By Colombo Telegraph –
“Gothabaya told us that the government was sure the LTTE did not believe in a political solution. He said the GSL has recently come into possession of a videotape of a speech by Prabhakaran apparently recorded about two months after the signing of the CFA in 2002. In the video, Karuna was standing next to Prabhakaran and introduced him. Prabhakaran asserted that the LTTE knew it would never reach its goal of a Tamil Homeland (“Eelam”) through peaceful means. He told Karuna’s cadres, who were about to return to the East, that the CFA only signified a pause for the LTTE, during which they could regroup, rearm, resupply, recruit and retrain. Gothabaya agreed to provide the Embassy a copy of the tape.” the US Embassy Colombo informed Washington.
The Colombo Telegraph found the related leaked cable from the WikiLeaks database. The cable is classified as “Confidential” and recounts a meeting the US Embassy had with the Secretary to the Ministry of Difence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The cable was written on March 14, 2007 by the US Ambassador to Colombo Robert O. Blake.
The ambassador Blake wrote; “PDAS Steven Mann, accompanied by Ambassador and Pol Chief, met Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on March 8. Gothabaya, noting that an overwhelming majority of Sinhalese Buddhists had voted for Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, told us that his brother’s popularity among the majority community was still strong. However, Sri Lanka’s system of proportional representation in Parliament meant that the President’s party would never secure an absolute majority on its own. This, he explained, had made it necessary to create such a big cabinet to satisfy everyone. Mann responded that the President’s considerable political skills and his strong support made him the right leader to make progress on a solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem. The U.S. hoped that the new power-sharing proposals that emerge form the current consultation process would be of a quality that hadn’t been seen before.”
“Gothabaya thought the government could reach out to the Tamil people, particularly their educated technocrats. ‘People need to know that there is a normal life waiting for them after the conflict,’ he said. It was therefore important for the government to intervene immediately and do development work in the areas in the East that had recently come under its control. The Tamils also needed genuine representation, Gothabaya said. The people had no confidence in the Tamil National Alliance, which was simply a placeholder for the LTTE. On the other hand, Gothabaya asserted that previous attempts by Sri Lankan government to ‘introduce’ alternative Tamil representatives in the North and East had failed, and would not work in the future, either.” Blake further wrote.
Ambassador Blake wrote; “Gothabaya said that over the next six months, the military planned to consolidate its control over the East, then stabilize the border region adjacent to the LTTE-held Vanni. Vavuniya remained a problem, with much LTTE infiltration, which was also causing problems in an east-to-west arc toward Mannar. In order to secure unfettered access to the population in government-held Mannar, the army would seek to push the Tigers back a bit more. The government would try to deny the LTTE resupply of arms and ammunition, then put pressure on them to return to the negotiating table. Gothabaya noted that cutting off arms LTTE shipments to Sri Lanka might be easier than stemming financial flows. The Tigers didn’t need t bring the money they raised abroad to Sri Lanka he said, but used it abroad to purchase arms. While the Navy and other security forces had found i difficult enough to choke off LTTE resupply of mmunition, it was worth the effort to try to do s. While Prabhakaran, with his terrorist mentaliy, would likely never give in, his younger cadre might eventually grasp that there is no militar solution to the conflict, he thought. Prime Minister Wickremenayake had visited a number of Southeast Asian countries and concluded MoUs on cooperation against LTTE arms smuggling with sevral governments, including Indonesia and Thailand, Gothabaya noted. He added that the LTTE arms ship sunk on February 28 had refitted and replenished in an Indonesian harbor. However, Gothabaya thought that the LTTE smuggling operations were not occurring with the approval of those governments, but that certain corrupt officials were abetting them.”
