18 November, 2026

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Why Colombo East Container Terminal Still Isn’t Working

By Prasanna Perera –

Prof. Prasanna Perera

Poor design, coordination failure, weak governance and the economics of delay at Colombo’s East Container Terminal

Few infrastructure assets in South Asia carry as much strategic weight as the East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Port of Colombo. Sitting on one of the busiest transshipment routes between Asia and Europe, it ideally should be a dependable earner of foreign exchange for a country still recovering from the worst economic crisis in its history. Yet, now more than a decade old and owned and developed by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), it is still not operating as intended despite the substantial public investment already committed.

Economically, the ECT is a case study in how inadequate design, fragmented procurement, and unstable leadership turn productive capital into stranded capital. Every month of further delay adds to a cost that Sri Lanka as a whole must bear due to the consequences of weak decision-making.

A decade of indecision

The first phase of the ECT was completed in mid-2015. For five years, it did not carry the container operations it was built for, denying SLPA the earnings expected from the completed investment.

Compared to other terminals, CICT began construction in December 2011 and operations in July 2013, while CWIT began construction in early 2022 and its first phase of operations in April 2025. As different, their timelines underline the extent of the ECT delay.

Between October 2014 and February 2021, the Cabinet and related bodies took many decisions on the terminal. They awarded a crane contract and rescinded it, endorsed a joint venture and then a public–private partnership before abandoning both, signed a trilateral Memorandum of Cooperation with India and Japan in 2019, and finally decided in February 2021 that SLPA would develop and operate the terminal as a wholly owned facility. Reversals could have been defensible politically, but it was SLPA that carried the idle asset and the interest on the loan. The cost of indecision was not the cost of any single bad choice but the value of the time lost between choices.

Decisions that were SLPA’s own

Delays cannot be blamed on Cabinet reversals alone when the authority also made choices. These choices and failures can be salvaged. The SLPA management and its engineers did not prepare a complete, integrated design for the terminal before committing to contracts, one that settled the ground conditions, the yard and gate layout, the operating model, the equipment mix and the systems interfaces together. The terminal was instead designed in pieces as it was built.

In 2021, SLPA set aside both a design consultant and a design-and-build contract, partly because it had no marine soil data for the site, and chose a measure-and-pay contract under which the cost of unforeseen conditions falls on SLPA itself. Soft cohesive soils required additional improvement, and the contract price rose by around 80 per cent.

Equipment was not staggered. The cranes arrived in 2024 and 2025, while the civil works, originally due in January 2025, slipped through three extensions of time (EOTs) to July 2026, with a fourth (EOT 4) requested but not yet granted.

Automation readiness was neglected. A semi-automated terminal needs a stock of critical spare parts, trained maintenance technicians, a proper transfer of technology from the suppliers, and tested operating procedures before its first automated move. There is no evidence that a full census of the spare parts delivered with the 52 cranes has been carried out against the contract schedules, or that the parts have been checked for completeness, condition and storage.

An interface gap was left open for years. The Equipment Control Interface Database (ECI DB), without which the terminal cannot run in semi-automated mode, was first raised in August 2023. The equipment supplier declared it outside its scope, the Attorney General advised arbitration, and more than two and a half years later, the component had still not been procured.

Straddle carriers have been tendered five times since 2021, and four of those processes were cancelled. In the third round, an award that Cabinet had approved was suspended within weeks, reportedly on instruction, and later cancelled after a court challenge by the losing bidder.

People and layouts were left unresolved. The 467 operational and engineering posts identified in 2023 still await approval from the Department of Management Services; there is no Chief Operating Officer, and the proposed operating company awaits the Attorney General’s response. The entrance road and building layouts were changed after construction had begun. From these decisions we observe an authority that finds difficult to plan, manage contracts and stick to decisions.

Idle cranes and the weakest link

A container terminal is a tightly integrated system, whose output depends on its weakest component, a logic captured by Michael Kremer’s O-ring theory of production. Phase II was split into three packages, civil works, container handling equipment and the Terminal Management System, with no single party accountable for how they fit together.

