By TU Senan –

TU Senan

Following Thileepan’s death, the LTTE launched an attack on the IPKF. In response, the powerful Indian military retaliated with Operation Pawan, aiming to eradicate the LTTE and assert full control over the north. The horrors unleashed by the Indian military in the north were unprecedented. Instances of brutal murders, sexual violence, and torture became rampant. Young women were subjected to heinous acts of violence, and arbitrary arrests and beatings were commonplace. Some women are subjected to cruel violence. There were incidents of women stripped naked and shot in their genitals. Others were subjected to their breasts and lips cut open with knives and left to bleed and die. Arrested young men were told to run, then the army opened fire at them. Many houses and shops were burned down. Numerous arrests were made. The majority of those arrested experienced severe beatings and cruel torture. This continued throughout the presence of the IPKF in the North and East. Beating up anyone who dared to even disobey them became a norm.

The IPKF also used other militant organizations as paramilitary units to maintain control. As they did not have enough youth involved in these paramilitary militant groups, they formed a new group called Tamil National Army (TNA) and forcibly recruited young children as young as 12. Revenge attacks and sexual violence perpetrated by these groups, under the guise of collaboration with the Indian military, further exacerbated the suffering.

Amidst this turmoil, the first provincial election was held, but it was marred by irregularities and lack of genuine representation. The EPRLF stood in the election but received no votes in northern districts. All 19 members who were ‘elected’ from the North were declared to have won ‘uncontested’ to avoid embarrassment. The JVP in the south, on the other hand, threatened violence against anyone participating in the provincial election, demonstrating their commitment to their chauvinist propaganda. They had no forces in the North. However, explaining the details of what is going on in the North did not serve their propaganda purpose. They stuck to their chauvinist propaganda about how Tamils supported India and their military presence in Sri Lanka was to divide the country for Tamils. Their patriotic position, in essence, was a Sinhala-nationalist position – leading them to create a corporation with a section of the elite and military. All those seen as non-patriotic were named as traitors and marked for killing.

After being expelled from the CWI, Bahu formed an electoral alliance with the Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP), branding it as a workers’ party. The SLMP, at that time, portrayed itself as ‘left-wing’ and had a populist programme. Its leader, Vijaya Kumaratunga was a former member of firstly the LSSP and then the SLFP, a prominent actor, and husband of Chandrika, who is the daughter of the founder of the SLFP, C.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.

In 1986, Vijaya Kumaratunga visited LTTE-controlled areas in the North and met with key leaders—a bold move that no other politician was willing to make at the time. Chandrika, residing in London, also engaged with several militants, including LTTE representatives in London, as well as holding discussions with the CWI about forming a potential united front. Bob Labi, from the CWI’s International Secretariat, met Chandrika in London to explore solidarity work.

During this period, there was the potential for united front collaboration to advance workers’ programmes and work towards a political solution for Tamils, but the focus shifted towards forging an electoral coalition. This coalition also included the Communist Party and the now-defunct LSSP.

Vijaya Kumaratunga’s position in relation to a negotiated settlement of Tamils’ demands was vehemently opposed by sections of Sinhala nationalists in the south, including the JVP. Vijaya Kumaranatunga was shot and killed by an armed JVP group in February 1988. Bahu almost faced a similar fate when he was targeted by the same JVP armed group during an election rally near Colombo, narrowly escaping death despite suffering a neck wound. In response, a faction of the NSSP began to arm itself. While the source of their limited arsenal remains ambiguous, speculation suggests it was provided by the Sri Lankan government. Despite claims of self-defence, these weapons were also turned against left activists who opposed the NSSP leadership. Shots were once fired ‘accidentally’ at the NSSP office in Colombo, narrowly missing Siritunga Jayasuriya (Siri), a co-founder of the party. the who had been excluded from the NSSP for siding with the CWI leadership and voting at the IEC (CWI) in Belgium to threaten the NSSP with expulsion from the International if it did not end its support for the Indian intervention. That IEC meeting which debated Sri Lanka situation took place in January 1988. Later at the fifth World Congress of the CWI held in December 1988, the NSSP was given a deadline to change course and, if it didn’t, the CWI would regard the party as being outside of the CWI, an outcome which was confirmed at the July 1989 IEC meeting. Later, with the support of CWI, Siri established the United Socialist Party (USP).

As a backdrop to these events, the 1988 presidential election unfolded. Both main capitalist parties, the SLFP and the UNP, pledged to annul the Indo-Lanka accord. R. Premadasa clinched the presidency by promising to expel the Indian army. However, no elections were conducted in the North or even the East, as most of the North was under the control of the IPKF at that time. Premadasa struck a clandestine deal with the LTTE to cooperate against the IPKF. Even before the presidential election, the Sri Lankan military provided support to the LTTE, which later became official after Premadasa’s victory. The Sri Lankan government commenced supplying weapons and aid to the LTTE to combat the IPKF. As part of this agreement, many LTTE members were permitted to operate freely in the south. Youth who faced threats from the IPKF and EPRLF in the North were also allowed to escape to the south through various routes, including the military controlled Palali airport.

With assistance from relatives and others, a number of youths found their way to Palali airport. Upon arrival, they were taken into the custody of the military and transported in cargo planes to Colombo. However, the military treated them all as LTTE members, subjecting them to a harrowing experience. Positioned near the powerful engines of the cargo planes, they endured deafening levels of noise, leaving many unable to walk or function upon arrival. It took several days for some to recover, while others never fully regained their hearing.

