By Dinesh Dodamgoda –

On 11 September 2026, the Young Lawyers’ Association held a public seminar at the National Library Auditorium in Colombo titled “Why Should We Mobilise for a New People’s Constitution?” The panel featured distinguished legal experts, including Emeritus Professor Savitri Goonesekere, Rohan Edrisinha, President’s Counsel Geoff Alagaratnam, and President’s Counsel Saliya Pieris.

In this article, I contend that authentic renewal requires transcending the ‘Majoritarian-Minoritarian Trap’ to create a social contract grounded in institutional alignment, the dispersal of power, and the protection of fundamental rights, thereby fostering hope for a more inclusive future.

The Panel’s Evaluation and Its Theoretical Boundaries

The seminar highlighted Sri Lanka’s constitutional vulnerabilities. Professor Goonesekere criticised executive overreach and called for abolishing the Executive Presidency. She noted that the drafted frameworks, including the 2000 proposals, aimed to prevent conflict, but political obstacles and entrenched interests have historically hindered such reforms, suggesting that overcoming resistance will require strategic consensus-building.

Rohan Edrisinha emphasised that a new constitution should reflect the “will of the people,” but modern social choice theory, especially Sean Ingham’s control framework, argues this is impossible. In complex societies, citizens form overlapping multiple majorities, not a single unified bloc. For instance, a majority supporting abolishing executive power may split over regional power-sharing or fiscal devolution.

Constitutional reforms, from the proposals made since 2000 to the present, are often seen as binary choices tied to identity politics related to ethnicity, religion, and language. Yet, a modern constitution should be modular and inclusive, offering separate democratic channels like a clearly elected House and a vocational Senate representing various Sectors. This structure lets majorities modify policies without any single group dominating, maintaining constitutional stability.

Building on Saliya Pieris’s focus on institutional integrity, institutional economics (notably Douglass North) underscores the difference between formal institutions (like constitutions and laws) and informal ones (such as norms and political culture).

Sri Lanka’s experience with the 13th Amendment illustrates the danger of ignoring the dual dynamic. Enacted under the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, it introduced provincial devolution on paper, yet nearly four decades later, key provisions on police and land remain stalled.

This failure is not merely technical but stems from a disconnect: the legal framework was introduced without building societal consensus and political support. If strong informal institutions underpin these formal guardrails, they can foster trust and stability, reassuring the audience that balanced reforms are achievable and sustainable.

Re-Evaluating the Existing Proposals

Seminar speakers saw the 2000 draft as a missed opportunity, but analysis shows Sri Lanka must go beyond the traditional consociationalists’ framework. The 2000 draft, like the 13th Amendment, relied on consociational power-sharing, pioneered by Arend Lijphart, which uses ethnicity to allocate authority and territory. Philip G. Roeder notes that consociationalism has significant flaws in post-conflict societies.

Embedding ethnic categories in consociational systems legally encourages ethnic politicians and radicals, leading to rigidity and instability. Many 20th-century consociational regimes ended with partition (like Czechoslovakia), civil wars (Cyprus, Lebanon), or coups (Fiji). Unlike the 13th Amendment, India’s approach avoided contentious issues-religion, princely states-focusing instead on language and overlapping identities for power sharing.

Power-Sharing via Consociationalism (13th Amendment /2000 Draft)

The 2000 draft contained procedural flaws. The executive sought to combine constitutional reform with personal agendas, such as prolonging presidential terms, and unethically pushed for a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The methods matter as much as the goals! For a constitution to earn lasting legitimacy, its means must match its noble ends. Sri Lanka cannot create a credible democracy with contaminated political methods.

Sri Lanka should adopt a distinct strategy grounded in recent academic research instead of relying on fragile elite agreements. This approach involves decentralising government authority into independent agencies, establishing a lean centralised government, and fostering ecological centres and civic groups. These measures aim to prevent any faction or ethnic group from seizing control by undermining the constitution.

Establishing the Fundamental Right to Life as a Protected Privilege

Both the 1978 Constitution and seminar discussions notably omit an explicit Right to Life. While Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by Sri Lanka, affirms the inherent right to life as a fundamental, non-derogable human right, Sri Lanka’s constitution does not explicitly enshrine it. Consequently, citizens and legal advocates must infer its existence through judicial interpretation of Article 11 (freedom from torture) and Article 13(4) (protection against arbitrary detention).

Relying only on judicial interpretation risks reducing a fundamental human right to shifting legal views and politics. A genuine “People’s Constitution” shouldn’t depend on legal inferences for human survival; it must explicitly enshrine an unchangeable Right to Life as its core guarantee!

A Proposed Framework for Renewal

To implement these ideas, I suggest that Sri Lanka may need an innovative constitutional framework that replaces majoritarian rule with a self-enforcing system of institutional checks and balances. This could involve abolishing the Executive Presidency and establishing a Council of State.

A Senate of Sectors (Functional Merit), comprising 75 members selected from essential functional sectors, would serve as a merit-based check on harmful laws, ensuring that diverse sectors like agriculture, education, and industry have a voice in governance. The Prime Minister, answerable to Parliament, would exercise executive authority and be supported by co-signatures from Sectoral Commissioners or Heads of the Senate, directly involving these groups in decision-making processes.

Ecological-Economic Decentralisation proposes replacing ethnically defined provinces with 25 economic-ecological hubs centred on river basins. This shift would redefine regional boundaries and be micro-managed by village leaders through Gramiya Samagi Councils. It aims to transform land and water into shared commons, foster cooperation among diverse groups, and grant communities a constitutional veto over resource management.

Conclusion

The Young Lawyers’ Association seminar reignited discussions on constitutional reform. However, sustainable governance requires moving beyond ethnic-majority or minority perspectives. Sri Lanka needs to move away from outdated drafts, ethnic quotas, and dependence on benevolent leaders. Instead, it should build a pluralistic system with multiple majorities, ensure that laws reflect societal values, maintain procedural integrity, and safeguard the right to life. I hope these measures will contribute to a stable, self-reliant democracy in which the negative effects of conflict outweigh any benefits of harmony.

*Dinesh Dodamgoda, a former MP and Attorney-at-Law, has an MSc in Global Security from Cranfield University (UK). He researched at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and CSTPV at St Andrews. He was a Fulbright Scholar in U.S. National Security at the University of Delaware.