All twelve ship-to-shore (STS) cranes and forty automated rail-mounted gantry (ARMG) cranes have been delivered. Yet four STS cranes are unutilised, only fourteen ARMGs have been commissioned, and the ARMG fleet in its entirety is reportedly idle. A trial at that stage, operating without straddle carriers, achieved only 7.8 moves per crane per hour. The World Bank’s port performance benchmarks suggest over 20.

The ARMGs illustrate the cost of poor sequencing. As the ECT yard was not ready, the cranes were unloaded elsewhere in the port, and some were used there temporarily. They must now be moved and re-erected on their assigned rails, at a cost that was never budgeted and with a risk of damage, misalignment of automation components, and disputes with the supplier over who is responsible for any defects.

Time is of the essence

Delays depreciate what has already been bought, let alone receive revenue. Equipment warranties and defects liability periods usually run from delivery or acceptance, so cranes that arrived in 2024 and 2025 may lose their cover before performing a single commercial move. Software licences, support contracts and IT hardware age in the same way. SLPA may be paying support fees on systems that are not running, may find the installed software nearing the end of its support life before it is used, and will need security updates before connecting an automated terminal to live operations. Cranes standing idle in salt-laden air also deteriorate without lubrication, periodic running and corrosion protection.

The Board must obtain a schedule of every warranty, licence and support expiry, and negotiate extensions while payments to suppliers are still outstanding and SLPA still has some leverage.

The money spent and owed

The two phases are estimated to cost USD 755 million. Of this, USD 550 million had been spent by early 2026. A substantial balance remains to be paid, including for civil works, straddle carriers not yet awarded, equipment, the terminal system and the operation building. The estimates exclude the cost of relocating the ARMGs and any claims not yet decided. It is not clear how the balance will be funded.

Idle capital is never free. At an illustrative 7 per cent cost of capital, the spending already committed to Phase II represents an economic cost of more than USD 30 million a year before a single revenue-earning move is made.

Contractors and vendors waiting on SLPA

The civil contractor, a joint venture company, is waiting for a decision on EOT 4. Its prolongation claim on earlier extensions was rejected, so it appears to have received time without the associated cost. The contractor lodged a notice of dissatisfaction, often a precursor to FIDIC-based dispute proceedings. Other claims remain uncertified, and physical progress stood at around 80 per cent at that stage. Delayed payments and unresolved claims can add to the slippage. Leaving EOT 4 undecided risks further claims and costs, while postponing the programme needed to complete the remaining works and earn revenue.

There is a real danger that EOT 4 will not be the last. Revetment and dredging works are exposed to turbulent weather. A strong El Niño is predicted too, so the known monsoon risks should already be built in. Marine works should be scheduled for calmer months, with acceleration where needed and close oversight by the Employer and Engineer, so that construction is completed within EOT 4.

The equipment supplier and terminal system vendor are awaiting payments under their contracts. The latter also depends on gate works, OCR portals, the ECI DB, staffing and integration testing. Completing one contract alone cannot make the terminal operational; these activities must be coordinated with the remaining civil works.

Regardless of intentions, contractors will ultimately respond to the credibility of the employer, and undecided claims and unfunded payments do not exactly instill faith in contractors.

The cost of delay

A committee of senior SLPA officers estimates the revenue foregone in 2026 at between USD 28.2 million and USD 105.6 million, or up to USD 8.8 million a month. In 2027, losses could reach USD 126.7 million if straddle carriers do not arrive. But this does not include actual economic costs of the delay. Only in the better scenario, with carriers from July 2027, does the year turn to a small gain of USD 8.2 million.

These numbers represent the revenue SLPA lost, but do not include the money SLPA is spending while waiting. This includes interest on loans and the costs associated with capital. It also includes preserving, insuring, and securing idle cranes, as well as relocating ARMGs. Furthermore, warranties may expire while licence fees continue. The Engineer’s extended supervision and the contractor’s prolongation costs exacerbate this. Additional money is being spent on repeated re-tendering and on legal and arbitration proceedings. SLPA is also paying staff for an operation that has not yet begun. Nor do they account for the USD 550 million already sunk. Economically, sunk costs should not drive future decisions, but every stagnant year earns that investment nothing and lowers the eventual return entirely.

