By Piyadasa Edirisuriya –

The Sri Lankan Government has proposed increasing the retirement age of judges through amendments to the Constitution and the Judicature Act. According to the proposal approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 27 July 2026, the retirement age of Supreme Court judges would increase from 65 to 67 years, while that of Court of Appeal judges would rise from 63 to 65 years, with corresponding increases for judges in the High Court, District Courts, Magistrates’ Courts and other judicial officers. The Government argues that the reform will strengthen judicial capacity and help reduce the backlog of approximately 1.1 million pending court cases.

The proposal has immediately generated vigorous debate. Supporters view it as a practical response to a judicial system struggling under an enormous caseload, while critics argue that changing the retirement age of serving judges risks undermining public confidence in judicial independence. Professional legal bodies, including the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL), the Judicial Service Association of Sri Lanka (JSASL), LAWASIA, the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association and several civil society organisations have questioned both the timing and the constitutional implications of the proposal.

As with most public policy decisions, the issue is not simply whether the proposal is good or bad. Rather, it is whether its benefits outweigh its costs and whether it addresses the underlying causes of Sri Lanka’s judicial delays. A balanced assessment suggests that extending the retirement age could provide important short-term benefits, but it cannot by itself resolve the structural weaknesses of the judicial system.

The Value of Experience

Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the proposal is the value of judicial experience.

Judges accumulate expertise over decades of legal practice and judicial service. They develop a deep understanding of statutory interpretation, constitutional principles, judicial precedent and courtroom management. Such experience is particularly valuable in constitutional litigation, commercial disputes and complex criminal trials, where decisions often have significant legal and economic consequences.

Experienced judges are also generally more efficient. Years of handling litigation enable them to identify the key legal issues quickly, manage proceedings effectively, discourage unnecessary delays and produce better-reasoned judgments. Well-reasoned decisions reduce the likelihood of appeals and retrials, thereby saving time and judicial resources.

Retaining experienced judges therefore represents an investment in institutional knowledge rather than simply extending individual careers.

Reducing Disruption in Long-Running Cases

Many important court proceedings continue for several years. Constitutional petitions, commercial disputes involving major financial transactions, environmental litigation and large criminal prosecutions frequently extend beyond the expected retirement date of the presiding judge.

When a judge retires before completing a lengthy trial, significant disruptions may occur. A newly appointed judge must spend considerable time becoming familiar with thousands of pages of evidence, witness testimony and legal submissions. In some circumstances, procedural rules may even require parts of the trial to be reheard, increasing costs for litigants and prolonging delays.

Allowing judges to remain in office for an additional two years would enable many ongoing cases to be completed without interruption. This would improve judicial efficiency and reduce unnecessary procedural complications.

Preserving Judicial Capacity

The retirement of experienced judges creates temporary vacancies that cannot always be filled immediately. The recruitment and appointment process takes time, and newly appointed judges require an induction period before they can manage a full workload.

During these transition periods, fewer judges are available to hear cases, resulting in postponed hearings and an expanding backlog.

Extending the retirement age therefore helps preserve judicial capacity. Rather than leaving courtrooms vacant while appointments are being processed, experienced judges continue hearing cases, ensuring greater continuity in the administration of justice.

Improving Productivity

If the objective is to reduce the backlog of pending cases, extending judicial service could make a measurable contribution.

Assume that a judge disposes of approximately 250 to 300 cases each year. A two-year extension would allow that judge to resolve an additional 500 to 600 cases. If around one hundred judges remained in office for two extra years, the judiciary could potentially dispose of between 50,000 and 60,000 additional cases, assuming productivity remains broadly unchanged.

These figures are illustrative rather than predictive, but they demonstrate how retaining experienced judges can increase the overall capacity of the judicial system.

Mentoring the Next Generation

The benefits of retaining senior judges extend beyond the courtroom.

Experienced judges play an essential role in mentoring newly appointed members of the judiciary. They help younger judges develop judicial ethics, improve courtroom management, understand complex legal principles and maintain consistency in legal interpretation.

This transfer of institutional knowledge strengthens the judiciary as a whole and contributes to maintaining high professional standards.

