By P M Amza –

From Ambiguity to Assertion

The twenty-one-hour negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad did not end in silence. They ended in clarity—clarity without convergence. While J. D. Vance stated that no agreement had been reached, Iran responded with equal precision, acknowledging limited areas of understanding but underscoring deep disagreements over sanctions, nuclear rights, and the status of the Strait of Hormuz.

This exchange reframes the talks. What initially appeared as a diplomatic impasse now reveals itself as a structured articulation of competing strategic visions. The two sides are no longer probing cautiously for compromise; they are defining the limits of what is negotiable. At the centre of this divide lies a deeper question: who determines the conditions under which access, security, and control are exercised in one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.

Hormuz Before the Crisis: A Stable Artery

Prior to the escalation triggered by the United States and Israel’s military strikes on Iran in late February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz functioned as a stable and indispensable artery of global commerce. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil and close to one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies transited through its narrow waters. On a typical day, more than one hundred vessels passed through the Strait, supplying energy markets across Asia, Europe, and beyond.

This stability was not accidental. Despite longstanding tensions, all actors—including Iran—had a shared interest in maintaining uninterrupted flow. The Strait remained open not merely because of international law, but because disruption imposed unacceptable costs on all sides.

From Open Passage to Disrupted Order

The situation changed dramatically following the military strikes on Iran in late February 2026. In response, Iran moved to restrict maritime traffic, issuing warnings and targeting vessels, thereby reducing the flow of commercial shipping through the Strait.

The consequences were immediate. Shipping volumes declined sharply—at points falling by more than seventy percent—while global energy markets reacted with volatility. Oil prices surged by as much as forty to sixty percent within weeks, and LNG markets experienced acute disruption. Hundreds of vessels, including oil tankers, were left waiting or rerouted as operators reassessed the risks of transit.

What had been a functioning international waterway was transformed into a contested strategic space. The Strait was not inherently unstable; it became so within the context of conflict.

From Closure to Conditional Access

Yet Iran’s response has not followed a simple logic of closure. Instead, a more nuanced pattern has emerged. While restricting access broadly, Iran has selectively allowed certain vessels to transit, particularly those perceived as neutral or not aligned with its adversaries.

This points to a shift toward what may be described as conditional access. Passage continues, but under conditions shaped by political alignment, security considerations, and strategic signalling. The Strait remains operational, but no longer neutral.

This is a critical transformation. Iran is not merely interrupting maritime flow; it is redefining the terms under which that flow occurs.

The Emergence of Structured Leverage

The pattern of selective access suggests the emergence of structured leverage. By maintaining partial openness while sustaining uncertainty, Iran is able to influence behaviour without resorting to outright closure.

Shipping companies, insurers, and energy markets respond to risk. Even the perception of instability alters routing decisions, increases costs, and reshapes trade flows. At the height of the crisis, hundreds of vessels were delayed, demonstrating the tangible impact of uncertainty.

In this context, risk itself becomes an instrument of influence. Iran does not need to assert legal control over the Strait to shape outcomes. It can do so through calibrated actions that affect the strategic environment.

The Economics of Risk

The economic implications of this approach are profound. The disruption of Hormuz has been described as one of the most significant supply shocks in recent energy history, affecting not only oil and gas but also wider global supply chains.

Even marginal instability in the Strait translates into global consequences: elevated oil prices, volatile LNG markets, and broader inflationary pressures. For Iran, operating under sustained sanctions, the ability to influence these dynamics offers a form of indirect leverage.In this sense, uncertainty itself becomes a strategic resource.

Islamabad: Clarifying the Divide

The Islamabad talks brought these dynamics into sharper focus. The United States continues to frame negotiations around compliance, particularly in relation to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while emphasising freedom of navigation. Iran, by contrast, frames the discussion in terms of sovereignty, rights, and strategic recognition.

Iran’s response makes clear that these are not procedural disagreements. They reflect fundamentally different conceptions of order. The talks did not fail; they clarified the limits of convergence.

