Munasinghe records Thangathurai as having told him, “You all must never allow this man Prabhakaran to come up. If he ever comes up I can assure you that he will ruin the entire country and wipe out the entire Tamil race”. Thangathurai, like Prabhakaran, who was much younger to him, hailed from Valvettithurai. Thangathurai was a key pioneer in building up an armed militant movement. He was also once Prabhakaran’s men- tor, and even a father figure. Prabhakaran left him in 1974, and rejoined Thangathurai’s TELO when his LTTE broke up about 1979. Prabhakaran was in the TELO when Thangathurai, Kuttimani and Jegan were arrested following the Neervely bank robbery in 1981.

Thangathurai knew Prabhakaran intimately and there may have been an element of suspi- cion in the formers late feelings towards the lat- ter. However, nearly all those in prison matured politically through reading and discussion and Thangathurai was respected by the others. His reported willingness to talk to the Government, one may take to be an understandable and ma- ture decision.

However, what did this Government do? It arranged for goons to massacre Thangathurai along with the other prisoners. Given the UNP leaders’ real position of ‘no devolution’ (Sect. 4.8), there was nothing for them to discuss with Thangathurai. They only had complete con- tempt for the man whom they thought they had in their power. By murdering Thangathurai, the UNP leadership threw away the key to an early solution to the ethnic problem.

The prison massacre was one of the many actions by which the UNP leaders fostered and nourished Prabhakaran as their own nemesis. In less than 3 years from the prison massacre, they were desperate to talk to him.

By the year 2000, the UNP led by Ranil Wickremasinghe, who was by no means an in- nocent party in the prison massacres, was in a singular situation. Its leaders pass messages to the to the LTTE in an attempt to buy guarantees for their life, and make regular conciliatory noises. They hope against hope that the LTTE’s suicide bombing of their prominent party man General Algama in December 1999 was merely an aberration, and went on trying to shift the blame for the murder on to the Government. They continue to play their historic role of block- ing a political resolution of the Tamil problem – this time partly in keeping with the LTTE’s wishes.

This behavioural trait is the quintessence of Sri Lanka’s ruling class. A cruel and frivolous arrogance, and abject surrender to their nemesis, are the two sides of the same coin.

To be continued..

Part one – Sri Lanka’s Black July: Borella, 24th Evening

Part two – Sri Lanka’s Black July: What Really Happened At Kanatte?

Part three – Black July: ‘Api Suddha Kara’ – JR’s Failure To Declare Curfew

Part four – Sri Lanka’s Black July: The Cover Up

Part five –  30th July 1983: The Second Naxalite Plot

Part six  – Black July: The Testimony Of Lionel Bopage, Then General Secretary Of The JVP

Part seven – Black July: Thondaman & Muttetuwegama

Part eight – What Was Behind Tiger Friday – 29th July? -The Significance Of The Pettah

Part nine – Tamil Merchants In The Pettah – Post July 1983

Part ten –  Sri Lanka’s Black July: A Family’s Tragedy In Colombo

Part eleven –  Sri Lanka’s Black July: The Question Of Numbers

Part twelve –  Welikade Prison Massacres: The First Massacre: 25th July 1983

Part thirteen –  Welikade Prison Massacres: Testimonies Given At The Magistrate’s Inquest

Part fourteen –  Circumstances Leading To The Magistrate’s Inquest

Part fifteen – Welikade Prison: The Second Massacre: 27th July 1983

Part sixteen – Welikade Prison Massacres: Chief Jailor Observed Army Commandos Coming In

Part seventeen – Welikade Prison Massacres: Postscript

Part eighteen – July 1983: Planned By The State Or Spontaneous Mob Action?

Part nineteen – July 1983: Ranil Wickremasinghe Followed Cyril Mathew

Part twenty – Events Of 24th July – The Eve Of The Holocaust: Who Wanted A Military Funeral?

Part twenty one –  Events Of 24th July: What Were The Army’s Orders?

Part twenty two – Black July: Further Evidence Of Advance Planning

Part twenty three – Black July: The JSS Goon Squad Regime

Part twenty four – Institutional Implications Of The JSS And Black July

Part twenty five – Black July: Ranil Wickremesinghe, Gonalwela Sunil And The Kelaniya University

Part twenty six – Black July: Army Hathurusinghe Prevented Police From Assisting Prison Victims Under Attack

Part twenty seven – Black July: Justice Of Peace Gonawela Sunil And The Killings In Prison

Part twenty eight – Prison Massacre And The Alitalia Hijacker Sepala Ekanayake

Part twenty nine –  Black July: Further Indirect Evidence Of State Involvement

Part thirty – Blak July: Remarks & Testimonies In Retrospect

*From Rajan Hoole‘s “Sri Lanka: Arrogance of Power  – Myth, Decadence and Murder”. Thanks to Rajan for giving us permission to republish. To be continued..