By P M Amza –

The recent war involving Iran, Israel and the United States has raised a question that goes beyond the usual language of victory and defeat: has Iran emerged stronger after the war? At first glance, the answer may appear doubtful. Iran suffered military damage, economic disruption and intense pressure on its political leadership. Yet wars are not judged only by physical destruction. They are also judged by whether a state survives, preserves deterrence, improves bargaining power and converts military pressure into diplomatic advantage.

Seen from that angle, Iran may not have emerged as a “regional superpower” in the classical sense. But it has certainly emerged as a more resilient and strategically consequential regional power than many expected.

Survival as Strategic Success

The first measure of Iran’s post-war strength is the survival of the state itself. Before and during the conflict, many observers believed that a sustained US-Israeli military campaign could weaken the Islamic Republic’s command structure, degrade its military capacity and possibly generate internal instability. That did not happen.

Iran’s political system survived. Its leadership remained intact despite losses. Its institutions continued to function. Its military and diplomatic arms continued to operate. In modern asymmetric conflicts, survival against a more powerful coalition can itself become a form of strategic success. Iran did not defeat the United States or Israel militarily. But it prevented them from achieving a decisive political outcome.

This is why Tehran is presenting the outcome as a victory of resistance. Whether one accepts that narrative or not, the fact remains that Iran emerged from direct confrontation without regime collapse, without surrender and without abandoning its core strategic assets.

Deterrence Not Destroyed

A second reason Iran appears stronger is that its deterrence capacity was not destroyed. According to reports citing US intelligence assessments, Iran retained around 70 to 75 percent of its ballistic missile capability despite the bombardment. Such figures, if accurate, are highly significant. They suggest that the military campaign may have damaged Iran but did not remove its capacity to retaliate.

Deterrence does not require a state to possess overwhelming superiority. It requires only the credible ability to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary. Iran appears to have preserved that ability. Its missile forces, drone capacity and regional reach remain central to its security doctrine.

This matters because Israel and the United States may now have to calculate the costs of any future attack more carefully. If Iran can absorb major strikes and still retain substantial retaliatory capacity, its deterrence posture may actually have improved after the war.

 The Nuclear Question: Ambiguity as Leverage

Iran’s nuclear programme remains perhaps the most important source of its strategic leverage. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran accumulated more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent purity. This does not mean Iran possesses a nuclear weapon. However, 60 percent enrichment is close to weapons-grade level and gives Iran what may be described as threshold capability.

The crucial point is that the post-war diplomatic framework has not yet clearly committed Iran to complete abandonment of enrichment. Reports suggest that disagreements remain over inspections, the future of enrichment and the handling of Iran’s existing stockpile. This uncertainty gives Tehran considerable bargaining power.

Iran’s strongest card may therefore not be a declared nuclear arsenal, but nuclear ambiguity. It can deny that it seeks a weapon while using its advanced enrichment capacity as leverage in negotiations. This places Iran in a stronger position than before, particularly if sanctions relief proceeds without a full dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure.

Sanctions Relief and Frozen Assets

The economic dimension is equally important. Reuters reported that the emerging US-Iran understanding includes a 60-day sanctions waiver and discussions on broader sanctions relief. It also reported Iranian claims regarding access to around US$12 billion in previously frozen assets, while earlier reports referred to a possible US$25 billion package.

Even if these figures are implemented gradually, they represent a major shift. For years, sanctions were the principal instrument used to weaken Iran. If Tehran now secures partial relief after surviving a military campaign, it can claim that resistance produced economic concessions.

This does not mean Iran’s economy will recover overnight. The sanctions architecture is complex and cannot be easily dismantled. But partial access to frozen assets, renewed oil revenues and easing of restrictions on petrochemical exports could provide Iran with fiscal breathing space. In that sense, the war may have produced an outcome opposite to what was intended: instead of deepening Iran’s isolation, it may have opened the door to economic recovery.

Hormuz: Geography as Power

Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz remains one of its greatest strategic assets. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran’s geography gives it a permanent role in the security of global energy flows.

Reuters reported that Iran and Oman have agreed to continue discussions on managing navigation and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has strongly opposed any Iranian attempt to impose tolls, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisting that Hormuz must remain toll-free under international law.

