1 October, 2020

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Winning Tamil Votes Without Losing Sinhala Votes

By Jude Fernando

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The traditions of all dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living—Marx (1852).

I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended upon to meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them the real facts, and beer—Abraham Lincoln.

Like Professor Laksiri Fernando, I initially found Maithripala Sirisena’s decision not to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) shocking. Though in hindsight I think, an MOU with concrete policies on the ethnic issue is premature and counter-productive to the immediate goals of the opposition. Such a move is unlikely to increase the Tamil vote and runs the risk of alienating both the Sinhalese and Tamils. The Tamils will view an MOU as condescending and opportunistic. History provides them with little reason to trust that MOU pledges will materialize.

A woman cries outside the Human Right Commission office in JaffnaThe Sinhalese voters also run the risk of falling prey to the ruling regime’s claim that the MOU is a foreign conspiracy against the country. The regime has already made reference to an MOU, which, according to TNA parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran, is non-existent and an attempt to misguide and manipulate Sinhalese voters (CT, December 18, 2014). An MOU runs the risk of disintegrating the opposition coalition, given its ideological diversity, and making Sinhala voters anxious about the stability of a government under the opposition. Demand for an MOU could very well be a trap set up by those “sinister elements” against regime change! The TNA’s position that boycotting the election is “favouring Mahinda Rajapaksa who is abominably worse for Tamils” and asking Tamils to vote for Maithripala, a less flawed candidate, is a prudent choice.

The Tamil vote is indispensable for regime change, and the opposition cannot take that vote for granted. The ruling regime’s trepidation over potential unity between the Sinhalese and Tamils is evident in President Rajapaksha’s claim in Mullaitivu that “he cannot allow an Arab Spring in Sri Lanka” (DM 18/12). Rajapaksha himself is fast becoming a source of the public’s fear of the Spring’s chaos and instability. The deep and inescapable quandary for the opposition is how to increase Tamil votes without sacrificing Sinhala votes. The current political culture’s legitimacy rests on intentionally polarizing the political consciousness of the Tamil and Sinhala communities. The same means used to create this culture is now militating against the regime and opposing the development of a shared political consciousness. Regime change is a non-negotiable prerequisite to find ways out of this quandary, the opposition insists.

It is naïve for the opposition to assume that current dissent against the ruling regime is evidence of a shared political consciousness between the Tamils and Sinhalese regarding the issues and solutions specific to the Tamil community. Why hasn’t a shared political consciousness between them evolved, even though they suffer equally under the executive presidency and the country’s political culture? What could the opposition do in fewer than 30 days to increase Tamil votes and prevent what Champika Ranawaka referred to as “sinister” attempts by certain groups to defeat the opposition by asking Tamils to boycott the elections?

For any opposition to be effective, it must overcome the current political quagmire – a quagmire caused by polarized and competing political narratives that exist among the Sinhala and Tamil communities. Thus, an alternative, unified campaign narrative needs to emerge. To get there, however, an effective opposition must first answer three basic questions: a) how do people remember the conflict vs. how the state wants them to remember it?; b) how do people make sense the post-war actions of the government in the areas of development, reconciliation, and rehabilitation?; and c) how are Tamil and Sinhala communities allowed to commemorate this shared history? The trick is to figure out how these three things continue to polarize political groups, and develop an effective political strategy to cultivate a shared political consciousness and action.

Contested Narratives

How do people remember the war? Sinhala and Tamil communities greeted the war’s end with a sigh of relief. Unfortunately, each group remains stuck in its own narrative – the same stories that led to the conflict. Developing a shared political consciousness (a common, shared story) is a daunting but essential task for the opposition. The alternative is to allow the government to tell and sell its ‘official history’ of the conflict – a story that exploits both Tamil and Sinhalese, alike.

