By P M Amza –

Introduction: Geography and the Price of Conflict

When great powers confront each other, geography often determines who pays the immediate price. The ongoing confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States illustrates this reality with renewed urgency. While strategic calculations are made in Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, their consequences are being felt across the Arab Gulf. Missile interceptions, heightened military alerts, disruptions to shipping routes, and concerns over energy infrastructure have reminded Gulf monarchies of a fundamental truth: alliances may offer protection, but geography cannot be changed.

Situated between Iran and an extensive network of Western military installations, Gulf states find themselves in a strategic crossfire not entirely of their own making. Their long-standing security partnerships with Washington remain vital, yet these same ties can expose them to retaliation during periods of escalation.

Strategic Geography: The Gulf as the Military Nerve Centre

The United States maintains one of its largest overseas military presences in the Gulf. The Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, hosting roughly 10,000 U.S. personnel, serves as a major hub for air operations, while Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet.[¹] Additional facilities across Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia form a wider regional defence architecture supporting logistics, surveillance, and missile defence.[²] Altogether, approximately 30,000–40,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the broader Middle East.[³]

This network has long underpinned Gulf security. Yet in the current context, it also represents a network of exposure points, where host countries risk becoming indirect participants in conflicts shaped by decisions beyond their control.

The Economic Stakes: Oil, LNG, and Strategic Vulnerability

The Gulf’s importance extends far beyond military considerations. Its economies remain central to global energy stability.

At the centre lies the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global petroleum supply and a significant share of global liquefied natural gas (LNG)—particularly exports from Qatar—passes daily, making it a critical dual energy chokepoint.[⁴] Even the threat of disruption can trigger price volatility, rising insurance costs, and rerouting of maritime traffic.

Increasingly, Gulf states are not only energy suppliers but also shock absorbers of geopolitical risk, bearing the immediate consequences of conflicts in which they are not principal actors.

Strategic Hedging: The Gulf’s Evolving Diplomatic Posture

In response, Gulf states are recalibrating—not abandoning—their partnerships with the United States. This approach reflects strategic hedging under conditions of heightened vulnerability.

The Saudi–Iran rapprochement of March 2023, facilitated by China, has taken on renewed importance.[⁵] It now serves as a stabilising buffer, reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation despite rising tensions.

More recently, Gulf governments have emphasised de-escalation and protection of domestic infrastructure, carefully avoiding overt military alignment.

Regional Mediation and Intra-Regional Security Balancing

Another dimension of this recalibration is the growing role of intra-regional partnerships. Saudi Arabia’s long-standing defence relationship with Pakistan—including training and advisory cooperation—provides an additional layer of reassurance, reinforced by the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in 2025.[⁶]

Pakistan has also positioned itself as a mediator, maintaining communication channels with Iran, Gulf states, and the United States, facilitating indirect exchanges between Washington and Tehran.

At the same time, Saudi engagement with Turkey—particularly in defence production, drone technology, and military training—points to a broader effort to diversify security partnerships. While still evolving, the prospect of complementary cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey suggests a more flexible and layered regional security framework.

These developments reflect a shift toward intra-regional balancing, where diplomatic engagement complements traditional security arrangements.[⁷]

Diversification of Strategic Partnerships

Gulf states have also expanded ties with global powers beyond the United States. China has emerged as a central economic partner, while Russia continues to engage through the OPEC+ framework.

A further indication of change is the growing relevance of technological expertise drawn from other conflict theatres. The war in Ukraine has generated advances in counter-drone warfare, particularly against Iranian-origin systems, lessons increasingly relevant to Gulf states facing similar threats.

This reflects a broader reality: the Gulf is now part of an interconnected security environment where lessons from one theatre are rapidly applied in another.

From Security-First to Stability-First

A deeper shift is underway in Gulf strategic thinking. Economic transformation has elevated stability as a central priority.

Initiatives such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 depend on investor confidence, uninterrupted trade, and regional predictability. Recent developments have reinforced a key lesson: even limited conflict can impose disproportionate economic costs.

Stability is no longer a by-product of security—it has become its primary objective.

Defence Spending and Persistent Security Dependence

Despite diversification, Gulf states remain deeply embedded in the American security framework. The region accounts for nearly 30 percent of global arms imports, with Saudi Arabia among the world’s largest defence spenders.[⁸]

Much of this procurement involves U.S.-supplied systems, reinforcing continued reliance despite efforts toward strategic autonomy.

Emerging Unease: The Cost of Dependence

At the same time, a more subtle shift is evident. While the United States remains indispensable, Gulf states are increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities associated with dependence.

The extensive American military presence—bases, logistical networks, and associated infrastructure—has made host countries visible targets during escalation. Gulf states also bear significant economic and security risks while contributing to sustaining the very system that exposes them.

In private diplomatic circles, this has prompted a reassessment. The perception that Gulf states are expected to underwrite regional security—financially and strategically—without commensurate influence has become more pronounced.

Recent reporting, including in The New York Times, highlights this complexity. Saudi leadership may favour pressure on Iran, yet remains cautious about escalation. While weakening Iran may be desirable, state collapse is viewed as a direct threat.[⁹]

Recent joint statements by Gulf and Arab states, including Qatar, further illustrate this dual approach. While condemning Iranian actions and reaffirming sovereignty, they have simultaneously emphasised restraint and the need to avoid wider conflict. This reflects both concern over external threats and a clear reluctance to become the theatre of a broader war.[¹⁰]

Conclusion: Between Dependence and Autonomy

The present crisis has reaffirmed a fundamental reality: geography imposes constraints that alliances cannot fully offset. While Gulf states remain tied to the United States, they are increasingly conscious of the risks of entanglement and overdependence.

Their response has not been rupture, but recalibration—balancing deterrence with diplomacy, dependence with diversification, and security with stability.

For the Gulf monarchies, the challenge today is not to choose between Washington and Tehran, but to navigate carefully between them while safeguarding the stability upon which their future prosperity depends. ENDS

Footnotes

[1] U.S. Navy, Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility.

[2] U.S. Department of Defense, Military Installations in the Middle East.

[3] Congressional Research Service, U.S. Forces in the Middle East.

[4] U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (2024).

[5] Reuters, “Saudi Arabia and Iran Agree to Restore Diplomatic Relations,” March 2023.

[6] Reporting on the Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, 2025.

[7] Reuters; Associated Press, reports on Pakistan mediation and emerging Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey defence discussions, March 2026.

[8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024.

[9] The New York Times, report on Saudi–U.S. discussions on Iran strategy, 2026.

[10] Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs; joint Arab statement on regional escalation, 2026.

*The author is former Sri Lanka Ambassador to EU, Belgium,  Turkey and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs