By Austin Fernando –

Next week President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) will visit Delhi on the invite of Prime Minister Modi (Modi). It is traditional courtesy- a “නෑගම් යාමක්” -visiting relations!

When Modi congratulated AKD he hoped to work closely with Sri Lanka to strengthen cooperation. AKD thanked and shared Modi‘s commitment to strengthen mutual ties, for the “benefit of our peoples and the entire region.” The words “our peoples” need no emphasis; “entire region” connotes AKD’s acceptance of India’s regional leadership. AKD may possess mutually beneficial novel views, but the ‘regional leadership’ is unchallenged.

Such Indian reactions to electoral victories show similarity. When PM Sheik Hasina (Hasina) won the Bangladeshi elections (mid-2024), Modi congratulated her and committed to strengthening people-centric partnerships with Bangladesh. The Indian High Commissioner (HC) Pranay Verma was the first envoy to meet Hasina and convey Modi’s greetings.

This Indian diplomatic finesse matches ours. Indian HC Taranjith Sandu did so when Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (GR) won, followed by Minister Jaishankar’s meeting with GR, and the latter accepted an invitation to visit Delhi. HC Santhosh Jha was the first ambassador to congratulate AKD, and Minister Jaishankar followed with the invitation to Delhi. After the parliamentary election, AKD’s first diplomatic visitor was HC Jha. This is Indians visiting relations, reserving the first visitor prerogative!

Ranil+Modi Vision Statement (VS)

While planning the Indian visit, AKD must have been shocked by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s (RW) reminder of a VS unveiled in July 2023 with Modi, further requesting AKD to implement it in its entirety. The VS anticipates that once the debt restructuring is completed, Sri Lanka will shift toward a massive overhaul of the economy, legal framework, and systems, aligning the Lankan path with that of India. It focused on “connectivity” – “maritime, air; energy and power, trade, economic, and financial; and people-to-people.” The development approaches are essential and compulsory, but concerns emerge when the aligned partner is restricted to India, though respect and acceptance of India’s regional supremacy are unchallenged.

I quote one VS understanding, titled “Cooperation for the economic development of projects in the Trincomalee District.” Summarily, its focus was the development of ports and logistics infrastructure, the development of Trincomalee as a regional energy hub; a petroleum pipeline connecting southern India with Sri Lanka; the development of the oil tank farms; and the construction of a land bridge providing Indians land access to Trincomalee and Colombo ports. It is extremely overarching and development-oriented.

Yet, this endorses an Indian foothold in Trincomalee Port with obvious strategic security advantages for India. Do not know whether it reminded AKD of US Under Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland’s proposal in mid-February 2023 to our Government to establish a US-India Joint Military Base in Trincomalee to serve as a critical component in “protecting US and Asia Pacific interests,” (not ours!) countering Chinese development activities. Was Nuland, with Indian concurrence, attempting to use us as the cat’s paw against China, or concerned only with the advantages to India and the US? A dubious approach!

When Nuland’s proposal and the VS are taken in conjunction, it hampers Chinese activities, Nuland saying without hiding intents, and RW and Modi shrewdly, thus eventually haunting the Chinese strategic power calculations. It is accentuated especially when Modi remarks that the ‘security interests’ and development of India and Sri Lanka are intertwined. Mark the words ‘security interests’ connecting to Nuland. When Sri Lanka needs to rally around everyone to relieve the economic crisis, unrestricted execution of VS in its entirety will call for troubles.

Elitist Vs. Non-elitist Protocols 

AKD’s Indian ‘relationships’ deviate from former Lankan Heads of State. Throughout, Indians dealt with Sri Lankan elitist politicians. Some like JR Jayewardene, and Bandaranaikes related to Indians for generational, family connections. Though other Sri Lankan leaders like R Premadasa, Rajapaksas et al emerged from these elitist political camps, they enjoyed distant relationships, sans family bonds.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) did not reach even that distant connection until AKD was “recognized” by Delhi in 2024. JVP/ National Peoples’ Power (NPP) must thank the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Indian diplomats for the recognition. Even with the Delhi-initiated connection, a recognition gap existed—i.e.,’ in-office and ‘out-of-office.’

