By P M Amza –

P M Amza

Joseph Vijay was appointed Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu by the Tamil Nadu Governor  Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar six days after the declaration of election results in which the Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) emerged as the single largest party in the State Assembly. The delay preceding his appointment has itself evolved into a major constitutional and political discussion extending far beyond routine coalition negotiations.

With 108 seats in the 234-member Assembly, TVK finished well ahead of its rivals and only ten seats short of the majority mark of 118. In many parliamentary democracies, such an outcome would ordinarily have enabled the leader of the single largest party to receive an early invitation to form the government and subsequently prove majority on the floor of the Assembly. Instead, Tamil Nadu witnessed six days of political consultations, coalition negotiations, constitutional interpretation and strategic positioning before Vijay was finally invited to form the government.

The episode has consequently generated debate regarding constitutional conventions, gubernatorial discretion, coalition arithmetic and the evolving nature of Indian federal politics. More importantly, it highlighted how the emergence of a powerful new political force can test both constitutional practice and established political structures within a parliamentary system.

Article 164, Constitutional Conventions and the Sarkaria Principles

The Constitution of India itself provides only limited direct guidance on how such situations should be handled. Article 164(1) simply states that “the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor.” It does not prescribe how the Governor should act when no party secures an outright majority. Over time, therefore, Indian constitutional practice evolved through what constitutional scholars describe as “constitutional conventions” — unwritten but accepted democratic practices guiding the exercise of constitutional powers.

These conventions were shaped through parliamentary practice, Supreme Court judgments and the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission. The Commission suggested a broad order of preference in a hung assembly: a pre-poll alliance commanding majority, the single largest party with support from others, a post-election coalition and finally a post-election alliance offering outside support. Although these recommendations are not legally binding, they have substantially influenced constitutional behaviour in India.

Equally important were judicial interventions that increasingly limited subjective gubernatorial discretion. Beginning particularly with S. R. Bommai v. Union of India and reinforced later during the Karnataka and Maharashtra political crises, the Supreme Court progressively emphasised that questions of majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the Assembly rather than determined privately by the Governor. The principle that legislative legitimacy must emerge from the Assembly itself rather than Raj Bhavan gradually became an important constitutional norm.

Viewed within this framework, Vijay possessed a constitutionally credible claim. TVK did not merely emerge as a large party; it emerged as the dominant electoral force of the election. Recent constitutional practice in India would generally favour inviting the leader most likely to command confidence and allowing the Assembly itself to determine the outcome through a floor test.

Did Vijay Pursue Coalition Arithmetic Too Early?

One of the significant questions raised during the six-day delay was whether Vijay himself may have been politically ill-advised in rapidly shifting toward coalition negotiations instead of first firmly asserting his constitutional claim as leader of the single largest party.

Historically, Indian Governors have often invited parties below the majority mark and subsequently directed them to prove majority within a stipulated period. Tamil Nadu itself witnessed such a precedent in 2006 when M. Karunanidhi formed the government although the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) itself secured only 96 seats, relying on outside support from alliance partners including the Indian National Congress and the Pattali Makkal Katchi.

In Vijay’s case, however, the narrative appeared to shift quickly from whether the largest party should be invited first to whether TVK could demonstrate majority support prior to invitation itself. This distinction is constitutionally significant. By moving early toward coalition arithmetic and negotiations, TVK may inadvertently have allowed the constitutional argument to evolve into a numbers-certification exercise. In effect, the issue gradually moved away from “largest party entitlement” toward “prior proof of majority.”

This may partly explain why the process became prolonged. Instead of allowing the constitutional convention itself to operate naturally through a floor test, political attention increasingly focused on alliance-building and numerical assurances outside the Assembly.

The Governor’s Role and the Political Controversy

The Governor’s handling of the situation consequently became one of the most debated dimensions of the post-election process. Critics argued that the delay and the apparent emphasis on prior demonstrations of majority support appeared inconsistent with the spirit of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, which increasingly favours floor tests as the legitimate constitutional mechanism for resolving uncertainty in hung assemblies.

The central constitutional concern therefore became whether the Governor could effectively require proof of majority support within Raj Bhavan itself rather than permitting the Assembly to determine legitimacy through a floor vote. Critics argued that such an approach risked shifting constitutional authority away from the legislature toward discretionary political interpretation.

