11 December, 2019

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Why A Political Settlement With The LTTE To Peacefully End The War Was Not Possible

By Pitasanna Shanmugathas

Pitasanna Shanmugathas

On May 18th 2009, the 25 year civil war in Sri Lanka ended in massive bloodshed—the UN estimated that 40,000 civilians were killed in the final stages of the war alone. According to the UN Panel of Experts report, during the final stages of the war, the Sri Lankan army relentlessly shelled hospitals, the United Nations hub, food distribution lines, as well as ships “near the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)  that were coming to pick up the wounded and their relatives from the beaches.” In addition, the Sri Lankan army raped and executed surrendering LTTE cadres and carried out enforced disappearances.  With respect to the LTTE’s atrocities during the final stages of the war, according to the UN report, the LTTE used Tamil civilians as human shields, as well as “point-blank shooting” of Tamil civilians attempting to flee the conflict zone, and the LTTE carried out tactics to deliberately blur the distinction between its own combatants and Tamil civilians, thereby exposing Tamil civilians to additional harm.

While reports were emerging about the dangerous escalation of the civil war during its final stages, presumably, to Sri Lankans living domestically and abroad, the thought must have occurred as to what went wrong for the civil war  to escalate to such a high degree of violence. Why wasn’t a political settlement to peacefully end the war possible? Was a violent solution the only way to end the war?

Ultra-Tamil nationalists assert that the reason why a politically negotiated settlement to peacefully end the war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government did not occur is solely the fault of successive Sri Lankan governments. Whereas, Sinhalese nationalists assert that the reason why a peaceful solution to end the war did not occur is solely the fault of Prabhakaran. If we are to be true to history, neither ultra-Tamil nationalists nor the Sinhalese are correct.  The truth is the reason why a peaceful settlement to the war was not possible is a result of both Prabhakaran’s unwillingness to genuinely consider a political solution to the end the war as well as party rivalry between the UNP and the SLFP.

There were two golden opportunities—in 1995 and in 2003—which if the UNP, SLFP, as well as the LTTE had taken advantage of, it could have resulted in a peaceful resolution to the civil war and could have saved thousands of lives from being killed.

In 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga won the Presidential elections with more than 62 percent of the vote while campaigning explicitly on a platform of reaching a political settlement to the ethnic conflict.  Upon assuming power, Kumaratunga initiated peace talks with the LTTE. On January 1995, a ceasefire between the LTTE and the Kumaratunga government was reached.  While the ceasefire was in place, the Kumaratunga government was working on a set of constitutional reform proposals which would be, up to that point, the most progressive and far-reaching constitutional reform proposals in Sri Lanka’s history.  In a February 5th 1995 interview, the LTTE chief political ideologue Anton Balasingham commented on the government’s upcoming proposals, “We are told that the government is working on a substantial set of proposals. Once the proposals are given to us we will study it and respond accordingly—we will have to find out whether it satisfies the aspirations of our people.”

On April 18th 1995, Prabhakaran abruptly broke the ceasefire with the Sri Lankan government “when the LTTE sank two navy gunboats (a fourth of the Sri Lankan navy’s entire gunboat fleet), wiped out a military camp killing at least 30 soldiers, and destroyed a police post killing another six.”

Prabhakaran publicly explained his reasoning for breaking the ceasefire: “In the peace negotiations we argued that talks should proceed stage by stage and that the urgent and immediate problems of our people should be resolved at the early stages of the dialogue. The Government agreed to this. The Tamil people have been subjected to enormous suffering as a consequence of the economic embargo, fishing bans and the blockade on traffic imposed by the previous Government. In the peace talks, we requested nothing other than the removal of these bans to alleviate the suffering of our people.” Prabhakaran then asserted that throughout the peace talks, the Government conflated serious problems faced by the Tamil people as “specific demands of the LTTE;” furthermore, Prabhakaran asserted that the Government viewed the LTTE’s demands, such as lifting the economic embargo, as “linked to national security and any effort to resolve them would result in military repercussions.”

The political negotiations revolving around the January to April 1995 ceasefire certainly were flawed, with academics such as Jayadeva Uyangoda asserting that both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government lacked a concrete agenda during the negotiations.  Nevertheless, in order to maintain the ceasefire with the LTTE, Kumaratunga asserted that she did give into many (but not all) of the LTTE’s demands.  Kumaratunga asserted that she even went against the advice of the army in doing so.  Prabhakaran cited the Kumaratunga government’s reluctance in fully implementing in practice its pledges to remove the bans as his reason for breaking the ceasefire. However, as asserted by Sri Lankan academic Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, if Prabhakaran was serious in his commitment to peace, he would not have broken off the ceasefire with that excuse; what Prabhakaran would have done instead was to maintain the ceasefire and try to find points of agreement with the government at the negotiating table and seek ways in which both the government and the LTTE could mutually reinforce each other during their journey to a peaceful settlement.

Kumaratunga, from the beginning of the peace talks, was continually exchanging letters with Prabhakaran, trying to get Prabhakaran to commit himself to a political solution—supposedly to get the LTTE involved in discussions on constitutional reform; however, Prabhakaran simply refused to join hands with the government on this matter. What Prabhakaran refused to realize was if the LTTE made good progress in negotiating with the government on a political settlement (i.e. constitutional reform) this in turn would then give the government greater trust and credibility with the armed forces and the Sinhala public in general to fulfill more of Prabhakaran’s demands in lifting the remaining embargoes and restrictions on the Northeast.

In an attempt to resuscitate peace talks, on August 3rd 1995, the Kumaratunga government released an outline of its constitutional reform proposals, widely known as the Union of Regions proposals. Upon its release, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu asserted that the proposals were “federalism in all but name.” At that point in time, the proposals were the most far reaching and progressive in Sri Lanka’s history.  The August 3rd proposals sought to divide the island into eight autonomous regions, and Sri Lanka instead of being known as a unitary state, would be recognized as a union of regions. As highlighted in an article by author Partha Sarathy Ghosh, the August 3rd proposals advocated that regions be “fully autonomous both in terms of executive and legislative powers. Article 76 of the Constitution which gives absolute power of legislation in the country to the Parliament is to be abrogated as the same power is now to be shared by the Regional Councils as well.”

