The truth has a funny side to it, and tells us something about Jayewardene. It comes from placing the key elements of Ratnatunga’s testi- mony in a different perspective. An informant came to Ernest Perera on Wednesday night, the story goes, with information about the plot. The informant appeared to have had this informa- tion on Sunday (24th), but the reasons for the delay in communicating it are not comprehen- sible. (The informant reportedly put this down to Perera being at Kanatte till late on the 24th and there being a curfew on the 25th and 26th.) Rajasingham and Perera left the President at 9.00 PM on the 28th. Then according to Ratnatunga, Jayewardene summoned Ernest Perera to his private residence at 6.00 AM the following morn- ing and got him to dictate a statement to his pri- vate stenographer J.A. Paulasz.

Jayewardene then made photocopies of the statement and gave it to his service chiefs and later in the morning to the visiting Indian For- eign Minister, Mr. Rao. This statement was about the said leftist plot to overthrow the Government and was in print with the signa- ture of an official for the first time. Ratnatunga says: “IGP Rudra Rajasingham, although unaware of this new development, was however the least sur- prised.” Ratnatunga appears to be saying something that he does not wish to elaborate. Jayewardene could have asked Perera to record a statement when he and Rajasingham were with him the previous evening, which he did not. Did Rajasingham too learn about the leftist plot for the first time when the state- ment was handed over to him the following (29th) morning?

Certain truths stand out from this re- markable episode. There had been a wider constellation of forces of the extreme Right which the UNP had been trying to bring under its umbrella, that had lent their sup- port to the violence of July 1983. This has been suspected but not fully explored. Many of the links were informal and remained un- recorded. But there had been tell-tale signs for some time. Among them was the attempt to drive the Tamil students out of Peradeniya in May 1983 where the core organisers had strong UNP connections.

It is also known that Gunawanse had met Jayewardene before the July violence and a more uncompromising approach to the Tamil ques- tion was also in evidence during the weeks lead- ing to it (e.g. Jayewardene’s interview to the Daily Telegraph). Although the problem was os- tensibly in the North, it suited others in the South (e.g. Sinhalese business interests which are rep- resented by the Press) to extend it to all the Tamils. According to local information, a good part of the loot from Black July too was acquired by Sinhalese mudalalis (businessmen). There had also been talk around about levelling down the Bambalapitiya and Anderson Flats, and chas- ing Tamils out of Wellawatte. Chasing out Tamils from border areas of the North-East and plant- ing Sinhalese colonies was a chief preoccupa- tion of Dissanayake’s at that time. Gunawanse, his protege, too, according to Ratnatunge, re- minded Jayewardene of this during their meet- ing on 28th July.

Another fact that stands out is that it was principally the firm interest then shown by In- dia that helped to end the violence sooner, limit the damage suffered by the Tamils and give them a fighting chance of asserting their rights. (Those who do not wish to admit it, avoid the issue by cataloguing a long list of social evils of India.) The sovereignty of this country was thus im- paired by forcing India to intervene on behalf of the Tamils and in turn by pushing the Tamils to look to India for their security. Thus the greatest damage to this country’s sovereignty was caused by the forces of the extreme Right who ironically make the most of sovereignty.

Throughout his account of the July 1983 vio- lence, Ratnatunga holds out tantalisingly (as in the Migara column) the prospect of Left involve- ment. He speaks of a meeting of ministers with Jayewardene at his residence on the 26th evening, and again at the cabinet meeting the next morn- ing, where a suggestion to declare the Soviet (Russian) Ambassador persona non grata, close down the embassy and expel the staff, was dis- cussed and abandoned. This was no doubt dis- cussed as a means to find a scapegoat and pacify the West from where concern was being voiced. He however finds that his evidence cannot sus- tain a Left conspiracy as the cause, and at the end of Chapter 2 opts for ‘disgruntled soldiery and wounded Sinhalese pride’ (p.69).

Yet on page 404 of his 408 page book, Ratnatunga returns to speculate on the July ’83 violence being a joint plot between ‘Tamil Marx- ist guerrillas and Sinhalese Marxist parties’ to destabilise and overthrow the pro-Western Gov- ernment. This was while completing his book in early 1988. But Jayewardene had already claimed this in his address to the UNP parlia-