The history of the conflict predates the emergence of Tamil militancy. Its origins lie in the communalism and racism that prevailed in the nation building process, and the failure of Sri Lanka to become an inclusive democratic nation. In the process of the country’s transition from a parliamentary system to an executive Presidential system, the ‘nation’ was reduced to ‘community.’ The dominant voices of the time insisted that the ideological, cultural and psychological foundations of the nation must rest on impeccably Sinhala Buddhist provenance. In response, minorities built their political agendas on their respective religious and racial identities. To the surprise of many, the country’s exposure to globalization and capitalism, did not make it’s ethno-religious nationalism obsolete, instead it was institutionalized as the main ideological force for political mobilization, and is the primary reason for polarization between communities.

There also exists a fundamental tension. While various political parties seek to champion a constitutionally democratic polity, their ideological and pragmatic inhibitions mitigate against it. This is evident where mainstream opposition political parties reject constitutional reforms to devolve power to minorities, as the incumbent party has proposed. Opposing constitutional reforms progressively evolved as an important, if not the most potent and widely used trump card to capture and legitimize state power. One proposal replaced another (e.g., federalism, Union of Regions, and numerous amendments), and each new proposal narrowed and diluted the extent of the power transfer. The Tamils largely perceived the 13th Amendment as weak as it never showed a concrete movement towards a meaningful devolution of power. Political parties ignored the dangers communal politics posed to democracy (including repeated warnings since 1950s of potential civil war), and their pledges to rectify them never materialized. Particularly, during and in the immediate aftermath of the war, no Sinhala mainstream opposition party directly challenged the ruling regime’s condemnation of devolution as the precursor of secession. The ruling regime always found ways to connect any form of dissent, including those unrelated to the devolution, with sinister forces that are plotting against the country’s sovereignty. Opposition fear full of persecution and of losing its popularity, either kept silent about political solution to the ethnic conflict or made competing claims to prove their ability to protect the country against secession and external threats.

In this political culture, violence against the minorities have continued to increase as it failed to prevent the institutionalization of the ethnoreligious nationalism as the framework for deliberating the minority demands for equal citizenship status that has found the support among many politicians and lawmakers. Mainstream political parties have organized or aided at least six riots against Tamil civilians since the 1950s. No party has yet made a public apology for these riots, and their perpetrators were rarely brought to justice, and their victims were not compensated. They passed the blame for the riots onto the incumbents’ failure to maintain law and order or on extremists, and rarely acknowledged the underlying systemic causes and ideological narratives. This has kept the extremist forces alive in national politics, rendering their ideologies essential for the popular legitimacy of political parties. Following each successive riot, political will for substantive devolution of power declined, and the prospects of a militant uprising of the Tamil youth against the government seemed inevitable. Subsequently, many of those groups opposed devolution transformed themselves into political parties or closely allied to any political party that promises to further their ideological and/or strategic political interests.

During 30 years of war, the two communities became further polarized. For a variety of complex reasons, the government and the LTTE narratives of the conflict failed to find common ground. Throughout the war the government claimed that ending war was a precondition for finding a political solution. Instead of honouring this promise, the regime created even more obstacles. After the war ended, not giving into public demands for a political solution became far more useful for gaining public support for the regime to further its parochial political and economic interests. The ‘culture of violence’ that the war bequeathed has now engulfed the entire political culture of the country, and its consequences disproportionately affect the minorities.

Throughout the war, relational contradictions between mainstream political parties and the LTTE abounded, as do mysteries and conspiracy theories regarding these contradictions. Allegations of million-dollar bribes and the LTTE receiving weapons from the government indicate that the regime found supporting the LTTE to influence the Tamil vote, more important than its purported priority of safeguarding national security. In the aftermath of the war, the ruling regime welcomed certain senior LTTE members who had killed hundreds of unarmed civilians, awarding them ministerial posts, while prosecuting others. The regime punished decorated war heroes, while elaborately commemorating the heroism of others.   For the majority population, these contradictions were secondary to the multiple gains from the war’s end and the regime’s assuming full control over economic and political affairs in the North and East.