Supporters of the Governor, however, could argue that constitutional stability required ensuring that a viable government existed before a formal invitation was issued. Critics countered that excessive discretion risks politicising the Governor’s office and undermining parliamentary principles.

The controversy inevitably generated suspicion among sections of the public and opposition circles that the six-day delay may have reflected broader national political calculations linked to the BJP’s long-standing efforts to expand its influence in Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu has historically remained one of the few major Indian states where the BJP struggled to independently establish political dominance within the State’s deeply rooted Dravidian political culture.

The emergence of Vijay and TVK as a powerful new electoral force therefore introduced a new variable into that political landscape. While claims of direct political interference remain interpretive rather than conclusively established, the episode nevertheless revived debate regarding gubernatorial neutrality within India’s federal structure.

Similar controversies have surfaced repeatedly in states such as Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Delhi. The Tamil Nadu episode therefore resonated far beyond the State itself and touched upon unresolved questions concerning the balance between constitutional office and political influence.

Did Congress Miscalculate the Political Moment?

The role of the Indian National Congress also came under scrutiny. Congress faced a strategic dilemma. By extending unconditional support to TVK, it could potentially have facilitated the rapid emergence of a non-BJP and non-AIADMK government under Vijay. Instead, negotiations evolved into a more cautious and conditional process.

This may partly reflect Congress’s own long-term calculations. Supporting Vijay too strongly could accelerate TVK’s consolidation as the principal anti-establishment force in Tamil Nadu, potentially shrinking Congress’s already limited political space within the State. Thus, Congress may have viewed a weaker coalition arrangement as more politically manageable than a strong and independently legitimised Vijay government.

The Influence of Smaller Parties

Smaller parties too acquired unusual importance during the six-day political process. Hung assemblies often transform parties with limited numerical strength into disproportionately influential actors. Parties such as Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, regional formations, Muslim political groups and independents suddenly became central to government formation.

Cabinet positions, ideological assurances, constituency interests and political survival all became part of coalition bargaining. Some smaller parties simultaneously supported Vijay’s democratic legitimacy while remaining cautious about being politically absorbed into a rapidly expanding political movement.

The Communist parties, while elected as part of the DMK-led alliance, also publicly indicated that as leader of the single largest party, Vijay should be given the constitutional opportunity to demonstrate his majority on the floor of the Assembly.

The episode also demonstrated how fragmented electoral mandates increasingly complicate government formation within India’s first-past-the-post parliamentary system. The same election that produced a strong political wave in favour of TVK also produced an Assembly arithmetic requiring negotiation, accommodation and compromise.

Beyond the Immediate Crisis

The six-day delay ultimately reflected more than a temporary procedural issue. It symbolised a deeper political transition underway in Tamil Nadu. Since 1967, the State’s politics has largely revolved around a bipolar Dravidian structure dominated by the DMK and AIADMK. Vijay’s rise appears to challenge that long-standing equilibrium.

Several factors contributed to this transformation, including the growing influence of Gen Z voters, social media-driven campaigning, weakening traditional party loyalties, anti-establishment sentiment and the continuing influence of cinema within Tamil Nadu’s political culture.

Yet electoral disruption and constitutional power are not identical processes. Winning votes is one challenge; converting electoral momentum into governmental authority within India’s coalition-driven parliamentary framework is another. The six-day delay surrounding Vijay’s appointment therefore reflected not merely legal uncertainty, but the friction that emerges when a new political force attempts to enter and reshape an established constitutional and political order.

Ultimately, Vijay’s appointment resolved the immediate constitutional question, but the delay left behind a wider political and institutional debate. The episode highlighted the continuing ambiguities surrounding gubernatorial discretion in hung assemblies and demonstrated how constitutional conventions in India often remain shaped as much by political context as by legal principle.

For Tamil Nadu, the transition also marked the arrival of a major new political force capable of disrupting the State’s long-standing political equilibrium. Vijay may have secured office, but the path to government formation revealed that electoral victory alone does not automatically translate into swift constitutional authority within India’s coalition-driven parliamentary system.ENDS

*The author is Sri Lanka’s former Ambassador to the EU, Belgium, Türkiye, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as Sri Lanka’s Deputy High Commissioner in Chennai from 2006 to 2009.