By Austin Fernando –

Austin Fernando

Politicization of administration is a universal social process bringing a political character or flavor to administration. It may yield positive (e.g. pressure to motivate officials) and negative (e.g. discrimination of political opponents through officers) results. The faint murmur by Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS) and others officers may be to minimize it. Concurrently, politicians vociferously demand it as a functional necessity.

Those who honor Max Weber Principles on bureaucracy[1], i.e. hierarchical structures, management by rules, being impersonal etc find difficult to tolerate politicization. Negative politicization appreciates non-hierarchy (except for political power), bending rules to politicians’ wishes, politics-based personal discrimination etc. Negative politicization affects respected aspirations in administration, e.g. human rights, environment, sustainable development, natural justice, accountability, transparency etc. This dichotomy irritates. This is why focus on politicization.

Since the establishment of the Ceylon Administrative Service (CAS) in 1963, later SLAS, politicians made constitutional and administrative arrangements reinforcing politicization. These diluted the aura and importance enjoyed by officers and in lieu enhanced overt and covert involvements of politicians in administrative processes.

Incidentally, one may cynically or sarcastically argue that the establishment of SLAS was also politically motivated, because anti-colonialist political thinking to erase the last vestiges of colonialism was uppermost in the agendas of the then ruling politicians.  In that cynical sense the birth of SLAS was a progressive step towards emancipation from colonialism!

Though politicization has affected other parallel services, it was the SLAS as the frontline administrators with close range relationships with politicians and people that faced the crunch mostly. Why? To answer, it is appropriate to reminisce how SLAS is introduced.

Importance of SLAS

The Wikipedia[2] introduction of SLAS projects it as the key administrative service of the Government of Sri Lanka, with civil servants working for both the ‘Central Government’ and Provincial Councils (PCs) and formed after the abolition of Ceylon Civil Service (CCS). It was considered “the senior public service” and hence any political, constitutional / legal or institutional change impacted earliest on SLAS.

This ‘seniority factor’ makes SLAS vulnerable on the cumulative failings of public service, because as the leading Service it should have countered weaknesses. However, the concurrent complaint is that the state administration- preponderantly consisting of SLAS cadres- is excessively politically guided. This status is consequential to intertwined factors (i.e. political, constitutional/ legal, institutional, attitudinal).

Reasoning political influence on SLAS

Let’s observe why political influence originated.

Historically, at Independence, Ceylonese senior executives (CCS) were expected to collect revenue and maintain law and order. The CCS was considered elitists. Of course, the contemporary political leaderships, except a handful, were also elitists.  Elitism was mutually matching until challenged by the Pancha Maha Balavega (Five Major Forces) led ‘social revolution’ in 1956. Until then, complaints against the CCS administration were a few, and the complaining political proxies too were a few. Therefore, the colonial and post independence administrations were independent to act in the interest of the British Raj and later the semi-elitist local politicians, because the people were secondary and political pressure lacked.

With post-1956 political approaches the aspirations of the poor were addressed more through proxy Members of Parliament (MPs). Most proxies were not sophisticated, though their leaders were, but preferred responsive people friendly administration. With more organizations established (e.g. Statutory Authorities, PCs and their Ministries, private industry) the number of proxies engaging SLAS cadres also increased. Good examples are the Parliamentarians, Provincial Councilors and Local Authority members, their staff competing to climb the political ladder engaging public officers, e.g. Divisional Secretaries (DSs) / Government Agents (GAs).

Of course, there were CCS GAs who closely linked with the poor, e.g. Leonard Woolf. Though all Divisional Revenue Officers (DROs) absorbed to SLAS in 1963 were not extreme elitists, in the eyes of the poor they were. Most DROs had their eyes and ears open for the poor. Nevertheless, they inherited some strong qualities from the CCS. In lighter vein it is said that when a novice DRO inquired his senior whether to visit the MP of the area upon assumption of duties, the response was ‘the politician should visit him and not the vice versa!’ Now, many a junior SLAS officer may pray for such seniors, who say and do! No wonder with socio-political “revolutionizing” the new “political masters” wanted politicized recognition.

