17 November, 2026

Blog

Sri Lanka’s Economic Dilemma: Trapped Between Debt Servicing, Financial Capital & The Urgent Need For Growth

By Sugath Amarasekera –

Sugath Amarasekera

Can the Government Deliver Economic Prosperity While Remaining Dependent on the Very Financial System That Constrains Its Development?

Sri Lanka’s government finds itself confronting a fundamental economic and political dilemma. It came to power promising an economic programme that would alleviate the severe hardships experienced by the overwhelming majority of the population, particularly the estimated 75% of households struggling with inadequate incomes and declining purchasing power.

Yet the government now faces an uncomfortable reality: much of the country’s financial capital remains concentrated in the hands of a relatively small economic oligarchy that exercises considerable influence over the commanding heights of the economy, particularly banking, finance and major commercial enterprises.

This concentration of financial power raises a fundamental question: Can a government genuinely transform the economic conditions of the majority while remaining heavily dependent on borrowing from the very financial interests that dominate the economy?

The Contradiction at the Heart of Government Finances

The contradiction becomes particularly evident when examining the government’s revenue and debt-servicing obligations.

Ordinary citizens contribute substantially to government revenue through indirect taxes imposed on the goods and services theyconsume. These taxes fall disproportionately on low- and middle-income households, whose already limited purchasing power has been severely weakened by the economic crisis.

Yet a substantial proportion of this revenue is effectively transferred to holders of government debt through interest payments.

Based on the budget figures under consideration, interest payments on domestic debt alone absorb more than 42% of total government revenue. When principal repayments are included, total debt-servicing obligations are estimated to reach approximately 78% of government revenue.

This leaves an amount equivalent to just 22% of government revenue after meeting these obligations.

Although principal repayments can be refinanced rather than paid entirely from current revenue, the scale of these obligations illustrates the government’s dependence on financial markets and the limited fiscal space available for development.

The fundamental contradiction is that the majority of citizens are being asked to shoulder an increasing tax burden while a substantial share of public revenue is committed to servicing financial claims accumulated through past government borrowing.

Such an arrangement raises serious questions about economic justice, the distribution of national income and the government’s ability to honour its electoral commitments.

Sri Lanka Cannot Afford Another Decade of Low Growth

Sri Lanka urgently needs political leadership capable of envisioning and implementing an economic transformation that delivers sustained annual growth of at least 6%, with a longer-term ambition of achieving 7% to 8% over the next five to ten years.

These are ambitious targets, but they reflect the scale of the economic transformation required to expand productive capacity, create employment, increase real household incomes and substantially reduce poverty.

Unfortunately, the government’s present economic vision, policy priorities and institutional approach appear insufficiently ambitious to achieve such a transformation.

An economic strategy that relies primarily on fiscal consolidation, taxation, domestic market borrowing and private-sector-led growth, without a sufficiently strong programme of productive investment, risks condemning Sri Lanka to prolonged economic stagnation.

If growth remains confined to approximately 2% to 3% annually, the country could become trapped in a low-growth equilibrium characterised by weak domestic demand,

inadequate productive investment, limited employment opportunities and persistent poverty.

Under such conditions, poverty affecting an estimated 25% to 30% of the population could become entrenched rather than progressively eliminated.

Economic stabilisation is not the same as economic development. A country can achieve fiscal discipline, accumulate primary budget surpluses and satisfy its creditors while simultaneously failing to improve the living standards of its people.

The real measure of economic success must therefore be the expansion of national productive capacity and the sustained improvement of household incomes, not merely compliance with fiscal targets.

When Will Economic Growth, Rather Than Higher Taxes, Balance the Budget?

This leads to a question that every Sri Lankan should ask:

At what point will the government be able to achieve a genuinely sustainable budget surplus through economic expansion rather than through successive increases in taxation and restrictions on public expenditure?

The government should aim to progressively reduce its overall fiscal deficit to approximately 1% to 2% of GDP, while simultaneously increasing productive public investment.

However, such an objective cannot be achieved sustainably through taxation and expenditure compression alone.

It requires a substantial expansion of the economy’s productive base, accompanied by higher employment, rising real incomes, increased business profitability and stronger domestic and export-oriented production.

Sustained economic growth of 7% to 8% would significantly expand the tax base, potentially allowing government revenue to increase without continuously raising tax rates.

The distinction is crucial.

Increasing government revenue by imposing heavier taxes on an economically distressed population is fundamentally different from increasing revenue because businesses are expanding, workers are earning more and the economy is generating greater value.

The first approach risks suppressing demand and weakening economic activity. The second creates the conditions for sustainable fiscal consolidation.

However, growth alone will not automatically resolve the fiscal problem. It must be accompanied by effective tax administration, a more equitable tax structure, improved public investment efficiency and a reduction in the long-term cost of government borrowing.

The Rs. 3.8 Trillion Question: Who Finances the Government?

Perhaps the most important issue confronting the government in the coming fiscal year is its projected requirement to raise approximately Rs. 3.8 trillion through market borrowing.

This raises a fundamental political-economic question: From whom will the government borrow this enormous sum, and what will be the consequences for productive investment and the wider economy?