Nor was there a space for the majority to critically think about the links between these contradictions and the political culture that they now wanted to transform. The regime suppressed this space by simultaneously keeping the war euphoria alive, demanding gratitude for the war’s end, and creating fear that another war would occur without the regime’s concentrated power.

The country’s connection to the West has in some ways exacerbated its internal turmoil. In the official post-war history, these relations with the West were linear and hostile to national interests. The official narrative ignores the West’s ideological and logistical support for the war and frames its concern for human rights as a sinister attempt to undermine the country’s sovereignty, driven by LTTE elements amongst the Tamil diaspora. This allows the regimes to suppress its ruling complicity with and reliance on international forces that are detrimental to just national interests as well as to distract the public attention away from abuse of power and dismantling of democracy that its claim to protect national interests could not justify. The regime used its engagement with the West to cultivate the local community’s paranoia of Western conspiracies, draw public dissent away from the dismantling of democracy and vilify those who stand against the regime as traitors. These contradictions leave no room for Tamils to have any faith in government’s interests in addressing their concerns. This is true even for those critical of LTTE’s duplicitous exploits of its relations with the international community that they considered as detrimental for democratic aspirations of the Tamils. These contradictions are detrimental to the interests of both Sinhalese and Tamils. The possibilities for shared political consciousness between these two communities are undermined by the policies that kept the ethno-nationalist and xenophobic mind-set alive.

Whatever the ruling regime and the opposition might have promised, they have both dropped from their agendas the Tamils’ post-war social, economic and political concerns. Responding to these concerns became politically riskier than before and during the war, as they were widely considered sinister attempts by traitors and conspirators against national interests. This alienated the Tamils from almost all parties competing in the presidential elections and induced confusion and anxiety in these parties as to how to win Tamil votes without losing Sinhala votes. The regime’s failure to improve human rights fed into minority distrust of the regime and agendas of groups of different competing political persuasions. The official history marks these failures as successes that enable the regime to protect the country from sinister forces, and addressing those failures means undermining its legitimacy.

The official narrative of the conflict, indeed, allowed the LTTE to justify it brutally suppressing dissent. The LTTE’s own narrative of the conflict, too, suppressed or provided justification for its own contradictions, culture of violence and human rights abuses and strategies it used to establish its dominance over the Tamil community. The LTTE justified it ending negotiations by calling them ‘peace traps’. It ignored the international community’s accusations of human rights violations by its cadres and vilified those within and outside the Tamil community who work with the international community as collaborating with imperialists and neocolonialists. Polarization between the two communities continued, as the government’s narrative of the conflict conflated historical grievances of the Tamils with the LTTE’s acts of terror.

The official narrative further entrenched the distinct and contentious experiences of nation building of the Tamils and Sinhalese, as it draws on and reinforces the version of history that polarized the two communities’ political consciousness and provided legitimacy to the military rather than a political solution to the ethnic conflict. In this history, demands for substantive devolution stemmed mainly from the violence of the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora and those hostile to the country and jealous of defeating terrorism. Maintaining these divided perceptions allowed the state to justify its post-war policies as necessary to prevent the Tamils’ perceptions from leading to another war and separatism and to maintain the continuity of the majoritarian history.

A political solution not forthcoming, regardless of the LTTE’s thoughts about it, Tamils viewed Sinhala criticism of the LTTE with a great deal of suspicion. The prominence given to the LTTE’s excesses in government media is not about empathy with, but rather justifications for not addressing the Tamils’ human rights concerns and their political aspirations, which are not reducible to the their demand for separatism or support for the LTTE. This lack of empathy prevented the regime’s working with Tamil political parties and civil society groups that have openly disavowed separatism and/or demand rights as equal and dignified human beings. Left with no other option the Tamil community was forced to seek the international community’s help to address its grievances, leaving it and the entire country vulnerable to the international community’s exploits. After the war, the regime even denied the reality of ethnic conflict in the country and continued to expand its national security apparatus in the name of protecting hegemonic national interests.