Yet the debate itself is revealing. Even if Iran cannot formally impose a toll system, the fact that global powers are compelled to negotiate over Hormuz demonstrates Tehran’s strategic weight. Iran and Oman may not be able to convert the strait into a formal revenue-collecting passage like the Suez or Panama canals. But Iran can still influence insurance costs, shipping risk, naval deployments and energy prices.

This is not merely military leverage. It is economic leverage over the international system.

Gulf Relations Despite Retaliation

One of the most remarkable features of the post-war environment is Iran’s ability to maintain working relations with Gulf countries despite launching attacks on US bases in the region. Some of those attacks reportedly caused civilian casualties and created serious concern among Gulf governments.

Yet Gulf states have not moved into open confrontation with Tehran. Instead, countries such as Oman and Qatar have remained involved in mediation and regional management. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while deeply cautious about Iran, also appear reluctant to return to the era of direct escalation.

This reflects an important regional reality. Gulf countries may distrust Iran, but they also understand that permanent confrontation carries enormous risks. Energy security, maritime trade, investment flows and domestic stability all require a minimum level of engagement with Tehran.

Iran’s ability to retaliate against US-linked targets while still preserving channels with Gulf capitals suggests that it has become too important to be isolated completely. That is a significant indicator of regional power.

The Axis of Resistance: Weakened but Not Eliminated

There is, however, another side to the story. Iran’s regional network, often described as the “Axis of Resistance,” has suffered heavy pressure. Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Houthis and other aligned groups have faced military, political and financial challenges. Israel and the United States have tried to degrade not only Iran’s direct capabilities but also its regional influence through these networks.

Yet the war may also have pushed Iran toward a more direct deterrence model. Instead of relying primarily on proxies, Tehran demonstrated that it could act openly and absorb the consequences. This may alter regional perceptions. Iran may have lost some proxy depth, but it may have gained direct strategic credibility.

The important question is whether Iran’s regional allies remain instruments of power or become liabilities. That balance will shape Iran’s long-term status after the war.

A Historical Parallel: The Iran-Iraq War

There is a useful historical comparison with the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. That war devastated Iran economically and militarily. Yet the Islamic Republic survived, consolidated itself internally and developed a long-term security doctrine based on self-reliance, missiles, regional alliances and strategic depth.

The recent war may produce a similar outcome. Iran may emerge wounded, but also more determined to strengthen domestic defence production, deepen ties with non-Western powers and reduce vulnerability to sanctions and air attacks.

In this sense, Iran’s strength should not be measured only by immediate military losses. It should be measured by whether the war hardens its strategic posture and improves its bargaining position. The evidence so far suggests that it has.

Regional Power, Not Regional Superpower

Still, it would be an exaggeration to say Iran has become a regional superpower. A superpower requires overwhelming economic resources, technological superiority, financial reach and broad diplomatic acceptance. Iran does not possess these qualities. Its economy remains fragile. Its society faces internal pressures. Its regional image is divisive. Many Arab governments remain suspicious of its intentions.

What Iran has become is something more precise: a resilient regional power with enhanced bargaining leverage. It has shown that it can survive direct attack, preserve deterrence, retain nuclear ambiguity, influence global energy routes and negotiate sanctions relief from a position of endurance rather than surrender.

That is not superpower status. But it is a strategic strength.

Conclusion

Iran emerged from the war damaged but not defeated. More importantly, it may have emerged with greater leverage than before. Its political system survived. Its missile capacity was not destroyed. Its nuclear programme remains a bargaining card. Its frozen assets and sanctions relief are now part of diplomatic negotiations. Its role in Hormuz has become even more central. Its relations with Gulf countries, though strained, remain functional.

The paradox is clear. The war intended to weaken Iran may have confirmed its indispensability. It may not have made Iran a regional superpower, but it has made it harder to ignore, harder to isolate and harder to coerce.

The more defensible conclusion is therefore this: Iran has not emerged as the Middle East’s dominant superpower, but it has emerged stronger as a regional power whose resilience, deterrence and negotiating leverage have significantly increased after the war.ENDS

*The author is Sri Lanka’s former Ambassador to the EU, Belgium, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.