India undergoes a similar political relationship with Bangladesh, after Hasina’s departure. Media reports that the Indian HC in Dhaka, and Delhi officials have been negotiating with BNP’s General Secretary Mirza Fakrul Islam Alamgir, and BNP’s Acting Chair, London-based Tarique Rehman, latter projected as the future PM, to rebuild misplaced trust. Fortunately, with JVP/NPP Indians have no interlocutor problems.

Nevertheless, due to this relationship gap, issues become complex, because of the conflicting interests, such as the 13^th Amendment (13A), understandings from the Yahapalana dispensation, the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement, the Free Trade Agreement, the VS plans, Adani contracts, Chinese investments, etc. They were not JVP/NPP creations. JVP/NPP were only unsupportive, vociferous critics. Hence, to NPP, compromising is tough, fighting for a pound of flesh will not work. Innovative approaches are required to revisit and review the past stances. Both must approach this state visit as a consensus-building exercise.

Differing Indian Responses

The Indians would avoid the repetition of misplaced relationships with Bangladesh on another front, i.e., Sri Lanka. Anyhow, Indians are selective in approaching relations as seen in Hasina being given refuge, and comparatively, GR hugged at victory, provided an assistance package of $450 million in 2019, being dropped like a hot potato in July 2022.

Any representation made by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) or other Bangladeshi Opposition about Hasina’s ‘undemocratic excesses’ was ignored by Indians, who put all eggs in Hasina’s basket. Of course, “the elected basket,” Indians will argue. I do not think Indians cared for JVP/NPP’s criticisms about “Indian deals” with the RW administration. Had Indians shown concern then, approaching NPP now would have been easier.

The reasoning was simple. Indians supported the Awami League and Hasina who were extremely friendly with Indians, signing several Agreements in 2019 and 2024, facing severe criticism at home, from youth, and the BNP, who disparaged these as India-centric. GR failed to be that India-centric (e.g., Eastern Container Terminal, Trinco Oil tanks), and reciprocation matched. The message is ‘Give and take works!’

When the Muhammed Yunus regime assumed office, they acted in an anti-Indian fit. Even now they demand PM Hasina’s extradition and say that they would seek Interpol assistance to repatriate her from India, directly challenging India. India has no such issues with AKD, though AKD also criticizes Adani’s business deals. Certainly, Indians are hurt, but Americans, Bangladeshis, and Kenyans also hurt Indians. It is the Rule of Law, transparency, and straightforwardness, plus what AKD stated at the Anti-corruption Day meeting: i.e., “I believe we must first examine our own conscience and actions.”

Indians suspect the Yunus Regime would allow Pakistanis to create security problems for India from Bangladesh; sometimes the same even from China, even though a deal for disengagement at Depsang and Demchok was sealed by India with China in Kazan recently. Irrespective of the recent igniting utterances of the Chinese Ambassador Qi Zhenhong made in Jaffna, a similar threat to India from the southern border is out of the question. Indians know to approach AKD cordially, and he will repeat what all his predecessors promised regarding Indian security. Consequentially, AKD may benefit from Indian generosity. GR, the Maldivian, Bhutanese, and Nepalese Heads of State, gained so on their first visit to India.

AKD may review the Agreements reached between India and Maldivian President Muizzu. They covered political exchanges, cooperation in development, trade, and economics, digital and finance, energy, health, and defense/security. It is noted that Indians negotiated these even after a misstep by Muizzu who signaled pro-Chinese and wanted the withdrawal of Indian troops. Indians have merciful approaches.