A shared political consciousness among Tamils and Sinhalese is impossible when the official narrative of the nation’s history fails to recognize that “nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any nationalism and sub nationalism, presented as the history of one race and religion, conceals the fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex,” notes historian Howard Zinn. In this complexity, we also see a hierarchy of oppression that coevolves. The interconnectedness between these oppressions does not make them mutually exclusive in terms of their respective histories and struggles. There is no logical reason to jettison one struggle until those with higher priority are settled. The state’s position in a democracy as the guardian of general interests cannot justify human rights abuses in one community to protect the same in another community.

The opportunity for regime change lies in the fact that the official narrative is failing to hide its contradictions and distortions and continues to suppress dissent against the oppression concealed in and transpiring from that narrative. Howard Zinn notes, “The memory of oppressed people is one thing that cannot be taken away, and for such people, with such memories, revolt is always an inch below the surface.” It simultaneously turns against and victimizes Sinhala and Tamil communities and deprives the Sinhalese of what the narrative exclusively promises them. Zinn goes on to say that “in the long run, the oppressor is also a victim. In the short run (and so far, human history has consisted only of short runs), the victims, themselves desperate and tainted with the culture that oppresses them, turn on other victims.” That is not to say that the official narrative of the LTTE or the minority Tamils is entirely free of the above allegations. Rather, I concur with Zinn: “I will try not to overlook the cruelties that victims inflict on one another as they are jammed together in the boxcars of the system. I don’t want to romanticize them. … the cry of the poor is not always just, but if you don’t listen to it, you will never know what justice is.”

Justice can never inspire a shared political consciousness when one community’s response to the legitimate human rights concerns of the other has not been to empathize but to highlight the wrongdoing on the other side and blame that side for its own plight. One debilitating consequence of official historical narrative is that its inherent ethnocentrism and xenophobia have imprisoned people within the narrow and discriminatory concept of inter-racial justice. These ideological inhibitions caused many to confuse absence of war with justice, demands for democratic rights with the demand for a separate state; the goodwill between the Sinhala and Tamil people with complete parity of political consciousness, and the history of ethnic conflict with the history of violence. The regime continues to thrive on conflating global concern for human rights abuses in Sri Lanka with external conspiracies against the country and the protection of national interests with the concentration of the executive’s power.

These narrow and racialized notions of justice blinded the society of the global trends that have undermined the conventional imagery of the state from below by growing pressure for it to confer culturally specific full rights and entitlements to all citizens and demands for decentralization and autonomy, and from above by supranational forces that coordinate the economic and security affairs of the state. Locally these same notions alienated Tamils and Sinhalese from each other, helped the state to distract public attention away from and provided legitimacy to its unjust practices and the country’s increased vulnerability to external forces, and now the two communities have begun to distance themselves from the regime. Growing unpopularity of the regime, however, does not automatically bring political consensus between Tamils and Sinhalese in support of the opposition.

An effective campaign to broaden the Tamil voter base against the ruling regime requires a great deal of empathy with how the political consciousness of the Tamil community is impacted by post-war humanitarian and security interventions And how this contributes to the further polarization between the two communities. I shall return to this topic in Part II.

To be continued..

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Latest comments

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    Jude Fernando –

    RE: Winning Tamil Votes Without Losing Sinhala Votes

    The Issue is Medamulana MaRa Dictatorship Vs. Peoples Democracy in the Democratic Socialisr Republic of Sri Lanka.

    The ethnicity or Religion does not come into the equation.

