By Jehan Perera –

The controversy following the Supreme Court’s decision to revoke the presidential pardon granted to Ven. Galagoda Atte Gnanasara exposed the pressures that a government can face from forces outside Parliament. The mobilisation of Buddhist clergy and opposition political parties demonstrated that even a government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority can be vulnerable to extra-parliamentary challenges. The government’s response to such pressures may help explain its interest in introducing legislation that would strengthen the coercive powers of the state.

The disrobing of Ven. Gnanasara by prison authorities before he appeared before the judiciary became an issue taken up at the highest levels of the Buddhist clergy. What began as a dispute over the monk’s robe escalated into demands for a presidential pardon and calls for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to resign if he refused to grant one. Opposition political parties mobilised behind these demands, organising public demonstrations in support of the monk. The political use of Buddhism and Sinhalese nationalism has been a recurring feature of Sri Lanka’s modern political history. Few politicians seeking to capture or retain power have been willing to confront this phenomenon directly.

The experience of Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike is instructive. Having reached an agreement with Tamil leader SJV Chelvanayakam in 1957 to address Tamil political grievances through regional councils and the devolution of certain powers, Bandaranaike came under intense opposition from Sinhala nationalist forces, including Buddhist monks. The protests contributed to his decision to abrogate the agreement. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s experience as prime minister and president also illustrates the constraints faced by political leaders seeking to advance reconciliation and power sharing.

The Vulnerability of Power

The government enjoys a two-thirds majority in Parliament and has a cohesive group of parliamentarians, making it difficult to challenge through parliamentary means. Its potential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Extra-parliamentary mobilisation could bring together political opponents, religious authorities and sections of the public in ways that parliamentary arithmetic alone cannot contain.

Three proposed laws are particularly significant: the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the legislation on NGO Registration and Supervision. Taken together, they would strengthen the powers of the state over citizens and organisations, with implications for their rights and freedoms. The government may believe that these powers will protect its democratic mandate against attempts to destabilise it through violence, organised criminal activity or other forms of extra-parliamentary pressure. There are legitimate reasons for a government to be concerned about such possibilities.

Sri Lanka has experienced political violence, terrorism and organised crime. The mobilisation of communal sentiment has repeatedly undermined democratic institutions and efforts at national reconciliation. A government elected on a promise of system change has every reason to protect its mandate and ensure that the law is applied equally. However, the means chosen to protect democracy can also undermine it. Laws that confer broad discretionary powers on the state may be used not only against those engaged in criminal activity but also against political opponents, peaceful protesters, civil society organisations and individuals who criticise the government.

There is an important distinction between protecting the state and protecting those who exercise power through it. The state belongs to all its citizens, whereas governments are temporary holders of political authority. A government that identifies its own survival too closely with the security of the state risks treating criticism of its policies as a threat to the country itself. This is one of the dangers that constitutional safeguards and independent institutions are intended to prevent.

The Lessons of History

The Prevention of Terrorism Act provides a sobering precedent. Originally introduced as a temporary measure intended to remain in force for six months, it has endured for decades. Its history illustrates how exceptional powers, once granted to the state, can become entrenched even when the circumstances that originally justified them have changed. Successive governments have found reasons to retain powers that they had previously criticised. Political history offers many examples of movements that challenge established authority eventually becoming its supporters. This does not necessarily mean that their original ideals were insincere. The responsibilities and insecurities of governing can encourage them to value the instruments of power placed at their disposal.

Good intentions cannot provide an adequate safeguard against the misuse of power. A government introducing legislation may sincerely believe that it will use its provisions responsibly. It cannot guarantee that its successors will do the same. Nor can it assume that institutions responsible for enforcing the law will always interpret its powers in ways that protect democratic freedoms. The test of a law is not simply how a particular government intends to use it, but how it could be used by a government with very different intentions.

The distinction between ends and means is important here. A worthy objective does not automatically justify every means adopted to achieve it. Indeed, the means employed can eventually undermine the objective itself. A government seeking to protect democracy through laws that weaken civil liberties and restrict legitimate dissent risks diminishing the democratic character of the state it seeks to defend.

A Constructive Example

The government’s handling of the controversy surrounding Ven. Gnanasara offers a useful example of how such challenges might be addressed. It is noteworthy that the government did not compromise on the question of a pardon for the convicted monk. At the same time, it found room for compromise on the issue of the robe, introducing rules under which members of the Buddhist clergy would not be disrobed without the authorisation of the relevant religious hierarchy. The dispute appears to have been brought to a peaceful conclusion through negotiations between the government and Buddhist monks rather than through the exercise of coercive state power.

The government maintained its position on the judicial process while finding a way to resolve the immediate dispute through dialogue. This demonstrated that firmness on matters of principle need not preclude flexibility in addressing the concerns of those who oppose a government’s position. Political compromise need not mean surrendering authority. It can instead be an expression of confidence in democratic processes and the ability to resolve differences peacefully. This approach could be applied to other challenges confronting the government.

The ultimate test of system change is not simply whether the government can overcome its opponents or implement its programme. It is whether it can resist the temptation to acquire powers that it would not wish a future government to exercise against its own supporters. This requires political self-restraint, particularly from a government enjoying such a substantial parliamentary majority. It is better to work towards a more democratic and accountable state, one that derives its strength from the confidence of its citizens rather than due to their fear of its institutions.