By Vishwamithra – –

“The very ink with which history is written is merely fluid prejudice.” ~Mark Twain 

It is difficult to see how a society’s cultural personality and original identity could remain unadulterated after surviving centuries of colonial rule, religious conversions, and economic exploitation. Ancient Ceylon has been portrayed to our children, especially Sinhalese Buddhist generations, as one whose prime ruler was a King who followed the advice and tenets of the Maha Sanga, the clergy of Buddhism.

One cannot argue against that overarching narrative of traditional Sri Lankan history, particularly as it has been chronicled and handed down to Sinhalese Buddhist generations. The foundational historical chronicles of the island, such as the Mahawamsa, strongly emphasize the symbiotic relationship between the Sinhalese monarch and the Buddhist clergy. This dynamic was established at the very dawn of Buddhist history in Sri Lanka. Monarchs like King Devanampiya Tissa were counseled by the Maha Sanga (led by Arahat Mahinda) upon the island’s conversion to Buddhism. Throughout ancient history, kings were often portrayed as protectors of the religion who relied on the moral and spiritual advice of the clergy to govern righteously.

Passing down this specific narrative has been a central pillar in educating Sinhalese Buddhist youth about their heritage. It serves to instill a sense of moral duty, cultural pride, and connection to the island’s religious roots. While this is indeed the traditional and heavily promoted narrative, modern historians also note that ancient Ceylon was a complex society. Depending on the historical context we are discussing, we might want to mention that the advice of the clergy could vary, and the early island kingdoms also navigated interactions with other cultures and belief systems.

Two and a half millennia of history, unbroken traditions, unquestioned fidelity, and steadfast resilience have all conspired to sustain the story of a nation whose fundamental sociocultural premise was set by the principles of Buddhism. However, beneath that ornamental veneer, it has been chronicled—both in ancient times and during the period of colonial rule from 1505 to 1948—that the core of the Sinhalese majority’s national identity has historically sought to dominate the minority communities: the Tamils in the North and the Muslims in the East.

Buddhism, the first religion that taught the concept of equality amongst all in the human family, nevertheless, was interpreted and practiced by the so-called keepers of the Dharma, the Maha Sanga, as an exclusive club, arranging its hierarchical order in accordance with the rigid caste system that dominated the evolution of Sri Lankan society.

While the historical Buddha fundamentally rejected caste and taught radical social equality, the practice of Buddhism often adapted to local, entrenched social structures as it evolved. The Buddha’s core doctrine strongly opposed the rigid Brahmanical caste system of ancient India. He taught that spiritual liberation and human worth were based on an individual’s actions (karma), not their birth.

When Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka, the monastic order (Maha Sanga) eventually absorbed the island’s highly stratified social realities. Over centuries, the Sanga fractured into different monastic fraternities (Nikayas). Certain Nikayas, such as the historically dominant Siam Nikaya, instituted strict ordination rules based on caste, primarily favoring the landed Govigama caste. This meant so-called lower-caste individuals were largely excluded from joining specific prestigious monastic lineages.

Scholars and historians note this paradox between Buddhist doctrine and historical practice: Sociologists emphasize that while Buddha’s teachings championed a casteless society, Sri Lankan monastic orders historically operated with ‘hidden’ stratification, contradicting their own egalitarian philosophy. Historical studies indicate that kings and elites often reinforced these temple hierarchies, shaping the Sanga’s evolution to reflect the broader power structures of Sinhalese society.

Yet, the victims of this social development that adopted this rigid caste system as its hierarchical architecture were Tamils in the north, whose sociocultural development was even more doggedly structured along caste lines and traditions. The caste system, a sociocultural dynamic that has persisted for over two and a half millennia, contributed largely to the polarization of society along utterly anachronistic traditions that impeded modern development. This social ailment was responsible for the deceleration of economic and scientific progress, leaving society deeply seated in regressive values.

This fundamental social tenet has profoundly influenced the wider Sri Lankan community across both Sinhalese and Tamil populations. Its legacy endures in familial matters, particularly in the ongoing tradition of matrimonial advertisements.

However, in the political sphere, the traditional caste system within both Sinhalese and Tamil populations was fundamentally challenged by two influential leaders. They were R. Premadasa, who broke the upper-caste political monopoly in the Sinhalese community, and Velupillai Prabhakaran, who dismantled rigid caste hierarchies in Tamil society.

