By Imtiyaz Razak –

Dr Imtiyaz Razak

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 marked one of the most significant global economic milestones of the 21st century. This historic step was made possible by China’s gradual departure from rigid socialist economic policies that had long kept it among the world’s poorest nations. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, China embraced market-oriented reforms under the banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This meant abandoning Mao Zedong’s centrally planned economic model and opening the door to privatization, foreign investment, and global trade.

While China had initiated economic reforms as early as the 1980s, the real windfall came only after it gained full WTO membership. The Clinton administration strongly supported this move, with then-Senator Joe Biden playing a key role in advocating for China’s integration into the global trading system. The dominant argument was that economic engagement would encourage political liberalization, greater transparency, and alignment with international norms.

China’s accession to the WTO ushered in a new chapter in the globalization of trade and development. Western capital flowed into China at unprecedented levels. In return, the Chinese Communist Party provided a massive, disciplined, and low-cost labor force to support foreign industrial and technological investment. Chinese workers became the backbone of global manufacturing, and China emerged as the world’s factory.

Major American corporations quickly took advantage of China’s economic opening. In any profit-driven system, the primary goal is clear: maximize returns. With rising labor costs in the United States—especially for manufacturing jobs—companies increasingly found it more profitable to outsource production. The result was a massive exodus of American capital and industrial capacity to China and other low-cost countries. While some domestic investment persisted, by the early 2000s, the trend was unmistakable.

This shift had profound consequences for the American working class. Non-college-educated Americans, particularly men, were disproportionately affected by job losses and wage stagnation. Entire industries in the U.S. heartland—once thriving—began to disappear. The effects were most visible in rural towns and inner-city neighborhoods, where economic despair translated into deep frustration and resentment. The backlash against globalization intensified, culminating in political upheaval during the 2016 and especially the 2024 presidential elections.

Donald Trump keenly read this public mood and became the voice of those who felt abandoned by both political parties—people who believed they were betrayed by elites who promoted a globalist economic agenda without regard for domestic consequences. His message was clear: free trade is acceptable, but only if it is fair.

Having lived in China for over 15 years, studied its socio-economic systems closely, and developed relationships with key business figures on the mainland, I can personally attest to how China’s elite skillfully exploited American openness. China did not become a technological powerhouse through innovation alone—it did so by leveraging U.S. generosity and taking advantage of weak trade enforcement. Intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and opaque regulatory systems were common strategies used by Chinese firms to gain an unfair advantage.

Despite its WTO membership, China frequently violated both the spirit and the letter of international trade agreements. It engaged in widespread intellectual property theft, manipulated its currency to boost exports, provided massive state subsidies to favored industries, and erected protectionist barriers that limited foreign competition. These practices tilted the playing field heavily in China’s favor.

Trump’s criticism of these practices is not without merit. If free trade is to remain the foundation of international cooperation, it must be underpinned by fairness, reciprocity, and enforcement. This principle applies not only to China but also to traditional U.S. allies—countries that have long benefited from America’s open markets while protecting their own domestic industries.

Trump’s tariff regime, often labeled as a “trade war,” was carefully crafted to serve three core objectives:

A. To radically reduce America’s trade imbalances, particularly with China, Europe, and Canada.
B. To pressure China into ending unfair trade practices such as currency manipulation, forced technology transfers, and state-sponsored industrial espionage.
C. To bring back manufacturing jobs to the U.S., especially for non-college-educated Americans who had suffered the most under decades of offshoring and automation.

Though controversial, Trump’s tariffs were not imposed haphazardly. They were part of a broader attempt to recalibrate America’s economic relationships and prioritize national economic security over short-term corporate profits. The tariffs targeted key Chinese exports, including steel, aluminum, electronics, and industrial machinery, while also penalizing unfair subsidies and IP theft.

Trump’s critics argued that tariffs risked triggering inflation and retaliation. However, his supporters viewed the policy as a necessary correction to decades of asymmetrical trade practices that hollowed out the U.S. industrial base. In essence, it was a wake-up call to both international partners and American elites: the era of unchecked globalization was over.

No war is a good war—including trade wars—but America’s trading partners must understand that they can no longer take advantage of global markets at the expense of ordinary Americans. The results of the recent elections in November sent a clear message to globalist elites and to American politicians who ignored the grievances of working-class Americans. Economic patriotism and strategic self-interest have returned to the center of U.S. trade policy.

*Dr. A.R.M. Imtiyaz is a political scientist and historian who holds an M.A. in International Relations from Beijing University and a Ph.D. in World History from Nanjing University, China. He is currently affiliated with the South Asia Center at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Google scholar: Imtiyaz, A.R.M.