Bangladeshis showed their opposition to the Indian citizen registration laws in 2019 affecting Muslims. Now. Indians criticize the Yunus Regime for discrimination against Hindus. Similar political issues were raised by Indians on the devolution of power, as a Tamil cause. How the Tamil electorates voted for NPP showed that the electorate did not negatively consider NPP as a discriminator on race, ethnicity, religion, etc. After AKD’s Policy Statement, which is anti-discrimination, Indians may think cautiously approaching issues such as devolution. They may even change their approach and prefer pursuing economic issues over political issues, though certain demands on their lists cannot be pruned, e.g., disappeared persons, human rights, refugees, etc.

However, JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva has disturbed a hornet’s nest by stating that the AKD government will abolish the Provincial Councils when a new Constitution is formulated. The Tamil political leaders have protested, presumably to motivate Delhi to query AKD. AKD strategically approached some Tamil politicians, diluting Tilvin Silva’s outburst. The Presidential Media Unit release on AKD’s Facebook says that “ITAK MPs raised concerns about the longstanding challenges faced by the people in the Northern and Eastern regions,” without any reference to questionable 13A. The quote must be the truth. One may argue that the “ITAK MPs” have logically endorsed that 13A is not a “longstanding challenge.” 

If Delhi approaches to query about the 13A, AKD may present that it is not a “longstanding challenge” for the people, admitted by Tamil political leadership. AKD can, in summary, share alternative power-sharing mechanisms, as the government encapsulates. Concurrently, AKD can very diplomatically approach Indians to accept power-sharing as our prerogative, an “internal affair.’ He can quote the same Indian stance in 2019 on the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A. Since Indians, as declared, abrogated due to political, economic, development, and security concerns in Kashmir, the same conditions may be matched to Sri Lanka, 37 years after the passage of 13A. This approach is open to Indians to support, provided an acceptable power-sharing mechanism is introduced by AKD. Indians may prefer them being bailed out!

Additionally, AKD’s Policy Statement and follow-up regarding military-acquired land issues, pursuance of accountability, Minister Nalinda Jayatissa stating the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, new Tamil representatives in governance, all-island electoral recognition of AKD, and even favorable responses heard at the British Foreign Affairs Committee deliberations last week, etc. could soften Indian approaches.

Any special Indian commitment could be used for the North and East, tertiary education, and agriculture, especially for value addition, digitalization, industrial investments, health facilitation, etc. Of course, that may bring procurement management issues. AKD is in a favorable environment since any unsuccessful interest in Delhi could be negotiated shortly with the Chinese when visiting Beijing. Indians will be mindful of such approaches.

Issues with Indian interest

Still, PM Modi may confront AKD with other relevant issues. They may encompass regional security, especially maritime security, engagement with BIMSTEC and SAGAR, bilateral economic project execution, ever-postponed trade agreement finalization, fishermen’s problems in Palk Bay, Belt and Road Initiatives, the effect of Adani court cases, etc. The last item may be discussed in a one-on-one basis meeting. Or, the outspoken Indian External Affairs Minister may discuss it, exempting Modi, since Modi politics has a voluminous bearing on alleged Adani issues.

Palk Bay Fishing Issues

Though we do not have serious issues with India, there could be queries made on Palk Bay attacks on Indian fishers, sometimes fatal, though the number of victims is minimal. The issue is related to the India- Sri Lanka Agreement of 1974 and 1976. The 1974 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement delimited the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) which brought Kachchu Thivu under Lankan sovereignty, thus limiting the fishing ground for Indian fishers. Indian fishermen’s traditional fishing right in Palk Bay recognized by the 1974 agreement, was cancelled by the 1976 Agreement. This has even provoked demands in India for retrieval of the Agreement. Due to Tamil Nadu pressures Indians must exhibit tough approaches to this.

