By S. I. Keethaponcalan –

Sri Lanka’s Jathika Jana Balawegaya (NPP) government gazetted the Twenty-Second Amendment to the Constitution on 7 August 2026. The Bill was tabled in Parliament on 18 August and is currently under debate. The proposed Amendment seeks to: (1) raise the retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 and Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65; and (2) increase the maximum number of Court of Appeal judges from 19 to 24. In response to mounting pressure, the government has also proposed raising the retirement age of judges in other courts, including District Court and High Court judges, by two years through separate measures. This article examines some of the controversies and concerns surrounding the proposed changes.

The government’s primary justification for the proposed changes is the need to address the large backlog of cases pending before Sri Lankan courts. The backlog, estimated at 1.1 million cases, poses a serious challenge to the country’s judicial system and society as a whole. Efforts to address this problem should therefore be viewed as a constructive step in the right direction. The second element of the proposed Amendment—expanding the number of Court of Appeal judges—could help reduce the backlog. The first element, however, concerning the extension of judges’ retirement ages, has attracted considerable criticism from both domestic and international actors.

It is important to note that the proposal to increase the retirement age of judges originated with a particularly controversial proposition. The initial proposal sought to raise the retirement age only for Supreme Court judges. This proposal attracted severe criticism, with critics viewing it as an attempt to benefit a particular sitting Supreme Court justice. The weakness of the proposal was readily apparent. The government subsequently expanded it to include most, if not all, judges. However, this raises an important question: Would increasing the retirement age of Supreme Court judges alone have enabled the government to meaningfully address the judicial backlog? The answer is clearly no. Critics of the current proposal therefore have legitimate grounds to question the government’s stated objective, even after its scope has been broadened. The sequence of events suggests that the original proposal was expanded primarily in response to the criticism it generated. Consequently, it remains possible to argue that the underlying objective is to retain judges perceived as favorable to the government.

Critics also point out that the judicial backlog is the product of multiple factors, including systemic deficiencies, and therefore cannot be addressed simply by increasing judges’ retirement age. Moreover, there is no guarantee that extending judges’ tenure would result in cases being resolved more quickly. More importantly, the controversy surrounding the proposal has already, to some extent, affected public perceptions of judicial independence in Sri Lanka. Future judicial decisions, particularly Supreme Court rulings favorable to the government, may consequently be viewed with suspicion, regardless of their legal merits.

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL), which has strongly opposed the Amendment, questioned the connection between the proposed changes and the government’s stated objective. In a published statement, the BASL observed that, “Despite the Government’s stated intention that such amendment is designed to expedite hearings and improve the efficacy of the judicial system, the correlation between the proposed extension of retirement age and the stated objectives remains obscure” (Sri Lanka Mirror, 12 August 2026). Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite, who had previously cautioned the government regarding the proposed changes, stated: “I respectfully recommend that any proposed amendment to the judicial retirement age be pursued through a transparent, inclusive, impartial, consultative and comprehensive justice reform process. Any ad hoc permanent change to the tenure of judges, without proper consultation and necessary safeguards, may erode the public’s confidence in the administration of justice and pose a serious threat to the independence of the judiciary” (The Island Online, 14 August 2026). These concerns underscore the need for comprehensive reform of the justice system rather than isolated institutional changes. The urgency of such reform has been further highlighted by the recent prison riots in Welikada, Mahara, and Negombo, which resulted in the deaths of several inmates and prison officers.

Nevertheless, from a political perspective, the principal problem with the proposed Amendment lies in the signal it sends to the public. Increasing the retirement age of judges is hardly the most pressing challenge facing Sri Lanka today. The rising cost of living, underworld violence, drug-related problems, and other forms of criminal activity have significantly affected everyday life and demand more concerted government action. Against this backdrop, the government’s decision to prioritize the judicial retirement age could send the wrong signal to voters regarding its policy priorities. More importantly, such a focus may reinforce the perception that the government has an ulterior motive in pursuing the proposed Amendment.

Significantly, in its 2024 presidential election manifesto, A Rich Country, A Beautiful Life, the NPP pledged to introduce a new constitution abolishing the executive presidential system. This commitment was hardly surprising, given that the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which forms the core of the NPP, has a long history of criticizing and opposing the executive presidential system. Despite securing the more-than-two-thirds parliamentary majority required to undertake constitutional reform, the government has yet to take meaningful steps toward fulfilling this promise. Successive political parties have similarly criticized the executive presidential system and pledged to abolish it, only to retain it once in power. The JVP/NPP now appears to be following the same trajectory, perhaps because it too has come to recognize the political advantages afforded by the Jayewardene Constitution. This apparent contradiction—pursuing a constitutional amendment concerning judicial retirement while making little progress toward the more fundamental constitutional reform it promised—has become a focal point of the opposition’s criticism of the proposed Amendment.

The proposed Amendment also raises questions about the government’s priorities in addressing the Tamil community’s longstanding political concerns. In its 2024 manifesto, the NPP pledged to hold the long-delayed provincial council elections within one year. Yet no meaningful steps have been taken to fulfill this commitment, and the Northern and Eastern Provincial Councils remain defunct. Against this backdrop, the government’s decision to prioritize an amendment extending the retirement age of judges while leaving the provincial council issue unresolved should raise concerns among Tamil voters about the government’s commitment to addressing their political grievances. Characteristically, however, Tamil political parties have so far failed to use the debate over the Amendment to draw attention to this broader issue. The controversy could have provided them with an opportunity not only to press for the restoration of elected provincial councils but also to renew the debate over reforming the provincial council system and devolving greater powers to the periphery.

One of the arguments advanced by the government to justify increasing the retirement age of judges could potentially return to haunt it. The government maintains that retaining experienced judges is necessary to address personnel shortages within the judiciary. The same rationale, however, could readily be applied to other sectors in Sri Lanka, including education, the military, and the higher levels of the public service. University academics provide a pertinent example. The retirement age of university professors is currently 65, even though their expertise in teaching, research, and publication generally increases with experience. At the same time, many university programs are taught by younger academics who have yet to obtain terminal degrees. If experience and personnel shortages justify extending the tenure of judges, what would prevent university academics, or other categories of public servants, from making a similar demand? For now, this remains only a possibility. It remains to be seen whether the proposed Amendment will generate comparable demands from other sectors of the public service.

Finally, the proposed Amendment will eventually come before the Supreme Court for a determination as to whether it requires approval through a national referendum. Under the existing Constitution, amendments affecting certain entrenched provisions require not only a two-thirds majority in Parliament but also approval by the people at a referendum. It is the Supreme Court that must determine whether the proposed Amendment falls within this category. This raises two important issues. First, Supreme Court judges would be called upon to determine the constitutional requirements applicable to an Amendment from which they themselves would directly benefit. This creates an apparent conflict of interest and raises legitimate questions about the appropriateness of the Court serving as the final arbiter on the matter. Given these circumstances, there is a strong case for allowing the people to make the ultimate decision through a referendum. Would the Court determine that the Amendment requires such public approval?

Second, even if the Court were to require a referendum, would the government be confident enough to take the issue before the electorate? Recent reports suggest that public support for the government has been declining. This may also help explain the government’s reluctance thus far to proceed with the long-delayed provincial council elections. Much remains to be seen.

*Dr. S. I. Keethaponcalan is a Professor of Conflict Resolution at Salisbury University, Maryland. He was formerly a Professor of Political Science at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.