The August 3rd proposals went beyond and even sought to resolve many of the problems faced within the Indo-Lanka Accord. A fundamental problem with the Indo-Lanka Accord is that whatever powers the central government gave to the regions with one hand, could, in effect, be taken away with the other hand.   In addition to abrogating Article 76 of the Constitution, the August 3rd proposals abolished the concurrent list as contained in the Thirteenth Amendment born out of the Indo-Lanka Accord. By removing the concurrent list, the August 3rd proposals made powers between the center and the region more defined and distinct, and the proposals implemented checks that made it more difficult for the central government to unilaterally usurp powers given to the regions. The proposals, with the removal of the concurrent list, advocated that “the respective powers of the Center and the regions are contained in the Reserved List and the Regional List, respectively. To ensure that the center does not meddle in the affairs of the region, [the proposals] clearly provided that the Chief Ministers cannot be removed from office so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Regional Councils. The Governors are not supposed to be the watch dogs of the Central interests as is the case in India and their appointment by the President will be strictly with the concurrence of the Chief Ministers. To resolve disputes between the Center and the Regions or between and among the regions, there will be a permanent commission on devolution appointed by the Constitutional Council. The Commission would have powers of mediation as well as adjudication.”  Another flaw of the Indo-Lanka Accord which the August 3rd proposals addressed was the fact that the Indo-Lanka Accord gave, as asserted by constitutional scholar Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam, “extreme dependence of the province on the center with regard to financing.” The August 3rd proposals gave regional councils the power to borrow as well as set up their own financial institutions; in addition, the proposals advocated that there will be “a National Finance Commission entrusted with the job of allocating grants to the regions keeping in view balanced regional development.”

In sum, the August 3rd proposals advocated for devolution of powers in an unprecedented manner giving an unprecedented level of autonomy to regions of Sri Lanka including the Northeast.  As articulated by Dr.Neelan Tiruchelvam, the August 3rd proposals were the “boldest attempt to redress the imbalance in the relationship between the different ethnic groups.”

Back in February of 1995, as mentioned in a previous paragraph of this article, Balasingham said the LTTE would respond to the government’s proposals. What was the response of the LTTE to the proposals? Dead silence.  There is good reason to suspect that Prabhakaran feared those proposals. Prabhakaran perhaps thought that if the Chandrika government succeeded in winning support for the proposals with the political forces in the South, this would have boxed Prabhakaran into a corner and forced Prabhakaran to negotiate with the government’s constitutional reform proposals. However, Prabhakaran’s fears soon disappeared as the UNP under Ranil Wickremeisnghe refused to negotiate with Chandrika’s proposals. The Chandrika government needed support from the opposition for the required two-thirds majority to implement constitutional reform. Subsequently, Prabhakaran was able to play off the rivalry between Chandrika’s People’s Alliance government and the UNP to his advantage, increasingly preaching to his Tamil nationalist base that the ongoing rivalry between the UNP-SLFP is even greater evidence that the Sinhalese can’t be trusted. Prabhakaran also made sure to kill dissenting political voices such as Tamil politician Neelan Tiruchelvam, a key contributor to the formulation of the August 3rd proposals. Chandrika asserted that had Ranil accepted the proposals, it would have most definitely forced Prabhakaran to negotiate with the proposals. Ranil’s official position for refusing to negotiate with the proposals is that the content of the proposals—especially its reference to Sri Lanka as a union of regions instead of a unitary state—was simply unacceptable to the people in the South. However, this is simply not true. Chandrika came into office with 62 percent of the vote, on an explicit platform of reaching a constitutional-political solution to the ethnic conflict, and by 1995 the Sinhalese in the South were simply tired of prolonged conflict and would have gladly accepted such a proposal if presented to them in the proper manner.  Most likely, the reason why Ranil Wickremesinghe refused to negotiate with the proposals was because he did not want Chandrika to be given credit for ushering into Sri Lanka a new constitution—even if it meant that such a constitution would have compelled Prabhakran to seriously negotiate a political settlement with the Chandrika government thereby providing the needed basis to end the ethnic conflict.

Chandrika’s government, in an attempt to compel the UNP to accept the proposals, repeatedly diluted the proposals from the original in 1995.  On August 3rd 2000, the official constitutional proposals were introduced into Parliament and were so diluted from the original that not only did the UNP not accept the proposals, but even the Tamil political party, the TULF, refused to accept them.  When the proposals were presented in Parliament, the UNP actually lit the proposals on fire in the chambers of Parliament.

On March 11th 2003, at the opening of an LTTE bank in Kilinochchi, Anton Balasingham made a startling revelation regarding the Kumaratunga government’s proposals. The speech was reported in full in the Jaffna based “Uthayan” of March 13 2003.  Translated from Tamil—Anton Balasingham said, “Neelan Tiruchelvam presented in 1995 a draft amending the constitution. That was a correct draft. That was acceptable. But later in 2000 Chandrika submitted an amended version based on that draft. This one was only a half-baked version of the earlier draft by Neelan Tiruchelvam.”  This statement by Anton Balasingham begs the question, if the original 1995 proposals were a satisfactory basis for negotiation to the LTTE, why didn’t the LTTE express an interest with the government to negotiate with them in 1995?

GL Peiris, the Constitutional Affairs minister and a key architect of the constitutional reform proposals, responded to Anton Balasingham’s assertion, “Anton Balasingham never expressed any of these intentions in 1995. So, these are mere excuses. Throughout the sequence of events, the LTTE resorted to the practice of blaming everybody other than themselves. If something went wrong, it was somebody else’s fault. They forgot their own atrocities, their own intransigence, [and] their absolute refusal to be accommodative or flexible in any manner whatsoever. So, they felt, they absolutely refused to turn the searchlight inwards and to identify their own infirmities and weaknesses, all they saw were the purported weaknesses of other people. So, I’m not really impressed with that statement.”

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu also responded to Anton Balasingham’s assertion, “That’s very much a political statement because 2003 happened [the Norway talks] and the 2000 proposals happened because the LTTE was not playing ball. [The LTTE] could turn around and say ah, what was presented in 1995 was much better. Why didn’t they accept it in 1995? If they accepted it in 1995, there would have been no reason to do anything else. So that is purely a political ploy on the part of Balasingham, although I think someone like Balasingham would have been more amenable to a federal solution with the Oslo declaration in the talks that happened later on than Prabhakaran.” .

During the Norway-brokered peace process, with respect to the LTTE’s political aspirations, the LTTE viewed Ranil Wickremesinghe far more favorably than Chandrika Kumaratunga.  For instance, during the peace talks, Ranil proposed concepts such as asymmetrical devolution or asymmetrical federalism, which the LTTE responded to favorably. On asymmetrical federalism, the chief facilitator of the peace talks, Erik Solheim, asserted “at this point such a solution would have been acceptable to nearly all Tamils and a vast majority of Sinhalese as well. Then there could have been a referendum: police, land, other such powers would be given over. And Prabhakaran could have been the prime minister of that area. Ranil took the view that Tamils are generally more successful, that the Sinhalese should learn from the Tamils and that way Sri Lanka would develop better. Economic prosperity was his agenda.”  However, while Ranil was in control of the peace process, Chandrika felt increasingly excluded and did not feel she had the ability to give input. It was also suspected that Chandrika felt Ranil was being too lenient with the LTTE.  Party rivalry was once again rising to the surface, and the rivalry ended up significantly damaging the hope for a peaceful solution to be reached during the Norway-brokered peace process.

