
By Mahil Dole –

Mahil Dole
Geographically: Sri Lanka sits at a critical point in the Indian Ocean shipping lanes—between East and West, near India, and on China’s maritime routes. Strategically: It can tilt the balance between India and China, or serve as a bridge between competing regional visions (like India’s SAGAR vs. China’s BRI). Diplomatically: Its choices in foreign policy, economic partnerships, and defense alignments impact regional stability.
Synopsis
The recent state visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Sri Lanka was marked by ceremonial warmth, smiling photo-ops, and affirmations of historic ties. However, seasoned observers would note that beyond the optics, the visit was a masterclass in calibrated diplomacy—rooted in a strategic tradition far older than modern international relations: the Arthashastra of Kautilya.
India’s foreign policy is often analyzed through modern frameworks—realism, strategic autonomy, and regional hegemony. However, an ancient lens reveals a deeper strategic culture. The Arthashastra, attributed to Kautilya (c. 4th century BCE), provides enduring concepts such as the Mandala Theory and the fourfold diplomatic toolkit (Sama, Dana, Bheda, Danda), which remain relevant in India’s approach to neighbors, especially Sri Lanka.
This ancient Indian treatise on governance and statecraft, attributed to the brilliant strategist Chanakya (also known as Kautilya), continues to inform India’s approach to its neighborhood. The essence of the Arthashastra lies in realpolitik—where the sovereign must secure the state’s interests using a fourfold toolkit: Sama (conciliation), Dana (gifts or inducements), Bheda (division or influence), and Danda (force or deterrence).
India’s engagement with Sri Lanka—particularly during and after this visit—reflects all four instruments, skillfully deployed.
Sama and the Power of Cultural Diplomacy
Modi’s speeches repeatedly invoked shared heritage, civilizational links, and religious commonality—especially Buddhism. These overtures form the foundation of Sama—conciliation and narrative-building. India positions itself not merely as a strategic partner, but as a cultural sibling, invoking millennia of intertwined history. Such messaging resonates not just with Sri Lanka’s policymakers but also with the public psyche, particularly in an environment where international alignment is being intensely scrutinized.
Dana and Economic Statecraft
India’s economic outreach—highlighted during the visit—is emblematic of Dana. With over USD 4 billion in support during Sri Lanka’s economic crisis in 2022, India now leverages that goodwill through long-term economic engagements: infrastructure, digital connectivity, energy security, and logistics hubs.
Recent announcements on collaborative projects in Trincomalee, renewable energy corridors, and port infrastructure all serve a dual purpose—economic development and strategic entrenchment.
Bheda and Strategic Influence
While diplomacy is the visible layer, India’s parallel engagements with diverse Sri Lankan political actors—from Tamil political representatives to key southern figures—signal the use of Bheda. This strategic outreach ensures India’s influence remains embedded across ethnic and political lines, insulating its interests regardless of domestic political shifts in Colombo.
This is not interference per se—but it is calibrated access, influence, and insurance.
Danda and Maritime Deterrence
Though India avoids overt pressure, the subtext is clear: security cooperation remains critical. India continues to strengthen naval collaboration, joint patrols, and intelligence partnerships in the Indian Ocean Region. Its naval footprint, enhanced training programs, and cyber-cooperation platforms quietly reinforce deterrence.
Danda in this context is not coercion—it is preparedness. It’s a message to Sri Lanka and others: India remains the preeminent security provider in the region.
Mandala Theory in Practice
Kautilya’s Mandala Theory posits that a state’s immediate neighbors are potential threats or dependencies, while allies lie beyond. For India, Sri Lanka is a critical link in its first strategic ring. With China’s presence growing—via infrastructure projects like Hambantota and Colombo Port City—India is recalibrating its posture.
Matsya Niyaya
The law of the fish emphasizes the need to protect weaker states from predatory powers to ensure regional stability
This visit was not just reassurance; it was a signal—to Sri Lanka, to China, and to the region.
Sri Lanka’s Counter-Framework: Balance, Not Bandwagoning
The key question is: How should Sri Lanka respond?