The foregone revenue must also be viewed against Colombo’s existing terminal capacity. In 2024, SLPA-run terminals handled 2.41 million TEUs in total, compared with 3.35 million at CICT alone. The figures are not a direct measure of crane productivity, but they underline the importance of bringing ECT’s additional capacity into operation.

Competition is also developing elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Hambantota’s container volumes rose from 53,169 TEUs in 2024 to 428,036 in 2025, and its operator is investing to raise annual handling capacity to 2 million TEUs. Disruptions to shipping routes in the Middle East have made reliable alternatives increasingly important. This does not mean that ECT has already lost business to Hambantota, but prolonged delays may influence where shipping lines choose to call.

The opportunity cost of delay goes beyond revenue foregone in a particular year. Capital tied up in unfinished works cannot be used for improvements elsewhere in the port, while shipping lines plan their services around reliable terminals. Calls lost during the delay may not return even after ECT opens, and the longer-term loss of business is not captured in the committee’s estimates.

The 14 December 2026 date now given for operationalising the terminal should thus be read with care. With straddle carriers not expected before July 2027, it is at best a date for partial operation.

Marking and Examining one’s own homework: Conflict of Interests

SLPA’s own engineers supervise the construction works and assess delays and contractual claims, including those arising from the Authority’s own instructions and decisions. This creates a clear conflict of interest, as SLPA is effectively assessing the consequences of its own actions. Such an arrangement is inconsistent with global industry best practice, which favours independent third-party engineering oversight and impartial assessment of contractual claims. An independent third-party Engineer should therefore be appointed to supervise the works and assess claims. Similar concerns arise in procurement, where parties with an interest in the straddle carrier award were able to reopen a completed technical evaluation.

There have also been shifts in leadership, with four or five Managing Directors and Project Directors being changed during Phase II, and SLPA has been led by at least four Chairmen since 2021. Each change brings a period of familiarisation, reopens settled questions and weakens accountability, because no single leader has owned the project from design to delivery. Meanwhile, the Board, the Ministry, the Cabinet, procurement committees, the Attorney General, the courts and organised labour each hold a some situational power, and the reality is an expensive, idle terminal.

What is to be done

The current management deserves credit for convening progress reviews and beginning to take stock, yet there is much to be done. We urge the Board to act hastily on the following:

1. Appoint an independent third-party Engineer to supervise construction and assess claims, supported by port, automation and commissioning specialists reporting to the Board, with a 60 to 90 day mandate to verify the critical path, the cost to complete and the pending claims.

2. Decide EOT 4 now and make it the last extension, on a realistic completion programme allowing for monsoon conditions.

3. Pay what is certified, decide what is claimed, and agree a funded plan for the remaining expenditure.

4. Procure the ECI DB now, while pursuing the dispute with the supplier in parallel.

5. Protect what has been bought through a census of spare parts, a schedule of warranty and licence expiries, and proper preservation of idle equipment.

6. Settle the straddle carrier award on an independent price assessment, and arrange interim operations meanwhile.

7. Approve the cadre, appoint a Chief Operating Officer, enforce the suppliers’ training and transfer of technology obligations, and keep one project director in post until completion.

8. Name a single party accountable for systems integration, and report the full cost of delay to the Board every month.

Lessons to be learnt from the ECT

The ECT experience demonstrates the importance of completing proper site investigations and preparing an integrated design before construction begins. Where different components of a project must coexist, they should either be procured as an integrated system or have a single party responsible for coordinating their interfaces and ensuring compatibility. Civil works, equipment, operating systems and personnel should be planned and coordinated to be readily available. Adequate attention must be given to spare parts, staff training and maintenance requirements, rather than concentrating merely on construction. Cancellations of tenders demonstrates that the lowest procurement price does not equate to the lowest overall cost, particularly when delays postpone revenue generation. Continuity in project leadership and independent scrutiny of major decisions are equally important. Although Cabinet decisions contributed to postponement, the SLPA shares responsibility given the oversights in planning, procurement and decision-making.

Thus we appeal to the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, the line Ministry, and other stakeholders to treat the ECT as a national economic priority. Continued delay costs Sri Lanka foreign exchange it cannot afford to lose. The ECT must deliver the revenue it owes.