In October 2003, during the Norway brokered peace process, the LTTE for the first time released a document that gave a glimpse into its political governing aspirations. The document was known as the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) Proposal. The ISGA, as discussed in detail in Mark Salter’s book—To End A Civil War—consisted of “an absolute majority of LTTE appointees alongside government and Muslims representatives would preside over an autonomous set of institutions—judicial, legal, fiscal and law and order-related with powers of governance including all powers and functions in relation to regional administration exercised by the government in and for the North-East.”  However, around the time the proposals were released, Chandrika usurped control of the peace talks from Ranil and dismissed the proposals as being too maximalist. This was the wrong move on the part of Chandrika Kumaratunga. Although the proposals were maximalist, given how the proposals went outside of a federal framework, as Jehan Perera argued, the LTTE in its ISGA proposals listed demands seeking complete autonomy “in virtually every aspect of political and economic life.”  Nevertheless, to their credit, the LTTE explicitly said the ISGA proposals were “negotiable.” In the art of negotiation, initial proposals have a tendency to be maximalist in nature, and it is the responsibility of the two opposing sides to then take that proposal, negotiate, and cut down the proposal to a mutually agreeable document.  Chandrika, owing to her rivalry with the UNP, and the need to take control of the peace process, dismissed an opportunity of meaningful negotiation with the LTTE.

In addition to the party rivalry between the SLFP-UNP, another previously unstated factor that may have led to the collapse of the Norway-brokered peace process, as well as the bloody and brutal end to the war, was the sidelining of Anton Balasingham at the hands of the LTTE leadership.  Within the LTTE, Anton Balasingham was the political ideologue, a man who advocated pragmatic solutions. Prabhakaran was the military mastermind. When this writer interviewed Erik Solheim, he described their relationship “as that of a husband and wife,” always needing each other but at the same time always fighting with one another. “Together, when [Balasingham and Prabhakaran] combined their forces, they were a strong team. Separately, neither of them could lead the struggle.” Balasingham, for the latter part of his life, would spend all his energy attempting to convince Prabhakaran that the ethnic conflict can only be solved under a united Sri Lanka. A separate state was not viable.

LTTE leaders like Nadesan and Tamilselvan were all junior both in age and experience to Prabhakaran and did not express any form of independent political thinking that deviated from the LTTE-status quo as it pertains to how to solve the ethnic conflict. Balasingham was one of the very few Tamil people, if not the only Tamil person, who had the unique power to criticize Prabhakaran directly to his face, and have dissenting views from Prabhakaran, without facing deadly consequences. Prabhakaran regarded Balasingham as an elder brother. Even though they had bitter disagreements, they both loved each other. When Balasingham required critical medical attention in 1999, it was Prabhakaran who organized Balasingham’s journey to Thailand to seek treatment.  It is largely owing to Balasingham’s efforts that Prabhakaran even agreed to peace talks. Balasingham, before having joined the LTTE, lived abroad for several years, sharpened his education with a master’s degree studying philosophy and politics at a university in London, and was a formally disciplined pragmatic thinker.

Balasingham voiced disappointment at the fact that he was largely excluded throughout the ISGA drafting process. According to Solheim, Balasingham regarded the proposals as being too maximalist. Balasingham believed it would weaken Wickremesinghe’s position in the South. Balasingham, in a conversation with journalist DBS Jeyaraj, attributed his exclusion from the peace process to the fact that other senior LTTE leaders like Thamilselvan, Castro, Pottu Ammaan and Ruthirakumaran prejudiced Prabhakaran’s mind against him after the Oslo talks between Wickremesinghe and the LTTE. On numerous instances, Balasingham stated that the LTTE does not operate on the concept of a separate state but that of a homeland and self-determination. And a homeland, Balasingham argued, does not mean a separate state but a territory where Tamil-speaking people live. Balasingham always knew that it would be impossible for Tamils to gain a separate state; however, he was never able to make Prabhakaran fully understand this reality.

At the very end of Balasingham’s life, Prabhakaran and Balasingham were not on good terms and allegedly did not speak to one another. Balasingham, in the last weeks of his life, met with Erik Solheim and told Solheim that the LTTE will lose the North and East. According to Solheim, Balasingham was disillusioned with Prabhakaran and may have viewed Prabhakaran as part of the problem. Balasingham predicted a bloody end for Tamils, in part due to Prabhakaran’s actions, and that is exactly what happened. The politically pragmatic Balasingham prophetically predicted, in a conversation with DBS Jeyaraj, that “China, Japan, Pakistan and India were going to back the Rajapaksa regime and ensure that the LTTE was militarily defeated and destroyed.”

Prabhakaran, in Balasingham’s own words, was “a war lord who has no real interest in political concepts.” Prabhakaran was a man who had virtually zero understanding of the political consequences to his actions. It would be Prabhakaran’s lack of political understanding that would seal the LTTE’s fate. This was obvious in many instances. The most obvious case was Prabhakaran’s decision to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. The least talked about case within the Tamil diaspora is how Prabhakaran, by boycotting the 2005 Presidential elections, was responsible for getting Mahinda Rajapaksa elected. Prabhakaran wanted to reenergize support for the separatist movement. Prabhakaran thought that by electing a Sinhala-Buddhist hardliner like Rajapaksa, he would get more sympathy for his separatist cause from the international community. This was, like most of Prabhakaran’s political decisions, a stupid one.  The other senior leaders, according to Balasingham, foolishly influenced Prabhakaran into thinking that the world would back the LTTE if Rajapaksa was in power. The sidelining and death of Balasingham left the LTTE without its main strategic political ideologue and left Prabhakaran to solely listen to the political advice of ultranationalist Tamils who did not have the political strategic thinking that Balasingham possessed.

Given the two aforementioned obstacles, on both the government and LTTE side, preventing a political settlement to the ethnic conflict, one can certainly argue that perhaps a violent solution to eliminate the LTTE was the only option for peace in Sri Lanka. Former Indian National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy takes this argument a step further by stating: “Indeed, one must logically ask the question, would an earlier adoption of the more brutal methods of the last thirty months of the war have brought it to an earlier end and actually saved lives and minimized the war’s deleterious effects? This is a recurrent problem in statecraft…the strategist Edward Luttwak argues that there are situations in which one should give war a chance. Was Sri Lanka one of them, where peace building efforts and international mediation only prolonged and worsened the agony? ”

 

It is uncertain had previous governments adopted the brutal methods used by the Rajapaksas whether the LTTE could have been defeated.  The Rajapaksas continuously proclaim that their government eradicated terrorism from Sri Lanka.  However, it is somewhat misleading to give Rajapaksas sole credit for eliminating the LTTE.  Prior to the Rajapaksas coming to power, two key factors occurred which paved the way for the Rajapaksas to annihilate the LTTE: first, the Karuna faction’s breakaway from the LTTE, which drastically militarily weakened the LTTE, and second, under the Kumaratunga government, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar played a key role in getting foreign governments across the globe to designate the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Following Menon’s suggestion, for instance, had the Kumaratunga government in 1995 escalated its military offensive against the LTTE to a Rajapaksa-style offensive, the government would have been unsuccessful in completely militarily defeating the LTTE because the LTTE simply was too militarily powerful at the time. Those two factors, especially Karuna’s breakaway from the LTTE, needed to have occurred in order to internally weaken the LTTE to the point that they could be defeated. It is unclear whether those two factors could have occurred any sooner than when they did. Especially, with respect to the second factor of internationally designating the LTTE as a terrorist organization, given that absent 9/11, it is unclear whether the Sri Lankan government would have obtained the needed political ammunition to successfully champion for the designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization on the global stage.

