By Rajan Philips –

Rajan Philips
The third NPP Budget offers something to everyone. But not in equal proportions. A budget for all seasons responding to multi-sectoral expectations: economic stability, economic growth and external strengthening, bracing for economic headwinds caused by climate change and the Middle East instability , advancing social justice and welfare, significant infrastructure outlays, digital exuberance and enthusiastic embrace of post-industrial capitalism of the service, financial and information technology sectors of the economy. The sectoral responses are indicative of where the government is hitting the mark and whose mark it is.
The politics of the budget appears to be based on the government’s self-assurance that it can sustain its support among its core voting blocs in the 2024 elections: the southern formation of – public and private sector workers, small businesses, farmers, fishers, urban poor and the rural population; plantation workers; and a proportionate share of the Tamil and Muslim voters. The NPP cannot maintain the same level of support among these groups in a future election as it did in the 2024 parliamentary election. Its bet is that it can do better among them than any of its opposition contenders.
At the same time, the sociopolitical contours are also changing and the budget’s vocabulary and allocations are reflective of these changes and the NPP’s pivoting around them. The government seems to be operating with different sounding boards for different purposes – exposing corruption, law and order matters, legislative agenda, energy markets, educational reform, domestic economy, external sector, foreign policy and national reconciliation. What seems to be missing are ministerial leaderships in any or all of these portfolios with the occasional exception of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The task of governance is compensated by the overarching presence of an executive president with consummate communication skills and capacity for subject mastery. The government’s real strength is the weakness of the opposition with Sajith Premadasa being his own echo chamber.
Budget Vocabulary
The purpose of the budget, on the other hand, is to demonstrate that the NPP can manage the economy without ruining it. The reactions to the third budget would seem to indicate that the government’s demonstration effects are positive. The final proof will not come until everyone has had some taste of it. The business sector and growth economists seem reasonably pleased with the direction of the budget. The welfare advocates welcome the budget’s ameliorative initiatives but are not happy that they are too little to bridge the wide gaps between earnings and living costs for the vast majority of families, especially those outside the public service and its pensions.
There is also general support for the IMF association. Those who oppose the IMF route have suggested no viable alternative, even if such an alternative were to be found given Sri Lanka’s circumstances and constraints. The government appears to be leaning towards a new IMF agreement that will include “targeted social protection programmes.
Conventional thinking is that the government has managed to stabilize the economy with IMF’s prodding and that the new budget should be setting the stage for the economy to take off by facilitating investments and productivity. An interesting variation of this school has called on the government to address the many instances of wage-exploitation and official corruption at the working levels of the economy as opposed to its commanding heights. This last criticism is valid and the budget does not acknowledge or address it.
The government’s exclusively prosecutorial approach to exposing high level corruption and remanding highly placed notables, does not address floor level corruption in factories and offices that hurts ordinary people and are a drag on the economy. Specific to workers and their problems, the budget is remarkable not only for its silence but also for the total absence in the budget vocabulary of the old words such as jobs, minimum wage, workers’ rights and trade unions.
What is excluded is reflective of the lopsided status of union participation in the country. There are 2,000 registered unions but only 9.5% of workers are members of a union. Only 18% of industrial and service sectors are union members while there are higher membership levels on the plantations and in public service. In 2025, minimum wage was adjusted to Rs.30,000 a month, Rs.1,200 per day in 2025. There is no mention of it in the budget.
The vocabulary is equally remarkable for what it includes – digital exuberance and the embrace of post-industrial capitalism, including stock market induction for 18 year olds, as well as concessions and incentives to encourage investments in Data Centres. The NPP’s enthusiastic embrace of these sectors as a key plank of its economic platform speaks to the new social classes and strata that seem to be influencing the NPP to formulate current policy as opposed to the social classes on whose behalf the old JVP founded its politics.
The External Sector
The budget emphasizes the continuing weakness of the external sector and the strategic objective of strengthening it while maintaining the core fiscal stability that has been achieved. The budget’s target is to maintain capital investment at levels greater than 4% with an initial allocation of Rs. 2,000 billion (5% of GDP). The initiative is to be implemented by establishing a new Company, fully owned by the Treasury and run by experts and professionals from outside the government. A somewhat related initiative is the plan to open a National Single Window for Trade as a pilot project, to achieve co-ordination among exporters and between importers and re-exporters.