There are four main solutions under discussion. The Indian government has implemented technologically advanced programs to prevent trans-border fishing and to divert the mechanized trawlers for deep-sea fishing, but unfortunately not been effectively done. The second is for the fishermen’s organizations of both sides to negotiate and decide, which is relevant to our state boundary (i.e., the IMBL) and cannot be delegated to fisheries organizations. The third is for Indian Coast Guards and our Navy to monitor fishing which may be an unsound solution since Indian Coast Guards are an immensely powerful naval organization. The fourth proposal is to allow fishing in our waters by Indians on given days, and it will not be tolerated by our northern fishers. This issue has been discussed with all Presidents of Sri Lanka in recent times and will be this time too. Indians may use a mix of these approaches.

The exceptionality of the visit

As for Indians, there is good reason to consider this visit exceptional. This is the first time the Indian establishment is meeting a politically non-elitist team, different from all previous political dispensations. Indians know the JVP, the core of NPP, as a Marxist organization, which had been critical of ‘Indian expansionism.’ Secondly, some observe the JVP is pro-Chinese, which displeases Indians. Thirdly, their understanding would be that the JVP was an eternal critic of whatever India did with the previous governments. The Rajiv-JRJ Accord, the 13^th Amendment, private investor projects (e.g., Adani, Amul), and the behavior of Indian governments on UNHRC’s post-war Resolutions are some. It is worthwhile to see how Indians approach these issues.

One area both countries must be concerned with is the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) security and the emerging South Asian security status. Before AKD sits in the Hyderabad House with PM Modi’s team, among others, I believe Defense and Foreign Ministries would brief him about Indian military procurements and upgrading, the latest addition to the Indian Navy-tested firing of a nuclear-tipped K-4 ballistic missile from the newly inducted nuclear submarine INS Arighaat, because such developments irk the Chinese. Though AKD is not visiting India to settle IOR scores, Chinese suspicions, the Sri Lankan stance had been the IOR to be a ‘zone of peace’.

In addition, the Chinese will continue research vessel operations. Our berthing moratorium expires at the end of December. PM Modi may approach for its continuation. Of course, when AKD visits China he may hear the opposite. Do not be surprised if this request had already been made by the Chinese Vice Minister Sun Haiyan with AKD a few days back when the news of the Indian visit was circulating.

Conclusion

A state visit is considered a formal visit by the Head of State of a country to the Head of State of another country. Its purpose is to confirm the good relationship between the countries concerned. It should not lead to secondary conflicting issues and thus should be conducted with friendly grace. Between India and Sri Lanka, we had centuries of friendly relations that continue even today. Let the leaders respect this historical and ethical guidance.

There had been occasional deviations in relations, but the recent economic crisis (4 billion dollars and Minister Nirmala Sitharaman at IMF) and the pandemic (vaccine, oxygen) brought the two countries to extreme proximity. Hence, this state visit should be approached on a positive foundation, aiming for a wider and higher level of relationship building. It will depend on pre-planning, scheduling, participation, agendas, the ability to mutually accommodate each other’s concerns frankly, and the outputs, and the capacity to manage the outputs, to enjoy the best mutual benefits. It was the intention of the Indian congratulatory messages and AKD’s responses.

It must be the fervent approach that any semblance of negatives that could arise are sealed, and the positives are expanded to confirm the governments’ friendliness. Both countries should build on the foundations laid by predecessors, thinking broad-mindedly regardless of any minor irritations, and accommodating rightful demands. The approach should be to let our neighbors thrive.

What we should strive for is for the region to win political, social, and economic battles to create a better Asia and a better world. India is capable of being the leader of the South Asian region. Wish AKD would succeed in proving that they are a different lot from 1971 who have the same craze and rage of Indians to achieve prosperity, peace, harmony, making good, better, and better best.

Even without any of these projected approaches or consequential positive outputs, if firm friendship is established to follow suit, irrespective of any suspicions of misgivings or potential deviations it can be called a successful state visit. It will be feathers on hats for all who made it possible. The initial good wishes for AKD’s victory and his friendly responses to PM Modi will be a reality then.