On the 10th anniversary since the end of the war, many Tamils in the diaspora are asserting that the Sri Lankan government carried out genocide against the Tamil people. Tamils in diaspora who claim that a genocide occurred against Tamil civilians, only speak about the atrocities carried out by the Sri Lankan government while omitting the atrocities on the part of the LTTE, which played an equal role in contributing to the violent end of the civil war—this writer believes that in order to truly understand why a political settlement did not occur, it is required that the wrongdoings of both the Sri Lankan government as well as the LTTE are analyzed.

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Latest comments

  • 2
    2

    correct me if i am wrong. was there a time when prabha was requested by LTTE politburo to cease all hostilities and go for a negotiated settlement, owing to the lack of men and material? but prabha didnt wasnt to do it as he feared reprisals from within LTTE ranks

    • 3
      0

      You have got it wrong. The Politburo was just a show; VP was the #1 in LTTE, and his words carried all the weight. But he had been telling his cadre that if ever deviated from the goal of Tamil Eelam, the cadre should shoot him dead. Moreover, for those who paid attention, during his live meeting with the world media in Kilinochchi during the Oslo peace process, he was asked about that command to his cadre, and he reaffirmed it. Not only did VP want nothing less than Eelam, but he wanted a Tiger Eelam which he could lord over, like a Chola King. Such an unbending mindset might have been a strength when he was a youngster, but when he was seeking to lead a movement of people as an adult, it was a sure path to annihilation.

  • 19
    3

    If the stupid SWRD Bandaranaike hadn’t brought the ‘Sinhala Only’ act of 1956, there wouldn’t have been an organisation called the LTTE. SWRD should be honoured with the title, “Father of Racism”, and for the creation of LTTE

    • 9
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      You forgot what the so-called ‘Father of the Nation’ did in 1948.
      Planned colonization in the East was his idea too.

      • 8
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        It is unfair to label SWRD as “Father of Racism” without knowing the facts. SWRD was a liberal, who was expecting leadership mantle to be passed on to him after DS Senanayake. As this did not happen he resorted to populist measures such as Sinhala only to come to power. In fact SWRD proposed federalism to Donoughmore commission. Therefore he is an opportunist racist, and compared to him both JR Jayawardena and DS Senanayake are inherent racists. DS was the first to bring racism in government when he formed the pan-Sinhala cabinet in 1931 and JR was the first to table a resolution for Sinhala only in 1943. Since both these took place during British rule, when Tamils protested, they compromised in order not to jeopardize the independence project. After independence they all somersaulted carrying out anti-Tamil policy. It was DS who disenfranchised Tamils of Indian origin. Sinhala colonization of Tamil areas is not just an economic project but a calculated political project to alter demographic pattern. Whoever comes to power, they will be either overt or covert anti-Tamil racists.

        • 2
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          May be Gnana is mostly correct but I think that his final conclusion is wrong. The reason: Even if a party in power is willing to agree on political solution the opportunistic pressure from the opposition will make it very difficult to make it in one go. Therefore, I think that both sides must play the game of giving/getting on piecemeal basis. The question is whether the Tamil politics has the patience to move on without dropping the ball of slow but continuous progress!

          • 2
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            Meager concessions were granted to Tamils in both B-C pact of 1957 and D-C pact of 1966. Both were unilaterally abrogated by the party in power due to opposition from Sinhala hardliners. The District council bill with little or no powers was sabotaged by the government itself. The present provincial council system was forced by India, and is being sabotaged by whatever government that came into power since that time. Constitution is blatantly being violated for the last 32 years by refusing to devolve enshrined police and land powers to provincial councils. Further the north-east merger which was effected under Indo-Lanka accord was de-merged by Supreme court which has no jurisdiction over an international agreement. For five and a half years after end of war, Mahinda government refused to go forwards despite promising to India several times. This government which came to power promising international community that they will settle the Tamil demand for autonomy has dragged on for four and a half years without much progress. and with this Muslim terrorism it is likely to be buried for good. The next government will start from scratch and waste time in order to hoodwink the international community. Tamil politics had the patience from 1948 till 1976 before some youths rightly or wrongly took up weapons to secure their rights. Now they have been waiting patiently for the last ten years with not even piecemeal basis. Other than a few Sinhalese, the rest are not in favour of sharing power and territory with Tamils in a fair way. Without blaming anyone why cannot the 13th amendment be implemented fully for the start including the north-east merger and then move on.This game of putting the blame on opposition is deliberate to deny Tamils their right. Unless there is foreign intervention, Tamils will not get any justice from within.

        • 1
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          Dr.Gna!
          Quite a number of Srilankan citizens do not go beyond 1956 to understand the racial discrimination which started some where in 1922. But just before the independence, DS the father of the Sinhla nation commenced his Sinhala only onslaught not only by language but also in physical terms of colonizing and disenfranchisement of the upcountry Tamils. Our Tamil leaders too were partly responsible for the escalation of the Sinhala only policy by not taking appropriate action. Some due to their personal ‘glory’ and others adopting a never mind attitude.
          Well! we can write and write all about discrimination, which will only be a repetition. Now due to the activities of SAM/SUNG things have come to sorry pace and Tamils have to rekindle their status by what ever means available. The Muslims who are in a bad plight will not hesitate to join the Sinhalese to do damage to Tamils. As much as they celebrate Vesak to mitigate their sufferings from the Sinhala/Buddhist community, they may not hesitate to join the Sinhalese to attack the Tamils to keep their ‘Thoppy” and ‘Abhaya’ intact ..

          • 0
            2

            K.Anaga,
            Muslims have decided to take Sinhala language as their mother tongue. Though it is late, a good move that resulted from the terrorist attack. In time to come, there will be group called ‘Sinhala Muslims’. After all, 50% of Muslim DNA is Sinhala because Muslims who were allowed to settle down in interior parts of the country by King Senerath when they faced persecution by Portuguese married ‘Yasawathie’, Premawathie’ and converted them to Islam. That could be the reason why Muslims speak Sinhala much better compared with Demalu.

      • 0
        2

        SJ,
        “Planned colonization in the East was his idea too.”
        What a joke. Where on earth, native people colonized their own land?

