By S. I. Keethaponcalan –

Dr. S. I. Keethaponcalan

Sri Lanka’s ruling National People’s Power/Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (NPP/JVP) government suffered a severe setback in the recently concluded (6 May) local authority elections. The government and its supporters dismissed the argument that the election was a setback because the ruling party won a majority of the bodies for which elections were conducted. To be precise, elections were held for 339 bodies, including municipal councils, urban councils, and pradeshiya shabhas (village councils), and the ruling party won 266 of these bodies. The government took a victory lap. However, a closer look at the statistics and a comparison with the parliamentary election results demonstrate that the local government election results were a severe setback.

Political Rollercoaster 

The NPP/JVP has experienced a political rollercoaster in recent times, marked by dramatic highs and lows. Its presidential candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake polled only 3.16 percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential election. Hence, in 2019, the NPP/JVP was a negligible player in national politics. In the next presidential election, in 2024, largely thanks to the economic crisis and the mass protests (Aragalaya) against the government of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Dissanayake emerged as a dominant factor in the electoral politics. Several opinion polls predicted an easy win for Dissanayake. Some even predicted a “red wave.” The red wave and the landslide did not materialize, but he won the election with 42.31 percent of the votes.

In Sri Lanka, 43 percent of the votes are not enough to win the election as the Constitution requires the winning candidate to secure at least 50 percent of the votes (plus one vote). Hence, Sri Lanka was forced to count the preferential votes, following which Dissanayake was declared the winner. Since Dissanayake did not win with a simple majority, I referred to him as the “minority president”.

Sri Lankan presidents often dissolve parliament and call for a fresh parliamentary election immediately after the presidential election. The idea is to use the euphoria created by the presidential election victory as a launching pad to secure more parliamentary seats. For example, Mahinda Rajapaksa, after winning the presidential election in January 2010, went for the parliamentary election in April. Dissanayake followed the same strategy.     

Dissanayake was sworn in as president on 23 September 2024 and dissolved parliament on 24 September. The parliamentary election occurred on November 14. There was hardly any time for a significant shift in voter sentiment within two months. Hence, an NPP/JVP parliamentary election victory was expected to be proportional to its performance in the presidential election.

Indeed, some of the political trends within these two months should have reduced the NPP/JVP votes. For example, Dissanayake did not introduce any significant policy changes or new projects. He followed the policy frameworks of President Ranil Wickremesinghe, an ideological foe. This should have disappointed some voters. Another example was that the news of Israelis systematically building facilities in Sri Lanka broke out in this period, and the government, instead of trying to curtail these activities, provided security to the newly emerged Israeli facilities. This should have angered Muslim supporters of the NPP/JVP, which received substantial support from Muslims in the presidential election.

Instead, the party’s votes increased significantly. It won more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. To be precise, the NPP/JVP won 159 out of 225 seats in the parliament. This was a shockingly huge mandate. I called it a “peaceful coup” by the Sri Lankan voters (https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/professor-keethaponcalan-on-sri-lankas-new-government/).  The NPP/JVP was in ascendancy. Therefore, the ruling party went to the local government elections with confidence.

Local Election Results

However, the election results should have been disappointing. Although the ruling party won most of the bodies (266), it failed to secure a clear majority in more than a hundred councils, which could be termed “problem councils”. This means that in the “problem councils,” the combined opposition parties hold more seats than the ruling party. Forming the governing bodies and administering problem councils could evolve into a significant issue, undermining service in these areas.

The Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) is a good example of a problem council. The CMC has 117 seats. The NPP/JVP won the council with 48 seats, falling short of ten seats to claim a clear majority. The combined opposition parties have a majority with 69 seats. The government claimed the “right” to form the administration in the CMC but struggled to secure the necessary numbers. Meanwhile, the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), the main opposition party in parliament, secured the second-largest number of seats (29) in the CMC and is striving to form an SJB-led administration. Recent reports indicate that the United National Party (UNP) has pledged support to the SJB, and these two parties, with the assistance of small parties in the CMC, could form the administration. The NPP/JVP could face a similar situation in many of the problem councils.