This event served as a stark lesson for a generation of northern youth, instilling a deep-seated distrust in authorities bearing promises and gifts. It was during the late eighties that the northern population experienced such widespread human suffering for the first time. Of course it is no comparison to the suffering that took place in 2009. The suffering endured by the northern population in 2009, particularly during the so-called ‘end of the war’, was unprecedented in Sri Lanka’s history. More than ten percent of the northern population was wiped out in a matter of months. But this earlier horror of the Indian military left behind a huge scar.

At a very young age, without a full grasp of the scale of war or the political complexities of the time, I, like many others, was drawn towards so-called ‘radicalism.’ At that time, clarity of thought and organized platforms were lacking among Tamils. Most former leftists had either joined the LTTE or fled the North in fear of it, leaving a void of coherent ideology.

However, within the NSSP, a process began, facilitated by the intervention of the international organization they were then affiliated with, the CWI. While all capitalist parties focused on manoeuvring against the Indian government and propagating Sinhala chauvinism, so-called ‘Marxist’ parties such as the JVP, LSSP, and CP moved even further away from revolutionary ideals to champion outright Sinhala nationalism. As Kumar Gunaratnam, a prominent JVP leader who later split to form the Frontline Socialist Party (FSP), aptly put it, they “dropped the red flag and raised the national flag of Sri Lanka”. This surge of Sri Lankan nationalism permeated all political parties, including Tamil ones, and even sections of the LTTE, where defending Sri Lanka was deemed strategically vital – a justification for full collaboration with the Sri Lankan state.

The NSSP, too, was not immune to this trend. However, it did not immediately succumb to Sinhala nationalism. Instead, a crisis erupted within the party. The NSSP managed to resist nationalist influences to some extent because it was the sole party exposed to genuine international developments. Nearly all Trotskyist internationals had some presence in Sri Lanka during that period. Most either collaborated with the LSSP or comprised a handful of individuals working independently, many of whom had to operate clandestinely for their safety. The prospect of sacrificing oneself for an ideology was very real at that time.

Initially, the NSSP emerged as a significant force opposing the nationalists. However, this stance was short-lived as the party itself descended into crisis. Intense debates ensued among leaders and members regarding the correct stance on the national question, the appropriate slogans to champion, the left’s strategic approach, and more. While there was an objective necessity for such discussions to occur within the broader left, including the leadership of all militant organizations, the reality was starkly different, primarily due to the nature of these organizations’ leaders.

Discussions within leftist circles at the time largely revolved around either endorsing the JVP or denouncing them as terrorists—regardless, no one strayed from their entrenched ‘patriotic’ stance. Sadly, few possessed a comprehensive understanding of international developments or a solid grasp of Marxist theory. Consequently, Marxism was swiftly abandoned, persisting only in rhetoric.

Understanding the significance of being part of an international Marxist organization is paramount. Without a robust organic connection to the struggles of the working class, both regionally and globally, every Marxist organization risks succumbing to nationalist tendencies. The Fourth International (USFI – United Secretariat of the Fourth International) during that era operated as a quasi-federal body, accommodating affiliates with diametrically opposing views, even on national questions. While this arrangement might seem functional in abstract scenarios where affiliates aren’t directly engaged in particular struggles, situations like those in Sri Lanka during this period demonstrate its limitations. When confronted with sharp circumstances demanding decisive positions, organizing together Indian nationalists and Sinhala nationalists becomes untenable. Developing a farsighted class position becomes imperative for the survival of any international organization.

Although the USFI formally expelled the LSSP in 1964 due to its class-collaborative coalitionism, its only remaining connection was with former LSSP members. Support for the USFI eventually waned in South Asia. Stalinist organizations like the communist parties in India lacked a history of genuine international engagement. Their understanding of internationalism typically amounted to national organizations convening, devoid of substantive debate or efforts to connect with workers’ struggles in other countries. Communist parties in India aligned with their bourgeois counterparts and made no attempts to foster solidarity with workers in Sri Lanka. Presently, their involvement has regressed to providing speakers for party events in other countries as mere ‘stage decoration,’ lacking political or programmatic substance.

A small faction within the NSSP courageously championed the Marxist position despite facing potential threats to their lives. The collective leadership of the Committee for a Workers’ International played a pivotal role in this period. Without exaggeration, this group of Marxists hoisted the banner of Marxism throughout the country, steadfastly advocating clear positions on various issues, including the necessary tactics to advance working-class interests and alleviate the suffering of the oppressed.

However, this was a marginalized debate, inaccessible to the broader working class or Tamil youth. Although all left parties counted Tamil members among their ranks at the time, none wielded significant influence. A Maoist organisation that had some influence by now had abandoned serious work, with several of its notable members joining the LTTE. Even its exiled leader, N. Shanmugathasan, underwent a complete ideological shift, endorsing the LTTE’s fight against the IPKF, not out of adherence to Mao’s ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ doctrine, but rather due to his belief that ‘the main enemy is India.’ It is also worth mentioning here that Rohana Wijeweera, who founded the JVP, started his political journey as a youth leader of the Maoist party that Shanmugathasan was leading. He allegedly left after a disagreement about the allocation of resources for printing a Tamil leaflet.

Thus, it came as a personal revelation to me when I learned about the debates within the CWI two decades later. Although I wasn’t affiliated with any organization at the time, I had come to appreciate the imperative of ideological clarity needed, especially concerning caste and national questions, and was actively seeking out those who had them.

*To be continued..

Part1 – Did the Sri Lankan military aid Tamil youth in escaping from Indian troops?