    • 5
      3

      Bingo, the Tamil leaders accepted the 1956 Act. Tamil had never been an official language. The reaction of the Tamils to the 1956 Act was mild in comparison to their reaction when SWRD introduced the Social Disabilities Act in April 1957 denying discrimination by caste a crime which Tamils were guilty of against their own.

      Tamils had been denying their own low caste members the right to education, to enter restaurants and temples. Tamil leaders even travelled to Britain to plead against this Act. Ponnambalam Ramanathan pleaded with the Governor not to give voting rights to low caste Tamil and demanded separate carriages for them when the train service from Colombo to Jaffna was launched.

      But don’t let facts get in the way of a good story for Western bleeding hearts. Just blame the Sinhala-Buddhists for everything.

      • 1
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        Taraki
        Can you give references from which PR pleads to the Governor?

        • 1
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          N.Ethirveerasngam

          I am sorry Taraki, Eussence, HLD M………….. and their fellow Sinhala/Buddhists do not have to support their typings with evidence simply because they believe they are the majoritarian and they have all the rights to say whatever they want to say.

          You are wasting your time.
          The moment you ask for evidence they move away.

    • 3
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      BINGO
      What set the conditions for LTTE to start and grow was Srimavo and the leftist constitution enacted outside the Parliament and importantly removed Section 29 of the Soulbury constitution.

      • 0
        0

        Dear Ethir
        “LTTE to start and grow”

        I have ticked aye for your comment,except for a small correction.Sirima started the LTTE,but it did not grow under her.It was the 83 riots that swelled its ranks.

  • 4
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    Truth be told. Pitasanna has provided all the information in hand, trying level best to present unbiased analysis and finding both parties responsible in not making use of the few opportunities provided, in a long and painful struggle. . The fact is when there in no TRUST or COMMITMENT there will never be peace. It is important to further explore why we lack both. Bro, as physicians we see a problem in a clinical way. We look into complaint, more details on the current problem, past history, personal history, family history and after getting such vital information we combine that with our clinical findings (examining the patient) and further order appropriate investigations to come to a diagnosis, which in turn helps in treating. By this we are aware of other possibilities (differential diagnosis) too and keep an eye during treatment, so that we are not blind sighted. If you apply the same it will be clear why LTTE was not trusting and was never convinced about government, s commitment. Past history of signing pacts,talks, giving promises,international mediation; family history of Bandas; personal history of Chandrika and the rest, dosent help with trust/commitment.As long LTTE is concerned they too had their own issues which did not help in grabbing these rare opportunities (in your words) in their 30 years struggle.Experience with India would have not helped with Norway ,s mediation. Retrospectively what our governments had done post war just goes to convince the mistrust LTTE had on any Lankan Government.

    • 1
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      There is no LTTE today;
      What is the government is doing? State colonization, oppression, oppression and oppression;

      Any war criminals brought to accountability? Please comment sensibly as now readers are more knowledgeable than ever before due to Social Media;

    • 0
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      70 Years of state terrorism, war crimes, pogroms and much more;

      No TRUST OR CONFIDENCE in the Sinhala Leaders and majority Sinhala are supporting the criminal leaders; Sinhala leaders lies, misleading, deceiving and unlesh terror is not new and it is historical;

  • 4
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    There was no doubt in my mind that prabhaharan was not working in the interests of the tamils.

    • 2
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      shankar

      “There was no doubt in my mind that prabhaharan was not working in the interests of the tamils.”

      Wasn’t he?
      Please read the lyrics below:

      Lyrics
      Yeah, I’m gonna take my horse to the old town road
      I’m gonna ride ’til I can’t no more
      I’m gonna take my horse to the old town road
      I’m gonna ride ’til I can’t no more (Kio, Kio)
      I got the horses in the back
      Horse tack is attached
      Hat is matte black
      Got the boots that’s black to match
      Ridin’ on a horse, ha
      You can whip your Porsche
      I been in the valley
      You ain’t been up off that porch, now
      Can’t nobody tell me nothin’
      You can’t tell me nothin’
      Can’t nobody tell me nothin’
      You can’t tell me nothin’
      Ridin’ on a tractor
      Lean all in my bladder
      Cheated on my baby
      You can go and ask her
      My life is a movie
      Bull ridin’ and boobies
      Cowboy hat from Gucci
      Wrangler on my booty
      Can’t nobody tell me nothin’
      You can’t tell me nothin’
      Can’t nobody tell me nothin’
      You can’t tell me nothin’
      Yeah, I’m gonna take my horse to the old town road
      I’m gonna ride ’til I can’t no more
      I’m gonna take my horse to the old town road
      I’m gonna ride ’til I can’t no more
      I got the
      Songwriters: Atticus Ross / Billy Ray Cyrus / Jocelyn Donald / Kiowa Roukema / Montero Lamar Hill / Trent Reznor
      Old Town Road lyrics © Universal Music Publishing Group

      • 3
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        Prabaharn did not lose the war to the Sinhalese. He lost the war to USA,UK,INDIA ,CHINA,PAKISTAN and few more foreign interventions. If not by now Sinhalese and Tamils would have solved the problems by themselves , either as a confederation or on a Federal basis’. UK Cheated the Tamils in 1948 at the time of independence and there after between 2005 and 2009. British Diplomacy is dangerous than their war machines. “Pillaiyaium Killi Thottilaium Adduwarkal’ meaning They will ‘pinch the baby and motion the cot to stop the baby from crying’ . The other country’s actions are relatively new.

        • 2
          0

          No UNHRC investigation as collaborators are responsible and accountability due to their complicity to genocide;

          70 Years of state terrorism, war crimes, pogroms and much more;

          No TRUST OR CONFIDENCE in the Sinhala Leaders and majority Sinhala are supporting the criminal leaders; Sinhala leaders lies, misleading, deceiving and unleash terror is not new and it is historical;

      • 1
        1

        Dear NV is a cool song………and I love the dance the younsters do for this song…..very expressive and full of energy…juts like the Bahratha Natiam.

  • 1
    1

    The ‘tragedy’ that was 2019 Lankan Easter Sunday.
    Absolutely corrupt politicians are trying to make political capital off the ‘tragedy’.
    Some trying to hide wrong doings.
    Hundreds are recycling the same prognosis standing in square one.
    Here is Pitasanna Shanmugathas trying to reenter journalism sagaciously suggesting ‘In the civil war that ended on 19 May 2009, both sides had faults’.
    .
    Look at the ‘tragedy’ Pitasanna.
    Lankan Muslims have accepted that radicalised Muslims are to be blamed.
    Please Pitasanna: Investigate the part played by Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) in the ‘tragedy’.
    If you do not conclude that BBS is not a terrorist organisation tell us why.

