By Jayantha Jayaweera –

Origins of the Left Movement

The Suriya-Mal movement was launched in colonial Ceylon in November 1933 by the South Colombo Youth League. It revived a campaign to sell yellow Suriya flowers on Armistice Day to help needy Ceylonese ex-servicemen rather than contribute to the British Poppy Day fund. The movement opposed imperialism and war. Doreen Young, later known as Doreen Wickramasinghe, became its first president. Its members also helped people affected by the malaria epidemic of 1934–1935.

The youth leagues and the Suriya-Mal movement helped lay the foundations for the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, established on 18 December 1935. Its early leaders included Dr Colvin R. de Silva, Dr N. M. Perera, Philip Gunawardena, known as the “Boralugoda Lion”, and Leslie Goonewardene. The party called for complete independence from British rule and socialism.

Disagreements over the Soviet Union led to the expulsion of a pro-Soviet group, including Dr S. A. Wickramasinghe, in 1940. They formed the United Socialist Party and later the Communist Party of Ceylon in 1943. Colvin R. de Silva and N. M. Perera remained associated with the Trotskyist movement.

The LSSP played a leading role in the Hartal of 12 August 1953 against Dudley Senanayake’s UNP government. In 1964, however, its leadership joined Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s SLFP government and accepted ministerial portfolios. Critics saw this as an abandonment of its independence and revolutionary principles. The Communist Party later joined the LSSP in the United Front government elected in 1970.

Meanwhile, the dispute between China and the Soviet Union contributed to a split in the Communist Party in 1963–1964. The pro-China faction became known as the Peking Wing, with N. Shanmugathasan as a leading figure.

The Birth of the JVP

Rohana Wijeweera joined the Peking Wing but later disagreed with its leadership. In 1965, he and a small group of activists began organising the movement that became the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. According to the JVP’s own history, a discussion at Akmeemana on 14 May 1965 marked an important step in its formation.

The JVP introduced five classes that new recruits were expected to attend. They were aimed mainly at students, unemployed educated youth and young people from villages. The following is my recollection of what we were taught and what I think of those teachings today.

Class 1 – The Economic Crisis

This class discussed inflation, unemployment and the failures of economic policies after independence. It criticised the SLFP’s so-called socialist policies and the UNP’s pro-American outlook. We were told that neither party had a proper answer to the difficulties faced by ordinary people.

S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s background as an Oxford-educated member of an elite Anglican family was also discussed. His conversion to Buddhism was presented as a political move to gain Sinhalese Buddhist support. The instructors argued that, despite his nationalist image, his policies favoured Western interests. That was how he was presented to us.

American food assistance, including wheat flour supplied under the PL 480 programme, was criticised as a way of creating dependence on imported food and damaging local agriculture. I also remember being told that it gave the CIA an opportunity to establish a foothold in the country. I cannot confirm that allegation.

Some of the proposed solutions now seem basic and amateurish to me. One was to construct dams in the Knuckles region, store rainwater and take it to the dry zone.

After obtaining my civil engineering degree in London, I questioned how much thought had gone into this proposal. Such a scheme requires detailed investigations into terrain, water availability, geology, environmental effects and cost. I do not remember these matters being properly discussed. What had convinced me as a young recruit later seemed more like a promise than a carefully considered engineering proposal.

Class 2 – Independence under Neo-Colonialism

This class described the independence Ceylon gained in 1948 as hollow. The British monarch remained the head of state, represented by the Governor-General. We were told that resistance to British rule in India had left Britain with little choice but to withdraw from the region.

The Privy Council’s decision to overturn the convictions arising from the attempted coup in 1962 was presented as another example of Britain’s continuing influence. Western ownership of tea estates and other major businesses was used to argue that political independence had not brought economic independence.

Class 3 – Indian Expansionism

This controversial class presented Indian political and economic influence as a threat to Ceylon. It focused on illegal immigration and Indian Tamil estate workers. People described as illegal immigrants were referred to by the derogatory term “kallathonis”.

