By Jehan Perera –

Sri Lanka is witnessing an unprecedented effort to challenge a culture of impunity, with senior political figures, public officials and others facing investigation and prosecution. The significance of the present moment is whether Sri Lanka can establish a system in which no person, regardless of political position or social status, is above the law. The credibility of accountability depends significantly on an independent judiciary capable of deciding difficult cases without fear or favour. It is in this context that the government proposal to amend Article 107(5) of the Constitution to raise the mandatory retirement age of Supreme Court judges from 65 to 67 and that of Court of Appeal judges from 63 to 65 has attracted particular attention. The government has also approved amendments to the legislation governing the other courts to increase their retirement ages by two years.

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka and opposition parties have raised concerns about the implications for judicial independence and public confidence. They have taken their objections to the larger society, but only with limited success so far. The general population does not seem as apprehensive of the government’s motives as the BASL and opposition parties. The large number of successful prosecutions of hidden and known corrupt and criminal activities of the past corresponds to popular expectations. The government has justified the proposed extension principally on the grounds of the severe backlog of cases and the need to retain experienced judges. The Minister of Justice Harshana Nanayakkara has said that approximately 1.1 million cases are pending before the courts and has emphasised that extending the retirement age is one part of a wider effort to improve the efficiency of the judicial system.

The debate, however, needs to go beyond the immediate question of whether judges should retire two years later. As Prof Jayadeva Uyangoda has pointed out in a recent interview, the larger issue is the condition of the judicial system itself. Delays in adjudication, the enormous backlog of cases, limitations in court administration and the lack of adequate institutional capacity all affect access to justice. The significance of the present moment should therefore be understood not simply in terms of the number of investigations or prosecutions being undertaken, but in terms of whether they represent a deeper change in the system through which public power and accountability operate. Systems change requires more than replacing individuals or pursuing individual cases. It requires changes in institutional practices, incentives, relationships and norms so that accountability becomes a sustained feature of governance rather than dependent on the intentions of a particular government.

Judicial Independence

Judicial independence and fearlessness is particularly important at a time when there are serious efforts to dismantle the culture of impunity that prevailed in the past. Senior political figures, senior officials and persons once thought to be beyond the reach of the law are being investigated and prosecuted through the institutions of the state. The credibility of this process ultimately depends on whether the courts are able to decide difficult cases without fear or favour. At a time when the courts are being asked to deal with a large backlog while simultaneously handling cases of major public significance, retaining experienced judicial leadership can contribute to stability, consistency and continuity in the administration of justice.

Leadership matters when institutions face exceptional challenges. Institutions do not operate automatically. They operate through the individuals who staff them and depend on leadership. The present Chief Justice, Preethi Padman Surasena, was President of the Court of Appeal when the constitutional crisis of October 2018 erupted with President Maithripala Sirisena dismissing Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and appointing former president Mahinda Rajapaksa in his place. Mass protests took place and the country was heading towards chaos when the Court of Appeal with Justice Surasena at the helm issued an interim order in early December 2018 restraining former president Rajapaksa from functioning as prime minister. The Supreme Court later that same month upheld the constitutional challenge to the president’s dissolution of parliament. The significance of that period is that the courts were called upon to resolve an exceptionally controversial political conflict through constitutional and legal processes which they did independently and fearlessly.

This experience illustrates why judicial leadership becomes particularly important when institutions face exceptional challenges. Prof Uyangoda’s analysis is useful here because it cautions against reducing judicial independence to the question of retirement age alone or individuals. The mere fact that judges are given an additional two years does not necessarily mean that they will surrender their independence and favour the government that made the change. Sri Lanka has several examples of judges who gave judgements against the wishes of the government leaders who appointed them and paid a heavy price. Two names that come to mind and are in living memory are Chief Justices Neville Samarakoon (1984) and Shirani Bandaranayake (2013).

Ensuring Continuity

The BASL has raised a serious concern about changing the retirement age of serving judges at this time which it believes will erode the independence of the judiciary. In its May 2026 communication to the President, the BASL argued that the existing retirement ages for the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal had been in place since the 1978 Constitution and expressed the view that they should not be changed arbitrarily. The more serious constitutional concern would arise if the executive were given discretion to decide which individual judges should receive an extension and which should not. A general rule applying equally to judges, as provided for in the 22nd Amendment, is fundamentally different from a system in which the government can selectively determine who remains in office.

Judicial independence depends not only on the conduct of individual judges but also on public confidence that the conditions under which judges serve are not being altered for political purposes. In this case, the valid argument has been made that life expectancy has increased significantly, and with it the ability to work productively for more years. Indeed, the government needs to utilise the public interest in the matter of the retirement age of judges to consider other sectors as well. When the Constitution was adopted in 1978, and the age of retirement of the judges was set, life expectancy at birth in Sri Lanka was about 67 years. By 2024, it had risen to almost 78 years, an increase of nearly 11 years. Six years ago Prof T Jayasingam, former Vice Chancellor of Eastern University advocated that the retirement age for academics should be increased to 70 years on the basis that retirement policies should take account of this increased longevity and enable those who are able and willing to make a continued contribution to society..

The retirement age debate should therefore become an opportunity to address these wider institutional deficiencies. Sri Lanka has waited a long time for government and public institutions to begin dismantling the culture of impunity. Political leadership, judicial leadership, professional law enforcement and an independent legal profession all have roles to play in ensuring that this process succeeds. But continuity will command public confidence only if it is accompanied by transparency and respect for the constitutional process. The forthcoming debate in parliament will hopefully ensure this. Government leaders have said they are prepared to make changes to the draft law when it is debated in parliament. The objective would be continuity in the judiciary without compromising independence. The passage of the 22nd Amendment needs to be seen in this light to support the progress that Sri Lanka has begun to make.