Political patronage for appointments was unimportant in early sixties. But, this status deteriorated with politicians becoming more responsive to grassroots development, handling state finances directly. Lack of skills and competencies in the SLAS would have increased the need for proxy political interventions. A good example was the extension of the Decentralized Budget (DCB). The increased DCB type allocations extended to PCs and Local Authorities and thus consequentially demanded wider political ‘alertness’ and ‘supervision.’ Likewise, increased number of works, performance levels and systems (especially tendering and contracting) would have motivated politicization, sometimes for their personal gain or their supporters’.

Political patronage measures

The passing remark on political patronage has to be further dealt with.

Steadily, an ‘informal political proposal’ was considered an ‘unwritten must’ for SLAS placements in district administration. No DS aspirant or SLAS Association questioned this arrangement, showing the legal stance, which read as: “Each Division shall be assigned to a DS as his area of authority and such DS shall exercise, perform, and discharge, within such Division, any power, duty or function conferred or imposed on, or assigned to, him by written law”[3]

“Written laws” have no reference to political blessings! One may in defense say that this does not happen always, and is a thing of the past. Yet they may agree that on political protest, even when the officer is innocent, he/she will be transferred!

Additionally, it is no wonder for officers to seek political blessing for placements when the SLAS letter of appointment, which was received by post by “SLAS Oldies” like the writer, is handed over individually by highest political authorities, in the presence of beaming Ministers and Secretaries. When such arrangement is audaciously accepted even by superiors, how can such appointee question any negative politicization, having set foot to SLAS en route?  Is not this equivalent to an upgraded version of JR Jayewardene Regime’s Job Bank appointments?

By mid seventies a GA required the ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ blessings and patronage of a particular district’s pro-government MPs, unless a powerful Minister demanded his nominee as the GA. The undertone of such selection was to oblige the ‘proposer’ over others.  Some politicians disagreed with such powerful Ministers. For example, the writer is aware of one such disgruntled Minister making informal ridicule on the GA Nuwara Eliya, by not referring to ‘GA’ as “Government Agent,” but as “Gamini’s Agent”! It showed how Ralph Braibanti’s abbreviation of “Government Agent” as ‘GA,’ also made equivalent by him to “God Almighty” (considering GA’s powers), was corrupted!

The political blessing requirement extends also to PCs. Law made it compulsory for the President to obtain Chief Minister’s concurrence when appointing a Chief Secretary.[4] It was easy when the President and Chief Minister were from the same political group. A conflict was reported as a rarity when Central Province Chief Minister WMPB Dissanayake did not concur with President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s nominees as Chief Secretary. Finally, the President’s choice was appointed, which was tolerated by the Chief Minister. This showed how SLAS officers get entangled in conflicting political battles.

The ‘Ministry Secretary’ is a political appointee. Hence political considerations cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, past holders of office (especially from the CCS) maintained independent responses. May be, it was because they were ‘Permanent Secretaries’! The old school Secretaries stuck to rules / laws, and survived by strategically handling Ministers. Probably they would have matched actor Nigel Hawthorne of Sir Humphrey Appleby fame in “Yes Minister”! With the 1972 Constitution their permanency was erased and gradual transformation of Secretaries to accept politicization commenced.

The monopoly maintained by the CCS/SLAS was blasted with Mr. Ananda Tissa de Alwis being appointed as Secretary of the Ministry of State followed by several others.  Presently the ‘SLAS’s monopoly’ has been severely encroached by other All Island Services and even by other professions. The trends indicate that such expansion will increase- certainly deteriorating SLAS hold, not only because of politics, but due to lack of skills and competency (to be even criticized by the Supreme Courts) to handle serious assignments.

Constitutionally[5] political considerations may be even defended because the Constitution provides for the Secretary of a Ministry to be subjected to the direction and control of the Minister in charge. Hence, capacity to perform amiably with politicians becomes a qualification. The usual grievance is ‘jumping the SLAS seniority list’ and the increase of non-SLAS cadres in Secretary’s posts.

Another issue arises when a SLAS officer is rejected by a Minister causing removal. Sometimes this displaced Secretary may not be acceptable to another Minister, even if he is innocent, because he is “black-marked”. Most such officers are SLAS officers and this has weakened many Secretaries who for survival become passive ‘torchbearers’ and even ‘cooperating bed-fellows’ unwilling to protest even when the Minister blatantly violates laws/ rules/ regulations/ government circulars etc or corrupt[6].