    මා ඔබේ සහෝදරිය -Samanalee Fonseka

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=V5FCndDWKxI

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=vchlNLghD70

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    As a tamil my vote is for my3-JHU alliance because they have promised to withdraw the cruel military from N/E, have promised to do justice to the families whose members have disappeared(abducted), have promised to grant land and police power to the N/E provinces, have promised to merge N/E, have promised to let impartial international inquiry into the last stages of war, have promised to release all the tamil political prisoners held for two decades without any charges and finally recognize an ethnic problem exist and have promised to solve it within the next two years via the “united” government that is to be formed.

    • 0
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      Ranjan,

      Maithri has not promised to merge North & East,has not promised to grant land and police power to the N/E provinces.

      Maithris main supporters are Rathana thero and Champika.JHU on their own can not win an election but can swing sinhala votes towards one of the major parties.

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    We Tamils never care about Sinhala modayas, Sinhala Buddhist never going to learn. Hope this Sinhala Buddhist mongrels choose right leader for rule srilanka….

  • 1
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    Dr. Jude,

    My effort was to raise the issue of the MOU for the more enlightened readers/people. Because in principle, progressive (Sinhalese based) parties should not be afraid to come to agreements with the Tamil (based) parties. That is the way for reconciliation. However, unfortunately given the prevailing backward political consciousness it could have been counterproductive as you say. Even at the moment it is a fine line, a tightrope walk. That is why I didn’t criticized the opposition or Maithripala. Educating people is a slow processes. The best is to strike a balance, without being adventurist (or idealist) or completely capitulating to the backwardness.

  • 1
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    Hats Off to Jude Fernando. Very detailed study. Awaiting part 2.
    Nanthan

  • 2
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    TNA throws its full weight behind the opposition….

    The TNA said that it had offered unconditional support to the Government and had not signed an agreement.

    TNA Parliamentarian M.A Sumanthiran said that the TNA had also not discussed withdrawing troops from the North, as alleged by the Government.

    The TNA said that before reaching the decision it had given careful consideration to the positions and pronouncements of the two main candidates at the upcoming Presidential election and has also undertaken an extensive process of consultation to hear the views of the Tamil speaking people, particularly those in the North and East.

    The TNA feels the Rajapaksa regime has only brought pain and suffering to the Tamil speaking peoples of this country and instead of pursuing reconciliation, the Rajapaksa regime has permitted extremist groups to carry out attacks against minority peoples and their places of religious worship.

    The TNA called on all citizens to turn out in great numbers and defeat the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime by casting their vote in favour of the Common Opposition Candidate Maithripala Sirisena and the Swan symbol.

    It is indeed commendable when most Sinhala politicians are paid huge sum of money to obey King Mahinda’s rule.

    If the military remains in the barracks, at least from midnight 05 January till the election is over and if the Dougles Devananda’s para military groups moving freely in those areas do not threaten the people, the Tamils will go to polls this time in large numbers unlike in 2005 or 2010. The Elections Commissioner will therefore have to make certain decisions very soon.

    TNA decides to support Maithri
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bKjpMYT_ub8#t=28

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    Tamils are second class citizens in Sri Lanka. 2nd class Citizenry is a form of slavery. Slaves do not have the right to choose their master. Manifestos of the two main candidates do not mention anything about the slaves welfare. Because the soldiers do not like it. let Tamils do their slave work and survive if they can.

    • 0
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      Pacs

      You should say this day and night till the 8th of January.

      Mahinda Saranan Gachchaami
      Basil Saranan Gachchaami
      Gota Saranan Gachchaami
      Namal Saranan Gachchaami
      Saadu, Saadu, Saadu…

  • 1
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    In reality in Sri Lankan situation tamils, muslims, catholics, buddhist cannot have written agreements for honky dory future for everybody.

    What should happen is small steps in right direction.
    Getting rid of corrupted, communal minded regime is a one step in right direction.

    We cannot foresee future far ahead.
    Stop worrying about hypothetical, crystal ball predicted futures.

    Lets take small steps at a time at right direction.
    Jan 8th is day for it.
    Make the right choice for the country, for the people.