What should be more worrying for the ruling parties is the national-level numbers. If one views the local government election as a national opinion poll, the results are nearly disastrous for the government — the party is under water.Nationally, it polled only 43.26 percent of the votes. In other words, opposition parties combined polled more votes than the government. Compared to the parliamentary election, the government lost about 18 percent of the votes. In actual numbers, the government lost 2.03 million votes. The polls were conducted to elect 8,793 members. The NPP/JVP won 3,927 seats, less than fifty percent of the total national seats. Hence, it is clear that the local government election results were a setback for the government.

One of the notable features of the results is that the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) has shown signs of recovery. The party was ousted from electoral politics following the economic crisis. During the crisis, many believed that the SLPP was dead. In the 2024 presidential election, the SLPP candidate Namal Rajapaksa received a meager 2.57 percent of the votes, and in the parliamentary election, the SLPP received 3.14 percent of the votes. In the local government election, it received 9.17 percent of the votes, a remarkable recovery.        

In my view, this aspect should be the most worrying factor for the NPP/JVP. Following the economic crisis, the SLPP votes transferred to the NPP/JVP primarily due to its Sinhala nationalist credentials. Possibly two processes are taking place simultaneously. First, Sinhala voters are starting to forget the economic hardship they experienced during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency. Second, former SLPP voters have begun to return home due to the disappointments caused by the NPP/JVP government. If current trends continue, all or most SLPP voters would likely return to the SLPP. This would pose a significant challenge to the ruling party.             

Cumulative Effect

Why did the honeymoon end so soon? Several reasons have been attributed so far. For example, some commentators argue that local government elections are a matter of personal choice. Hence, the results do not fully reflect the national sentiments, implying that this is not a serious setback. Some politicians have argued that national policies, such as the defense pact with India and the lies (pacha) promoted by the government leaders, were the reasons for the voter disappointment.           

I believe the setback was caused by the “cumulative effect” of several factors. What I mean by “cumulative effect” is that small groups of voters were disappointed by the different actions and policies of the government. Hence, they changed their vote, having a national adverse effect on the government. In other words, no single or two fundamental factors could be identified as the cause. In some past elections, one or two key factors determined the election results. For example, the Easter Sunday massacres helped Gotabaya Rajapaksa to win the election in 2019. The economic crisis helped Dissanayake to win in 2024.

Concerning the issues causing disappointment among small pockets of voters, many examples could be cited:

1. In 2024, one of the main issues was the extremely high cost of living, and people expected relief from the new government. The issue of the cost of living has hardly been resolved. The President promised an angata thenena (substantial) relief in the recently approved national budget, but the goodies provided were disappointing.

2. Some groups suffered disproportionately due to newly implemented policies and programs. For example, as part of the “Clean Sri Lanka” program, the government targeted the private buses and tuk-tuks for a cleanup. Most people involved in these industries come from very marginalized backgrounds, and most of them voted for the NPP/JVP. The government had to postpone (never to restart) these programs due to the aggressive response of these groups.

3. Government mismanagement led to a shortage of many essential commodities over the last six months, including rice, coconuts, and salt. The shortage issues would have eroded public confidence to a certain degree.

4. One of the main promises made during the election was to eradicate corruption and hold corrupt politicians accountable. Not many were prosecuted. During the Aragalaya, the Rajapaksa family was the main target of the corruption allegations. Nevertheless, it seems the Rajapaksa family has been spared. This should have disappointed at least a small group of people. Following the local government setback, the government has initiated investigations into the corruption-related activities of many politicians. Investigation alone is inadequate. The government should be able to prosecute.

5. The government promised to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Easter Sunday massacre. No meaningful action was taken on this front.

The point is that the issues that caused disappointment among small pockets of voters could be extensive. Hence, the problem is multipronged. The government should recognize this fact and address its shortcomings in multiple issues and sectors. Otherwise, future election results may look bleak for the ruling party. Believing in the argument that the local government election was a victory could lead to a disaster.

*Dr. S. I. Keethaponcalan is a Professor of Conflict Resolution at Salisbury University, Maryland. He was formerly a Professor of Political Science at the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.