We were told that the British had brought Indian workers to do difficult and unpleasant work that the Sinhalese were unwilling to do. It was the first time I had heard a political movement openly suggest that Indians might one day take over the country. Looking back, I believe this encouraged suspicion towards people of Indian origin, including estate workers.

The class also discussed people it described as illegal immigrants who had become millionaire businessmen. One example was Gnanam Mudalali. I am recalling how he was portrayed, not confirming the allegation about his immigration status. He was also associated with establishing the Anton PVC business and providing employment for Sri Lankans. In my view, that contribution should be recognised rather than judging him only by his origins.

Class 4 – The Established Left Movement

This class discussed the movements led by Dr N. M. Perera, Dr S. A. Wickramasinghe, Philip Gunawardena and various splinter groups. It focused on what the JVP called the LSSP’s betrayal of the working class after joining the government.

I remember discussions about a bank employees’ strike. We were told that the LSSP had supported the employees’ demands in opposition, but that Dr N. M. Perera had acted against the strike after becoming Finance Minister.

Philip Gunawardena was criticised for joining Dudley Senanayake’s seven-party coalition government between 1965 and 1970. The JVP regarded this as another left leader abandoning his principles.

These examples were repeatedly used to discredit socialist leaders who remained popular among workers. The class also criticised the movement associated with “Kamkaru Mawatha” and led by Keerthi Balasuriya, so its criticism was not confined to parties that had accepted ministerial office.

Class 5 – The Path of the Sri Lankan Revolution

This class focused on taking up arms to overthrow a democratically elected government and capture power. The instructors discussed Marxist ideas, drawing examples from the Russian, Chinese, Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions. As I remember it, we were told that a revolution could not succeed without external support.

The proposed strategy for Ceylon was to attack police stations across the island simultaneously. We were told that this would provide weapons, weaken the government’s authority and open the way to capturing power. Parliamentary democracy was dismissed as ineffective. Young recruits like me were taught that armed struggle was the way forward.

My Association with the Movement

I was introduced to the JVP by a young man named Seneviratne, who played tennis-ball cricket with us at the People’s Park in Dehiwala. He was the only boy in a family of six children. His mother was a widow and the family’s sole breadwinner. I later heard that, at the height of the 1971 insurrection, he had been captured and shot by the police.

By January 1971, I had become disillusioned with the JVP’s tactics. I was firmly opposed to taking up arms to overthrow a democratically elected government, and I left the movement. I lost interest in revolutionary politics but remained critical of the main political parties and their vision for the country.

Despite leaving the movement, I was arrested in May that year and spent six months on remand. This experience is one reason I question Mr Bopage’s account of what led to the uprising.

Internal Disputes and the Leadership’s Responsibility

Recently, Mr Bopage, a former member of the JVP’s politburo, said that the demonstration outside the American Embassy had been organised by D. I. G. (Castro) Dharmasekera faction with the blessing of a few ministers in Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government. I have not seen evidence that those ministers supported or encouraged it.

Dharmasekara was a former student leader at the Vidyalankara University (now the University of Kelaniya). Originally hailing from the Communist Party of Ceylon. My understanding was that Dharmasekera’s group had broken away over disagreements with Wijeweera and favoured a clandestine guerrilla strategy influenced by the Cuban foco theory.

Many of those associated with the demonstration were students from Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara universities. I met most of them at Colombo Remand Prison. I remember Reginald Cooray being very critical of the SLFP and dismissive of Bandaranaike. His later political career with the SLFP marked a remarkable change from the views I heard him express in prison.

A police officer was killed during the demonstration, and JVP activists were arrested afterwards. But this cannot explain away the decision to attack police stations. As I recall, the movement had been organising camps and training cadres before the embassy incident.

The Conduct of the Leadership

In a recent podcast interview, Mr Bopage also said that attacking the police stations was Loku Athula’s idea. According to him, others opposed it, but Athula persuaded a majority of the politburo to support it. If so, what had the leadership been preparing for before that decision? Those who organised and encouraged the preparations must also take responsibility.