Sri Lanka must not default into orbit around any single power. Instead, it must craft a strategic counter-framework that emphasizes:
* Strategic balancing between India, China, and other major powers;
* Sovereign-first economic policy, ensuring national interests in every agreement;
* Internal political stability, minimizing the scope for external manipulation;
* And a bold, new Maritime Neutrality Doctrine—positioning Sri Lanka as an open, collaborative, but unaligned actor in the Indian Ocean.
Colombo must not allow itself to become a pawn in someone else’s grand strategy. Rather, it should present itself as a resilient, sovereign maritime pivot, essential to regional peace and trade.
Final Thoughts
India’s approach to Sri Lanka is not reactionary—it is deeply strategic and grounded in thousands of years of geopolitical thought. For Sri Lanka to protect its space and future, it must understand this paradigm, and respond not with confrontation or dependence, but with clear-eyed diplomacy, strategic clarity, and national unity.
Kautilya wrote for kings—but his lessons endure for nations. Sri Lanka must now write its own chapter—one of sovereign pragmatism in a contested ocean.
*Writer Mahil Dole SSP rtd, served in the Police department for over 40 years and was the former Head of Counter Terrorism- State Intelligence Service and served as First Secretary (Defence) Embassy of Sri Lanka in Thailand.
References
* Kautilya. (2002). Arthashastra (L.N. Rangarajan, Trans.). Penguin Classics.
* Brewster, D. (2019). India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership. Routledge.
* Samaranayake, N. (2011). “Are Sri Lanka’s relations with China deepening?” Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 110.
* Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2023). “India–Sri Lanka Relations.” www.mea.gov.in
leelagemalli / April 8, 2025
I believe people should be told the truth today. The AKD leadership resembles a handicapped person. What was signed is still unclear to parliament. If this had been the case in a previous administration, things would have been completely manipulated in favor of JVPrs. People are now being caught by facists, also known as JVPrs, who continue to lie.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJWRHBmcLMQ
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old codger / April 9, 2025
“Strategically: It can tilt the balance between India and China, or serve as a bridge between competing regional visions (like India’s SAGAR vs. China’s BRI). Diplomatically: Its choices in foreign policy, economic partnerships, and defense alignments impact regional stability.”
I beg to differ with the illustrious Mr. Dole.
Let us not get carried away with our importance in the grand scheme of things. We can do none of the above, because we have no money. We should not forget that three years ago, we were standing in queues for practically everything.
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leelagemalli / April 10, 2025
People in Sri Lanka are idiots. But nothing really matters to them.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDxZlEPT3vY
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Today, where are we heading? They are reminded of everything they did loudly in the past. Jayatissa maintained that the Easter Sunday catastrophe was orchestrated by India. These criminals, however, are openly hanging around with Indian leaders. Humans are immobile. Those in the JVP are true hypocrites. They have no idea what they are discussing. They are completely unstable. People who haven’t seen another world often do that. Since the first day I knew them, they have opposed all outside activities. How can AKD and others like him be leaders for the common good when they have no prior experience with foreigners?
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SJ / April 10, 2025
oc
However small, SL has its worth in regional ‘rivalry’ (real or imagined).
My own view is that India is paranoid about China’s influence in the ASEAN region.
China is a business first entity and not given to illusions of grandeur like India.
Its concerns are security of its trade routes and bonds with other countries.
India cannot do much to hurt it.
China, by doing virtually nothing, scored in Nepal and Bangladesh. It desires stability here as it is good for business.
The defence treaty with India is redundant as there is no military threat to the country from any power right now. It served a purpose– soothing the wounded ego of Modi who invited humiliation by inviting himself to meet Trump.
China will not react with hostilit. But if there is going back on any its agreements there could be a ‘mild’ nudge. Any defence treaty that does not trouble its business interests here, especially the B&R project, is irrelevant to it
Policy was once friendship first, competition after. Now it is business first, all else after.
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Naman / April 10, 2025
” It can tilt the balance between India and China,”
How is this “IT” can do this tilt is what I don’t understand.
IT is a country that has failed in all fields such as economics/ socio-political aspects/ morality/ honesty.
SL should realise it’s minimal impact on geo-politics involving India/West/China.
SL has to align itself with INDIA in order to thrive economically. SL first and foremost need to be very fair in it treating the minorities, if it is to PROSPER.
It [GoSL] need to be ready to tackle any sort of rekindling religious and ethnic disharmony.
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