A substantial proportion of government securities is held by banks, financial institutions, institutional investors and other holders of accumulated financial wealth.

Provident and pension funds, including the EPF and ETF, must be distinguished from private financial capital because they represent workers’ retirement savings. Nevertheless, excluding these funds, the government remains heavily dependent on domestic financial institutions and investors to finance its obligations.

The projected borrowing requirement is particularly concerning because it must accommodate debt principal repayments and financing needs associated with government expenditure, including capital investment.

This creates a potentially self-reinforcing cycle.

The government collects taxes from households and businesses, uses a substantial proportion of that revenue to service existing debt, and then returns to financial markets to borrow additional funds to meet its financing requirements.

Meanwhile, banks and financial institutions can continue allocating substantial resources to government securities rather than financing productive enterprises.

This does not mean that all government borrowing necessarily crowds out private investment. However, excessive dependence on domestic borrowing can constrain the availability and affordability of long-term credit for manufacturing, agriculture, exports, technology and other productive sectors.

The result could be a financial system that remains profitable while the productive economy struggles to expand.

A country cannot build lasting prosperity merely by recycling financial capital between the Treasury and the banking system. It must channel a substantially greater share of national savings into activities that create new productive assets, employment and export earnings.

The 2027 Budget: A Development Programme or Another Exercise in Debt Management?

These structural contradictions become especially important when examining the government’s proposed expenditure programme for 2027.

The projected overall budget deficit is approximately 4% to 4.5% of GDP, while planned capital expenditure is estimated at around Rs. 1.75 trillion, together with an additional allocation of approximately Rs. 250 billion for expenditure associated with Ditwah.

These figures raise several important questions.

How much of the proposed capital expenditure will actually translate into new productive capacity?

How much will be directed towards infrastructure and investments that generate measurable economic returns?

Will the government implement its full capital expenditure programme, or will development spending once again be compressed to satisfy fiscal targets?

Most importantly, how will the government finance these commitments while simultaneously meeting substantial domestic and external debt obligations?

The distinction between the fiscal deficit and gross financing requirements is particularly important. The reported budget deficit does not fully capture the government’s borrowing needs because principal repayments on maturing debt must also be financed or rolled over.

Consequently, a government may report an apparently manageable fiscal deficit while continuing to face enormous gross financing requirements.

The public should therefore be presented with a transparent account of the government’s total borrowing requirements, the maturity structure of its debt, the interest rates attached to that borrowing and the implications for productive investment.

Without such transparency, headline fiscal indicators can create a misleading impression of economic stability.

The Need for a Fundamental Change in Economic Direction

Sri Lanka cannot overcome its present economic difficulties simply by collecting more taxes, maintaining primary surpluses and repeatedly borrowing from financial markets to refinance existing obligations.

The government must develop a credible national economic transformation programme aimed at expanding the country’s productive capacity.

Such a programme should include a more active role for development-oriented finance, concessional long-term credit for productive enterprises, strategic investment in manufacturing and agriculture, export diversification, technological upgrading and measures to strengthen domestic purchasing power.

It should also examine options for progressively reducing the burden of domestic debt interest payments through lower refinancing costs, prudent liability management and negotiated arrangements where legally and financially feasible, while protecting financial stability and workers’ retirement savings.

The objective should not be to undermine the financial system but to redirect a greater proportion of available financial resources towards activities that generate real economic value.

The Central Bank, Treasury, commercial banking system and government development institutions must operate within a coherent national development framework that balances macroeconomic stability with the urgent need for productive investment.

A strategy focused exclusively on financial stability, without a corresponding strategy for economic transformation, will not deliver the prosperity promised to the electorate.

Conclusion: Sri Lanka Must Choose Between Managing Debt and Transforming the Economy

The central challenge facing Sri Lanka is not simply how to finance another annual budget. It is how to escape an economic structure in which an enormous share of government revenue is absorbed by debt servicing while productive investment and household purchasing power remain inadequate.

The government was elected on the expectation that it would fundamentally improve the economic circumstances of ordinary people.

That promise cannot be fulfilled through fiscal consolidation alone.

Sri Lanka needs a government prepared to confront the structural weaknesses of its economy, challenge the excessive concentration of financial power and establish a development strategy capable of delivering sustained growth,

rising real incomes and meaningful poverty reduction.

The question is no longer whether the government can achieve another primary budget surplus or satisfy its creditors.

The real question is whether it can transform the economy sufficiently to generate the income, production and public revenue required to reduce its dependence on borrowing.

Unless that transformation becomes the central objective of economic policy, Sri Lanka risks remaining trapped in a vicious cycle of debt servicing, taxation, weak investment and low growth.

A government that merely manages the country’s debt may succeed in stabilising its finances. But only a government that transforms its productive economy can deliver prosperity to its people.

No comments

Leave A Comment

Comments should not exceed 200 words. Embedding external links and writing in capital letters are discouraged. Commenting is automatically disabled after 5 days and approval may take up to 24 hours. Please read our Comments Policy for further details. Your email address will not be published.

leave a comment