*Writer is a former Vice Chairman, Sri Lanka Ports Authority. Head, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Peradeniya

Latest comments

  • 1
    1

    Answer for this is geo-political blunder. Colombo south container terminal and Colombo international container terminals were given to China which caused concerns for India. In order to checkmate this, India asked Srilanka to give them Colombo east container terminal which is situated between the two, from where India while operating it could monitor Chinese activity in the port which could be detrimental to Indian security. Under pressure from China, Srilanka refused to give centrally located east terminal to India and offered west terminal which is in the periphery of the harbour complex. Even the proposal of Japan to jointly develop the east terminal with India was rejected. This annoyed India, but feeling something is better than nothing, agreed to take over west terminal. To expect India to go to sleep was idiotic. Ever since, India has sabotaged development and operation of east terminal. Now India has built two large deep sea container terminals along the main sea route at Vilinjam in Kerala and at Nicobar Island. Once they are fully operational, transhipment cargo hitherto handled by Colombo will be diverted to these two. This is a good lesson for Srilanka not to antagonise India about its geopolitical designs.

    • 0
      1

      “This is a good lesson for Srilanka not to antagonise India about its geopolitical designs”
      Should it not rather read as ‘a good lesson for Srilanka not to trust India about its geopolitical designs’?

  • 1
    4

    ” Why Colombo East Container Terminal still isn’t working ? “
    What else is working except Tilvin in Pelawatte ?

    • 3
      3

      Hello WW,
      To tell the truth, even Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri (one of the key men of NPP) dares to say today that the NPP politicians elected to govern this country are incompetent. Yet, some CT commenters still believe that the AKD-led government has achieved a great deal over the past 26 months. Can you imagine? Either our people have failed to learn to distinguish facts from political propaganda, or they remain hopelessly biased regardless of the consequences. This government inherited a relatively stable state from former President Ranil Wickremesinghe and his capable, compact cabinet, including Harin, Shehan, Ali Sabry, Siyambalapitiya, Manusha, Kanchana, and others. Yet, ungrateful Sri Lankans chose inexperienced politicians, hoping for miracles. Even today, AKD continues to mislead the public, while some CT commenters remain loyal despite declining voter support. As Dr. Ajantha Perera aptly observed, many Sri Lankans seem to consume “thanakola” rather than rice and curry. Sadly, a nation that fails to recognise competent leadership risks repeatedly electing leaders without vision, whose actions increasingly resemble authoritarianism.

      • 1
        2

        L M ,

        The U N P led by Ranil is still failing to read the general public .
        The country wants a change , change from head to toe . If
        Ranil and his bandwagon think that the current situation
        will soon change into worse and then people will have no
        alternative than running after whatever coalition they make .
        Is that the politics we are longing for ? What Ranil did and
        failed to do , let us put it aside , who is ready to take on AKD
        for the top post ? Who is next ? Our political landscape has
        now changed and if there’s a party that has no eyes to see
        this change , no doubt anybody will name it U N P . Remember ,
        it is Ranil and Mara leadership that brought this N P P to
        power through their failures to address issues honourably .
        They were all busy looking after themselves . Who is the next
        right contestant ? Sajith is next Dunnoth Baragannang ! Ranil ,
        Denne Kowda ?

        • 2
          0

          WW,
          It is the people who elect their leaders, and the mandate they receive reflects the collective thinking, attitudes, and expectations of the electorate. Therefore, blaming former leaders indefinitely is no longer acceptable.
          –
          The AKD-led groups have, in my view, misled gullible sections of the public through exaggerated claims and blatant falsehoods. People often stop questioning when loud public statements, gossip, and sensationalism dominate the conversation.
          –
          Just as the Swiss enjoy their strong-smelling blue cheese, Sri Lankans seem to have a particular appetite for political gossip and character assassination, often at the expense of facts and truth.
          –
          Today, even teenagers are increasingly aware of the contradictions between AKD’s public statements and the available facts. Some even compare the scale of these claims with the legendary exaggerations of King Chethiya. In my opinion, not a single minister in the current Cabinet has yet demonstrated consistently convincing performance. Nevertheless, the same audience continues to be fed a steady stream of self-congratulatory speeches and political rhetoric.

