection.   

In this context, since 1979, neighbouring states, particularly the Gulf countries, have been viewing Iran with deep suspicions. This sentiment has been fuelled by series of regional crises including the Mecca Siege (1979), the Mecca Incident (1987), the Iran – Iraq War (1980 – 1988), the Iran Hostage Crisis, and the Lebanon hostage crisis. Collectively, these events reinforced perceptions among many Gulf States that post-revolutionary Iran sought to export its revolutionary ideology and expand its regional influence through intervention in the internal affairs of neighbouring sovereign states. Consequently, strategic mistrust happened to deepen shaping Gulf States’ enduring security concerns over Iran’s regional ambitions. 

2. Hegemonic ambitions and Energy Supremacy in the region  

It is reportedly claimed that the Iranian regime aims to achieve its hegemonic ambition, which encompass the ‘crescent land’, believed to be the fertile land of Mesopotamia civilization. It is evident that this hegemonic ambition consists of two strategic dimensions, namely the “Persian Empire vision” and the “Islamic Imamate vision”. 

Domestically, Iran, in particular the IRGC, promotes the vision of regaining the glorious past of the Old Persian Empire with Aryan identity that once stretched from Northern India to the Balkans and the MENA region. By the time, it externally promotes the vision of establishing the Islamic Imamate, which aligns with ‘Shiite Crescent’, a cornerstone of Iranian Grand Strategy. It aims at establishing a contiguous sphere of influence on the pretext of reviving the Fatimid and Safavid paradigm of Caliphates. In fact, this serves as a hybrid strategy of forward defence designed to project power, counter external threats, and secure regional hegemony. Both visions ultimately serve the incumbent Iranian regime. 

The first helps build a resilient nation inside the country ensuring that citizens will endure the regime at any cost. The second enables the creation of a physical and moral buffer zone. This strategic vision is often referred to as the “Axis of Resistance”, which mobilizes ideologues outside Iran in support of Tehran whenever it faces external challenges. It also serves to boost Iran’s status as a regional superpower with the support of the Shia community in the region and to establish a land bridge known as the “Crescent Land”. By establishing regional hegemony through intervention and expansion, Iran seeks to capitalize on energy supremacy in the region. 

As seen in Yemen, Iran has been widely accused of supplying sophisticated weapons and military supports to the Houthis, one of its principal regional allies; in return, it exercises significant strategic leverage over Yemen’s energy dynamics.  Many analysts are in the view of  that the potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and then the Houthis’ attacks on commercial shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, reflect a broader strategy to enhance Iran’s geopolitical leverage over critical maritime trade routes and regional energy security. These developments have further reinforced Gulf perceptions of Iran’s expansionist regional agenda.

Therefore, it is believed that ideological expansion through indoctrination, cultural diplomacy and public engagement along with subsequent sectarian escalation with the support of its proxies has created avenues to increase Iran’s intervention and involvement in West Asia.  This status quo has tremendously destabilized the region creating conditions conducive to achieving Iran’s hegemonic ambition, which is perceived by neighbouring states as the greatest threat to their sovereignty. 

3. Ambiguity in Palestinian Cause: Moral obligation or Strategic Calculation

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has remained one of the staunchest supporters of the Palestinian cause and a persistent adversary of Israel, rejecting its legitimacy as a Zionist entity. Tehran has consistently portrayed Israel as an instrument of Western imperialism, particularly that of the United States, and as a threat to Islam, Muslim unity, and regional stability. Consequently, Iran has extended political, financial and military support to Palestinian resistance groups, most notably Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 

However, developments preceding the Gaza war suggest a more complex regional landscape. The West Asia was witnessing two parallel trends before Tufan al Aqsa. One was the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states under the Abraham Accords, including the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. On the other hand, Iran pursued its own diplomatic rapprochement with regional actors, including the UAE in 2020 and Saudi Arabia in 2023.  

While these developments promised greater regional stability and economic cooperation, many observers argue that they came at the expense of the Palestinian issue, particularly the plight of Gaza. Indeed, some contend that the Palestinian cause was gradually being marginalized in regional diplomacy until the “Tufan Al-Aqsa operation on 7 October 2023” brought it back to the forefront of international attention. Critics also argue that in pursuit of its economic and hegemonic interests, Iran prioritized rapprochement with regional actors, effectively relegating the Palestinian cause to a secondary concern.    

The conflict has also reignited debates regarding Iran’s broader objectives. Some analysts argue that Tehran’s support for the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” including Hezbollah, Hamas, and various regional militias, is driven not solely by ideological or religious commitments but primarily by strategic calculations. According to this perspective, the Axis of resistance serves as an instrument of deterrence and provides Iran with strategic depth, enabling it to project influence across the region and shape outcomes in favour of its national interests. Furthermore, critics question whether Iran has consistently prioritized the Palestinian cause in its diplomatic engagements, claiming that Palestinian interests have often been secondary to broader regional considerations involving Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Others point to perceived inconsistencies in Iran’s policies, particularly regarding Sunni minority communities under governments aligned with Tehran, arguing that such positions reveal a divergence between rhetoric and practice. 

Ultimately, the central question remains: Is Iran’s support for Palestine primarily a moral and ideological commitment, or is it an integral component of its regional strategy? While Iran’s support has undoubtedly sustained Palestinian resistance movements over several decades, many experts opine that Tehran also derives significant geopolitical benefits from keeping the Palestinian issue central to regional politics. For Iran, the Palestinian cause serves not only as a symbol of resistance but also as a means of preserving its influence, maintaining strategic leverage, and reinforcing its position within the broader West Asia’s balance of power. Whether one views Iran as a genuine champion of Palestine or as a state pursuing its national interests through the Palestinian cause, it is evident that the issue remains deeply intertwined with the region’s complex geostrategic realities. 

Moreover, Tufan al-Aqsa fundamentally altered the strategic landscape of the entire region. It exposed shifting alliances, renewed geopolitical competition, and competing regional ambitions. Observers note that both Iran and Israel seek to maximize their influence in the region, albeit through different means. Meanwhile, the Gulf and Arab states have increasingly sought to balance public support for Palestine with national interests through diplomacy, deterrence, and strategic engagement. Notably, Gulf states have reaffirmed their support for a two-state solution while reassessing the pace and scope of normalization with Israel.

Conclusion 

While recent conflicts have generated unprecedented sympathy towards Iran among segments of the Muslim world due to the Gaza crisis and confrontation with Israel, entrenched strategic distrust among Arab states regarding Iran’s regional policies continues to persist. Arab states’ responses to Iran therefore reflect a dual reality: either rapprochement with Iran for regional stability or continued caution towards perceived Iranian intervention and hegemonic ambitions. The historical grievances fuelling this distrust are not easily overcome since trust, once broken, is not easily restored.   

Nevertheless, Gulf States have sought to promote Iran’s strategic integration into the regional order as a means of enhancing broader regional stability, while simultaneously making significant efforts to maintain Israel’s strategic isolation. Therefore, institutional frameworks for regional actors that foster mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference and collective security are essential. Above all, the future of regional stability largely depends on a sustainable and just solution to the Palestinian question. Unless, these two major root causes namely the Palestinian question and the entrenched distrust are addressed regional stability and prosperity remain a mirage.    

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