Sometimes subservience may be ‘gratifying’ as post-retirement employment is assured by being so. This had been traditional. Secretary and non-Secretary SLAS officers, Military/ Police seniors and repentantly and remorsefully even some supreme judicial officers have been ‘beneficiaries of subservience’. Post-retirement appointments, e.g. Diplomats, Advisors and Heads of Statutory Authorities etc are attractive motivator tools. This is a politicization attitudinal issue- i.e. politicians ‘offering bribes’ and SLAS or other officers ‘accepting bribes’, in a country where offering and accepting bribes / gratifications are illegal![7]

Economically viewed, just after Independence, due to satisfactory foreign reserve status consequential to Korean War Boom and the limited development challenges, it was possible to leave the administration alone. Since development overtook welfarism the contribution from the pre-SLAS and SLAS officialdom was quite relevant in development administration- especially in the districts. Several politicized innovations to respond to economic deterioration were attempted, which had large SLAS officer involvements. Some of these will be discussed later.

Complications for SLAS with devolution[8]

Use of the term “central government” by Wikipedia under a Unitary Constitution is inappropriate. If Sri Lanka is a Federal State, there could be a separate ‘State’ or parallel ‘Provincial Public Service’ (PPS). The Sri Lankan “PPS” is not synonymous with Indians. ‘All Island Services’ in Sri Lanka finally come under ‘central’ fiat and terms of engagement in PCs were decided by the government.[9]

Law empowers the Governor vast determining powers on the PPS extending to preparation of schemes of recruitment and other establishment actions (e.g. promotions, transfers, dismissal). Nevertheless, in formulating such schemes it is compulsory to follow the schemes of recruitment prescribed for corresponding offices in the public service.[10] This caveat forces the PCs / Governors to act according to Service Minutes of All Island Services, including the SLAS.

SLAS officers appointed as Secretaries of Provincial Ministries cease to be SLAS officers while holding such post[11] and hence transfer orders by Secretary Public Administration (mooted by political needs) was challenged in Courts by a SLAS officer leading to the withdrawal of the transfer,[12] which is a landmark judgment favoring SLAS and other service officers, who are appointed as Provincial Ministry Secretaries.    

However, the current dialogue on PC administration is not mainly on Governor’s ‘establishment functions’, especially in the North and East, but of ‘operational functions.’ The Governors engage SLAS officers to execute their decisions. The issue is acute now with a resolution passed by the Northern PC to replace the Governor with a civilian. In the East even pro-government Provincial Councilors criticize the Governor. No wonder executive authorities led by SLAS cadres face administrative difficulties.

In this background, the writer predicts that in the Northern PC bungling implementation or untoward manipulation of Board of Ministers’ decisions will invariably happen, due to the political conflict between the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery.’ If SLAS officers, PCs, Chief Ministers, Governors, and Governments do not respect the Rule of Law and act within legal boundaries, they will weaken good governance and invite and reinforce politicization.

Tamil speaking SLAS officers

For long there had been a dearth of Tamil speaking SLAS officials. As District Secretaries over-aged SLAS officials (one reaching 68 years while being a GA!) were posted. Comparatively junior officers in senior positions in the North and Eastern PCs and District Administration are proof of this problem. This definitely lowers the quality of administration causing fissures, which in turn attracts politicization pressures.

Correction of this situation was attempted by appointing SLAS officers on a ‘compulsory fixed term basis’ to serve the North and East. Even recently a batch of SLAS officers for these regions was recruited. With passage of time the first batch was automatically dissolved and the recent recruits have been already shifted to southern areas on a Cabinet decision. Perhaps stricter supervision of DSs by qualified experienced District Secretaries may assist improvement.

Constitutional changes and politicization

In general, public administration was affected by institutional adjustments over time, backed by constitutional changes. Though discussed here in the context of SLAS, it is common to the whole public service.

(a)  Constitutions of 1946 and 1972

One conspicuous event influencing SLAS and public service in general was the passage of the Sri Lanka Constitution in 1972. Before it the CAS / SLAS enjoyed constitutional cover[13], where an independent Public Service Commission (PSC) was responsible for the appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers. Sri Lanka’s Constitution of 1972[14] ‘usurped’ these powers and made the Cabinet of Ministers all powerful. This Constitution further strengthened the Cabinet of Ministers regards to public officers.[15] This strengthened politicization.  

(b)  Constitution of 1978

Article 106 in the 1972 Constitution was repeated in the Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka- 1978. Heads of Departments were appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers who was permitted to delegate its powers of appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers to the PSC. This was wrenching the independence of the public service- especially the lead service SLAS.

