“With IDP camps in Sri Lanka coming under civilian control, the issues now facing the international community were ensuring access, improving conditions in the camps and encouraging repatriation, said Frebort. A meeting of the co-chairs would be useful, he said, noting that U.S. had indicated that July 7 would be a good date for a co-chairs meeting. Moran (European Commission’s James Moran) noted that framework conditions for reconstruction efforts need to be drawn up locally by the donors. There were questions over sustainability and the conceptual work could not be undertaken until onorshad a clearer idea of the political situation. Should Sri Lanka now be treated as a villain or as a country that had wiped out a terrorist group? Majewski opined that the international community should ‘cut them some slack’ and consider what the GOSL had achieved. Molin said the international community needed to consider how best to convince Rajapaksa to now be magnanimous and make the most of the opportunity. We need to be careful about isolating the Colombo regime and inadvertently creating ‘another Burma.'” the US Embassy Brussels informed Washington.
A classified diplomatic cable which details a meeting on United States – European Union on South and Central Asia, just after the Sri Lanka’s war. The Colombo Telegraph found the related ‘Confidential” US diplomatic cable dated June 22, 2009 from the WikiLeaks database.
The Embassy wrote; “South and Central Asia Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary Michael Owen noted that this was a critical question: whether to focus on accountability over human rights abuses committed during the successful military campaign or to look forward to focus on humanitarian assistance, resettlement of IDPs, and political reconciliation. This was a fine balance. Our leverage was limited, he noted, as the U.S. was not a major donor in Sri Lanka. It was therefore important to consider what we need to accomplish in Sri Lanka over the next few years and determine how best to pursue those goals. The U.S. did not want to see a financial collapse in Sri Lanka, but it a decision on the pending IMF loan to Sri Lanka had not been taken. The GOSL would need space to start reconstruction and reconciliation activities. It was important to marginalize residual LTTE loyalists, such as the Tamil Relief Organization (TRO) and to win over the Tamil diaspora. Moran agreed that the GOSL must now ‘win the peace’ and the international community should therefore give the GOSL the ‘benefit of the doubt — but there are limits.'”