President Ranasinghe Premadasa was the first Sri Lankan President to break the political monopoly of the Govigama (landowning/highest) caste. He hailed from the Hinniwo (washerman) caste, and his political rise shattered these traditional barriers. He contested the Presidential Election in 1988, and his opponent was none other than Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a woman hailing from the Kandyan Radala Govigama caste. As a matter of fact, Premadasa was first elevated to the office of Prime Minister by the then President J.R. Jayewardene over and above Gamini Dissanayake, of Kandyan Govigama lineage, and Lalith Athulathmudali, of the low-country Govigama caste. At the time, J.R. made a strategic decision, as he knew it was Premadasa who could win the election, rather than either of the other two.

Prabhakaran’s story is totally a different one. Whereas Premadasa was elected by the people to the leadership of the country, Velupillai Prabhakaran became the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam by sheer force of the gun.  The greater leadership of the Tamil population in the North was dominated by the Vellalar caste, Prabhakaran broke the caste system in Tamil society by enforcing strict anti-caste rules in areas under his control to unite the Tamil population for their militant campaign, sociologists often argue this shifted Tamil society from rigid caste divisions to a militant class structure rather than completely eradicating caste-based prejudices.

Velupillai Prabhakaran belonged to the Karaiyar (coastal/maritime) community rather than the elite Vellalar (agricultural) caste. This distinction is critical because his rise to power—and the foundational makeup of the LTTE—marked a shift away from the traditional, Vellalar-dominated Tamil political establishment, representing as much of an uprising against internal social hierarchies as it was a fight against the Sinhalese-dominated state.

The LTTE actively dismantled the overt, ritualistic public practices of the caste system (such as segregated schools, temples, and tea stalls) in the areas they controlled. Rather than a strict ‘militant class structure,’ sociologists and historians typically describe this as a shift toward a militant, totalitarian meritocracy or a nationalist movement where military loyalty superseded traditional social hierarchies. However, any assessment that the LTTE’s actions shifted Tamil society into new structures without completely eradicating deeply ingrained caste prejudices could be true. While public discrimination was outlawed or severely punished, underlying prejudices, particularly regarding marriage and social networks, persisted.

In both cases, amongst Sinhalese and Tamils, superficial changes may depict a paradigm shift, but when exploring the deep-seated factors of how the caste system influenced—and was influenced in return—the fundamental system seems to be still in place. Radical social change has not taken root. Both Aragalaya-22 and the LTTE-dominated military campaign in the North may have scratched the surface of this centuries-old system without causing a real transformation of society.

Even the National People’s Power NPP), whose leader is Anura Kumara Dissanayake hails from a Govigama caste and his election, first as the leader of the NPP/JVP and later as President of the country, had to take a strategic move by electing him as their leader. Rohana Wijeweera, even though he ran the JVP movement rigidly on militaristic lines, would never have been elected by the larger majority of the country, especially in the context of the prevailing caste system.

Sri Lankan political history has long been intertwined with the Govigama (the highest-ranking caste among the Sinhalese). Apart from the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa, nearly all major heads of state have hailed from this community, and this includes President Anura Kumara Dissanayake.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) historically attracted a larger share of its grassroots support from lower/non-Govigama castes in the rural south. To make a serious bid for the

Presidency and broaden its base, the party needed to appeal to the larger Sinhalese-Buddhist electorate and the urban middle class. The creation of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition allowed the party to soften its extreme Marxist image and project a more moderate, palatable leadership, successfully distancing itself from the traditional, caste-based elitism of older political establishments.

Rohana Wijeweera ran the JVP on rigid, militant lines during the insurrections of the 1970s and 1980s. His revolutionary rhetoric, history of armed rebellion, and class-warfare tactics made the JVP deeply feared. It is widely agreed that even within the context of the caste system, Wijeweera’s violent, militaristic approach and extremist ideology would have prevented him from achieving mainstream democratic success with the broader Sri Lankan public.

Drawing moral equivalence between the caste systems of the Sinhalese and the Tamils is a futile exercise. At the core of both systems is not a genuine structural difference, but rather deep-seated personal and social prejudice.

*The writer can be reached at vishwamithra1984@gmail.com