  • 0
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    This comment was removed by a moderator because it didn’t abide by our Comment policy.For more detail see our Comment policy https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/comments-policy-2/

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    Jude,

    Just in the interest of accuracy, I didn’t see your quote saying that boycott would be “favouring Mahinda Rajapaksa who is abominably worse for Tamils” in any TNA statements.

    I think you are confusing an article by a Tamil expatriate writing under the pseudonym Aahithyan Ratnam (his real identity is clear to many) as coming from the TNA. I don’t disagree with that characterization, but it caught my eye because the TNA has been much more diplomatic than that in many of its recent statements.

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    One way to unite Sinhalese and Tamils (and also Muslims), is for opposition to have a ceremony asap, of the converse of Anagarika Dharamapala being honored amongst the Chinese, e.g honoring Durraiappah or someone………also for the opposition to show the similarity in genes between Sinhalese and Tamils, and make it official in official ceremony. Then, and only then, can
    we go forwards as a modern, civilized, and sophisticated country.

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      Durraiappah was an SLFP organiser and never able to win the hearts and minds of the people. Tamils always remeber Durraiappa as the one who supported the Srimavo Government blindly even during the transition to the First Republic of Sri Lanka Constitution which deprived the Sec29 B of the previous constitution meant for safeguarding the rights of the minorities.
      Stadium might bear his name, may be some SLFP leaders in the south but not the Tamil people. His omissions and commissions during the 4th International Tamil Conference held Jaffna in 1974 January is an apt example of what Durraiappa for Tamils!!!.
      Nanthan

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        Durraiappa was for a United Island concept in the end. Tamils at that time were willing to work with Sinhalese to get the country going into the modern, progressive, and futuristic epoch. But both sides preferred to go back 2-3 millennia of ancient history (even disregarding the millennia before colonization).

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        Durraiappa was for a United Island concept in the end. Tamils at that time were willing to work with Sinhalese to get the country going into the modern, progressive, and futuristic epoch. But both sides preferred to go back 2-3 millennia of ancient history (disregarding even the millennia before colonization).

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    There was a time Tamil people whole heartedly cast their votes for TNA and elected them. Now the TNA is exposed among the Tamils.In the last seventy years Tamil leaders achieved nothing to the Tmails.They couldnt even run the PC effectively.People lost hope in the TNA.Gajendrakuar,Sivajilingam,Ananthy and the Tamil diaspora are against the TNA’s decision. Even Tamilnet is very critical of Colombo based national list MP Sumanthiran.Tmails voted for TNA not because they are genuine to the Tamil cause.But to show their anger to Douglas and MR.Once MS comes to power ,in few months their honey moon will be over and anti-government,anti-Sinhala campaign will be initiated by the TNA.Sammanthan got bullet proof car from madam Chandrika who genuinely wanted to solve the Tamils; problem and idiot S refused support her peace package in 2000.Then she was portrayed as a war monger.

    TNA,s last days are numbered.

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      Ramany
      Are you mad or brainwashed? May be you are an anti TNA right from the beginning. A very few supporters of Tamil Tigers still blame TNA. Tamilnet is not an official Tamil Voice. A bunch of Tamil radicals are running it and it is not a reliable source to quote. Let the people decide on January 8th and in subsequent elections about TNA’s future. You are interested to have the same environment as in 2005 so that you dreams can be fruitful. It is not going to happen this time. TNA’s statement is very clear and gives a detailed assessment of the current situation.
      Nanthan

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        Nanthan,
        who is brainwashed?You or me?If you answer the following questions you will come to know who is brainwashed.Poor Tamils have been supporting TULF and TNA for decades in the belief that they could live in Srilanka as equal citizens.
        1.WHAT DID THE TAMIL LEADERS ACHIEVE TO THE TAMILS IN THE LAST SEVENTY YEARS?
        Tamil leaders thunder in the election platforms that “SINHALESE WONT GIVE US ANYTHING”.