This affected mostly the senior SLAS appointees as Heads of Departments. This created demands by other services for Secretary’s postings too. Now heavy canvassing has lowered the intended destination also to District Secretary appointments. Subtle machinations are reportedly planned to create a “mezzanine” appointment below District Secretary, but above Additional District Secretary. The definite ulterior motive is to step in to the District Secretary’s shoes at the earliest occurring vacancy.

Several times the designated list of SLAS posts has been overlooked (e.g. Director General of Customs, Post Master General). Apparently this threat is continuing and certain to erode SLAS’s strength. Whether the SLAS seniors in top echelons would assist in ceasing these undercurrents is a concern. In a way if the seniors also depend on political patronage this is unachievable. Moreover, if the SLAS officers are non-achievers and others surpass them ‘brilliantly’ in the eyes of politicians, the seniors also will be in dire straits to shield the SLAS. Hence, conversion non-achievers to achievers becomes pertinent.

Politicians work on time-framed achievements as they are not ‘permanent’ like public officers, even though pensionable. Earned recognition by the electorate would depend mostly on the efficiency and effectiveness of public officers– especially SLAS at the grassroots.  However, there are alleged manipulative moves to replace SLAS officers with private sector or politically affiliated ‘party-men’ or other technical personnel, much to the detriment of SLAS.

(c )  13^th Amendment to the Constitution

Another constitutional provision relevant to the SLAS is the 13^th Amendment to the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka- 1987[16]

This has to be looked at from the legal angle which provided for power sharing between the centre and the periphery and service delivery angle at grassroots. Theoretically devolution should solidify the execution of the ‘Principle of Subsidiarity.’ Subsidiarity in management is “an organizing principle of decentralization, stating that a matter ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least centralized authority capable of addressing that matter effectively.”[17]  This principle is not best adhered in Sri Lanka. No government since 1987 was for committed implementation of the 13^th Amendment and SLAS and other officials had been debilitated to satisfactorily devolve. Nonetheless, since SLAS officers are charged with varied functions of the centre and periphery, conceptually the 13^th Amendment provisions are relevant to the SLAS.

However, in 1988 there was not much of a demand for voluntary relocation to PCs by SLAS officers, excepting in the North and East merged PC. This led to many comparatively junior SLAS officers holding sway in southern PCs, which had been corrected greatly with passage of time and by the 10-year automatic promotion rule whereby instant seniority was acquired. Whether capacity also accompanied promotions may be the issue.

(d)   Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act

President R Premadasa was responsible for legally splitting the district administration responsibilities between the then GAs and DSs.[18] If his intention was to sustain the Principle of Subsidiarity it would have been a positive move.

This law in its interpretation provided for pruning the GAs’ powers by substituting the reference to GA by “the DS of the DS’s Division”. This provision soured relationships between the GAs and DSs.

Neelan Thiruchelvam[19] considered this law providing “further inroads in to the scheme of devolution” and considered DSs as a “new tier in public administration,” “representing an extension of presidential power, perform administrative functions within the geographical limits of a province, where no provincial authority could exercise and direct control or supervision over them.” This revelation gave an impression that SLAS officers could be a law unto themselves.

However, this on the other hand was an important challenge faced by SLAS officers due to facing dual accountability relationships, which requires balanced approaches. It could practically become a conflict between ‘decentralization’ and ‘devolution’. This was in a background scenario where political competition to prosper in the political ladder created conflicts even among same political party members.

After this Act the GAs were perturbed, especially in southern areas, because they found that with ten years in SLAS, officers were to hold positions of Heads of Departments, and the GA was becoming redundant with denuded power / status, being uncared for even by DSs. GAs complained to the Ministry of Home Affairs of this status. In the interest of management principles they highlighted the need for greater supervision by GAs.

Concurrently an ad hoc Association of DSs pressurized the then President requesting for more independence from the GAs. They accompanied by a senior government MP from Kalutara District, represented matters to the President.[20] As much as the public canvassed the support of politicians for their personal benefits, DSs also did! They insinuated political gains for the President at the then forthcoming elections, if their demands were met. A demised CCS officer or DRO would have turned in their graves, had they heard this prospect emanating from a group who did not possess political rights!  They will roll the other way round too if some currently reported incidents (even rare) of politicking / misdemeanor by SLAS officers are heard.

