By Vishwamithra –

“He who would learn to fly one day must first learn to stand and walk and run and climb and dance; one cannot fly into flying.” ~ Friedrich Nietzsche

The Rubber-Rice Pact, officially known as the Ceylon–China Trade Agreement of 1952, was signed on December 18, 1952, in Beijing. Our first Prime Minister DS Senanayake had already passed away. His son, Dudley had to deal with the oncoming crisis; and he apparently was not ready for the national turmoil that was to follow.

Dudley may have been a dignified gentleman; he may have accumulated some rare qualities that characterize men of honor and poise, and the very image he depicted to the outer world might have been that of a gentleman bathed in empathy and affection for his fellowmen. But in times of national crisis, the country demanded a more versatile and ruthless leader. He succeeded his father as Prime Minister, DS. Senanayake, whose otherwise steady and respected leadership was marred by the implementation of controversial policies, most notably the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948.

Commonly known as ‘father of the nation’, D S Senanayake selected men of wide experience and education to man his Cabinet of Ministers. His Cabinet included, DS himself, SWRD Bandaranaike, Sir Oliver Goonatilaka, Sir John Kotelawala, JR Jayewardene, Dudley Senanayake, EA Nugawela, George E de Silva, TB Jayah, Sir Lalitha Rajapaksa, A Ratnayake, C Sittampalam, C Suntharalingam and RSS Gunewardene. Yet, despite their extensive credentials, the first Cabinet under DS failed to break the mold of the British colonial system. The period lacked the rawness of local talent, the drive for rapid execution, and any sense of government urgency.

They were deeply rooted in elitist governance; and apathetic towards the common man. In every government decision they made, their detachment from the rustic life of the Deep South and the torrid labor in the arid zone was evident. Dudley Senanayake’s approach to Agriculture did not match that of his father. The continued dependence on tea, rubber, and coconut as primary exports functioned as an archaic policy, perpetuating a colonial economic model that actively hindered macro-economic diversification and development in a nation striving to establish its own economic identity after five centuries of colonial rule.

Dudley Senanayake’s first test as Prime Minister occurred just as the Korean War boom ended. Rubber, a primary export earner, saw its market value crash, causing a major foreign exchange crisis in Ceylon. The onus fell on the shoulders of J R Jayewardene as Finance Minister to introduce major changes to our economic policy; harsh measures had to be adopted on the local scene, and given the opposition to capitalism headed by local Trotsky followers, it was not going to be very palatable. As Finance Minister, J R introduced the 1953 budget, which drastically increased the price of a measure of subsidized rice from 25 cents to 70 cents (some sources cite 72 or 75 cents). This move was a response to a severe economic crisis and pressure from international financial institutions to cut food subsidies.

The Hartal, stoppage of work, was so effective that the government was forced to meet on a British warship, the HMS Newfoundland, for safety. The civil unrest ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake later that year. The people of Ceylon had already become accustomed to an ‘entitlement syndrome’ as a result of the welfare facilities extended to them by the British rulers in the wake of the Second World War. Subsidized rice was one of those facilities. Playing politics with sound economic policies ultimately paid the price.

It was also rumored in the grapevine that Dudley’s close relatives and friends, who were not very happy with J.R., managed to plant a seed of suspicion in Dudley’s mind that JR was working to oust him from the leadership of the United National Party and the government. It was not so; the allegation was totally false and without any foundation. Ceylon missed an opportunity for ‘tightening of belt’ at an early stage of a country’s rise after colonial domination.

Sir John succeeded Dudley Senanayake as Prime Minister and the downfall of the UNP-domination began at an accelerated pace. Sinhalese Buddhists rallied around SWRD Bandaranaike and a totally new paradigm was created in the political landscape. The emergence of the Bandaranaike doctrine served as a catalyst, effectively institutionalizing identity politics within the national framework. Sir John, the Imam of ‘elite politics’ in Ceylon, contributed heavily to the creation of this new paradigm as well as to the downfall of the UNP at the Hustings. In the 1956 General Election, the United National Party—facing a massive wave of popular dissent—suffered a crushing defeat and was reduced to just 8 seats in Parliament.

In the immediate aftermath of the ‘Common Man’s’ victory in 1956 in Ceylon, the people’s expectations rose to unprecedented heights. The policy of ‘Sinhala-only in twenty four hours’ and a widely propagated smorgasbord of denunciations of capitalist policies and principles, Bandaranaike, who was in every sense of the word an aristocrat, managed to convince the common man that he was their messiah.