        2.DID SAMMANTHAN SUPPORT MADAM CHANDRIKA’S PEACE PROPOSAL IN AUGUST 2000?
        (Tamils will never get a better solution than madam Chandrika’S)

        3.DONT YOU THINK WHAT SAMMANTHAN DID TO THE TAMILS WAS TREACHERY?

        4.DONT YOU THINK THAT HAD SAMMANTHAN SUPPORTED MADAM CHANDRIKA’S PACKAGE IN 2000,THOUSANDS OF LIVES COULD HAVE BEEN SAVED?

        Subsequent to the Indo-Lanka accord,North and East became temporarily merged and an election was held in 1989.

        5.DIDNT THE TULF BOYCOTT THAT ELECTION AND AGAIN DIDNT THEY CONTEST IN THE EASTERN PC ELECTION AFTER NORTH AND EAST BECAME SEPARATE?

  • 0
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    Jude Fernando,
    Yours is the most accurate and rationale analysis of the key events and thoughts on the problems in Sri Lanka. Please publish the part two before January 7 so voters like me can make a decision. I wish it is translated by eminent scholars into Tamil and Sinhala for all to benefit from such an impartial academic analysis.

  • 2
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    A very good decision by the TNA. Mahinda Rajapakshe did not deliver any of his promises.

    The Tamils can’t expect miracles from Sirisena but at least they can hope for:

    An End to inhuman treatment of minorities (Anti-minority)

    End of treating the country as if it is a Rajapakse kingdom

    End of violence and abuse of power

    End of nepotism, One-family rule

    Restoration of democracy and ethnic harmony

    Maintain law and order

    Allow media freedom

    End corruption and waste

    Reduction in cost of living

    Kick out the thugs from politics

    Kick out the Ex-LTTE leaders (Karuna, KP)

    Get the security forces to carry out their duties impartially

    • 1
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      Very well said.
      Nanthan

  • 1
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    The Blood Sweat and Tears of the Tamils and Minorities and to mention the innocent lives lost since the Ahimsaawaadha Sinhala Buddhist Nation, who supposed to not even hurt an ant(only on Full Moon Poya day ofcourse); will forever a curse to this island nation.
    Imagine those who died in riots, those who were raped and maimed and bombed by the Forces and the political goons; dying with curses in their mouths; karma to do a U-Turn and revisit this beautiful island nation over and over and over again….
    Do you see what Cyril Mathew and Gamini Dissanayake did to the Jaffna library. Was it called for? The same planned the 1983 pogram and RW will vouch for who orchestrated the July Violence against Tamils…

    Do you see what Karuna and Pillayan did to those six hundred policemen from the east, was it called for? Imagine the children and family of those policemen now grown up without a bread winner and a father in their lives?
    Tsunami was a reminder to put the past behind and get together as HUMANS with respect regardless of ethnicity and religion.
    Now every year there is natural disaster in the island. It doesn’t differentiate whether you are a Tamil, sinhalese or Muslims…all are taken to task.
    You have MR and Namal to loot and pillage the Treasury and public funds for their own dreams and fancies to fulfill.It another Karma..coming back to haunt…
    Compare Sri Lanka to Singapore and Malaysia and you will get the answer why they progress and develop while SL is left to destruction…

  • 1
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    So far all progressing well with Maitre e’s campaign with SLMC, TBA etc joining the side without any MOU’S. This is the best way for TNA to proceed forward. Once when mutual trust and understanding is established talks would follow very smoothly and with a “give & take” policy all problems can be settled without hiccup. Very unfortunately, the MR camp has misdirected themselves by spreading non existent MOUs and bring more hatred and unpleasantness which in fact is going to have a serious setback for them.
    Let us hope and pray for Maitree’s victory.

  • 0
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    Cats on the fence will make decision after the TNA’s announcement. Not only the Tamil votes cats on the fence’s votes also going for Mi3.

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