Nuclear Ambition, Frozen Assets, and the Politics of Compensation

Beyond Hormuz, two additional fault lines reinforce the depth of the divide. Iran’s nuclear programme remains central to the dispute. While Washington seeks limits on enrichment and verification mechanisms, Tehran maintains that enrichment is a sovereign right and a non-negotiable component of its civilian nuclear programme.

Recent estimates suggest that Iran possesses significant quantities of uranium enriched to levels approaching weapons-grade thresholds, strengthening its position as both a security concern and a bargaining asset. At the same time, its growing leverage in Hormuz may reduce its reliance on nuclear escalation as its primary negotiating tool, reshaping the balance between military and geopolitical leverage.

Parallel to this is the dispute over frozen assets and reparations. Iranian assets held abroad are estimated at between $100 billion and $120 billion, accumulated through restricted oil revenues under sanctions. Tehran has demanded the release of at least $6 billion in frozen funds, while also raising claims for compensation linked to recent military actions.

These demands reflect a deeper divergence. For the United States, sanctions and asset releases are instruments of leverage. For Iran, they are framed as entitlement and restitution. This introduces a retrospective dimension into negotiations, complicating any forward-looking agreement.

Lebanon, Israel, and the Expansion of Instability

The situation is further complicated by developments beyond the Gulf. Iran’s insistence that any ceasefire must include Lebanon reflects an understanding that regional dynamics are interconnected.

Continued Israeli military operations against Hezbollah introduce a destabilising factor into the broader diplomatic process. In this context, Israel functions as a structural spoiler, capable of undermining arrangements reached in other theatres.

This has direct implications for Hormuz. If access to the Strait is conditioned by the broader security environment, then escalation in Lebanon contributes to instability in maritime transit. Conflict in one domain generates pressure in another, reinforcing the logic of conditional access.

A Negotiated Maritime Space

Taken together, these developments point toward the emergence of a new maritime order. The Strait of Hormuz is no longer simply a chokepoint governed by established norms. It is becoming a negotiated space, shaped by the interaction of law, power, and perception.

Iran’s strategy reflects a broader evolution in geopolitics, where influence is exercised not through absolute control, but through the ability to shape conditions and expectations.

Conclusion: The New Logic of Openness

The Islamabad talks did not produce agreement, but they revealed the contours of a changing strategic landscape. Before February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz functioned as a stable artery of global commerce. Today, it operates under a different logic—one shaped by conflict, conditionality, and strategic calculation.

Iran is no longer relying solely on the threat of closure. It is advancing a model in which access is neither denied nor guaranteed, but conditioned by the broader political environment.

The question is no longer whether Hormuz will remain open. It is whether openness itself has become conditional—defined by the interplay of power, risk, and regional dynamics.

References

Al Jazeera, “Iran Says Key Differences Remain After Islamabad Talks,” April 2026.

U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, 2024.

Congressional Research Service, “Shipping Through the Strait of Hormuz,” 2026.

Reuters, “US-Israeli Strikes Trigger Iranian Response in Gulf,” March 2026.

Al Jazeera, “Iran War Sends Oil Prices Soaring,” March 2026.

MarketWatch/Reuters, “Hundreds of Ships Stranded as Hormuz Traffic Drops,” April 2026.

Reuters, “Selective Shipping Resumes Through Hormuz,” April 2026.

International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, 2026.

Reuters, “US–Iran Talks End Without Agreement,” April 2026.

International Atomic Energy Agency, “Verification and Monitoring in Iran,” 2025–2026.

Reuters, “Iran’s Enriched Uranium Stockpile Nears Weapons Threshold,” 2026.

The Guardian, “Iran Gains Leverage Beyond Nuclear Programme,” April 2026.

Congressional Research Service, “Iranian Frozen Assets,” updated 2025.

CGTN, “Iran Demands Release of Frozen Funds in Talks,” April 2026.

Reuters, “Israeli Strikes in Lebanon Complicate Ceasefire Efforts,” April 2026.

*The author is former Sri Lanka’s  Ambassador to EU, Belgium, Turkey, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs