By Jehan Perera –

Jehan Perera

A toned-down UN resolution on Sri Lanka now appears likely at the current session of the Human Rights Council. The government would prefer that the periodic scrutiny of its human rights record be wound down. The government would much rather have this thrice yearly procedure come to a permanent end without having to provide answers to the reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to member countries of the UNHRC. However, the international human rights community is not prepared to let Sri Lanka slip off without fulfilling promises made in successive resolutions and by past governments. Long unresolved issues continue such as missing persons, long term prisoners, militarization of the north and east and the absence of devolution of power, to mention but a few.

There are reasons to believe the next resolution will be softer. One is the diminished moral authority of some sponsoring states. The international human rights community has become compromised by the human rights tragedies and war crimes unfolding before the entire world. Another is the government’s visible progress against financial corruption and abuse of power, which gives it credibility domestically. The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) came into office on a strong mandate in 2024, with explicit pledges to end impunity, to deliver accountability, and equal citizenship for all. To the extent it follows its mandate, the government is well within its rights as a democracy.

Sri Lanka is an exception in the world today in which xenophobia and intolerance have got the upper hand in many countries once thought to be examples to be followed. In Sri Lanka, the government is making a serious attempt in both words and deeds to treat all citizens the same regardless of race or religion. There is still a far distance to go before all communities feel and believe that they have an equal place and equal stake in the country. This is especially the case when it comes to government appointments in Tamil and Muslim majority areas, where the top government officials continue to be Sinhalese and the use of the Sinhala language without Tamil translation continues to be an obstacle to the full participation of Tamil speaking people in the administrative life of the country.

Without Vote

The likely softening of the resolution on Sri Lanka at the UNHRC is to be seen in the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights no longer calling for an international or hybrid mechanism for determining accountability for war crimes. Instead, they call for a domestic mechanism which is credible and would deliver justice. It is likely that the new resolution on Sri Lanka will be adopted without a vote in the UNHRC. It appears that the government does not wish to get into confrontation with the sponsors of the resolution which are powerful and wealthy countries. In a world in which the powerful are increasingly ruthless in their treatment of those with less power, it is rational of the Sri Lankan government not to present itself as a target. This may account for its conciliatory posture and its stated willingness to accept technical assistance from those same countries to make its domestic mechanism work better.

The international community, however, is frustrated by the government’s willingness to accept technical assistance and its tardiness to make it actually happen on the ground. The fact is that the government is proceeding slowly with regard to the issue of accountability for war crimes, which is at the heart of successive UNHRC resolutions. The Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP), established in 2021 under UNHRC resolution 46/1, continues gathering preserved evidence of serious human rights violations. Its mandate is under pressure, as the indications are that the latest resolution will not have the demand for external or hybrid mechanisms in favour of domestic ones as past resolutions had.

The government seems willing to accept technical assistance from foreign states and UN human rights bodies to make its domestic accountability mechanisms better. It has not, however, moved at the pace or with the transparency that was hoped for. However, this slowness in dealing with the issue of war crimes is not specific to the present government, but was seen with previous governments as well. Previous government too sought to prevaricate or deny the issue of the need for accountability. Putting members of the war-winning military on trial for war crimes would be politically challenging. The government would be apprehensive of the political fallout that is likely to materialize.

Lankan Exceptionalism

As a first step in the direction of accountability, the government may wish to focus on crimes that were committed outside of the military battlefield. These would include the extortion rackets that took place in which people were arrested for ransom to be paid by their families with death being the price of non-compliance. Perhaps the arrest of very high ranking military officers for crimes that appear to have taken place off the military battlefield, and which they had knowledge of, is the first stage of an incipient accountability project. It brings in the concept of “Command Responsibility” in which commanders need to take responsibility for what their subordinates did if they made no attempt to stop them. When governments ignore this doctrine of Command Responsibility they create a culture of impunity.

The importance of Command Responsibility has been affirmed by international tribunals and national laws. In recent months the spotlight has returned to mass graves, enforced disappearances, and slow domestic investigations. The Chemmani site near Jaffna has become emblematic. There are also well documented instances of mass detentions made, as early as 1990 when Prof. Thangamuthu Jayasingam, former Vice Chancellor of Eastern University was the Officer in Charge of the. Vantharumoolai refugee camp in 1990 before whose very eyes on September 5, 158 people, including young boys were taken away, never to be seen again. But still, no mass grave nor mass abduction in Sri Lanka has yet led to a conclusive judicial outcome. The lack of technical capacity, political will and trust among victims remains real.

The mass graves at Chemmani and elsewhere, and the many instances of abductions and enforced disappearances would count as killings off the military battlefield. Being made accountable for such crimes are less likely to generate nationalist emotion. It is here that a start may be made. The NPP government so far has shown sincerity in most of its words and deeds. Sri Lanka stands at a moment of transition. The NPP came into office with a strong mandate for change. The government needs to use this window to deliver justice and reconciliation. If it chooses to delay again, it will bring to nothing the hopes placed in it. If it moves ahead, carefully and forthrightly, it might build the shared political culture that was promised and take Sri Lanka off the list of countries earmarked for UNHRC resolutions in Geneva.