What is not clear is how these new agencies will be different from what the Board of Investment (BOI) is already doing and why it is necessary to duplicate it with new agencies. BOI handles both foreign and local investment proposals. The budget’s only reference to the BOI is in connection with the new initiative to provide 200% enhanced capital allowance for “BOI enterprises” that invest at least $3 million in export manufacturing within three years of approval, or tourism development within five years.
The budget is also silent about the operations of the BOI and the flow Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) through it to the country. BOI’s website highlights the uptick in FDI inflow to the country under the NPP government after the drop in recent years. The FDI inflow hit the USD one billion mark in 2025, including both the expansion of existing ventures and proposals for new investment in almost equal proportions. A majority of them were in manufacturing (46%), followed by port development (26%), and the rest in tourism, telecommunication and development. Also in 2025, BOI’s export-oriented enterprises accounted for 59% of merchandise exports and 73% of industrial exports.
The budget includes a proposal for a feasibility study “to establish a knowledge and experience centre that expands links between industry and universities, promotes research and development, and supports the commercialization of new products and processes.” This idea is worth pursuing and could be started as a Task Force without a feasibility study and let it grow into something formal to provide a forum for co-ordinating export promotion and domestic production. But it would be wasteful and duplicative to have all four – the BOI, a company under the Treasury, a National Trade Window, and a knowledge centre – running around on the same track.
Sri Lanka’s chronic problem has been the inability to attract FDI at the requisite 3% to 4% GDP levels for significant impacts. Between 1970 and 2025 FDI inflow has exceeded 2% only once, reaching a maximum of 2.8% in 1998. Last year it was 1%, and 0.76% in 2024. Data for 2024 year shows that among Asian countries, Malaysia and Vietnam reached 4%, while Thailand and Philippines were over 2%. Sri Lanka had company in South Asia with Pakistan at 0.72% and Bangladesh at 0.28%.
As to who needs FDI for exports and who doesn’t is indicated by the vast gap between Hong Kong (30.8%) and Singapore (23.5%) at one end, and South Korea (0.69%) and Japan (0.45%) at the other end of the FDI spectrum. Sri Lanka is close to Japan and South Korea in FDI receipts but without their manufacturing assets.
The Domestic Scene
One piece of data and discussion missing in the budget is employment and job creation. With the national employment at 8.2M, the unemployment rate is reasonably low at 4%. But the demography of unemployment should be disturbing. While only 1.4% of those older than 30 years are unemployed, the unemployment level is 30% for those between 15 and 30 years. Graduate unemployment is 43%, the highest in Asia, and 18% of graduates between 25 and 29 are jobless. These are crosswires in a ticking bomb. More so because the projected job requirement over the next ten years is one million jobs. At its current pace, the economy can produce only 300,00 of them.
According to BOI data, 14,000 new jobs were created by $507M FDI in the first six months of 2025. This translates to 27.6 jobs per $1M FDI. To achieve one million jobs, FDI inflow should be at an annual rate exceeding 3.5% GDP. For 700,000 jobs FDI inflow should be over 2%. That is either doubling or tripling the current rate. Not an easy task. While FDI is not going to be the sole solution, it an important part of the solution.
The somewhat unspoken elephant in the budget are Provincial Councils, with an allocation Rs 650 billion to Ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Local Government, and distributed among the different District Secretariats. There are also specific allocations to PC under other headings such as education, health, transport etc. But the political farce of running a Provincial Council system without a single Provincial Council is becoming all too tedious.
The allocations to physical and social infrastructure are routine and significant. But the problem has been slow implementation and low or non-utilization of the funds allocated in previous years. There are issues in the allocations to specific sectors and the distribution between them. The project allocations in Energy, Transport and Urban Drainage warrant detailed reviews for their effectiveness and priority. Hopefully, the budget debate will show whether the opposition is able to raise pertinent questions on budget allocations and spending, and whether the government has plausible answers or demonstrate its plans for efficient spending.
Naman / November 22, 2026
“ running a Provincial Council system without a single Provincial Council is becoming all too tedious”
If running the PCs without the politicians and their provincial governments CAN be done efficiently and effectively that would be the best.
Having Provincial Governments is utter waste of public money.
The government needs volunteers in each and every village levels to give feedback on the ISSUES/PROBLEMS affecting them. Each ministry should get the feedback to get involved to bring solutions to their needs
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