By P M Amza –

What America’s withdrawal from global institutions means for small and medium states

The announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump that the United States will withdraw from more than sixty international organisations represents one of the most sweeping retreats from multilateral engagement in contemporary diplomatic history. Formalised through a Presidential Memorandum issued in January 2026, the directive covers 66 international entities, comprising 35 non-United Nations organisations and arrangements and 31 United Nations-linked bodies. The White House justified the decision on the grounds that these institutions operate contrary to U.S. national interests, promote “globalist agendas,” or fail to meet standards of efficiency and accountability.¹

While U.S. disengagement from individual multilateral bodies is not unprecedented, the scale, breadth, and ideological framing of this withdrawal mark a significant departure from post-1945 norms. Rather than a selective recalibration of policy, the move signals a deeper shift away from rules-based international cooperation toward a transactional conception of sovereignty—one with implications that extend far beyond American foreign policy.

Scope and Categories of Withdrawal

The significance of the decision lies not merely in the headline figure, but in the diversity of institutions affected. The 35 non-UN organisations include regional development mechanisms, technical and research bodies, democracy-support initiatives, and sector-specific forums. The 31 UN-linked entities encompass treaty frameworks, funds, programmes, and coordinating mechanisms central to global norm-setting and policy coherence.²

Taken together, these institutions fall broadly into four overlapping categories.

First, climate and environmental governance features prominently. This includes withdrawal from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the foundational treaty underpinning global climate cooperation and the legal framework within which the 2015 Paris Agreement operates.³ An exit from the Convention itself—distinct from withdrawal from a subsidiary agreement—would be unprecedented and challenges the universality of a regime designed to address a transboundary global commons problem.⁴

Second, development, gender, and social policy institutions are heavily represented. These include bodies such as UN Women, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), education initiatives, and democracy-support mechanisms. Historically, such institutions have served as instruments of U.S. soft power, enabling influence through funding, leadership, and agenda-setting rather than coercion.

Third, the list includes peacebuilding, legal, and governance-related bodies, encompassing post-conflict recovery mechanisms, international legal institutions, and offices focused on civilian protection. Though often criticised for slow delivery and bureaucratic complexity, these bodies form part of the normative infrastructure that underpins restraint, accountability, and predictability in international relations.

Finally, the withdrawals extend to trade, technical, and sector-specific cooperation, including commodity groups, research networks, and regional forums that facilitate information-sharing, standards development, and policy coordination.

Sovereignty Reframed

The rationale articulated by the administration reflects a reconceptualisation of sovereignty. In the post-war order, sovereignty was protected through participation in shared rules and institutions that constrained arbitrary power and provided predictability. Multilateralism functioned as a collective insurance mechanism, particularly valuable in an anarchic international system.⁵

The current approach treats multilateral commitments as optional and reversible, to be retained only when they yield immediate and tangible benefits. Under this logic, institutional restraint is increasingly viewed as a liability rather than a safeguard. This shift alters not only U.S. behaviour, but also the expectations of other states operating within the same international system.

Climate Governance and Institutional Erosion

Withdrawal from the UNFCCC carries implications that extend well beyond climate policy. The Convention establishes reporting obligations, scientific assessment processes, and negotiation frameworks that lend coherence to global climate action. An American exit would weaken the universality of this regime and diminish U.S. influence over evolving norms on mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance.

More broadly, it reinforces a perception that global public goods are increasingly framed as ideological battlegrounds rather than shared responsibilities. In such circumstances, leadership vacuums are quickly filled, and normative influence shifts toward actors willing to invest consistently in institutional engagement.

Development, Gender, and Soft Power

The withdrawal from development- and gender-focused agencies highlights the strategic cost of disengagement. Institutions such as UN Women and UNFPA do not merely deliver programmes; they shape global agendas and establish standards. U.S. participation historically ensured a measure of influence over priorities, governance structures, and funding norms within these bodies.⁶ ⁷

Disengagement does not eliminate global demand for these functions; it redistributes influence to others. From a strategic perspective, the loss of agenda-setting capacity may outweigh any fiscal or political gains derived from withdrawal.

Peacebuilding, Law, and Precedent

Disengagement from peacebuilding and legal institutions raises concerns about precedent. International bodies derive authority not merely from legal texts but from sustained participation by major powers. When such powers disengage, the normative environment becomes more permissive of unilateral action.⁸

Over time, the weakening of institutional restraint risks normalising selective compliance and eroding expectations that disputes will be managed through agreed mechanisms—an outcome with serious implications for global stability.

The Colombo Plan: A Quiet but Symbolic Casualty

Among the 35 non-UN organisations listed for withdrawal is the Colombo Plan, an intergovernmental organisation of particular relevance to Sri Lanka and the Asia-Pacific region. Established in 1950, the Colombo Plan is one of the oldest regional development initiatives and the only intergovernmental organisation headquartered in Colombo.⁹

For Sri Lanka, the Colombo Plan has long represented more than a development mechanism. It has supported human resource development, technical cooperation, and regional dialogue, while enhancing Colombo’s profile as a host city for international institutions. U.S. participation has historically strengthened the Plan’s credibility and reach. An American withdrawal will not dismantle the organisation, but it signals a diminishing commitment to regional development frameworks that operate outside great-power rivalry.

Implications for Small and Medium States

For small and medium-sized states, multilateral institutions function as essential equalisers. They provide structured environments in which power asymmetries are moderated by rules, procedures, and collective expectations. As these mechanisms weaken, outcomes are increasingly shaped by relative power rather than legal principle.

For countries such as Sri Lanka, which rely on predictability, institutional mediation, and normative stability, the erosion of multilateralism is not an abstract concern. It directly affects diplomatic space, economic security, and strategic autonomy.

Conclusion

The significance of America’s withdrawal from sixty-six international institutions lies not only in what it abandons, but in what it legitimises. When the principal architect and long-time beneficiary of the multilateral order steps back from its foundations, the system as a whole becomes more fragile. Even if individual withdrawals are reversed in future, the signal sent—that commitments are contingent and institutions negotiable—may endure.

For the international community, and particularly for smaller states, defending multilateralism is no longer a matter of idealism. It is a practical necessity in an increasingly uncertain world.

*Author is former Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to EU, Belgium, Turkey and Saudi Arabia 

Footnotes

1. The White House, Presidential Memorandum on Withdrawing the United States from International Organizations, Conventions, and Treaties Contrary to the Interests of the United States, January 7, 2026.

2. The White House, Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations, January 2026.

3. United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992.

4. Paris Agreement, adopted December 12, 2015, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.

5. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

6. UN Women, Mandate and Governance Structure, United Nations documentation.

7. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Mandate and Strategic Framework.

8. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).

9. Colombo Plan Council, History and Mandate of the Colombo Plan, Colombo.