If one studies the devolved and reserved subjects under the 13^th Amendment it is obvious that most important lifeline activities fall under the administration of the SLAS cadres. In fact, the Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act Section 3 (2) said:

“A Divisional Secretary shall, with the concurrence of his appointing authority, exercise, perform and discharge within his Division, any power, duty or function conferred or imposed on, or assigned to him by a Statute of a Provincial Council or any power, duty or function delegated to him by the Governor of a Province.”

The DSs accountable to the Ministry of Home Affairs were converted accountable also to the Governor, who was the President’s executive representative in PCs. Simultaneous split accountability and responsibility to two ‘Heads’ was managerially difficult. Even under this condition, DSs and local heads (mostly SLAS) have administered many politically, economically and socially sensitive subjects, e.g. Land, Social Services, Cooperatives, Local Government. These SLAS officers (even comparative juniors) exhibited their capacity for flexibility, commitment for service delivery and learning talents to deal with multifarious politicians. .

Another advantage for SLAS officers was the early opportunities that arose for less experienced and junior officers to undertake positions of Secretary and Heads of Department in the Provinces. It is believed that the SLAS officers gained from these opportunities making them fit to undertake vulnerable positions comparatively earlier in their careers.

(e)   17th and 18^th Amendments to the Constitution

If one needs to discuss politicization and public administration this sub-heading by itself deserves to be an article.

Basically the 17^th Amendment was an overall integrated arrangement for good governance. The innovations in it were to address what was lost by politicization. However, it was repealed and the 18^th Amendment came in to being. It weakened public administration and governance mechanisms as a whole, but not expected to be repealed soon.

Administrative arrangements affecting the SLAS

It may be necessary to understand the administrative arrangements that affected the SLAS. Let us discuss some of them.

(a)        District Political Authority (DPA) system – With the Nixon Oil Shock that pervaded developing country economies Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike initiated two development administration arrangements. They were the DPA system and the DCB (later ‘District Budget’). Sri Lankan political leaders were capable in making such arrangements work, as seen from the Green Revolution related production drive during Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake’s era, which was extensively carried over by the old guard of remaining CCS and mostly younger SLAS officers- especially in the districts.  

The DPA was to quicken the pace of agricultural production, as there were foreign reserve shortages to continuously import food. All SLAS officers had to provide production inputs for the agriculture drive. Of course, the planning and direction were affected due to this being the first localized formal political intervention with District Administration. However, the politicians were different from now and had an ear to SLAS officers.

(b)  District Ministers (DMs) – The 1978 Constitution provided for appointment of non-Cabinet Ministers from among MPs[21] and the DMs fitted well to this category. President JR Jayewardene appointed DMs to all districts. They were to formulate, monitor and evaluate district development plans; identify bottlenecks and initiate corrective action; supervise inter-departmental activities. Though the functions of a GA were similar to these, the status of the GAs and Assistant GAs (AGAs) did not compromise much with both DPAs and DMs, other than cosmetically. Hence, establishment–wise DM system was not a hassle, especially due to the understanding between the DMs and GAs.

(c)   After 1977 with economic liberalization investments increased, new policies and institutions undoing the previous anti-market orientation developed, and the economy became more outward looking. Involvement of changed macro-economic strategy initiated in consultation with multilateral financing organization required higher level of SLAS officers to be ready to work according to national requirements. Satisfactory examples of how SLAS officers performed, to suit positively politicized programs were observed in the manner in which restructuring of the government budget, public enterprise reforms, monetary policy and financial sector reforms, poverty alleviation and human resource development were undertaken, and, specifically multi-faceted Mahaweli Project, Village Reawakening (Gam Udawa) Programme, 300- Garment Factory programme were implemented efficiently / effectively.  SLAS officers’ performance in these projects would give a totally positive interpretation of them.

  (d) District Coordinating Committee and District Agriculture Coordinating Committee were two important coordinating mechanisms in which the GAs had authority, as Chairman and many SLAS officers had to contribute to their success.  The MPs and DMs were participants. They contributed, cleared bottlenecks and usurpation of bureaucratic powers was not heard. There was explicit mutual respect between the Ministers and officers.

Later these institutions were overwhelmingly politicized with the senior MP or a Cabinet Minister taking charge, which was extended to the Chief Minister and the Co-chair system being introduced. This showed the deterioration of power and recognition of SLAS Heads of Departments and the vacuum filling by politicians. The empowerment of politicians in this manner was emanating from Cabinet decisions and the SLAS officers did not have any space for protest.

