By Imtiyaz Razak –

Dr. Imtiyaz Razak

At the core of President Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan—and central to Israeli demands—is the disarmament of Hamas, formally framed as the “process of demilitarization,” along with the group’s relinquishment of governance over Gaza. This is not merely a symbolic step: it is essential to the plan’s logic. In return, Israel would withdraw its forces from Gaza, and a broad international presence would oversee reconstruction, security, and governance in the postwar territory. Without Hamas’s disarmament, the plan cannot succeed. Should the group refuse, the peace framework would collapse, international involvement on the ground would be undermined, and Israel could face pressure to initiate a renewed military campaign. The stakes, therefore, are existential for the short- and medium-term prospects of peace in Gaza.

Hamas’s October 9 statement stopped short of an explicit commitment to disarmament. Instead, the group acknowledged “the conclusion of an agreement” that included demilitarization, couched in the language of achieving “an end to the war” and “the occupation’s withdrawal.” This statement refers not to the full Trump peace plan but to a six-point Hamas-Israel agreement covering the plan’s initial phase. While this reflects a willingness to engage diplomatically, it also underscores the tension inherent in the process: Hamas recognizes that these objectives cannot be secured without the group’s own disarmament. Disarmament is, in effect, the plan’s essential “quid pro quo”—a nonnegotiable condition that underpins both the cessation of hostilities and the legitimacy of future governance structures.

The current peace plan, however, lacks clarity on several critical operational details. Who will oversee disarmament? When will it occur? How will it be implemented? And what precisely is to be dismantled—tunnel networks, rocket arsenals, small arms caches, or all of the above? One logical candidate for independent monitoring is the International Stabilization Force (ISF), envisioned under the plan’s Board of Peace framework. The ISF would operate under the supervision of the recently announced CENTCOM-led international joint control center, potentially in coordination with the international task force established under the Hamas-Israel agreement. Nevertheless, the precise delineation of responsibilities, mandates, and enforcement authority remains unclear, creating a potential operational gap that could affect compliance.

The challenges of implementing disarmament are not purely technical; they are profoundly political and strategic. Historically, international actors have successfully monitored disarmament in other conflict zones, from Lebanon’s southern militias to the disbandment of paramilitary groups in post-conflict Bosnia. These examples demonstrate that international oversight can work—but only if the conflict party consents to comply. In Gaza, the ISF can develop protocols for inventorying weapons, verifying tunnel destruction, and ensuring compliance, but the ultimate responsibility rests with Hamas itself. The ISF is unlikely to have the mandate—or the capacity—to forcibly disarm a determined armed group.

The pressure on Hamas, therefore, is primarily political and strategic. Refusal to disarm carries the risk of renewed conflict under far worse circumstances than the current ceasefire arrangement. It could also strain relationships with regional “guarantor” states, including Egypt, Qatar, and other influential actors, whose support is critical for both reconstruction aid and diplomatic legitimacy. Moreover, failure to disarm would undermine the credibility of Hamas in the eyes of both the local population and the broader international community, isolating the group and potentially inviting unilateral Israeli military action.

Disarmament is also a prerequisite for broader stabilization in Gaza. Without it, international actors cannot effectively rebuild infrastructure, restore civil services, or ensure security for civilians. The disarmament of Hamas is, therefore, the linchpin of the peace plan, the foundation upon which Israeli withdrawal, international oversight, and postwar reconstruction depend. A successful disarmament process would not only halt the immediate cycle of violence but also open a path for Gaza to integrate into a broader regional framework of security and governance. Conversely, noncompliance risks perpetuating instability, making Gaza a flashpoint for renewed hostilities, regional tension, and international criticism.

In conclusion, Hamas’s disarmament is more than a tactical step in a single peace plan—it is the decisive factor that will determine whether Gaza enters a period of reconstruction and relative stability, or spirals back into conflict. The international community, led by the ISF and regional guarantors, can provide oversight, incentives, and legitimacy, but only Hamas itself can take the critical step of laying down arms. The consequences of failure are stark: renewed war, greater civilian suffering, and the collapse of what may be the last viable framework for a sustainable peace in Gaza.

*Dr. A.R.M. Imtiyaz is a historian and educator specializing in South Asian politics, minority rights, and global affairs. He serves as an affiliated professor at the South Asia Center, University of Pennsylvania, USA. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, terrorism, and Muslim minority issues in Sri Lanka, China, and the United States. He has extensive experience in education and community leadership, having directed programs at YMCA Philadelphia and academic institutions in China. In addition to scholarship, he is active in mentoring and public engagement, bridging academic research with real-world impact.