Yet, instead of utilizing this massive victory to enact broad legislative and institutional changes, he became consumed by the Swabhasha issue. This ultimately prioritized majoritarian interests over pluralism, causing severe injury to the ethnic harmony and national unity of the country. The long term effects of the Bandaranaike-doctrine are being felt even today. Bandaranaike wasted a golden opportunity to bring about changes that would have had tremendous beneficial consequences to Ceylonese society. Political power has driven another educated man and a great orator to the condemnation of a robust minority; Bandaranaike’s political postures and his marked indecisiveness played a very consequential role in the Buddharakkhita/Wimala Wijeywardene episode. Even during the racial riots that engulfed the whole island in 1958, he had to hand over running of the state machinery to Sir Oliver Goonatilaka, the then Governor General.

Bandaranaike may ultimately be chastised to the wilderness of forgotten history; yet the crucial decisions he made, although few and far in between, plunged Ceylon into an irredeemably polarized country along ethnic lines. Bandaranaike’s short-lived regime that lasted from 1956 to 1959 was another place  and time where and when Ceylon went wrong. The detrimental side effects of the ‘common man’s’ empowerment ultimately eclipsed its enduring positive contributions.

His widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike was no better. The United Front government of the early 1970s introduced university standardization and a district quota system. This policy created a deep-seated sense of alienation and a siege mentality amongst most Northern Tamils, which has lingered through each phase of our society’s development. Yet again, a missed chance!

In 1977, J.R. Jayewardene gained an unprecedented electoral victory. His reign ushered in three watershed changes: first, introduction of Executive President system, second, the liberalization of the economy, and third, the escalation of the ethnic conflict into a civil war that would last for 26 years. While the Executive President system accelerated the implementation of his economic policies—including the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Program—by centralizing authority, it also established a powerful, often authoritarian, tool in the hands of his successors, who frequently lacked the calculated, institutional, or ‘disciplined’ approach JRJ took in managing this power. While JR Jayewardene’s transition to an open economy provided the structural foundation for Sri Lanka’s modern growth, his legacy is deeply complicated by the 1978 Constitution. He may be credited with economic foresight, but he is equally criticized for architecting an Executive Presidency that lacked the necessary safeguards to prevent its eventual abuse by successors. Another chance missed!

It is, quite frankly, a sorrowful review of a difficult chapter in our history. All those who succeeded JRJ- Premadasa, CBK, the two Rajapaksas and Ranil Wickremesinghe – belong in the trashcan of political dump-yard. For them, Executive Presidency became an instrument in their hands that could be used to enrich themselves. The executive presidency became a scepter they wielded for their own benefit. Their rush to judgment, unscrupulous conduct, lack of class, and, above all, lack of empathy for their own electors, darkened the national skies. A dark pall fell over the masses, who were utterly powerless against the suffocating weight of the Executive Presidency.

But that was only until the Aragalaya was born in 2022. Aragalaya-22 changed the complexion of the people’s struggle; it opened the windows for different vistas.  The veneer of elitism cloaking the upper middle class was torn away; The shortage of essentials—including petrol, diesel, and cooking gas—was not limited to one class; its crushing repercussions were felt by every layer of society, and  positions in long lines became a universal equalizer for people of all walks of life.

Following the declaration of national bankruptcy, and amid intense, widespread protests against the status quo, Sri Lankan President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa had little choice but to resign from office and flee the country. The rest, as they say, is our recent history. After a short honeymoon for Ranil Wickremesinghe, the people voted for a man from Thambuththegama as President, and the NPP (the old JVP) was voted into power with a commanding mandate.

Insofar as the NPP government led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake is concerned, the jury is still out. When and where did we go wrong? Seventy plus years is a substantial period for a small country to have made significant strides toward modern development. Yet we failed miserably. This sociopolitical collapse cannot be attributed to any single year or cause. A combination of reasons has caused this, but the primary cause is the policy failures of our leaders since independence, which have brought us to the brink of national calamity. They used the treasury as a credit card with unlimited funds; some misused it; others plundered it; and the main source of the funds—the people—had to pay the ultimate price! 

The Senanayakes, Bandaranaikes, Jayewardenes and Rajapaksas are men of the past. How far a brand new generation, thinking in the vernacular and implementing in the indigenous fashion, AKD and the NPP government, can take us, we don’t know. But the hope is still alive; let it not fade into a flash of the past.

*The writer can be reached at vishwamithra1984@gmail.com