  • 2
    2

    “Why A Political Settlement With The LTTE To Peacefully End The War Was Not Possible”
    Really? We are not all fools to buy this non-sense and those who say so have blood of Tamil people on their hands. Just ask yourself this – why does a government that came to power with Tamil votes and a complacent Tamil leadership who is ready to give up even the fundamentals cannot even fully amend the 13th amendment?
    Ten years on, it has increasingly become obvious there is no will (and has never been) on the part of the Sinhala government. As far as they are concerned, the “Tamil problem” has ended at Nandikadal. Yet, you continue to parrot this lie.
    The fact is Sri Lankan Sinhala Buddhist state is ready to go to any extent to preserve its unitary status and hegemony and that includes massacring a section of its people. They just needed excuses and the so called “Tamil moderates” whose survival depends on the South played and continue to play a utility role in their campaign.

    • 1
      1

      Thamizh,
      “As far as they are concerned, the “Tamil problem” has ended at Nandikadal.”

      What is the ‘Tamil Problem?

      Some still blame Sinhalayo for not treating minorities equally. Can any of you guys give an answer to this question?
      “What is it that the Sinhalayo are enjoying that the other communities are not enjoying because they are not Sinhala?’.

      • 1
        0

        Eagle Eye,

        “What is it that the Sinhalayo are enjoying that the other communities are not enjoying because they are not Sinhala?’.”

        I didn’t know that you were a poop-eating BABY until you asked this question.

  • 8
    2

    Dear Pitasanna,
    “Why A Political Settlement With The LTTE To Peacefully End The War Was Not Possible”
    You should have written about Why a political settlement not possible with Sinhalese politicians from 1920s to …

  • 1
    1

    Shanmugathas:
    Generally you have tried fairly to analyse the LTTE and the Sinhala Leaders’ role in the violent conflict. It would have been best if you could have written the article as an academic paper with references etc. There are many errors and misconceptions. In a comment format it is not possible to delve into it. From 1994 to 2009 I was in the North and have firsthand knowledge of some of the points you have addressed and given your and other’s interpretations. I shall try to give my interpretation of events during the timeframe 1994 to 2009 at a future date.

  • 5
    2

    The answer of Pitasanna Shanmugathas as to why a peaceful settlement to the war was not possible, is:
    (1) Prabhakaran’s unwillingness to genuinely consider a political solution
    (2) the party rivalry between UNP and SLFP
    .
    Had there been a reasonable offer to Tamils, by any of the two Governments during the time of Prabhakaran, Tamils themselves would have removed Prabhakaran from the equation.
    .
    That leaves us all with only ONE reason. That reason has been enunciated correctly by the writer himself.

  • 0
    4

    Immigrants and minorities are .living all over the world. Those LTTE rump living overseas are just have Identification numbers because they have to pay taxes. But, In Sri lanka, they do nothing and they want everything free for their kind and a homeland.
    We know sinhala Politicians are backbone-less leaders. That is why sinhala people loses their country. Mahinda rajapakse and Ranil are brothers and relatives. So, they both are the same.

  • 3
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    This comment was removed by a moderator because it didn’t abide by our Comment policy.For more detail see our Comment policy https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/comments-policy-2

  • 1
    4

    Neelan Thiruchelvam was a Tribalist. but, when he understood the Deep Pit that Tamils are in, I think, he ganged up with the Sri lankan govt. That may be the reason why Neelan Thiruchelvam and KAdiragamar, were Killed, that is my guess. Some one did not want any healing between Tamils and the govt. and they wanted some how Pabakaran to get a piece of Island which would be governed by Pabakaran wife and it would be given to their foreign hand as a gift for their support. both Thiruchelvam and Kadiragamar tried to come into a middle ground with the Tamils.

  • 4
    3

    Regarding the Indo-Lanka Accord, India was willing to militarily back what would have ultimately been a federal state for Sri Lankan Tamils. The reason the LTTE rejected this proposal was because they did not want to give up their arms (a requirement of the Accord). This is a very important point. It means the LTTE did not want to join any political process as a recognized political party, because mainstream political parties do not carry weapons. It also means the LTTE considered themselves the sole representatives of the Tamils. And finally it means the LTTE thought its goal of a separate state was possible via a military as opposed to a political solution. Given these factors, no legitimate government could have negotiated a political solution with the LTTE. If a political solution is not possible, then the only remaining solutions are to give up or use a military solution. The Sri Lankan Government obviously chose the latter, with the exception of PM Ranil, who would have handed over the whole country. Reforming the Constitution to address Tamil grievances would not have made a difference. The LTTE wanted a separate state, with a separate Tamil army, a demand which no sovereign government anywhere in the world will agree to.

  • 1
    0

    Mr . Ethirveerasingham , it will be refreshing to hear the views of a person who actually was living in the affected areas, instead of political analyst, conspiracy theorist, experts in alternate facts,soothsayers,diaspora——etc—–etc. So please do a favor. If possible write an article or if not a comment.At the end there are some truth which will die with those individuals ,which rest of us will never be aware.People read CT and DBS for facts, which are mostly hear say too.

  • 2
    0

    This Gentleman’s analysis is spot on!

    Prabakaran was the sole cause for the failure of a political solution.
    It is his stupidity, lack of geo-political knowledge, classic down to earth arrogance (typical Jaffna man trait) – that has now thrust the poor people of North and East to live in misery and caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths at the final stages of the war.

    Prabakaran -The Man Who Destroyed Eelam https://www.academia.edu/4738983/The_Man_Who_Destroyed_Eelm

    We don’t have to jump over any high bars as Ethir has suggested to have an academic paper to analyze, discuss and debate the author’s point of view. The personal experiences of some of us who lived through Prabakaran’s tyranny will bear testimony to the events and atrocities committed by this megalomaniac.

    That is the bad news…

    The good news is, Thanks to Rajapakse and his sell out to China – Tamils will have their homeland after all – Sri Lankan military will be gone – and UN Peacekeepers and or Indian/US military will be here sooner or later.
    Rajapakse – The Man Who Gave Tamil’s their Eelam.

    • 0
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      Ugly American,

      “The good news is, Thanks to Rajapakse and his sell out to China – Tamils will have their homeland after all.”

      What exactly you do mean?

  • 2
    1

    On genocide allegations:

    One-sided justice is no justice; it’s just a provocation for continued hostility. Tamil diaspora who support the myth of Tamil Genocide should reflect on their OWN contribution to the destruction of life – Tamil, Muslim, Sinhala etc.

    Perhaps then, they will realize their folly, and work towards lasting peace on the island they hail from. Instead, what they are doing is continuing to foment discontent among their younger generations and cause economic catastrophe to the island – of which the North will be the worst off.

    Cleanse your minds of hate and do not force your grandchildren – who have never lived on the island – to suffer for your sins.

    • 2
      2

      sinhalese buddhist

      “Tamil diaspora who support the myth of Tamil Genocide should reflect on their OWN contribution to the destruction of life – Tamil, Muslim, Sinhala etc.”