Although I opposed the insurrection, I admired the fighting courage of some JVP leaders, such as Loku Athula, Sanath, Sarath Wijesinghe and a few others. But, in my view, many of the leaders acted like cowards. They went into hiding while the young cadres faced the consequences. Some sought refuge in temples.

As I understood it, the first accused in the main trial before the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) following the conclusion of the 1971 JVP insurrection was supposed to lead a group of young cadres in an attack on Jaffna Prison to rescue Wijeweera, who was being held on remand. According to the account I heard, he complained of a stomach illness and got off the bus on the way to Jaffna. He promised to rejoin the group the following day, but never did. The cadres continued without him and were captured by security forces who were reportedly waiting for them.

My classmate Lamahews was a member of that group. He was captured and held in Jaffna Prison. I later heard that he died there after contracting diarrhoea. His fate is one of the reasons I believe the JVP leadership must answer for the decisions they made and the young lives that were lost.

My recollection is that Loku Athula fought for several months before being captured in the Wilpattu jungle. In prison, I heard hardline JVP activists spread stories that I believed were intended to tarnish his image. I felt that rivalry over the leadership contributed to this hostility, although I cannot establish who started those stories or whether the allegations were true.

A Poorly Executed Military Plan

In January 1964, a relatively small group of insurgents overthrew the government in Zanzibar. They attacked police stations and armouries, seized weapons and quickly took control of the capital.

My understanding was that Wijeweera saw Zanzibar as a model for Sri Lanka. He regarded local police stations as the main pillars of government authority in the towns and villages. As I recall from the fifth class, the intention was to attack these stations, overpower the police and seize their arms and ammunition to continue the revolution.

However, the plan was poorly executed, with inadequate coordination and contingency arrangements. The main uprising was suppressed within weeks, although pockets of resistance continued for longer. Thousands of people died during the insurrection and its suppression.

In my view, organising camps and training cadres did not amount to a workable military plan. JVP members relied largely on locally made weapons and a limited number of firearms. They were poorly equipped to confront the armed forces. I believe the decision to attack police stations was premature and contributed to the loss of thousands of young lives.

Wijeweera was a persuasive speaker, but I did not regard him as a military tactician. Many of those around him were university undergraduates and unemployed young people with little knowledge or experience of warfare. From what I heard, some of those captured disclosed extensive information during interrogation. I cannot judge the circumstances in which they did so, but the movement’s wider failures showed how poorly prepared these young people were for the struggle their leaders had encouraged them to undertake.

My Recollections of Upatissa Gamanayake

I met the young Upatissa Gamanayake at Colombo Remand Prison around July 1971, where we shared a cell. At the time, he was quiet and relatively unknown within the movement. He never discussed the movement or the conflicts within its leadership with me. He was released in October 1971. After I left prison in December that year, I did not hear of him again until 1978.

In 1978, I attended a JVP public rally at Uyanwatte Stadium in Matara. When Upatissa saw me in the crowd, he came down from the stage, and we spoke briefly. It was a memorable encounter with someone I had known in very different circumstances. In my view, he played a leading role in rebuilding the JVP during the 1970s. I salute him for his courage and organisational skills.

Conclusion

Today, the JVP is in government through the National People’s Power. Yet I find it difficult to recognise the revolutionary ideals for which so many young people fought and died. The NPP government deserves credit for its efforts to reduce corruption and bring those accused of it to justice. But its present achievements do not remove the need for an honest examination of the JVP’s past and the decisions that led to 1971.

In the twilight of my life, I look back and wonder what we achieved. We believed we were fighting for a fairer society. Instead, thousands of young lives were lost, families suffered, and the country was left with wounds that endured for decades.

I do not question the sincerity of those young people or the strength of their convictions. But the leadership must take responsibility for the decisions that led them into disaster.

Was it worth the loss of so many lives? Looking back on my own experience, I find it difficult to say that it was.