    • 4
      0

      “Competition is also developing elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Hambantota’s container volumes rose from 53,169 TEUs in 2024 to 428,036 in 2025, and its operator is investing to raise annual handling capacity to 2 million TEUs. “
      Who is the operator in Hambantota? China Ports, of course. Did SLPA achieve even a tenth of that output while it was in their hands with that Rajapaksa relative Bandu Wickrama heading it? Nope. What is the lesson? That the government should leave business to businessmen. Just collect the taxes. No real businessman would leave equipment idling in salty air for years.
      Most of the flip-flopping around the East Terminal happened under Gota. I am surprised that the idiot never called on the Army to build it, as he tended to do with with many other things. I wonder what happened to the school principals he anointed as Majors, Colonels etc.

      • 0
        1

        oc
        “Most of the flip-flopping around the East Terminal happened under Gota.”
        True.
        But it is some years since then.

      • 2
        0

        OC,
        Have you noticed how Dr. Ajanatha Perea has been making sweeping remarks suggesting that the majority of Sri Lankans are thana kola eaters?
        –
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfbjTK4sRvo
        –
        I believe I am not alone in finding such generalisations troubling. Looking at countries such as Honduras, where environmental and public health challenges have affected communities, one cannot ignore the wider impact of geography, social conditions and national circumstances on a population’s future. Similarly, Sri Lanka continues to struggle with political divisions, the legacy of rebellion and violence, and an inability to reach a common national vision. The disruptive role played by groups such as the JVP and other political movements cannot simply be overlooked. Having followed these developments over the years, I fear that Sri Lanka may find it extremely difficult to regain its economic strength and international standing in the near future. It is a bleak prediction, but what realistic alternatives remain for the Sri Lankan people?

  • 4
    3

    Professor Perera, while you urge the government to prioritise the development of the Colombo East Terminal, the reality is that it appears more focused on political vendettas, hate-mongering, and hunting down the opposition and the Rajapaksas for political survival than on national development. The President himself has reportedly declared that he was elected to pursue these objectives rather than development projects. Meanwhile, ordinary people continue to suffer. Yesterday’s reports of alleged police brutality, including the death of an arrestee, were deeply disturbing. The tragedy in Homagama, leaving a widow and her young child devastated, raises serious questions about law enforcement and accountability. No suspicion of drug-related offences can ever justify extrajudicial punishment. Transparency and accountability appear increasingly absent, while political rhetoric dominates public discourse.
    Tbc

  • 4
    3

    cont.
    Development projects remain neglected as the cost of living soars and gas and fuel shortages threaten to return people to the queues they endured before Ranil Wickremesinghe stabilised the situation. The government continues to blame the bankruptcy inherited from the previous administration, despite the progress made in restoring stability. Its own contradictions and unfulfilled promises are now catching up with it. If El Niño worsens the situation, shortages of fuel, gas, and medicine could push people into even deeper hardship. Sadly, the decision of 6.8 million voters to entrust power to former rebels may prove to have been a grave political miscalculation.

  • 2
    0

    Readers,
    Leaders who rise to power through popularity rather than truth, integrity, and accountability are unlikely to sustain public confidence for long. The hope is to witness the downfall of the NPP in 2029. Trump’s first term demonstrated how religious and racial loyalties could bring a leader back to power, despite serious questions surrounding his administration’s handling of COVID-19 and the resulting loss of lives. People’s tendency to become emotionally attached to popular leaders is hardly different, whether in developed or developing nations. Sri Lankans learned this the hard way in July 2022, when the country plunged into an unprecedented crisis, ultimately driving Gotabaya Rajapaksa from power. His successor, AKD, appears to be heading towards a similar loss of public confidence. Although such leaders are democratically elected, their subsequent abuse of power, disregard for accountability, and failure to honour their promises remain deeply troubling. The NPP, in particular, has raised serious concerns by seemingly disregarding established ethical and international norms while failing to deliver tangible results in line with its lofty promises to the very people who entrusted it with power.

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