      Do you think there was/is a greater certainty the number of civilians who were targeted and killed remains Zero between 1971 and 2015?

      • 2
        0

        Pitasanna,

        Provide reference to the quote from G.L.Peiris and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu. in response to what Balasingham said in 2003 regarding the 1995 CBK-Neelan proposals.

        Your analysis ignores another factor – the tsunami, which weakened the LTTE’s naval assets and they were never the same again.

        It also ignores the post 9/11 hostility against non-state actors in the international community. Prior to that Mr. Menon would have been wrong in asking whether more brutal methods would have weakened the LTTE.

        VP had a lot to blame, but who were his advisers and enablers? While any adviser within SL would have been afraid to give honest advice to VP for fear of being murdered, why did the Diaspora members who had no such fear agree with him to restart the war after the Oslo peace process?

        The reason is that these so-called LTTE ‘advisers’ in the Diaspora might have held lucrative professional positions, and had big egos on account of that, but had no rational mind, common sense nor analytical skills. Wasn’t it clear that the peace process was the only way out, and restarting the war, in the face of the collective will of the international community against it, would mean complete annihilation?

        • 1
          1

          My analysis does not ignore the post-9/11 hostility. I EXPLICITLY mention it in the article. Please read again. “Especially, with respect to the second factor of internationally designating the LTTE as a terrorist organization, given that absent 9/11, it is unclear whether the Sri Lankan government would have obtained the needed political ammunition to successfully champion for the designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization on the global stage.” Furthermore, I clearly express disagreement and skepticism with Menon’s statement, and that is explained in the article. The two factors (the Karuna factor and the post-9/11 factor) I listed played a far more important role, I believe, in the internal weakening of the LTTE than the role the tsunami played. Ultra Tamil nationalists within the diaspora did play a significant role in policing the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community. Human Rights Watch in 2006 did a report on this called “LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora” google it and check it out. Nevertheless, I agree with you that the diaspora should have been vocal in opposing Prabhakaran’s actions. At the present moment, I am not at liberty to reveal the source behind Saravanamuttu and GL Peiris’ statement in response to Balasingham’s 2003 statement on the 1995 Union of Regions proposal.

          • 0
            0

            Pitasanna,

            You noted 9/11 in response to Menon’s question, but didn’t mention LTTE’s failure to make any course corrections in response to that. For instance, they coudl have given an undertaking they wouldn’t resort to suicide bombings anymore, and still earned respect internationally, despite the international ban. A ban itself won’t do much. Hezbollah was banned a long time ago but survived. The LTTE didn’t have any strategy to face this and that could be attributed to sterile thinking by both VP and his advisers.

            I am well aware that Diaspora Tamils were under pressure by the LTTE in countries like Canada and Norway, but their ability to hurt the Diaspora was limited, especially in countries like the US, Australia and UK. In my view and direct observation, these so-called ‘advisers’ were all thinking inside the box and repeating what the leadership was saying, and were not capable of understanding the changing international context nor thinking afresh. their worldviews were based on muddled thinking.

            I will make another post to stay within word size limits.

            • 1
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              Continuing….

              Also, while Balasingham would have added some more sanity, you have an overly positive view of Balasingham. If you talk to others like R. Jayadevan, they will tell you he could scold people using filthy words. I once read about his crude and threatening remarks in a public speech in London about then CM of Tamil Nadu, Ms. Jayalalitha. He was hardy diplomatic. Solheim might have found him a good partner to have drinks with while trying to achieve peace, but positive views from Solheim and DBJ can’t hide Balasingham’s negatives.

              As for the references I asked for, if you can’t make them public, then you have to explicitly state that the sources requested anonymity for a particular reason. You should also say when and to whom they made their comments. Without those details, it looks less professional. After all, you could simply make it up and readers would continue to have that suspicion

              • 0
                0

                If there is suspicion I am making up the quote, anyone can ask GL Peiris and Saravanamuttu directly whether they made those comments. I am also compelled to quote what DBS Jeyaraj once said to a similar question directed at him, “I dont think it is appropriate for people to write to journalists & ask them for sources. No self respecting journo would even reply.” I stand by that position.

                • 1
                  0

                  PS
                  “I dont think it is appropriate for people to write to journalists & ask them for sources. No self respecting journo would even reply.”
                  That is lousy defence. If there is need to protect the source from the state or any other bully, there is a case for such refusal.
                  Otherwise, by this logic a “self respecting journo” can get away with any falsehood.
                  “Self respect” cannot be a shield that protects lying journalists who makes up stories.

              • 0
                2

                If there is suspicion that I made up that quote, anyone can ask GL Peiris and Saravanamuttu directly whether they made those comments. I am also compelled to quote what DBS Jeyaraj once said when a similar question was directed at him, “I dont think it is appropriate for people to write to journalists & ask them for sources. No self respecting journo would even reply.” I stand by that position.

                • 2
                  0

                  PS,

                  What DBSJ said is not true. Journalists improve their credibility by quoting sources directly; where that is not possible, in the West, at least their editors know the details of the sources. DBSJ just provides a lot of details in his articles as fact and some people may take it as fact, but his methods are still somewhat suspect and I always take his words with a pinch of salt. You don’t have to follow in his footprints. There is a better way to do it.

                  • 1
                    0

                    Agnos
                    What you say about DBSJ is true of several others who we come across here.
                    People like DBSJ spice up their stories with fine detail, of which much is imagined or extrapolated, to appear ‘well informed’.
                    Gossip passes for news and gets recorded as history.
                    PS needs to grow up.

              • 2
                1

                With respect to your comments on Balasingham, I dont think I have an overly positive view of him. Balasingham was certainly no dove. Balasingham had flaws, most definitely. What is argued in the article is that Balasingham was more open to a federal solution but was sidelined by the LTTE leadership and this likely played a detrimental role in reaching a peaceful solution.

  • 1
    1

    we are very happy how it turned out. if not we would have an LTTE caliphate in the north and an IS one in the east .

    • 0
      0

      Abhaya

      “if not we would have an LTTE caliphate in the north and an IS one in the east .”

      How could we have a caliphate when LTTE had already expelled the entire Muslim population from the north while keeping the eastern front in check?

      PS
      Caliphate (Arabic: خِلافة‎ khilāfa) is a state ruled by an Islamic leader known as a caliph (Arabic: خَليفة‎ khalīfah).

      Please note there is a very good chance of Sinhala/Buddhist fascists building a Sinhala/Buddhist fascists state in the entire island.

    • 0
      0

      Now we have racist facist genocidal Sinhala caliphate, with homosexual monks preaching Sinhala buddist ethnic purerity.

  • 0
    0

    Kudos to the author for an article that adroitly addresses the issues at hand. His analysis of the reasons underlying the ultimate failure of both the CBK-led peace effort of the mid 1990s and the Norwegian-led peace facilitation effort running from 2000 onwards is prescient. Ineed in essentials it very much follos the argu,ment of my book on the subject, which the author cites.