We give below the relevant part of the cable;
VZCZCXRO4586 OO RUEHBI RUEHLMC DE RUEHLM #0416/01 0730542 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 140542Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5651 INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0275 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 9963 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6932 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 5009 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3603 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0747 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 3690 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1012 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2770 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7505 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 5209 RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0137 RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1888 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000416 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND SCA/RA MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2017 TAGS: PTER PGOV MOPS PREL CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY OUTLINES SIX-MONTH MILITARY STRATEGY Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
¶2. (C) PDAS Steven Mann, accompanied by Ambassador and Pol Chief, met Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on March 8. Gothabaya, noting that an overwhelming majority of Sinhalese Buddhists had voted for Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, told us that his brother's popularity among the majority community was still strong. However, Sri Lanka's system of proportional representation in Parliament meant that the President's party would never secure an absolute majority on its own. This, he explained, had made it necessary to create such a big cabinet to satisfy everyone. Mann responded that the President's considerable political skills and his strong support made him the right leader to make progress on a solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic problem. The U.S. hoped that the new power-sharing proposals that emerge form the current consultation process would be of a quality that hadn't been seen before. ¶3. (C) Gothabaya told us that the government was sure the LTTE did not believe in a political solution. He said the GSL has recently come into possession of a videotape of a speech by Prabhakaran apparently recorded about two months after the signing of the CFA in 2002. In the video, Karuna was standing next to Prabhakaran and introduced him. Prabhakaran asserted that the LTTE knew it would never reach its goal of a Tamil Homeland ("Eelam") through peaceful means. He told Karuna's cadres, who were about to return to the East, that the CFA only signified a pause for the LTTE, during which they could regroup, rearm, resupply, recruit and retrain. Gothabaya agreed to provide the Embassy a copy of the tape. ¶4. (C) Gothabaya thought the government could reach out to the Tamil people, particularly their educated technocrats. "People need to know that there is a normal life waiting for them after the conflict," he said. It was therefore important for the government to intervene immediately and do development work in the areas in the East that had recently come under its control. The Tamils also needed genuine representation, Gothabaya said. The people had no confidence in the Tamil National Alliance, which was simply a placeholder for the LTTE. On the other hand, Gothabaya asserted that previous attempts by Sri Lankan government to "introduce" alternative Tamil representatives in the North and East had failed, and would not work in the future, either. COLOMBO 00000416 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Gothabaya said that over the next six months, the military planned to consolidate its control over the East, then stabilize the border region adjacent to the LTTE-held Vanni. Vavuniya remained a problem, with much LTTE infiltration, which was also causing problems in an east-to-west arc toward Mannar. In order to secure unfettered access to the population in government-held Mannar, the army would seek to push the Tigers back a bit more. The government would try to deny the LTTE resupply of arms and ammunition, then put pressure on them to return to the negotiating table. ¶6. (C) Gothabaya noted that cutting off arms LTTE shipments to Sri Lanka might be easier than stemming financial flows. The Tigers didn't need t bring the money they raised abroad to Sri Lanka he said, but used it abroad to purchase arms. Wile the Navy and other security forces had found i difficult enough to choke off LTTE resupply of mmunition, it was worth the effort to try to do s. While Prabhakaran, with his terrorist mentaliy, would likely never give in, his younger cadre might eventually grasp that there is no militar solution to the conflict, he thought. ¶7. (C) rime Minister Wickremenayake had visited a number of Southeast Asian countries and concluded MoUs oncooperation against LTTE arms smuggling with sevral governments, including Indonesia and Thailan, Gothabaya noted. He added that the LTTE arms hip sunk on February 28 had refitted and replenished in an Indonesian harbor. However, Gothabaya thought that the LTTE smuggling operations were not occurring with the approval of those governments, but that certain corrupt officials were abetting them.
BLKE
Dr.Rajmogan / March 15, 2013
No one can deny the fact that Tamils do have problems.The problems can be solved only through negotiations .All Prapakaran wanted was Eelam,nothing else.There were so many opportunities to solve the Tamil problem.When Chandrika brought a package in August 2010,Tigers didnt support it.Not only the Tigers,but the Tamil leaders including Sampanthan also didnt support it.The Tamil leaders keep telling the innocent Tamils that the “Sinhala ” governments wont give anything to the Tamils.When the government comes up with some solution,they oppose it.Because they can only survive as long as the Tamil issue is there.
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murugan arasu / August 9, 2013
how long will it take for the srilankan government to give autonomy to the tamils or materialise the a 13a or declare srilanka as a democratic country. what Mr. prabakaren told in public speech is a aked truth and it has been proved by this time the whole world may now know that srilankans are cheating once before it was known only to the tamils in sruilanka but now it got concealled to the whole world
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pbb / March 16, 2013
you are correct Dr Rajmogan,
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Antany Peter / March 16, 2013
Prapakaran could not solve the problem, because the West was pushing the Tamil diaspora leasers to carry-on the war. The LTTE had many opportunities to solve the problem, but they didn’t. Doesn’t matter how much I tell you guys you won’t understand, because you are not smart as the Chinese leaders. The Westerners even surprise the devil. You need lot of knowledge to understand the West. The TNA and TGTE won’t let Sri Lanka to move forward. The Tamil and Sinhala leaders are not smart enough to understand Delhi or the Westerners.
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Piranha / March 16, 2013
Well Gota, you never had any intention of granting asolution based on the 13th amendment to the tamils, did you? Why were you complaining about what VP’s intetntions were. There is no difference between your stand and VP’s stand on this.
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Peter / March 20, 2013
Gota lets start with finding the killers and the master killer who ordered the execution of Lasantha? Do you have a tape?
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Manesh Rajakaruna / March 23, 2013
Peter
Why asked Gota? GO and your mother. It appears that Gota has already given to her.
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