(e) With District Development Councils at the district level, Divisional Development Councils were established, comprising of the MP (Chair), divisional level government officials and representatives Local Authorities, Cooperative Societies, and Cultivation Committees. They were to plan, implement and monitor implementation of divisional development activities. This gave valuable training to SLAS officers to work with lower level local politicians, especially because most participants in these were handpicked by pro-government MPs. Such experience would have helped SLAS officers to manage dissolved Local Authorities, Multi Purpose Cooperative Societies, when called upon.

(f)         Similar were the establishment of the Agricultural Productivity Committees comprising farmer representatives; Cultivation Committees established to promote agricultural development and safeguard tenant farmer rights; and, People’s Committees to sensitize and apply a check on government bureaucracy and to create responsiveness to the people. Of course, Peoples Committees were hated by public officers, but offered political behavioral experience to build capacities.

(g)       Late seventies saw the emergence of the Integrated Rural Development Programmes (IRDPs) which were executed through district administration. The elements of IRDPs were; (a) rural development through social change; (b) human development, people’s participation and institution building; (c) poverty alleviation; (d) resources and economic development; (e) mitigating disparities between groups, genders and potential entrepreneurs. Though politicians were keen on these projects, the executives- whether SLAS or otherwise- had enough freedom to act objectively, probably due to President JR Jayewardene being the Minister in charge and Dr. Wickrema Weerasooria, a non-SLAS, politically motivated Secretary brought in positive bureaucratization of politics in to the management system.

(h)      Conflict in the North and East trained the SLAS and other executive officers to face an abnormal political status- i.e. working with terrorists. The disaster management situations they faced were extremely dangerous and challenging. To balance between terror and formal administration, disaster and mitigation, serving two masters and sometimes three when the Military intervened were not the safest and easiest.

The involved SLAS officers had to sometimes accommodate wrong demands from terrorists, in fear of life. The difficulty could be measured from the number of SLAS officers who paid with supreme sacrifice, incomparable by any other civilian services personnel. These officers proved by practice that ‘disaster’ in Chinese characters has two meaning: one ‘danger’ and the other ‘opportunity’(=corruption)!

Conclusion

Politicization as a global phenomenon has encroached the public service in Sri Lanka. It is due to historical, constitutional, legal, economic, institutional and attitudinal factors that had been reinforced by politicians with a resilient public service and tolerant civil society.

One may argue favoring stances supporting politicization projecting it as an extension of democracy. If democracy applies to serve the ‘whole’ within the Rule of Law, formal structures, impersonally, without discrimination one may support this argument. But, what the country experiences is different.

It is to the credit of the SLAS and generally for the public service that one can quote wonderful achievements by SLAS and public officers in management, irrespective of intruded politicization. Perhaps in almost all these projects / programmes politicization intrusions were extremely positive. The need may be to spread these achievement mooting intrusions to the totality of administration by clear demarcation by understanding of positive and negative politicization processes and nullifying the latter.

Under these circumstances de-politicization should be an integrated exercise with pure understanding of the complexity of the exercise. This is another political exercise, and the contradiction is that negative politicization factors as mentioned are created by politicians and they are also expected to make changes. The brave but rare agreement to depoliticize by the 17^th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka (even with weaknesses), approved with the agreement of 223 MPs was repealed with two third majority in the Parliament a few years later, without any acceptable societal / political demand. It exhibited how fragile any attempt to depoliticize would be and how even politicians fall a pray to whimsical politics.  

Concurrently, it must be accepted that competencies, skills, preparedness to handle politicization should be developed in SLAS and other officials, which will be the responsibility of relevant line ministries, other human resources development agencies and Associations. Mere complaint of politicization will not solve the problem, though what has happened is the latter.

As a beginning it may be appropriate if solutions can be found to circumvent the politicization difficulties caused by existing laws, systems, institutions and political and bureaucratic attitudes.

Fatalistic silence and negative attitudes have to be blown off by the losers of politicization. They are not the public officers; but, the unorganized, disorganized and most difficult to organize sections of the public who will be discriminated or exploited through politicization. Therefore, finding means and mechanisms to fight negative politicization will become another unbearably humongous exercise. Nonetheless, it should be attempted.