Once the Indian Peace Keeping Force arrived, the interests of the country and the Army would have been best served by maintaining a smooth working relationship between the two armies. But this desirable aim was vitiated by what had become in practice a diffused command structure and a lack of cohesion in the Sri Lankan Army, with the Commander’s authority subverted through political interference.

This was evident in the crisis that cropped up on 5th October 1987. Seventeen LTTE members, including 5 leaders were apprehended at sea on 3rd October by the Sri Lankan Navy and were brought to Palaly, the main base, then shared by both the Indian and Sri Lankan armies. They had a few arms and were technically in breach of the Accord. The matter required delicate handling. National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whose ambitions of total victory had been thwarted by the Accord, wanted the prisoners flown to Colombo. The LTTE initially took it for granted that since there was an official amnesty by the President, they would be released. Although the amnesty was conditional upon a surrender of arms, it was contended that a few arms for self- defence were allowed.

The Indian High Commissioner, Mr. Dixit, sensed the gravity of the problem, and on rushing back to Colombo, went to Jayewardene who agreed to stop the transfer, and asked Dixit to tell the Indian Army to take custody of the prisoners. But General Harkirat Singh refused to take an order from Dixit and wanted it conveyed through the proper channels. This meant that it had to go to the Indian Foreign Ministry, then to the Defence Ministry and downwards. In the meantime Athulathmudali had dispatched a plane to Jaffna and ordered Jayantha Jayaratne, the Sri Lankan brigadier in charge, to send the prisoners to Colombo. Jayaratne understood the consequences and his Indian counterpart Brigadier Rodriguez was also trying to stop it by methods short of direct confrontation with the Sri Lankans.

Iqbal Athas wrote about this incident in the Sunday Times two days after Athulathmudali was killed (25.4.93). Raheem, an LTTE leader who was in Madras, and knew Athas as a defence correspondent, called him in Colombo, and asked him to tell Athulathmudali not to proceed with this. He instead offered to come to Colombo with others in Madras to discuss matters of mutual interest. Athas had conveyed this to Athulathmudali who stuck to his position. Then some time on 5th October, Raheem telephoned Athas to say, “The men will never come to Colombo, see where they go.” Athas would have understood what Raheem meant and would almost certainly have conveyed that to Athulathmudali. Athas says that in the evening he heard that the prisnors were dead.

The LTTE, which was wary of the Accord, peace and elections, was already on a course of brinkmanship by gunning down several members of other groups in the East and by starting the Thileepan fast. Raheem’s call to Athas meant that the LTTE would start trouble – big trouble. We do know that on the 5th afternoon, LTTE leaders Mahattaya and Balasingham sought and obtained permission to take meals to the detainees and secretly gave them also cyanide capsules with instructions. That afternoon Mahattaya was giving a press conference in Jaffna. At 4.30 PM, he looked at his watch and told the shocked audience that it was time for him to go to Palaly and collect the bodies!

At Palaly, Brigadier Jayantha Jayaratne was very reluctant to force the detainees into the plane and he told this to Athulathmudali on the telephone. Athulathmudali threatened to strip him of his rank and bring him to Colombo under arrest. He added that he would have his second- in-command take charge. When an attempt was made to force the LTTE detainees into the aircraft, twelve of them bit their cyanide capsules and committed suicide. The LTTE then went on a binge massacring Sinhalese civilians, and provoking a war with the Indian Army that was very costly to the civilians.

The incident undoubtedly weighed heavily on Jayaratne’s mind. He was the same officer referred to earlier who was unhappy with what was going on in Jaffna under Weeratunge in 1979 and was taken out. Jayaratne later reflected very sadly to his former commander, Lt. Gen. Denis Perera, that he had been a sergeant in the cadet platoon at Royal College, Colombo, while Athulathmudali was an ordinary cadet. Now, he added, Athulathmudali had spoken to him in such a humiliating manner. Jayaratne would also perhaps have remembered Athulathmudali the ambitious schoolboy, who, without having touched a tennis racket, went about canvassing votes to have himself elected secretary to the Tennis Club. This was to pick up points for extra-curricular activities for the head prefectship. Many years later this schoolboy grew up to be the national security minister who clearly wanted a further round of war and, through it, to advance his political ambitions, and succeeded.