Benefits Depend on Broader Reform

Nevertheless, these benefits should not be overstated.

Extending the retirement age does not automatically improve judicial efficiency. The expected gains depend upon several conditions. Judges must remain physically and mentally capable of performing their duties, maintain high levels of productivity and continue exercising complete independence.

More importantly, the reform must be accompanied by broader improvements in judicial administration. Without better case management, additional court facilities, improved technology and adequate staffing, the gains from retaining experienced judges will remain modest.

Structural Problems Remain

This is perhaps the greatest weakness of the proposal.

Sri Lanka’s judicial backlog is not caused solely by judicial retirements. It reflects a range of structural constraints that have accumulated over many years.

These include shortages of judges, insufficient courtroom infrastructure, inadequate administrative staff, delays in police investigations and forensic reports, repeated adjournments, outdated paper-based filing systems and inefficient case management procedures.

Unless these underlying problems are addressed, extending the retirement age can only provide temporary relief.

Judicial Independence Matters

The most controversial aspect of the proposal concerns judicial independence.

Critics argue that increasing the retirement age of judges who are already serving may create the perception that the Executive is influencing the judiciary. Even if no improper influence actually exists, public confidence may decline if constitutional changes appear to benefit incumbent judges.

This distinction is important.

Judicial independence depends not only on actual independence but also on the public perception that judges remain entirely free from political influence. Public trust is one of the judiciary’s most valuable institutional assets, and reforms should avoid creating unnecessary doubts about its impartiality.

Career Progression

Another potential consequence is slower career progression within the Judicial Service.

If senior judges remain in office longer, vacancies arise less frequently. This delays promotions for judges in lower courts and reduces opportunities for younger judges to assume leadership positions.

Although this cost is less visible than concerns about judicial independence, it can affect morale, succession planning and long-term workforce development.

The Economic Perspective

From an economic standpoint, the proposal presents a classic cost-benefit question.

The benefits include retaining valuable human capital, reducing recruitment and training costs, improving the efficiency of commercial dispute resolution and lowering the economic costs associated with delayed justice.

Delayed court proceedings impose significant costs on businesses, investors and citizens. Commercial disputes remain unresolved, contracts cannot be enforced promptly and investment decisions are often postponed while litigation continues.

If experienced judges can reduce these delays, the resulting economic benefits may exceed the additional salary costs associated with extending their tenure.

On the other hand, extending judicial service also increases expenditure on salaries, allowances and related employment benefits. Furthermore, if public confidence in judicial independence is weakened, the broader institutional costs could outweigh the economic gains.

The challenge is therefore to maximise the benefits while minimising the risks.

A Better Way Forward

Rather than viewing retirement age reform as a standalone solution, it should form part of a comprehensive judicial reform programme.

Such a programme should include appointing additional judges, expanding court infrastructure, introducing modern digital case-management systems, reducing unnecessary procedural delays, strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and improving administrative support throughout the court system.

Only a comprehensive package of reforms is likely to produce lasting improvements in judicial efficiency.

Finding the Right Balance

Ultimately, the debate should not focus solely on whether judges should retire at 65 or 67.

The more important question is how Sri Lanka can build a judiciary that is efficient, independent and trusted by the public.

From an efficiency perspective, extending the retirement age may help retain experienced judges, preserve judicial capacity and modestly reduce case backlogs. These are genuine and measurable benefits.

From a governance perspective, however, extending the tenure of judges who are already serving raises legitimate concerns about public confidence in judicial independence.

One possible compromise, adopted in several jurisdictions, is to apply any revised retirement age only to judges appointed after the constitutional amendment rather than to incumbent judges. Such an approach would preserve the long-term workforce benefits of the reform while reducing concerns about executive influence over serving judges.

Ultimately, improving Sri Lanka’s justice system requires more than changing the retirement age of judges. It requires sustained investment in judicial institutions, modern court administration, effective case management and governance reforms that strengthen both efficiency and public confidence.

Extending the retirement age may therefore be a useful component of judicial reform—but it should not be mistaken for the reform itself.

*Dr Piyadasa Edirisuriya -Former Academic, Monash Business School, Australia, email: pedirisuriya@gmail.com