    Reviewing the online discussion above, it is evident that many focus their attention on the frist elementof the analysis viz. the inflexible, maximalist, authoritarian nature of Prabakharan’s leadership of the LTTE. While this is in many respects understandable, I would also stronly encourage equal attention to the other part of the equation viz. perennial division, competition and infighting within the Sinhala polity, in particularbetween the two major parties, (now the UNP and SLFP). The author mentions a number of occasions when this wwas a critical factor: the 1995 and 2000 Constitutional Reform debates, and official reaction to the LTTE’s 2003 ISGA proposal.

    More could be added, the point in my view being to appreciate the extent to which a divided Sinhala polity has undermined the prospects for a peaceful settlement in Sri Lanka. Nor is this an academic question: in an impotant sense, to this day the division continues to undermine the prospects for a genuine, final constitutional-political settlement to ‘The Tamil Question’. Reason enough, in other words, to take it seriously.

    • 1
      0

      Mr. Salter,

      “…effort running from 2000 onwards is prescient.”

      How can an analysis of past events be ‘prescient’?

      As for the online discussion, as a Tamil myself, I am well aware of Sinhalese chauvinism, violence, intransigence and inter-party rivalries. But the manner in which the Tamil struggle was conducted, leading to the massive slaughter of innocents at Mullivaikal, had a lot to do with VP. There were many turning points at which he could have chosen to take another course but didn’t.

  • 3
    2

    Pitasanna Shan is at it again writing another misleading and damaging article about the LTTE while trying to feign impartiality. His article – especially at this time when Tamils are commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Mullivaikkaal genocide leaves much to be desired. He is bad news. He has a propensity to lie about the LTTE and demonize them. His article distorts facts about the peace process and the causes why a political settlement with the LTTE to peacefully end the war was not possible. This guy’s mentor is DBS Jeyaraj – there’s a story behind DBS turning anti-LTTE from being pro-LTTE at one time. Not convinced himself Pitassana is even casting doubt on the Tamil genocide as just the view of some Tamils. Tamils should not give him a platform.

  • 3
    2

    Pitasanna,
    Your writing and analysis are absolutely nonsense and ridiculous;

    LTTE was a product of Sinhala Buddhist racism, hatred and State sponsored terrorism and Indra Gandhi supported and armed these guys;

    There were no golden moments but Sinhala Buddhist cunning lies, lies and lies; SInhala Leaders never wanted to respect, treat Tamils equally as Tamils are denied the Rule of Law and Justice by the racist Law Enforcement;

    Rajiv Gandhi order Indian Air Force planes to fly over Jaffna as Sri Lanka leaders failed and only believed in state terrorism;

    Mullivaikal is not the end of the Tamils’ struggle and now Diaspora become more involved in politics in many nations, isolating Sinhala in many countries and only time will tell how they achieve Tamil Eelam;

    Tamils continue to demand for an International investigation and Sri Lanka Government continue to deny despite they co-sponsored UNHRC resolution and Srisena Government busy in corruption and releasing Sinhala war criminals while crushing legitimate Tamils’ struggles; Sinhala racists dream that oppression of Tamils but only time will tell when the Sinhala racist leaders and Generals will stand on the docks of ICC for their action;

  • 0
    2

    Hi Mr PS
    Thank you for sharing your analysis.
    FP/TULF created all the armed groups by selling all our children to Indian projects. One of the offshoot is the LTTE. The rest remain intact in the form TNA having been protected by the GOSL during the war. New addition people of SL is now gifted with is an Indian Consulate in Jaffna.
    Since 1970 under the cover of democracy we the people of Sri Lanka have been taken for a ride at gun point and all opposition to TULF were systematically eliminated using our own children. The same in the name of JVP in the south took place earlier.
    It was no surprise to us the ‘non partisan’ Majority when LTTE would not agree to ‘free and fair’ elections (given an agreement was reached and the mandate approved in the refereandum by the people)……….hence LTTE backed off as people will not vote for them period.
    A 1977 victory for separatism was never free and fair election nor a legal mandate period…the pattern followed. The democratic and the armed wing were very consistent in achieving their goal a very well organised set up plotted in the training camps in India where our children were brain washed.
    From the ashes comes the TNA again to continue where they were made to leave the scene by the LTTE due to rivelary amongst the armed liberators and their TULF masters/fellow armed groups.
    I also do not think LTTE was a one man story as impacted by the the supporters and the opponents a like. All we know everyone is capitalising politically on the missing LTTE vacuum they all worked hard to eliminate a national/geo political event.
    Unavoidable consequence of Lankan children resorting to kill their fellow countrymen is the loss of life in the armed forces and the civilians alike. Children are children be it Tamil/Sinhalese we the adults should take responsibility.

  • 0
    0

    continued

    what we have not documented is the TULF activities from 197o to 1983. The death suqds and the killing fields in Jaffna a Tamil crime vs crime. We need to complement the work of Broken Palmera with this investigations. We need to audit/document every stage speeches/suthenthiran writings/politicians responses to each and every killings that was carried out on opponents/civilians/teachers/policemen by these groups. We have far too much of talk on LTTE but failed to visit the real era/sequence of events from 1970 -1983 that has let to the state if affairs in Sri Lanka.

    the recruitment of our children/methodologies/camps where they were trained/who trained them all need to fully mapped and documented and presented to the UN. A serious crime has been committed on us by the TULF and Tamil Nadu which requires ‘crime against humanity’ investigations. The same need to be done with regard to the JVP activities too. This is the missing links in our Nation that is allowing us to discuss current affairs without any basis and bench marking playing into the hands of geo politicians to rape us repeatedly for a long time to come.

    we need to plot graphs of death/riots/war, who did what to create this scenarios..there is a clear path to this misery we are all in…………and the current narrative GOSL/Sinhala Bhuddists is responsible for all that took place can not hold water. fact vs fiction need to be put right. If we plot a graph 1948-1970, 1970-1977, 1977-19183, 1983-2009 we will get the picture the consequence of offering solutions without risk analysis. We have all been played by our own people and the neighbours.

  • 0
    0

    Dear PS

    Please start writing about MP’s who delivered economical projects/life changing events positively for Tamil communities and to their mother land too. Leading/defining the job scope for members of parliament how to represent their constituents? these are the folks who did the thinking and walk the talk in our history. They set president along with so many thinking people from all other communities……..worked together too get us to 1970’s then all hell broke loose………JVP and Tamil militancy…..now the third dimension the Muslim militancy. Most ion us knew this path to come a long time ago but we’re silenced by the guns.

    You can see how some people even write comments/respond to others thoughts gives you the nature/thuggery we have all endured in our own land/in our own life because guns were brought into the equation.

    You do not need guns to be elected by the community you want to liberate???????? all progressive, analytical & scientific thinking should pause this question at the end??

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